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THE 


Validity  of  Statutes 


IN 


Pennsylvania 


I.  TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY 

II.  ENACTMENTS  BY  PREFERENCE  TO 
FORMER  LEGISLATION 

III.  LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION 


BY 

JOHN  F.  SANDERSON 

Of  the  Allegheny  County  Bar 


PHILADELPHIA 
T.  & J.  W.  JOHNSON  & CO. 
1898 


Copyright  by 

T.  & J.  W.  JOHNSON  & CO- 
1S98. 


9F/5  *T‘0  0 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


The  purpose  of  this  work  is  not  to  expound  the  several 
constitutional  provisions  treated,  but  to  show  how  our  courts 
have  expounded  them.  As  a rule,  the  decisions  of  authority 
are  the  basis  of  the  text,  those  of  the  lower  courts  of  the  notes. 
The  decisions  of  the  courts  of  other  States  upon  similar  pro- 
visions have  been  deemed  irrelevant.  So  far  as  they  agree 
with  ours  they  are  useless,  and  so  far  as  they  relate  to  unset- 
tled questions  they  exceed  the  purpose,  are  not  themselves  in 
harmony  and  their  use  would  tend  only  to  confuse.  Where 
our  own  cases  “do  square  and  vary”  there  is  no  discussion  nor 
attempt  to  Reconcile  them.  They  are  usually  grouped  in  such 
manner  as  to  enable  the  learned  reader  to  judge  of  their  con- 
sistency, and  thus  the  work  is  made  suggestive,  rather  than 
critical  or  argumentative.  It  is  recognized  that  the  law  upon 
the  subjects  treated  is  yet  in  a formative  condition,  and  the 
effort  has  been  to  indicate  the  settled  points,  to  exhibit  the 
reasoning  in  the  language  of  the  cases,  and  to  formulate  the 
general  principles  without  vainly  attempting  a final  exposi- 
tion of  their  scope  and  application — a thing  forbidden  alike 
by  the  present  state  of  the  authorities  and  the  nature  of  the 
subject-matter. 

Pittsburgh,  Nov.  ist,  1897. 


</»> 


CONTENTS. 


PART  I. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 

PAGE 

1.  The  provision  is  mandatory,  .....  i 

2.  The  title  is  part  of  the  Act,  .....  6 

3.  The  purpose  of  the  provision,  .....  10 

4.  The  construction  of  the  provision,  . . 12 

5.  The  scope  of  the  Act  is  measured  by  the  title,  . . 14 

6.  The  subject  must  be  clearly  expressed,  . . . 16 

7.  Fair  notice  of  the  scope  of  the  Act  must  be  given,  . 19 

8.  The  title  must  be  in  terms  sufficiently  specific,  . 19 

9.  The  title  must  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  enact- 

ment, .........  21 

10.  The  title  must  indicate  the  effect  of  the  Act  in  rela- 

tion to  persons  or  matters  not  necessarily  affected 
by  the  general  legislative  purpose,  ...  23 

11.  The  subject  must  be  single,  .....  29 

12.  The  Act  may  properly  include  matters  germane  to 

the  subject  expressed  in  the  title,  ...  34 

13.  Two  subjects, 40 

14.  Original  Acts  and  general  supplements  and  amend- 

ments, .........  42 

15.  Original  Acts  and  specific  supplements  and  amend- 

ments, ........  47 

16.  Repeal  and  re-enactment,* ......  48 

17.  Provisos,  exceptions,  and  exemptions,  . . . 52 

18.  Appropriation  bills, 53 


v 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


PART  II. 


ENACTMENTS  BY  REFERENCE  TO  FORMER  LEGIS- 
LATION. 

PAGE 

1.  The  object  of  the  provision,  . . . . .61 

2.  The  provision  is  mandatory, 62 

3.  It  is  not  necessary  to  recite  at  length  the  pre-existing 

statute,  or  portions  thereof,  the  provisions  of  which 
are  revived,  amended,  extended,  or  conferred,  . 62 

4.  Express  amendments  by  way  of  addition  must  recite, 

in  full,  the  provision  to  which  the  addition  is  made,  64 

5.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  independent  enact- 

ments, .........  64 

6.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  supplements,  . 65 

7.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  repeals,  ...  67 

8.  The  provision  does  not  apply  in  case  of  revival  of 

a pre-existing  statute  by  reason  of  the  repeal  of  a 
repealing  Act, 67 

9.  Independent  enactments  referring  to  pre-existing 

law,  .........  68 

10.  The  provision  cannot  be  evaded  by  an  expository 

statute,  ........  83 

11.  Re-enactment  of  former  statute  by  way  of  amend- 

ment, without  regarding  intervening  repeal  or 
amendment, 84 

12.  Making  a local  statute  general  where  the  local 

statute,  enacted  prior  to  1874,  extended  the  provis- 
ions of  a pre-existing  statute,  ....  89 


CONTENTS. 


Vll 


PART  III. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


CHAPTER  I. 


General  Principles^ 

page 

1.  The  constitutional  provisions  generally,  ...  95 

2.  What  is  meant  by  a special  or  local  law,  ...  98 

3.  The  constitutional  provisions  are  to  be  so  construed 

as  to  prevent  the  mischief  designed  to  be  remedied 
by  their  adoption,  . . . . . . 101 

4.  The  provisions  as  to  local  and  special  legislation 

apply  only  to  the  General  Assembly,  . . . 107 

5.  A law  is  general  which  contains  an  exception  render- 

ing it  apparently  special,  if  the  exception  be  made 
pursuant  to  a special  constitutional  provision,  . 109 

6.  A law  is  general  though  its  operation  may  be  im- 

peded by  pre-existing  special  laws,  and  hence  such 
laws  may  be  saved  by  exception,  . . . .111 

7.  A law  may  be  general  as  to  a class  of  persons,  and 

therefore  valid,  although  special  and  local  as  to  its 
subject-matter,  . . . . . . . 116 

8.  A general  law  may  contain  special  provisions  neces- 

sary to  render  it  effective,  . . . . 117 


Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  II. 


Classification  and  Minor  Topics. 


1.  Classification  generally,  . . . 

2.  The  principle  of  classification  is  not  as  a rule  affected 

by  the  Constitution,  ...... 

3.  What  is  a proper  classification  is  generally  a judicial 

question,  ........ 

4.  There  can  be  no  classification  of  cities  or  counties 

save  bv  population, 

5.  Classification  of  cities,  counties,  or  other  subdivis- 

ions, must  be  complete  in  order  to  justify  legisla- 
tion for  a given  class  of  either,  . . . . 

6.  Classification  must  not  be  pretended,  false,  evasive, 

nor  excessive,  ....... 

7.  Classification  by  population  must  not  work  exclusion, 

but  must  be  operative  from  time  to  time,  so  as  by 
change  of  population  the  subject  may  pass  from 
class  to  class, 

8.  Transition  from  class  to  class,  .... 

9.  Option  under  classification  Acts,  . 

10.  Option  as  related  to  local  and  special  legisla- 

tion,   

11.  Legislation  for  cities  by  classes  must  be  confined  to 

municipal  matters  proper,  ...  . . 

12.  What  are  municipal  matters  proper  and  what  are  not, 

13.  Acts  of  Assembly  void  in  part,  .... 

14.  Validity  of  things  executed  under  invalid  Acts  of  As- 

sembly, ......... 

15.  Curative  statutes,  ....... 

16.  Questions  of  repeal,  ....... 


PAGE 

121 

129 

135 

139 


140 

141 


147 

148 
156 

163 

172 

203 

214 

216 

223 

230 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


CHAPTER  III. 


Summary  of  Applications  of  the  Foregoing  Principles. 

PAGE 

1.  Local  affairs  of  political  subdivisions  of  the  State,  238 

Preliminary,  .......  238 

1.  Counties, 241 

2.  Cities, 249 

3.  Boroughs,  .......  256 

4.  Townships, 257 

5.  School  Districts,  ......  257 

2.  Highways,  . . . . . . . . 261 

3.  Judicial  matters, 262 

4.  Liens,  .........  267 

5.  Taxation,  .........  269 

6.  Elections, 275 

7.  Private  corporations,  .......  276 

8.  Cemeteries,  etc.,  .......  279 

9.  Labor,  trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing,  . . . 279 

10.  Special  privileges  and  immunities,  . . . . 281 

1 1 . Partial  repeal  of  a general  law, 283 

12.  Cases  within  general  law  or  judicial  jurisdiction,  283 

13.  Notice, 284 


A TABLE  OF  ACTS  WITH  CITATIONS. 


This  table  cites  the  Acts  of  Assembly  directly  involved  in  the  cases  referred  to 
in  the  text  and  notes  following.  It  is  made  up  principally  of  those  objected  to 
upon  constitutional  grounds,  and  either  sustained  or  held  invalid  in  whole  or  in 
part.  Many  other  Acts  have  been  supplied  by  legislation  or  silently  disregarded  by 
the  courts  and  the  profession  because  plainly  invalid  within  the  principles  declared 
by  the  decided  cases. 


1865,  Feb.  4,  P.  L.  97  Streets 

Church  Street,  54  Pa.  St.  353 

1865,  Mar.  16,  P.  L.  394  Railways 

Philadelphia  v.  Spring  Garden  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  5 22 

1866,  Oct.  31,  P.  L.  1867,  p.  1527  Forest  Co. 

Blood  v.  Mercelliott,  53  Pa.  St.  391 

1867,  Apr.  12,  P.  L.  1178  Liquors 

Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,  120  Pa.  St.  395 

1867,  Apr.  18,  P.  L.  91  Courts 

Commonwealth  v.  Green,  58  Pa.  St.  226 

1868,  Mar.  3,  P.  L.  263  Oxford 

Oxford  Borough  Street,  2 P.  D.  R.  327 

1868,  Mar.  16,  P.  L.  352  Boroughs  in  Chester  Co. 

Nutt’s  Avenue,  2 Chester,  49 

Phcenixville  Road,  109  Pa.  St.  44 

1868,  Mar.  23,  P.  L.  424  Fences 

Penna.  R.  R.  v.  Riblet,  66  Pa.  St.  164 

1868,  Apr.  1,  P.  L.  583  Norristown 

Schall  v.  Norristown,  3 Luz.  Leg.  R.  77 


Schall  v.  Norristown, 


6 Leg.  Gaz.  167 


1868,  Apr.  8,  P.  L.  752  Liens 

Dorsey’s  Appeal, 

1868,  Apr.  23,  P.  L.  1022  Fences 

Penna.  R.  R.  v.  Riblet, 

1869,  Mar.  18,  P.  L.  393  Streets 

Hancock  Street, 


72  Pa.  St.  192 
66  Pa.  St.  164 
1 W.  N.  C.  1 12 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


Xll 


8 1 Pa.  St.  433 
135  Pa.  St.  389 
1 W.  N.  C.  112 
64  Pa.  St.  425 
1 14  Pa.  St.  470 


1869,  Mar.  24,  P.  L.  513  Liens 

Mauch  Chunk  v.  McGee, 

1869,  Apr.  9,  P.  L.  759  Liquors 

Commonwealth  v.  Franz, 

1869,  Apr.  10,  P.  L.  828  Streets 

Hancock  Street, 

1869,  Apr.  15,  P.  L.  30  Evidence 

Yeager  v.  Weaver, 

1869,  Apr.  15,  P.  L.  965  Streets 

McGee’s  Appeal, 

1869,  May  3,  P.  L.  1870,  p.  1441  Sewage  Company 

City  Sewage  Company  v.  Davis,  8 Phila.  625 

1870,  Feb.  25,  P.  L.  241  Taxation 

Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Lower 

Macungie  Township  81  Pa.  St.  482 

1870,  Apr.  5,  P.  L.  1871,  p.  1484  Railroads 
State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Co.’s 

Appeal,  77  Pa.  St.  429 

1870,  Apr.  9,  P.  L.  1056  Sewage  Company 

City  Sewage  Company  v.  Davis,  8 Phila.  625 
1870,  Apr.  9,  P.  L.  1068  Bottles 

Commonwealth  v.  Farley,  6 C.  C.  R.  433 

1870,  June  2,  P.  L.  1318  Turnpikes,  etc. 

Frederick  v.  Penna.  Canal  Co.,  109  Pa.  St.  50 

1870,  Aug.  5,  P.  L.  1871,  p.  1548,  Appx.  Public  Buildings 

Wheeler  v.  Rice,  83  Pa.  St.  232 

Lea  v.  Bumm,  3 W.  N.  C.  335 

1871,  Jan.  2,  P.  L.  1556  Harrisburg 

State  Street,  2 Leg.  Cliron.  1 

1871,  Feb.  8,  P.  L.  31  Coudersport 

Payne  v.  School  District,  168  Pa.  St.  386 

1871,  Mar.  22,  P.  L.  1873,  p.  1955,  Appx.  Philadelphia  Co. 

Carother’s  Appeal,  118  Pa.  St.  468 

1871,  Apr.  25,  P.  L.  1138  Allegheny  County 

Allegheny  Co.  Home’s  Case,  77  Pa.  St.  77 

1871,  May  9,  P.  L.  639  Boroughs 

Street  in  Royersford,  2 Montg.  Co.  153 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


Xlll 


1871,  May  10,  P.  L.  655  Troy  Hill  Road 

Beckert  v.  Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St.  191 

Dewhurst  v.  Allegheny,  95  Pa.  St.  437 

1871,  May  24,  P.  L.  1096  Mount  Joy,  etc. 

Mt.  Joy  v.  Lancaster  Tpk.,  13  Lane.  Law  Rev.  180 
Mt.  Joy  v.  Lancaster  Tpk.,  182  Pa.  St.  581 

1872,  Mar.  8,  P.  L.  264  Railways 

Phila.  v.  Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  142  Pa.  St.  484 
Phila.  v.  Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  6 C.  C.  R.  283 
Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phila.,  124  Pa.  St.  219 
Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phila.,  142  Pa.  St.  484 
Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phila.,  23  W.  N.  C.  324 
1872,  Mar.  9,  P.  L.  290  Railways 

Millvale  v.  Evergreen  Ry.  Co.,  31  Pa.  St.  t 

1872,  Mar.  13,  P.  L.  339  Railroads 

Union  Pass.  Ry.  Co.’s  Appeal,  81*  Pa.  St.  91 
1872,  Mar.  16,  P.  L.  405  Cambria  County 


17C.  C.  R.  227 
2 Super.  Ct.  6 


Commonwealth  v.  Dillon, 

Commonwealth  v.  Lloyd, 

1872,  Mar.  29,  P.  L.  651  Roads 

Philadelphia  v.  Donahew, 

Philadelphia  v.  Donahew, 

1872,  Mar.  30,  P.  L.  679  Loyalsock  Creek 

Rogers  v.  Mfrs.  Improvement  Co.  109  Pa.  St.  109 
1872,  Apr.  1,  P.  L.  707  Roads 

Beckert  v.  Allegheny, 

Dewhurst  v.  Allegheny, 

1872,  May  6,  P.  L.  1163  Streets 

Commonwealth  v.  Clovis, 

Commonwealth  v.  Dickinson, 

1873,  Jan.  28,  P.  L.  100  Carlisle 

Quinn  v.  Cumberland  Co. 

1873,  Mar.  14,  P.  L.  290  Private  Act 

Commonwealth  v.  Henderson,  172  Pa.  St.  135 
Commonwealth  v.  Henderson,  37  W.  N.  C.  344 

Commonwealth  v.  Henderson,  43  P.  L.  J.  207 


5 Leg.  Gaz.  21 
1 Leg.  Chron.  4- 


85  Pa.  St.  191 
95  Pa.  St.  437 

33  Leg-  Gaz.  53 
9 Phila.  561 

162  Pa.  St.  55 


XIV 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


I W.  N.  C.  l8> 


1873,  Mar.  25,  P.  L.  330  Streets 

Commonwealth  v.  Dickinson, 

Commonwealth  v.  Clovis,  1 W.  N.  C.  185 

1873,  Mar.  25,  P.  L.  396  Arbitration 

Cutler  v.  Richley,  15 1 Pa.  St.  195 

1873,  Mar.  27,  P.  L.  54  Danville  Hospital 

Clearfield  Co.  v.  Cameron  Poor 

District,  135  Pa.  St.  86 

1873,  Apr.  28,  P.  L.  860  Kilbuck  Island 

Allegheny  v.  Moorhead,  80  Pa.  St.  118 

1873,  May  24,  P.  L.  1874,  p.  379,  McKeesport 

McKeesport  v.  Owens  6 W.  N.  C.  492 

1873,  June  6,  P.  L.  1874,  p.  407,  Streets 

In  re  Arrott  Street,  18  W.  N.  C.  12 1 

1874,  Apr.  20,  P.  L.  65  Municipal  Debt 

Bruce  v.  Pittsburg, 

1874,  May  6,  P.  L.  125  Fees 

Commonwealth  v.  Anderson, 

1874,  May  14,  P.  L.  158  Taxation 

Sewickley  Borough  v.  Sholes, 

1874,  May  14,  P.  L.  159  Boroughs 

Commonwealth  v.  Dolphin, 

Commonwealth  v.  Morgan, 

Commonwealth  v.  Rynkiewicz, 

Commonwealth  v.  Shoemaker, 

Commonwealth  v.  Taylor, 

Commonwealth  v.  Toomey, 

Commonwealth  v.  Van  Loon, 

Commonwealth  v.  Williams, 

1874,  May  23,  P.  L.  230  Cities,  Schools 


166  Pa.  St. 

152 

178  Pa.  St. 

171 

1 18  Pa.  St. 

165 

2 C.  P.  Rep 

>•  85 

178  Pa.  St. 

198 

178  Pa.  St. 

213 

178  Pa.  St. 

214 

159  Pa.  St. 

45 1 

178  Pa.  St. 

215 

4 Kulp, 

338 

178  Pa.  St. 

211 

Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia, 
Reading  v.  Savage, 

Ayars’  Appeal, 

Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg, 
Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg, 
Klugh  v.  Harrisburg, 
Meadville  v.  Dickson, 


77  Pa.  St.  338 
120  Pa.  St.  198 
122  Pa.  St.  266 
122  Pa.  St.  285 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
129  Pa.  St.  1 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XV 


124  Pa.  St.  328 
181  Pa.  St.  56 6 
6 P.  D.  R.  617 
18  C.  C.  R.  265 

5 P.  D.  R.  549 

6 P.  D.  R.  599 
4 C.  C.  R.  124 
3 C.  C.  R.  567 
3 C.  C.  R.  571 
I Wilcox,  189 


1874,  May  23,  P.  L.  230 — Continued 

Reading  v.  Savage, 

Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 

Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 

Gaston  v.  Graham, 

Gaston  v.  Meadville, 

Baker  v.  McKee, 

Sixteenth  Street, 

Van  Storch  v.  Scranton, 

Van  Storch  v.  Scranton, 

Hoopes  v.  Scranton, 

1875,  Mar.  18,  P.  L.  15  Cities 

Scranton  School  District’s  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St.  176 
Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  1 C.  C.  R.  335 

Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  2 C.  P.  Rep.  247 

Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  18  W.  N.  C.  385 

1875,  Mar.  18,  P.  L.  24  Married  Women 

Loftus  v.  Bank, 

1875,  Mar.  18,  P.  L.  62  Assessors 

Pittsburg’s  Assessors, 

1875,  Apr.  12,  P.  L.  40  Liquors 

Commonwealth  v.  Deibert, 

Commonwealth  v.  Deibert, 

1876,  Mar.  31,  P.  L.  13  Salaries 

Taggart  v.  Commonwealth, 

Rymer  v.  Luzerne  Co., 

Guldin  v.  Schuylkill  Co., 

Commonwealth  v.  Comrey, 

1876,  Apr.  11,  P.  L.  20  Cities 

Ayars’  Appeal, 

Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg, 

Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg, 

Klugh  v.  Harrisburg, 

Meadville  v.  Dickson, 

1876,  Apr.  17,  P.  L.  29  Summary  Convictions 

Commonwealth  v.  Swift,  17  C.  C.  R.  95 

Mauch  Chunk  v.  Betzler,  19  C.  C.  R.  27 


133  Pa.  St.  97 

7 Leg.  Gaz.  1 17 

12  C.  C.  R.  504 
2 P.  D.  R.  446 

102  Pa.  St.  354 
142  Pa.  St.  108 
149  Pa.  St.  210 
149  Pa.  St.  216 

122  Pa.  St.  266 
122  Pa.  St.  285 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
129  Pa.  St.  1 


B 


XVI 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1876,  Apr.  17,  P.  L.  29 — Continued 

Mauch  Chunk  v.  Betzler,  10  York,  151 

Mauch  Chunk  v.  Betzler,  6 P.  D.  R.  330 

1876,  Apr.  20,  P.  L.  43  Appeals  from  Justices  of 

Peace 

Foster  v.  Stray er,  19  C.  C.  R.  417 

Foster  v.  Strayer,  13  Lane.  L.  R.  285 

Foster  v.  Strayer,  6 P.  D.  R.  333 

Cochran  v.  McKelvy,  25  P.  L.  J.  120 

1876,  Apr.  20,  P.  L.  44  Taxation 

Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191 

Lake  Shore  & M.  S.  Ry.  Co.'s 
Appeal,  1 C.  C.  R.  327 

1876,  May  1,  P.  L.  90  Corporations 

York  Telephone  Co.  v.  Keesey,  9 York,  153 

Telephone  Co.  v.  Keesey,  5 P.  D.  R.  366 

1876,  May  1,  P.  L.  93 

Barrett's  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  486 

1876,  May  4,  P.  L.  201  John  Robinson 

School  District  v.  Robinson,  37  Leg.  Int.  94 
Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth, 

1876,  May  5,  P.  L.  124  Cities 

Bruce  v.  Pittsburg, 

Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Co.  v. 

Fricke, 

1876,  May  5,  P.  L.  112  Bridges 

Myers  v.  Commonwealth, 

1876,  May  8,  P.  L.  147  Street  Railways 

Reeves  v.  Phila.  Traction  Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  153 

Watkins  v.  Phila.  Pass.  Ry.,  152  Pa.  St.  153 

Haines  v.  Twenty-second  St.  Pass. 

Railway,  152  Pa.  St.  153 

Watkins  v.  West  Phila.  Pass.  Ry. 

Co.,  ’ 1 1 C.  C.  R.  648 

Watkins  v.West  Phila.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  1 P.  D.  R.  4^3 
1876,  May  8,  P.  L.  149  Poor 

Taxpayer’s  Petition,  26  P.  L.  J.  146 


91  Pa.  St.  125 
166  Pa.  St.  152 
152  Pa.  St.  231 
1 10  Pa.  St.  217 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 

xvu 

1876,  May  15,  P.  L.  109  Bottles 

W <! 

Commonwealth  v.  Farley, 

6 C.  C.  R. 

433 

1877,  Mar.  22,  P.  L.  16  Taxes 

Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Fricke, 

152  Pa.  St. 

231 

Kilgore  v.  Magee, 

85  Pa.  St. 

401 

Commonwealth  v.  Macferron, 

152  Pa.  St. 

244 

McKay  v.  Trainor, 

1 52  Pa.  St. 

242 

Pittsburg  v.  Hughes, 

13  C.  C.  R. 

535 

Bradley  v.  Pittsburg, 

130  Pa.  St. 

475 

1877,  Mar.  24,  P.  L.  40  Poor 

Taxpayer’s  Petition, 

26  P.  L.  J. 

146 

1877,  Mar.  24,  P.  L.  47  Cities 

Commonwealth  v.  Denworth, 

145  Pa.  St. 

172 

1877,  Apr.  7,  P.  L.  83  Scranton 

Ruth’s  Appeal, 

10  W.  N.  C. 

498 

1877,  Apr.  18,  P.  L.  54  Cemeteries 

Craig  v.  Presbyterian  Church, 

88  Pa.  St 

• 42 

1877,  May  23,  P.  L.  25  Fees 

Strine  v.  Foltz, 

1 C.  C.  R. 

490 

Strine  v.  Foltz, 

1 13  Pa.  St. 

349 

1878,  Apr.  18,  P.  L.  29  Courts 

Commonwealth  v.  Patton, 

88  Pa.  St. 

258 

1878,  May  3,  P.  L.  43  Records 

Beaver  Co.  Indexes, 

6 C.  C.  R. 

525 

Lanius’  Petition, 

1 York, 

22 1 

1878,  May  10,  P.  L.  51  Boroughs 

Commonwealth  v.  Morgan, 

178  Pa.  St. 

198 

Commonwealth  v.  Williams, 

178  Pa.  St. 

21 1 

Commonwealth  v.  Rynkiewicz, 

178  Pa.  St. 

213 

Commonwealth  v.  Shoemaker, 

178  Pa.  St. 

214 

Commonwealth  v.  Toomey, 

178  Pa.  St. 

215 

Commonwealth  v.  Taylor, 

159  Pa.  St. 

45i 

1878,  May  23,  P.  L.  111  Street  Railways 


Berks  v.  Lebanon  Electric  Ry.,  5 C.  C.  R.  467 

Seitz  v.  Lafayette  Traction  Co.,  5 C.  C.  R.  469 

1878,  May  24,  P.  L.  133  Taxation 

Lake  Shore  & Mich.  So.  Ry., 


1 C.  C.  R.  327 


XV111 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


i D.  R.  si 
4 P.  D.  R.  582 
122  Pa.  St.  322 
17  C.  C.  R.  671 
6 C.  C.  R.  613 


1878,  May  24,  P.  L.  133 — Continued 

Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  19 1 

Penna.  R.  R.  Co.’s  Appeal,  3 C.  C.  R.  162 

1878,  May  24,  P.  L.  134  Executions 

Wilson  v.  Downing,  4 Super.  Ct.  487 

1878,  May  25,  P.  L.  144  Milk 

Commonwealth  v.  Hough, 

1878,  June  3,  P.  L.  160  Fish 

Commonwealth  v.  Nihil, 

1878,  June  12,  P.  L.  187  Fees 

Morrison  v.  Bachert, 

1878,  June  12,  P.  L.  196  Crime 

Commonwealth  v.  Fleckner, 

1878,  June  12,  P.  L.  198  Dogs 

Bowen  v.  Tioga  Co., 

1879,  Mar.  19,  P.  L.  9 Street  Railways 

Weinman  v.  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  118  Pa.  St.  192 
1879,  Apr.  16,  P.  F.  24  Taxes 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30 

1879,  Apr.  22,  P.  L.  30  County  Auditors 

Nason  v.  Poor  Directors,  126  Pa.  St.  445 

Nason  v.  Poor  Directors,  22  W.  N.  C.  60 

1879,  May  1,  P.  F.  44  Cities 

Commonwealth  v.  Denworth, 

1879,  May  21,  P.  L.  72  Salaries 

Commonwealth  v.  Mercer, 

1879,  June  4>  P-  L.  78  Poor 

Jenks  v.  Sheffield, 

1879,  June  7,  P.  L.  1 12  Taxation 

Commonwealth  v.  Martin, 

1879,  June  11,  P.  L.  126  Husband  and  Wife 

Kelly  v.  Mayberry,  154  Pa.  St.  440 

1879,  June  11,  P.  L.  129  Fraudulent  Debtors 

Hortsman  v.  Kaufman,  97  Pa.  St.  147 

1 879,  J une  1 1 , P.  L.  1 50 


145  Pa.  St.  172 
9 C.  C.  R.  461 
135  Pa.  St.  400 
107  Pa.  St.  185 


Boroughs 


Pottstown  Borough, 
Pottstown  Borough, 


1 Montg.  Co.  16 t 
1 Montg.  Co.  189 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XIX 


1879,  June  11,  P.  L.  150 — Continued 
Pottstown  Borough, 
Lansdale  Borough, 

1879,  June  12,  P.  L.  174 

Scowden’s  Appeal 
1879,  June  28,  P.  L.  182 
Davis  v.  Clark, 

1879,  July  7,  P.  L.  194 

Johnson  v.  Beacham, 


4 Montg.  Co.  29 
1 Montg.  Co.  192 

Courts 

96  Pa.  St.  422 
Mechanics’  Liens 

106  Pa.  St.  377 
Justices’  Jurisdiction 

2 C.  C.  R.  108 
2 C.  C.  R.  103 


Wissler  v.  Becker, 

Wilkes-Barre  v.  Myers,  113  Pa.  St.  395 

1881,  Feb.  14,  P.  L.  3 County  Officers 

Donohugh  v.  Roberts,  11  W.  N.  C.  186 

1881,  Feb.  14,  P.  L.  6 Cities 

Commonwealth  v.  Denworth, 

1881,  June  2,  P.  L.  41  Taxes 

Van  Loon  v.  Engle, 

Townsend  v.  Wilson, 

Bryn  Mawr  v.  Anderson, 

Miller  v.  Cunningham, 

Ancona  v.  Becker, 

1881,  June  2,  P.  L.  41  County  Auditors 

Nason  v.  Poor  Directors,  126  Pa.  St.  445 

1881,  June  8,  P.  L.  60  Cities 

East  Grant  Street, 

1881,  June  8,  P.  L.  70  Trespass 

Commonwealth  v.  Clark, 

1881,  June  10,  P.  L.  79  Fish 

Commonwealth  v.  Bender, 

Commonwealth  v.  Bender, 

1881,  June  10,  P.  L.  86  Taxation 

Second  National  Bank  v.  Caldwell,  39  Leg.  Int.  414 
Second  National  Bank  v.  Caldwell,  13  Fed.  Rep.  429 
1881,  June  10,  P.  L.  93  Interpleader 

Reynolds  Lumber  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  4 P.  D.  R.  573 
1883,  Feb.  16,  P.  L.  5 Boroughs 

Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,  159  Pa.  St.  451 


145  Pa.  St.  172 

171  Pa.  St.  157 
7 C.  C.  R.  101 
10  C.  C.  R.  442 
7 C.  C.  R.  500 
3 P.  D.  R.  86 


12 1 Pa.  St.  596 
3 Super.  Ct.  141 

7 C.  C.  R.  620 

8 W.  N.  C.  73 


XX 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1883, 

1885, 


Apr.  19,  P.  L.  9 Taxes 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates, 

May  17,  P.  L.  36  Boroughs 

Pottstown  Borough, 

Pottstown  Borough, 

May  22,  P.  L.  39 

Strohl  v.  Ephrata, 

June  1,  P.  L.  51 

Ruth’s  Appeal, 

Cassel’s  Appeal, 


150  Pa.  St.  30 

11 7 Pa.  St.  538 
1 Montg.  Co.  189 

Streets 

13  Lane.  L.  R.  i 

Taxation 

8 Lane.  L.  R.  264 
8 Lane.  L.  R.  260 
La  Plume  Borough  v.  Gardner,  148  Pa.  St.  192 
June  1,  P.  L.  52  Miners 

Commonwealth  v.  Hartzell,  17  C.  C.  R.  91 
June  1,  P.  L.  58  County  Buildings 

Chester  County  Court-house,  7 C.  C.  R.  212 
June  4,  P.  L.  72  Railroads 

Hoover  v.  Penna.  R.  R., 

June  13,  P.  L.  99  Prisoners 

Commonwealth  v.  Carey, 

Carey’s  Petition, 

June  13,  P.  L.  1 16  Wages 

Evans’  Appeal,  152  Pa.  St.  401 

Rogers  v.  Glendower  Iron  Works,  17  W.  N.  C.  444 
June  20,  P.  L.  134  Foreign  Insurance  Cos. 

Kennedy  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  165  Pa.  St.  179 
June  22,  P.  L.  139  Salaries 

McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  243 
June  22,  P.  L.  16 1 Municipal  Claims 


156  Pa.  St.  220 

2 C.  C.  R.  293 
43  Leg-  Gaz.  384 


Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 
Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 

Phila.  v.  Haddington  Church, 
July  5,  P.  L.  182  Salaries 

Commonwealth  v.  Mercer, 
Commonwealth  v.  Evans, 

June  1,  P.  L.  37  Cities 

Simon’s  Case, 

Betz  v.  Philadelphia, 


2 C.  C.  R.  287 
16  W.  N.  C.  331 
1 15  Pa.  St.  291 

9 C.  C.  R.  461 
6 Kulp,  145 

4 P.  D.  R.  189 
18  W.  N.  C.  121 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XXI 


1885,  June  1,  P.  L.  37 — Continued 


Betz  v.  Philadelphia, 

21  W.  N.  C. 

155 

Betz  v.  Philadelphia, 

4 C/C.  R. 

481 

1885,  June  3,  P.  L.  55  Lottery 

Gifts 

Commonwealth  v.  Moorhead, 

7 C.  C.  R. 

5i3 

1885,  June  11,  P.  L.  108  Schools 

Baker  v.  McKee, 

6 P.  D.  R. 

599 

Gaston  v.  Graham, 

18  C.  C.  R. 

265 

1885,  June  23,  P.  L.  141  Wolves, 

etc. 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co., 

16  C.  C.  R 

~ 94 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co., 

4 P.  D.  R 

• 24 

1885,  June  23,  P.  L.  142  Fences 

Frost  v.  Cherry, 

122  Pa.  St. 

4i7 

1885,  June  24,  P.  L.  160  Records 

Gackenbach  v.  Lehigh  Co., 

166  Pa.  St. 

448 

Pierie  v.  Philadelphia, 

139  Pa.  St. 

573 

1885,  June  25,  P.  L.  187  Taxes 

Evans  v.  Phillipi, 

1 17  Pa.  St. 

226 

Bennett  v.  Hunt, 

148  Pa.  St. 

257 

Bitting  v.  Commonwealth, 

20  W.  N.  C. 

178 

Bitting  v.  Commonwealth, 

2 C.  C.  R. 

298 

Commonwealth  v.  Swab, 

8 C.  C.  R. 

1 1 1 

Evans  v.  Witmer, 

4 Lane.  L.  R. 

105 

Commonwealth  v.  Frutchey, 

1 P.  D.  R. 

153 

Commonwealth  v.  Frutchey, 

11  C.  C.  R. 

1 12 

Keim  v.  Devitt, 

3 C.  C.  R. 

250 

Hannick’s  Bond, 

3 C.  C.  R. 

254 

Collector’s  Bond, 

4 Lane.  L.  R. 

166 

Commonwealth  v.  Lackawanna 

County  Commissioners, 

7 C.  C.  R. 

173 

Evans  v.  Witmer, 

2 C.  C.  R. 

612 

Commonwealth  v.  Lyter, 

162  Pa.  St 

:.  50 

Commonwealth  v.  Klugh, 

162  Pa.  St 

• 50 

Commonwealth  v.  Swatara  Town 
ship, 

1885,  June  25,  P.  L.  170  Turnpikes 

Carbondale.  etc.,  Turnpike, 


1 Super.  Ct.  502 
17  W.  N.  C.  310 


XXII 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1885,  June  25,  P.  L.  170 — Continued 
Carbondale,  etc.,  Turnpike, 

Carbondale,  etc.,  Turnpike, 

Little  Equinunk,  etc.,  Turnpike 
Company, 

1885,  June  30,  P.  L.  193  Taxation 

Sanderson  v.  Commissioners, 

Hawes  Mfg.  Co.’s  Appeal, 

1885,  June  30,  P.  L.  250  Plumbers;  Boards  of  Health 

Commonwealth  v.  Lambrecht,  3 C.  C.  R.  323 1 
Commonwealth  v.  Lambrecht,  44  Leg.  Int.  196 
1885,  July  7,  P.  L.  260  Milk 


22  W.  N.  C.  105 
4 Lane.  L.  R.  361 

2 C.  C.  R.  632 

1 C.  C.  R.  342 
1 Monaghan,  353 


Commonwealth  v.  Hough, 


1 D.  R.  q 


1887,  Mar.  22,  P.  L.  8 Livery-stable  Keepers 

Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  2 Super.  Ct.  162 

Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  4 P.  D.  R.  649 

Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  16  C.  C.  R.  481 

Commonwealth  v.  Lehr,  16  C.  C.  R.  532 

1887,  Mar.  22,  P.  L.  8 Motor  Companies 

Smith  v.  Reading  City  Pass. 

Ry.  Co., 

Smith  v.  Reading  City  Pass. 

Ry.  Co., 

Smith  v.  Reading  City  Pass. 

Ry.  Co., 

1887,  Apr.  13,  P.  L.  22 

Reid  v.  Smoulter, 

1887,  Apr.  28,  P.  L.  263 

Straub  v.  Pittsburg, 

1887,  May  6,  P.  L.  79 

Bittinger’s  Appeal, 

Del  Busto’s  Estate, 

1887,  May  6,  P.  L.  84 

Commonwealth  v.  Havens, 

1887,  May  6,  P.  L.  87  Streets 

Ruan  Street,  1st,  24  W.  N.  C.  460 

Ruan  Street,  2d,  25  W.  N.  C.  349 


13  C.  C.  R.  49 
2 D.  R.  490 
156  Pa.  St.  5 

128  Pa.  St.  324 

38  P.  L.  J.  89 
Col.  I nh.  Tax 

129  Pa.  St.  338 
23  W.  N.  C.  1 1 1 

Obscene  Literature 

6 C.  C.  R.  545 


Salaries 


Poor 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XX111 


1887, 

1887, 

1887, 


May  6,  P.  L.  87 — Continued 
Ruan  Street, 

May  6,  P.  L.  92  Bridges 

Boston  Bridge  Co.’s  Case, 

May  13,  P.  L.  108  Liquors 

Commonwealth  v.  Silverman, 
Commonwealth  v.  Sellers, 

Durr  v.  Commonwealth, 
Commonwealth  v.  McCandless, 
Commonwealth  v.  Fowler, 
Commonwealth  v.  Haag, 
Commonwealth  v.  Doll, 


132  Pa.  St.  257 

13  C.  C.  R.  190 

138  Pa.  St.  642 
130  Pa.  St.  32 
3 C.  C.  R.  525 
21  W.  N.  C.  162 
18  Phila.  513 
6 C.  C.  R.  1 18 
6 C.  C.  R.  49 


1887, 

1887, 

1887, 

1887. 


1887, 


May  13,  P.  L.  116  Wolves,  etc. 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co., 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co., 

May  18,  P.  L.  118  Mechanics 

Smyers  v.  Beam, 

Purvis  v.  Ross, 

May  24,  P.  L.  189  Druggists 

Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias, 
Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias, 

May  24,  P.  L.  194  Liquors 

Doberneck’s  License, 

Doberneck’s  License, 

Doberneck’s  License, 
Commonwealth  v.  Deibert, 

May  24,  P.  L.  204  Cities 

Meadville  v.  Dickson, 

Ayars’  Appeal, 

Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg, 
Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg, 
Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg, 

Klugh  v.  Harrisburg, 

Grant  Street, 

Reading  v.  Savage, 

Carbondale  Township’s  Appeal, 


16  C.  C.  R.  94 

4 P.  D.  R.  g\ 
Lien 

158  Pa.  St.  57 
158  Pa.  St.  20 

181  Pa.  St.  126 
3 Super.  Ct.  364 

5 c.  C.  R.  454 
45  Leg.  Int.  256 

35  P.  L.  J.  476 
2 P.  D.  R.  53 

129  Pa.  St.  1 
122  Pa.  St.  266 
122  Pa.  St.  285 

4 C.  C.  R.  86 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
122  Pa.  St.  289 
121  Pa.  St.  596 
120  Pa.  St.  198 

5 C.  C.  R.  339 


XXIV 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1887,  May  25,  P.  L.  271  Procedure 

Krause  v.  Penna.  R.  R.  Co., 
Kaufman  v.  Jacobs, 

Doud  v.  Insurance  Co., 

Reeves  v.  Edsall, 


4 C.  C.  R.  60 
4 C.  C.  R.  462 
6 C.  C.  R.  329 
1 Lack.  Jur.  96 


1887,  May  28,  P.  L.  274 

Schools 

Engle  v.  Reicharcl, 

4 Kulp,  361 

Engle  v.  Reichard, 

4 C.  C.  R.  48 

1887,  June  1,  P.  L.  285 

Boroughs 

Darby  & Collingdale, 

19  C.  C.  R.  315 

Sharon  Hill  Borough, 

140  Pa.  St.  250 

Sharon  Hill  Borough, 

4 Del.  252 

1887,  June  1,  P.  L.  289 

Judgments 

Stuart’s  Appeal, 

163  Pa.  St.  210 

1887,  June  2,  P.  L.  310 

Corporations 

Luzerne  Water  Co.  v. 

Toby  Creek 

Water  Co., 

148  Pa.  St.  568 

1887,  June  3,  P.  L.  332 

Married  Women 

Grubb’s  Appeal, 

174  Pa.  St.  187 

1887,  June  3,  P.  L.  337 

Wages 

Evans’  Appeal, 

152  Pa.  St.  401 

1887,  June  14,  P.  L.  386 

Streets 

Pittsburg’s  Petition, 

138  Pa.  St.  401 

Wyoming  Street, 

137  Pa.  St.  494 

King  v.  Philadelphia  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  160 

Dunn  v.  Mellon, 

147  Pa.  St.  11 

Donley  v.  Pittsburg, 

147  Pa.  St.  348 

1887,  June  14,  P.  L.  395 

Cities 

Pittsburg’s  Petition, 

138  Pa.  St.  401 

Straub  v.  Pittsburg, 

138  Pa.  St.  356 

Commonwealth  v.  Morrow, 

40  P.  L.  J.  327 

1887,  June  17,  P.  L.  409 

Liens 

McKeever  v.  Victor  Oil  Co., 

9 C.  C.  R.  284 

Swaney  v.  Washington  Oil  Co., 

7C.  C.  R.  351 

Titus  v.  Elyria  Oil  Co., 

1 P.  D.  R.  204 

TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XXV 


1887,  June  17,  P.  L.  413  Liens 

Titusville  Iron  Works  v.  Keystone 


1 22  Pa.  St.  627 
45  L.  I.  454 
4 Kulp,  537 
21  W.  N.  C.  12  ; 

5 C.  C.  R.  17 
21  W.  N.  C.  6,1 


17  C.  C.  R.  622 

7 Kulp,  15 1 
9 C.  C.  R.  90 

146  Pa.  St.  248 


Oil  Company, 

Lucas  v.  Ruff, 

Bennett  v.  Maloney, 

Gardner  v.  Gibson, 

Roth  v.  Hobson, 

Roth  v.  Hobson, 

1889,  Feb.  14,  P.  L.  4 Constables 

Allegheny  Co.  v.  Constables, 

1889,  Feb.  14,  P.  I..  7 Assessors 

Commonwealth  v.  Green, 

Commonwealth  v.  Coleman, 

1889,  Apr.  22,  P.  L.  39  Boroughs 

Washington  v.  McGeorge, 

1889,  Apr.  25,  P.  L.  54  Foxes  and  Minks 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co.,  4 P.  D.  R.  241 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  Co.,  16  C.  C.  R.  94 

1889,  Apr.  25,  P.  L.  52  County  Commissioners 

Young  v.  Bradford  Co.,  7 C.  C.  R.  428 

Wren  v.  Luzerne  Co.,  6 Kulp,  37 

1889,  Apr.  28,  P.  L.  44  Boroughs 

Greensburg  v.  Laird,  8 C.  C.  R.  608 

1889,  May  4,  P.  L.  83  Constables 

Reading’s  Constables,  8 C.  C.  R.  iot 

1889,  May  7,  P.  L.  116  Insurance  Agents 

Commonwealth  v.  Morningstar,  144  Pa.  St.  103 
1889,  May  8,  P.  L.  123  Veterans 

Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township, 

Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township, 

1889,  May  8,  P.  L.  129  Roads 

Cheltenham  Road, 

Cheltenham  Road, 

Sewer  Street, 

East  Avenue, 

1889,  May  8,  P.  L.  133  Cities 


9 C.  C.  R.  342 
27  W.  N.  C.  211 


Commonwealth  v.  Wyman, 


140  Pa.  St.  136 
7 Montg.  42 
8 C.  C.  R.  226 
7 Lane.  L.  R.  154 

137  Pa.  St.  508 


XXVI 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1889, 

1889, 

1889, 

1889, 

1889, 

1889, 

1889, 

1889, 


May  8,  P.  L.  133 — Continued 

Commonwealth  v.  Green,  7 Kulp,  15 1 

May  9,  P.  L.  162,  Deputy  Coroners 

Commonwealth  v.  Grier,  9 C.  C.  R.  444 

May  13,  P.  L.  196 

Devers  v.  York,  150  Pa.  St.  208 

Devers  v.  York,  156  Pa.  St.  359 

Melick  v.  Williamsport,  162  Pa.  St.  408 

May  14,  P.  L.  21 1 Street  Railways 

Penna.  R.  R.  v.  Montgomery  Co. 

Pass.  R.  R.,  3 P.  D.  R.  58 

Gettysburg  Battlefield  Association,  2 P.  D.  R.  649 
May  15,  P.  L.  222  Dogs 

Commonwealth  v.  Depuy, 

May  1 6,  P.  L.  228  Streets 

Pittsburg’s  Petition, 


148  Pa.  St.  201 


Assessments 


Schools 


1889, 


Donley  v.  Pittsburg, 

Dunn  v.  Mellon, 

May  23,  P.  L.  272 

Chester  City  v.  Black, 

May  23,  P.  L.  274 

Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds, 
Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds, 
Commonwealth  v.  Reichard, 
Commonwealth  v.  Reichard, 

May  23,  P.  L.  277  Cities 

Scranton  v.  Whyte, 

Harris’s  Appeal, 

Lackawanna  Township, 

Gardiner  v.  Chester, 

Smith  v.  Meadow  Brook  Brewing 


138  Pa.  St.  401 

147  Pa.  St.  348 
147  Pa.  St.  11 

132  Pa.  St.  568 

137  Pa.  St.  389 
8 C.  C.  R.  568 
5 Kulp,  540 
8 C.  C.  R.  563 

148  Pa.  St.  419 
160  Pa.  St.  494 
160  Pa.  St.  494 

2 P.  D.  R.  162 


Company, 

McAskie’s  Appeal, 
Jermyn  v.  Scranton, 
Devers  v.  York, 

Devers  v.  York, 

Melick  v.  Williamsport, 


3 Lack.  Jur.  154 
154  Pa.  St.  24 
3 Lack.  Leg.  N.  1 12 
150  Pa.  St.  208 
156  Pa.  St.  359 
162  Pa.  St.  408 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XXV11 


1891,  Apr.  15,  P.  L.  1 7 Roads 

Road  in  Otto  Township, 

Road  in  Otto  Township, 

1891,  May  7,  P.  L.  44  Wages 

Hoffa’s  Appeal,  1 Super.  Ct.  357 

1891,  May  12,  P.  L.  53  Acknowledgments 

Land  Co.  v.  Weidner, 

1891,  May  16,  P.  L.  65  Sewers 

Twenty-eighth  Street  Sewer, 

1891,  May  16,  P.  L.  71  Streets 

Whitney  v.  Pittsburg, 

Bingaman  v.  Pittsburg, 

Gray  v.  Pittsburg, 

Rubright  v.  Pittsburg, 

Donley  v.  Pittsburg, 

Boggs  Avenue, 


2 Super.  Ct.  20 
181  Pa.  St.  390 


169  Pa.  St.  359 
158  Pa.  St.  464 


Allen  Avenue, 

1891,  May  16,  P.  L.  75  Streets 

Strohl  v.  Ephrata, 

1891,  May  20,  P.  L.  96 

Commonwealth  v.  Isenberg, 
Commonwealth  v.  Isenberg, 
Bauer  v.  Reynolds, 

189: 


147  Pa.  St.  351 
147  Pa.  St.  353 
147  Pa.  St.  354 
147  Pa.  St.  355 
147  Pa.  St.  348 
39  P-  L.  J.  308 
39  P-  L.  J.  309 


13  Lane.  L.  R.  1 
Semi-monthly  Pay  Roll 

4 P.  D.  R.  51 
4 P.  D.  R.  579 

14  C.  C.  R.  497 


May  23,  P.  L.  107  Corporations 

Commonwealth  v.  Keystone  Benefit 
Association, 

1891,  June  2,  P.  L.  176  Mines 

Durkin  v.  Kingston  Coal  Co., 

1891,  June  8,  P.  L.  214  Counties 

Cole  v.  Economy  Township, 

1891,  June  8,  P.  L.  216  Cemeteries 

Phila.  v.  Westminster  Cem.  Co., 
Phila.  v.  Westminster  Cem.  Co., 
1891,  June  8,  P.  L.  229  Taxation 

Commonwealth  v.  Edgerton  Coal 


1 71  Pa.  St.  465 

171  Pa.  St.  193 

3 P.  D.  R.  699 

3P.  D.  R.  151 
162  Pa.  St.  105 


Company, 


164  Pa.  St.  284 


XXV111 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


1891,  June  8,  P.  L.  229 — Continued 

Commonwealth  v.  Wilkes-Barre  & 


162  Pa.  St.  614 


1 P.  D.  R.  781 
11  C.  C.  R.  572 

2 P.  D.  R.  622 


Scranton  Ry., 

1891,  June  8,  P.  L.  247  Divorce 

Oakley  v.  Oakley, 

Oakley  v.  Oakley, 

Burdick  v.  Burdick, 

1891,  June  9,  P.  L.  248  Liquors 

South  Bethlehem  v.  Hemingway,  16  C.  C.  R.  103 
1891,  June  1 6,  P.  L.  313  Druggists 

Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias,  18 1 Pa.  St.  126 

Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias,  3 Super.  Ct.  364 
1891,  June  19,  P.  L.  349  Ballot  Law 

Dewalt  v.  Bartley, 

Dewalt  v.  Commissioners, 

Meredith  v.  Lebanon  Co., 

Ripple  v.  Commissioners, 

1893,  May  11,  P.  L.  44  Boroughs 

Smith  v.  Baker, 

1893,  May  15,  P.  L.  52  Mines 

Commonwealth  v.  Jones,  4 Super.  Ct.  362 

1893,  May  19,  P.  L.  108  Recording  Act 

Davey  v.  Ruff  ell,  162  Pa.  St.  443 

1893,  May  23,  P.  L.  1 17  Fees 

Rupert  v.  Chester  Co.,  2 P.  D.  R.  688 

1893,  May  24,  P.  L.  124  Public  Buildings 

Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554 

Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  539 

1893,  June  6,  P.  L.  300  Appropriations 


[46  Pa.  St.  529 
1 P.  D.  R.  199 
1 P.  D.  R.  220 
1 P.  D.  R.  201 

3 P.  D.  R.  626 


Commonwealth  v.  Gregg, 
1893,  June  6,  P.  L.  328  Poor 

Poor  Dist.  v.  Clearfield  Co., 
Poor  Dist.  v.  Clearfield  Co., 
Poor  Dist.  v.  Luzerne  Co., 
Poor  Dist.  v.  Luzerne  Co., 


161  Pa.  St.  582 

16  C.  C.  R.  554 

4 P.  D.  R.  584 
17  C.  C.  R.  83 

5 P.  D.  R.  183 


1893,  June  6,  P.  L.  342 
Potters’  Field 


Burial  Grounds 


8 York,  145 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


XXIX 


1893,  June  6,  P.  L.  342 — Continued 

York  School  District’s  Appeal,  169  Pa.  St.  70 
1893,  June  8,  P.  L.  344  Husband  and  Wife 

Mink  v.  Mink,  16  C.  C.  R.  189 

1893,  June  8,  P.  L.  393  Controllers 


Commonwealth  v.  Severn, 

Commonwealth  v.  Samuels, 

Commonwealth  v.  Severn, 

Commonwealth  v.  Samuels, 

1893,  June  10,  P.  L.  419  Elections 

Evans  v.  Willistown  Township, 

Commonwealth  v.  Weir, 

1893,  June  12,  P.  L.  451  Roads 

Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.’s  Petition,  3 P.  D.  R.  610 
Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.’s  Appeal,  164  Pa.  St.  44 
Phila.  & Reading  C.  & I.  Co.’s 


164  Pa.  St.  462 
163  Pa.  St.  282 
15  C.  C.  R.  249 
14  C.  C.  R.  423 

168  Pa.  St.  578 
18  C.  C.  R.  425 


Streets 


Petition, 

1895,  Apr.  18,  P.  L.  36 

Senor  v.  Ephrata, 

1895,  May  8,  P.  L.  56 

Millvale  Borough, 

1895,  May  22,  P.  L.  106 

Dorrance  v.  Dorranceton, 
1895,  May  22,  P.  L.  1 1 1 Taxes 

Kenner  v.  Kelly, 

Rutt  v.  Burkey, 

Snyder  v.  Mogart, 

Taylor  v.  Bowling, 

Land  v.  Wack, 

Wetzell  v.  Goodyear, 
Frampton’s  Estate, 


164  Pa.  St.  248 
Municipal  Debt 

176  Pa.  St.  80 

Cities 

43  P.  L.  J.  41 1 

181  Pa.  St.  164 

19  C.  C.  R.  348 
14  Lane.  L.  R.  11 
17  C.  C.  R.  1 
5 P.  D.  R.  605 
5 P.  D.  R.  606 
5 P.  D.  R.  605 
18  C.  C.  R.  462 
12  Montg.  108 


Fryer  v.  Metz, 

Provident  Association  v.  Flanagan,  19  C.  C.  R.  529 
i895,  June  18,  P.  L.  196  Trespass 

Commonwealth  v.  Clark,  3 Super.  Ct.  141 

1895,  June  24,  P.  L.  212  Superior  Court 

Commonwealth  v.  Reeder,  171  Pa.  St.  505 


XXX 


TABLE  OF  ACTS. 


19  C.  C.  R.  251 
6 P.  D.  R.  136 
4 Super.  Ct.  301 
4 Super  Ct.  356 
6 P.  D.  R.  136 


37  W.  N.  C.  297 


1895,  June  26,  P.  L.  317  Pure  Food 

Commonwealth  v.  Wickert, 

Commonwealth  v.  Wickert, 

Commonwealth  v.  Hufnal, 

Commonwealth  v.  Curry, 

Commonwealth  v.  Hartman, 

1895,  June  26,  P.  L.  343  Sureties 

American  Banking  & Trust  Co.’s 
Petition, 

1895,  June  26,  P.  L.  375  Constables 

Allegheny  Co.  Constables,  if  C.  C.  R.  622 

1895,  June  27>  P-  L.  403  County  Controllers 

Lloyd  v.  Smith,  176  Pa.  St.  213 

1895,  July  2,  P.  L.  428  Lodgings 

Commonwealth  v.  Muir,  1 Super.  Ct.  578 

Commonwealth  v.  Muir,  180  Pa.  St.  47 

1895,  July  2,  P.  L.  434  Soldiers’  Children 

Sewickley  v.  Osborn, 

Sewickley  v.  Osborn, 

1895,  July  3,  P.  L.  588 

Chalfant  v.  Edwards, 

1895,  July  3,  P.  L.  603 

Chalfant  v.  Edwards, 

1897,  May  12,  P.  L.  56 

Portuondo’s  Estate, 

Portuondo’s  Estate, 

Blight’s  Estate, 

Blight’s  Estate, 

Lacey’s  Estate, 

Lacey’s  Estate, 

1897,  June  15,  P.  L.  164 

Fraser  v.  McConway, 


Schools 


Schools 


19  C.  C.  R.  257 
6 P.  D.  R.  21 1 

173  Pa.  St.  246 


173  Pa.  St.  246 
Direct  Inheritance  Tax 

19  C.  C.  R.  419 
6 P.  D.  R.  462 
19  C.  C.  R.  426 
6 P.  D.  R.  459 
19  C.  C.  R.  431 
6 P.  D.  R.  499 
Alien  Tax  Law 


6P.  D.  R.  555 


I. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


Art.  XI.  Added  Sec.  8.  No  bill  shall  be  passed  by  the 
Legislature  containing  more  than  one  subject,  which  shall 
be  expressed  in  the  title,  except  appropriation  bills. 

Amendment,  1864. 

Art.  Ill,  Sec.  3.  No  bill,  except  general  appropriation 
bills,  shall  be  passed  containing  more  than  one  subject, 
which  shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  its  title. 

Constitution. 

Art.  Ill,  Sec.  15.  The  general  appropriation  bill  shall 
embrace  nothing  but  appropriations  for  the  ordinary  ex- 
penses of  the  Executive,  Legislative,  and  Judicial  Depart- 
ments of  the  Commonwealth,  interest  on  the  public  debt  and 
for  public  schools;  all  other  appropriations  shall  be  made 
by  separate  bills,  each  embracing  but  one  subject. 

Constitution. 


CONTENTS. 


1.  The  provision  is  mandatory. 

2.  The  title  is  part  of  the  Act. 

3.  The  purpose  of  the  provision. 

4.  The  construction  of  the  provision. 

5.  The  scope  of  the  Act  is  measured  by  the  title. 

6.  The  title  must  be  clearly  expressed. 

7.  Fair  notice  of  the  scope  of  the  Act  must  be  given. 

8.  The  title  must  be  in  terms  sufficiently  specific. 

9.  The  title  must  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  enact- 

ment. 

10.  The  title  must  indicate  the  effect  of  an  Act  in  re- 

lation to  persons  or  matters  not  necessarily  af- 
fected by  the  general  legislative  purpose  as  ex- 
pressed. 

11.  The  subject  must  be  single. 

12.  The  Act  may  properly  include  matters  germane  to 

the  subject  as  expressed  in  the  title. 

13.  Two  subjects. 

14.  Original  Acts  and  general  supplements  and  amend- 

ments. 

15.  Original  Acts  and  specific  supplements  and  amend- 

ments. 

16.  Repeal  and  re-enactment. 

17.  Provisos,  exceptions,  and  exemptions. 

18.  Appropriation  bills. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


i.  The  Provision  is  Mandatory. 

There  is  an  intimation  in  the  earlier  cases1  that  the  consti- 
tutional provision  relating  to  the  title  of  Acts  may  be  di- 
rectory, but  the  whole  course  of  decision,  beginning  with 
Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192,  and  including  all  of  the  cases 
following  in  which  titles  have  been  held  to  be  insufficient, 
shows  that  the  provision  is  mandatory,  that  the  validity  of  a 
statute  must  depend  upon  the  sufficiency  of  the  title,  and 
that  where  the  latter  is  defective  the  statute  will  be  sustained 
only  in  so  far  as  the  title  indicates  the  subject-matter  of  the 
law.  Indeed,  the  provision  is  expressly  said  to  be  mandatory 
in  Road  in  Phoenixville.2 

1 Commonwealth  v.  Green,  58  Pa.  St.  226;  Barton  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, 4 Brewst.  373. 

2Road  in  Phoenixville,  109  Pa.  St.  44,  48. 

Argument  to  sustain  the  validity  of  an  Act  of  As- 
sembly frequently  begins  with  such  propositions  as,  that  the 
presumption  favors  the  validity  of  the  Act;  that  the  Judicial 
Department  assumes,  in  deference  to  the  Legislative,  that  no 
violation  of  the  Constitution  was  intended  by  the  latter;  that 
an  Act  of  Assembly  is  valid  unless  it  is  plain  and  clear  that  it 
infringes  some  specific  provision  of  the  Constitution,  and 
that  any  doubt  upon  the  subject  is  to  be  resolved  in  favor  of 
the  Act.  It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  these  propositions 
are  so  well  settled  as  to  have  become  trite  and  commonplace, 
and  perhaps  their  application  in  cases  arising  under  the  sev- 
eral provisions  herein  treated  ought  not  to  be  doubted.  It 
may  be  well  to  point  out,  however,  that  these  propositions 
were  established  with  reference  to  constitutional  provisions 
prior  in  time  and  different  in  character  from  those  under  con- 

5 


6 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


sideration;  provisions  relating  to  legislative  power,  not  pro- 
visions governing  merely  the  forms  and  methods  of  legisla- 
tion where  the  power  may  be  unquestioned.  The  provisions 
limiting  legislative  form  and  method  were  adopted  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  what  was  deemed  to  be  a valuable 
legislative  reform,  to  end  certain  legislative  practices 
which  had  long  been  considered  to  be  abuses,  to  prevent 
log-rolling,  deception,  and  surprise  in  legislation,  and 
to  check  what  was  deemed  to  be  a growing  dispo- 
sition to  favoritism  in  the  enactment  of  special  and  local 
laws.  The  reform  was  further  intended  to  secure  uniformity 
of  law  throughout  the  Commonwealth  upon  many  subjects 
of  legislation,  with  reference  to  which  a lack  of  uniformity 
tended  to  complicate  the  administration  of  the  law  or  give 
undue  local  advantages.  The  reader  of  the  decided  cases 
upon  the  topics  under  consideration  cannot  fail  to  note  a 
steady  determination  of  the  courts  to  carry  out  to  the  full 
intent  the  remedial  provisions,  nor  will  he  fail  to  notice  the 
difference  in  argumentative  treatment  which  results  from 
the  character  of  these  provisions.  In  form  they  are  purely 
technical,  and  hence  the  argument  must  be  so.  The  argu- 
ment of  them  does  not  admit  of  such  broad  and  practical 
treatment  as  arguments  upon  questions  of  legislative  power 
necessarily  require,  and  because  of  their  purely  technical  na- 
ture these  provisions,  as  a rule,  are  less  difficult  of  applica- 
tion; there  is  less  room  for  doubt.  When  a given  statute  is 
challenged  as  violative  of  one  of  these  provisions  the  issue  is 
upon  a demurrer  to  the  indictment.  An  argument  founded 
upon  a presumption  of  guilt  or  innocence  is  not  relevant. 
Putting  analogy  aside  it  may  be  considered  in  truth  that  the 
issue  is  upon  a special  demurrer  to  the  statute  itself. 

2.  The  Title  is  a Part  of  the  Act. 

Prior  to  the  amendment  of  1864  it  was  well  settled  that 
the  title  was  not  part  of  an  Act  of  Assembly  and  could  be  re- 
sorted to  only  when  there  was  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
enacting  words.1  Since  the  amendment  of  1864  the 
“title  of  an  Act  is  a part  of  it.  It  limits  its  scope,  and  is 
properly  used  in  interpreting  its  words.”2 

1 Commonwealth  v.  Slifer,  53  Pa.  St.  71. 

2Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554-58. 


t 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY.  7 

“It  is  objected  that  the  title  of  the  Act  is  'An  Act  allowing 
parties  in  interest  to  be  witnesses,’  and  that  since  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitutional  Amendment  of  1864  the  title  must 
be  regarded  as  a necessary  part  of  a statute.  We  may  admit 
this  premise.  In  England  the  title  is  no  part  of  a statute. 
Lord  Mansfield  gives  as  a reason  for  this,  that  'it  does  not 
pass  with  the  same  solemnity.  One  reading  is  often  suffi- 
cient:’ The  King  v.  Williams,  1 W.  Bl.  93.  With  us,  however, 
it  is  always  read  three  times.  There  may  be  good  reason  for 
holding  that  the  title  as  well  as  the  preamble  may  be  resorted 
to  for  the  purpose  of  assisting  the  construction  whenever  the 
enacting  clause  is  doubtful.  See  Cochran  v.  Library  Com- 
pany, 25  Leg.  Intel.  20,  but  certainly  not  to  overrule  or  con- 
trol it.” — Sharswood,  J.:  Yeager  v.  Weaver,  64  Pa.  St. 

425-428. 

The  title  of  an  Act  since  the  first  amendment  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  1864  must  now  be  regarded  as  a part  of  it.  How- 
ever it  may  have  been  before,  this  is  important  rather  upon  a 
question  of  construction  than  of  power:  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Company  v.  Riblet,  66  Pa.  St.  164. 

“However  it  was  in  England,  where  the  title  is  held  to  be  no 
part  of  a statute,  indeed,  was  commonly  framed  by  the  clerk 
of  Parliament  after  the  bill  had  passed,  without  any  vote  be- 
ing taken  upon  it,  certainly  since  the  first  amendment  of  the 
Constitution  adopted  in  1864,  Article  XI,  Section  8,  it  is  now 
necessarily  a part  of  the  Act,  and  a very  important  guide  to 
its  right  construction.” — Sharswood,  J.:  Eby’s  Appeal,  70 
Pa.  St.  31 1,  314;  and  see  Commonwealth  v.  Lloyd,  2 Super. 
Ct.  6;  Halderman’s  Appeal,  104  Pa.  St.  251-9;  Common- 
wealth v.  Moorhead,  7 C.  C.  R.  513. 

In  the  case  of  Commonwealth  v.  Martin,  107  Pa.  St.  185, 
the  Act  of  June  7th,  1879,  P.  L.  112,  was  in  question.  The 
title  of  the  Act  as  printed  in  the  Pamphlet  Laws  was,  “An 
Act  to  provide  revenue  by  taxation.”  By  the  original  roll  in 
the  custody  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth,  the  title 
appeared  as  follows: 


No.  463. 


An  Act  to  provide  revenue  by  taxation 

of  corporations 

associations  and  limited  partnerships 

It  was  held  in  the  court  below  that  the  record,  i.  e.,  the 


8 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


roll,  was  conclusive  as  to  what  the  title  really  was,  and  that 
the  record  should  be  read  without  regard  to  the  black  lines 
enclosing  the  words  indicated  above. 

His  Honor,  Judge  Simonton,  remarked:  “We  may  add 

that  we  have  looked  into  the  printed  journals  for  informa- 
tion, and  are  satisfied  that  even  if  they  could  be  received 
and  acted  upon  they  would  not  enable  us  to  arrive  at  a sat- 
isfactory conclusion.  They  give  no  intelligible  account  of 
the  passage  of  the  Act;  and,  indeed,  we  think  it  would  be 
impossible  to  show  from  them  that  it  was  ever  legally  passed 
in  any  form. 

“The  thing  which  most  clearly  appears  is  that  in  all  the 
stages  of  the  progress  of  the  bill  in  question,  up  to  the  time 
when  it  first  passed  both  Houses ' and  was  sent  to  the  Gov- 
ernor, it  contained  its  full  title;  and  it  is  manifest  that  if  a 
bill  can  be  passed  with  a title  which  does  not  denote  its  sub- 
ject, and  after  its  passage  the  title  can  be  amended,  so  as  for 
the  first  time  to  express  its  purpose,  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision is  of  little  value.  . . . 

“We  have  then  before  us  the  original  Act,  with  lines  drawn 
around  part  of  the  title,  as  already  stated.  Can  we,  looking 
only  at  the  Act  itself,  as  evidence  of  its  contents,  and  remem- 
bering that  the  title  is  a part  of  the  Act,  give  significance  to 
these  lines,  and  understand  them  to  import  that  the  words 
within  them  were  stricken  out?  We  think  the  reasons  given 
by  Judge  McPherson,  in  the  Lehigh  Valley  Company’s  case, 
39  Leg.  Int.  210,  are  sufficient  to  show  that  this  cannot  be 
done.” 

Upon  this  branch  of  the  case  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  by  Mr.  Justice  Gordon,  page  204,  is  as  follows: 

“The  court  held  that  these  lines  were  to  be  disregarded, 
and  that  the  title  to  the  Act  must  be  read  as  though  they 
were  not  there.  If  the  correctness  of  this  construction  be 
admitted,  the  conclusion  arrived  at  cannot  be  gainsaid,  for  a 
title  expressing  an  intention  to  tax  corporations,  associa- 
tions, and  partnerships  only,  necessarily  excludes  natural  per- 
sons, hence,  so  much  of  the  Act  as  provides  for  the  taxation 
of  the  property  of  such  persons  would  clearly,  under  this 
construction,  be  avoided  by  the  constitutional  provision.  We 
cannot,  however,  assent  to  the  reasoning  by  which  a conclu- 
sion of  this  kind  was  reached.  These  marks  are  part  of  the 
original  bill,  as  found  upon  the  files  in  the  Secretary’s  office, 
and  at  most  imply  only  an  irregularity;  that  is,  that  the  bill 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


9 


was  not  transcribed  as  it  ought  to  have  been  before  it  was 
sent  to  the  Governor  for  his  signature.  It  is  true,  as  the 
court  suggests,  some  unauthorized  person  might  have  thus 
mutilated  the  bill  after  it  was  signed,  but  of  this  there  is  no 
evidence,  and,  in  the  absence  thereof,  we  are  not  warranted 
in  presuming  a forgery.  Other  than  this  want  of  transcrip- 
tion there  is  neither  irregularity  nor  mark  of  suspicion  about 
this  document.  To  those  acquainted  with  legislative  rules, 
the  marks  above  mentioned  would  indicate  an  amendment 
properly  made  in  either  the  House  or  Senate,  and  so,  had  the 
bill  been  transcribed,  would  the  transcribing  clerk  have  in- 
terpreted them,  as  did  the  compiler  of  the  pamphlet  laws. 

“The  eleventh  joint  rule  requires  that  such  an  amendment, 
as  that  under  discussion,  be  marked  by  brackets  with  a note 
of  the  legislative  branch  in  which  it  is  made,  so  that  in  the 
case  in  hand  there  is  but  an  irregularity  in  the  neglect  to 
comply  with  a direction  which,  whilst  it  conduces  to  orderly 
legislation,  is,  in  itself,  of  no  material  importance.  Without 
evidence  to  the  contrary,  then,  we  must  take  it  that  these 
marks  were  made  in  the  regular  course  of  legislation,  and  that 
they  indicate  an  amendment  made,  by  striking  out  the  words 
embraced  within  them,  during  the  passage  of  the  bill.” 

The  foregoing  case  suggests,  if  it  does  not  decide,  the  in- 
teresting and  important  question  as  to  whether  the  title 
should  accompany  a bill  in  its  passage  through  the  Legisla- 
ture. The  learned  author,  Sutherland,  in  Statutory  Con- 
struction, Section  91,  quotes  with  approval  from  the  above 
remarks  of  Simonton,  P.  J.,  and  says:  “It  is  during  the  pas- 
sage of  a bill  that  its  title  is  intended  by  the  Constitution 
to  impart  information  to  the  public  and  to  members  of  the 
Legislature  of  the  general  subject  of  legislation.  To  effect- 
uate that  intent  the  title  should  accompany  the  bill  in  all  its 
stages  through  the  process  of  enactment.” 

In  Attorney-General  v.  Rice,  64  Mich.  385,  it  appeared  that 
to  an  Act  to  organize  the  township  of  Ironwood,  in  the 
county  of  Ontonagon,  it  was  objected  that  it  had  been  sub- 
stituted, after  the  time  for  introducing  new  bills  had  expired, 
for  a skeleton  bill,  entitled  “An  Act  to  organize  the  township 
of  Au  Train;”  that  therefore  the  title  of  the  bill  as  introduced 
did  not  express  the  object  of  the  Act  as  passed.  The  court 
say:  “We  cannot  extend  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
beyond  its  express  terms  in  this  respect.  If  the  object  of  the 
Act  as  passed  is  fully  expressed  in  its  title  the  form  or  status 


IO 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


of  such  title  at  its  introduction,  or  during  any  of  the  stages 
of  legislation  before  it  becomes  a law,  is  immaterial.  To  hold 
otherwise,  would,  in  many  cases,  prevent  any  alteration  or 
amendment  of  a bill  after  its  introduction,  as,  in  legislative 
practice,  it  frequently  becomes  necessary  to  amend  the  title 
as  introduced  in  order  to  conform  to  changes  in  the  bill.  The 
title  to  a bill  is  usually  adopted  after  it  has  passed  the  House, 
and  it  is  not  an  essential  part  of  a bill,  although  it  is  of  a law: 
Larrison  v.  Peoria,  etc.,  R.  R.  Company,  77  111.  17.” 

The  facts  stated  in  the  contention  were  not  accepted  by 
the  court,  and  it  was  held  that,  the  journals  not  showing  the 
facts,  parol  evidence  was  not  admissible:  Sutherland  on  Stat- 
utory Construction,  Sec.  91;  and  see  23  Am.  and  Eng.  Enc. 
of  Law,  163;  Bing  v.  Weber,  81  111.  290. 

3.  The  Purpose  of  the  Provision, 

Was  to  avoid  improper  influences  which  might  result  from 
intermixing  in  one  and  the  same  Act  such  things  as  have  no 
proper  relation  to  each  other,  and  to  prevent  the  real  pur- 
pose of  the  bill  being  disguised  by  a title  which  failed  to  ex- 
press it,  or  was  framed  in  such  terms  as  to  mislead. 

The  Constitution  of  New  Jersey,  Article  IV,  Section  7, 
Paragraph  4 is  quoted  in  Blood  v.  Mercelliott,  53  Pa.  St. 
391-3,  as  indicating  the  purpose  of  the  amendment  of  1864 
as  follows: 

“To  avoid  improper  influences  which  may  result  from  in- 
termixing in  one  and  the  same  Act  such  things  as  have  no 
proper  relation  to  each  other,  every  law  shall  embrace  but 
one  object,  and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title.” 

The  opinion  further  quotes,  Parkinson  v.  The  State,  14 
Maryland,  185,  as  follows:  “It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this 
restriction  upon  the  Legislature  was  designed  to  prevent 
an  evil  which  had  long  prevailed  in  this  State  as  it  had  done 
elsewhere,  which  was  the  practice  of  blending  in  the  same 
law  subjects  not  connected  with  each  other  and  often  entirely 
different.  This  was  not  unfrequently  resorted  to  for  the  pur- 
pose of  obtaining  votes  in  support  of  a measure  which  could 
not  have  been  carried  without  such  a device.  And  in  bills  of 
multifarious  character,  not  inappropriately  called  omnibus 
bills,  provisions  were  sometimes  smuggled  in  and  passed  in 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY.  II 

the  hurry  of  business  toward  the  close  of  a session,  which,  if 
they  had  been  presented  singly  would  have  been  rejected.” 

“Prior  to  that  date  (1864)  the  vicious  practice  had  ob- 
tained of  incorporating  in  one  bill  a variety  of  distinct  and  in- 
dependent subjects  of  legislation.  The  real  purpose  of  the 
bill  was  often  and  sometimes  intentionally  disguised  by  a mis- 
leading title  or  covered  by  the  all-comprehensive  phrase, 
‘and  for  other  purposes,’  with  which  the  title  of  many  ‘ omni- 
bus' bills  concluded.  Members  of  the  Legislature  as  well  as 
the  general  public  were  thus  misled  or  kept  in  ignorance  as 
to  the  true  character  of  proposed  legislation.  To  remedy 
this  great  and  growing  evil  the  amendment  in  the  first  place 
prohibits  the  introduction  of  more  than  one  subject  in  each 
bill.  But,  unity  of  subject  is  not  enough.  The  mandatory 
clause  of  the  amendment  imperatively  requires  that  the  sub- 
ject of  proposed  legislation,  whatever  it  may  be,  shall  be 
clearly  expressed  in  the  title  of  the  bill.  As  the  means  of  no- 
tice to  representatives  as  well  as  their  constituents  the  latter 
is  quite  as  essential  as  the  former.  We  are  not  called  upon, 
however,  to  show  the  necessity  or  vindicate  the  wisdom  of 
the  constitutional  requirement.  It  is  enough  for  us  to  know 
that  it  is  an  express  mandate  of  the  organic  law,  which  the 
Legislature  ought  to  obey  and  courts  are  bound  to  enforce. 
While  it  may  be  difficult  to  formulate  a rule  by  which  to  de- 
termine the  extent  to  which  the  title  of  a bill  must  specialize 
its  object,  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  title  must  not 
only  embrace  the  subject  of  proposed  legislation,  but  also 
express  the  same  so  clearly  and  fully  as  to  give  notice  of  the 
legislative  purpose  to  those  who  may  be  especially  interested 
therein.  Unless  it  does  this  it  is  useless:”  Road  in  Phoenix- 
ville,  109  Pa.  St.  44-8-9. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Samuels,  163  Pa,  St.  283-6,  it  is  said, 
referring  to  the  Act  of  June  8th,  1893,  P.  L.  393:  “So  far  as 
appears  in  the  title  the  Act  is  merely  cumulative,  in  providing 
an  additional  county  officer.  It  is  true  that  the  Constitution 
in  enumerating  county  officers,  Article  XIV,  Section  i,putsthe 
two  offices  together  in  the  disjunctive,  ‘auditors  or  control- 
lers,’ and  that  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  duties  of  con- 
trollers as  existing  in  Philadelphia  and  Allegheny,  would 
know  that  they  are  mainly  the  same  as  those  of  auditors  in 
other  counties,  and  therefore  that  the  creation  of  the  office  of 
controller  was  likely  to  interfere  with,  if  not  to  abolish,  the 
other.  But  this  is  not  the  notice  which  the  Constitution  re- 


12 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


quires  the  title  of  the  Act  to  give  of  its  subject.  The  object 
of  that  requirement  is  that  legislators,  and  others  interested, 
shall  receive  direct  notice  in  immediate  connection  with  the 
Act  itself,  of  its  subject,  so  that  they  may  know  or  be  put 
upon  inquiry  as  to  its  provisions  and  their  effect.  Sugges- 
tions or  inferences  which  may  be  drawn  from  knowledge 
dehors  the  language  used,  are  not  enough.  The  Constitution 
requires  that  the  notice  shall  be  contained  in  the  title  itself.” 

4.  The  Construction  of  the  Provision. 

The  general  principle  is  applied  that  it  must  be  a clear  case 
to  justify  a court  in  pronouncing  an  Act,  or  any  part  of  it, 
void  for  a defective  title.1  In  Allegheny  Home’s  Appeal,2 
the  court  remarked:  “The  course  of  decision  in  this  court 

has  been  intended  to  carry  out  the  true  intent  of  the  amend- 
ment of  1864,  as  to  the  title  and  subject  of  bills,  instead  of 
resorting  to  sharp  criticism,  which  must  often  bring  legisla- 
tion to  nought.  The  Amendment  of  1864  was  in  substance 
proposed  in  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1837-8,  and 
rejected,  because  it  was  feared  it  would  render  legislation 
too  difficult  and  uncertain,  and  lead  to  litigation.  It  will 
not  do,  therefore,  to  impale  the  legislation  of  the  State  upon 
the  sharp  points  of  criticism,  but  we  must  give  each  title,  as 
it  comes  before  us,  a reasonable  interpretation,  ut  res  magis 
valeat  quam  pereat.”  Legislative  usage  has  received  a partial 
recognition;  thus  in  State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Company’s 
Appeal,3  Mr.  Justice  Paxson  said  in  relation  to  an  Act  gen- 
erally entitled  a supplement  to  a former  Act:  “The  amend- 

ment to  the  late  Constitution,  under  which  this  question 
arises,  Section  8 of  Article  XI,  was  adopted  in  1864.  A11  ex- 
amination of  the  Pamphlet  Laws  since  that  time  discloses 
the  fact  that  one  hundred  and  thirteen  ‘supplements’  and 
‘further  supplements’  to  railroad  charters  have  been  passed. 
Embracing  other  corporations,  there  are  about  fourteen 
hundred.  This  is  important,  not  only  as  showing  the  extent 
of  the  interests  to  be  affected  by  our  decision,  but  also  as 
exhibiting  the  uniform  construction  placed  upon  this  section 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


13 


by  the  legislative  and  executive  departments  of  the  govern- 
ment. While  we  are  not  bound  by  their  construction,  it  is 
nevertheless  entitled  to  weight,  and  should  always  be  treated 
with  respect.  In  view  of  this  unbroken  current  of  legisla- 
tion, we  are  constrained  so  to  treat  this  question  as  not  to 
obliterate  from  our  statute  book  a large  number  of  Acts 
under  which  important  and  costly  improvements  have  been 
commenced,  and  rights  have  become  vested.  The  construc- 
tion now  claimed  for  this  clause  of  the  Constitution,  if 
adopted  by  this  court,  would  unsettle  the  business  of  the 
State  to  an  extent  beyond  the  capacity  of  any  one  to  de- 
fine. That  we  are  not  bound  to  do  so  is  sufficiently  clear 
both  upon  reason  and  authority.” 

The  maxim  expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius  is  applied 
in  the  construction  of  a title  and  the  scope  of. the  Act  will 
be  limited,  when  the  title  is  specific,  to  what  is  therein  ex- 
pressed.4 Thus,  for  example,  where  the  title  refers  to 
leaseholds  and  the  Act  includes  freeholds,  it  is  inoperative 
as  to  the  latter.5  Where  elections  of  public  officers  is  ex- 
pressed, elections  to  increase  municipal  debts  will  be  ex- 
cluded.6 An  examination  of  all  the  cases  will  indicate  a 
liberal  construction  of  title  in  the  application  of  the  con- 
stitutional provision  where  the  purposes  of  the  Act  are  for 
the  general  public  benefit;  and  a strict  construction  where 
private  or  corporate  privileges  are  asserted,  or  where  the 
Act  has  a collateral  effect  upon  interests  not  necessarily  or 
apparently  within  the  legislative  purpose  as  disclosed  by  the 
title. 

An  error  in  the  placing  of  the  quotation  marks  in  a sup- 
plementary Act  reciting  an  original  Act  will  not  vitiate  the 
title  when  the  sense  is  clear.7 

1 Commonwealth  v.  Green,  58  Pa.  St.  226. 

2Allegheny  Home’s  Appeal,  77  Pa.  St.  77. 

3State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Company’s  Appeal,  77  Pa.  St. 
429-431. 

4Union  Pass.  Ry.  Company’s  Appeal,  81*  Pa.  St.  91;  Com- 


14 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


monwealth  v.  Martin,  107  Pa.  St.  185;  Philadelphia  v.  Spring 
Garden  Farmers’  Market  Company,  161  Pa.  St.  522. 

5Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192. 

6Evans  v.  Willistown  Township,  168  Pa.  St.  578. 

7 Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,  159  Pa.  St.  451. 

5.  The  Scope  of  the  Act  is  Measured  by  the  Title. 

Only  that  part  of  the  law  is  void  which  is  not  referred  to 
in  the  title,1  thus  in  Allegheny  County  Home’s  Case,2  the 
Act  in  question  was  entitled  “An  Act  providing  for  an  equita- 
ble division  of  property  between  the  county  of  Allegheny  and 
the  city  of  Pittsburg.”3  Two  sections  related  to  the  county 
and  city  named,  the  third  section  extended  their  provisions 
to  Allegheny  City  in  like  manner  as  they  applied  to  Pitts- 
burg. The  question  arose  on  the  first  two  sections,  which 
were  sustained  without  reference  to  the  third,  which  was  not 
necessarily  involved.  In  Dewhurst  v.  City  of  Allegheny,4 
Mr.  Justice  Paxson  said:  “The  defendant  below  objects  to 
paying  the  assessment  upon  his  property  for  the  grading 
and  paving  of  Troy  Hill  Road,  in  the  city  of  Allegheny,  for 
various  reasons,  the  first  of  which  is,  that  the  Act  of  Assem- 
bly of  May  10th,  1871,  authorizing  the  same,  and  the  supple- 
ment thereto  approved  April  1st,  1872,  are  unconstitutional, 
and  the  assessments  thereunder  null  and  void.  In  Beckert  v. 
The  City  of  Allegheny,  4 Norris,  191,  so  much  of  said  Act 
was  declared  to  be  unconstitutional  as  provided  for  the  as- 
sessment of  a part  of  the  cost  of  the  work  upon  property  in 
Reserve  Township,  which  said  township  is  located  wholly 
in  Allegheny  County  and  outside  the  city  limits.  The  title 
of  said  Act  was  ‘An  Act  relative  to  grading,  paving,  curbing, 
and  otherwise  improving  Troy  Hill  Road  in  the  city  of  Alle- 
gheny,’ and  this  was  held  not  to  be  notice  to  property-owners 
in  Reserve  Township  that  their  property  was  to  be  assessed 
for  the  cost  of  the  improvement.  There  was  nothing  in  that 
case,  however,  to  throw  the  slightest  doubt  upon  the  consti- 
tutionality of  any  part  of  the  Act  except  in  so  far  as  it  re- 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY.  15 

lated  to  Reserve  Township.  It  is  no  injury  to  the  defendant 
that  property-owners  in  the  township  have  escaped.  Their 
burdens  have  not  been  thrown  upon  his  property,  but  have 
been  very  properly  assumed  by  the  city  of  Allegheny.  His 
benefits  are  the  same  whether  Reserve  Township  pays  or  not; 
his  burden  is  only  increased  by  his  share  of  general  taxation, 
and  of  this  he  has  no  cause  to  complain:  Bidwell  v.  City  of 
Pittsburg,  4 Norris,  491.  An  entire  Act  is  not  necessarily 
unconstitutional  because  the  title  fails  to  give  notice  of  some 
particular  matter  contained  therein.  The  rule  has  been  to 
sustain  the  portion  of  which  the  title  gives  notice:  Dorsey’s 
Appeal,  22  P.  F.  Smith,  192;  Allegheny  County  Home’s  Ap- 
peal, 27  Id.  77;  Lea  v.  Bumm,  2 Norris,  237;  Wynkoop  v. 
Cooch,  8 Id.  450.” 

In  McGee’s  Appeal,5  the  Act  in  question  was  “An  Act  to 
authorize  the  Select  and  Common  Councils  of  the  city  of 
Pittsburg  to  vacate  streets  and  alleys  in  said  city.”6  In  the 
opinion  it  was  said  the  vacation  of  Washington  Street,  or  the 
ordinance  stipulating  for  its  vacation  is  the  precise  matter 
complained  of.  If  it  be  conceded,  however,  that  the  title 
does  not  fully  cover  the  subject  of  the  Act  it  is  only  those 
provisions  not  covered  by  it  that  are  void. 

*Per  Sharswood,  J.,  in  Commonwealth  v.  Green,  58  Pa. 
St.  226,  a case  wherein  the  title  was  held  to  be  sufficient. 

2 Allegheny  County  Home’s  Appeal,  77  Pa.  St.  77. 

325th  April,  1871,  P.  L.  1138. 

4Dewhurst  v.  City  of  Allegheny,  95  Pa.  St.  437. 

5McGee’s  Appeal,  114  Pa.  St.  470-478. 

6April  15th,  1869,  P.  L.  965;  and  see  Allegheny  v.  Moore- 
head,  80  Pa.  St.  1 18;  Washington  Borough  v.  McGeorge, 
146  Pa.  St.  248,  251;  Act  of  April  22d,  1889,  P.  L.  39,  au- 
thorizing boroughs  to  license  hacks,  etc. 

The  Act  of  June  26th,  1895,  P-  L-  317,  known  as  the  “Pure 
Food  Law,”  was  enforced  in  a case  of  adulteration  of  food, 
and  the  rule  was  applied  which  holds  so  much  of  an  Act  to 
be  valid  as  is  covered  by  the  title:  Commonwealth  v.  Wick- 


i6 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ert,  19  C.  C.  R.  251;  s.  p.,  Commonwealth  v.  Hartman,  6 P. 
D.  R.  136.  In  Commonwealth  v.  Curry,  4 Super.  Ct.  356,  the 
title  was  held  to  be  sufficient. 

6.  The  Subject  Must  be  Clearly  Expressed. 

Thus  an  Act,  the  title  of  which  purports  to  authorize  a 
railway  company  to  lay  additional  tracks,  does  not  clearly 
express  the  intent  disclosed  in  the  body  of  the  Act  to  author- 
ize it  to  lay  an  extension  of  its  line;1  upon  this  point  Mr. 
Justice  Agnew  said:  “When  the  title  conveys  the  belief  that 
one  subject  is  the  purpose  of  the  bill,  while  another  and  dif- 
ferent one  is  its  real  subject,  it  is  evident  that  it  tends  to 
mislead  by  diverting  the  attention  from  the  true  object  of 
the  legislation.  Confiding  in  the  title  as  applicable  to  a pur- 
pose unobjectionable  to  the  reader  he  -is  led  away  from  the 
examination  of  the  body  of  the  bill.  In  such  a case  the  sub- 
ject is  not  clearly  expressed  in  the  title.  Indeed,  it  is  not  ex- 
pressed at  all.  It  may  have  something  colorable  in  it,  but 
this  is  merely  hinting  at  the  subject,  not  expressing  it.  To 
lay  additional  tracks  on  an  existing  railway  is  a different 
thing  from  extending  the  railway  itself  into  new  territory 
not  before  authorized  to  be  used.  The  difference  in  purpose 
is  so  palpable,  and  the  difference  in  consequence  so  grave  the 
mind  cannot  hesitate  a moment  in  the  conclusion  that  the 
language  which  authorizes  the  former  only  cannot  mean  to 
sanction  the  latter.  To  confound  these  two  is  to  open  the 
door  to  fraud,  and  to  enable  men,  expert  in  the  use  of 
phrases,  to  steal  away  the  rights  of  the  people;  and  this  it  was 
a purpose  of  the  amendment  to  prevent.”  . . . “How,  then, 
will  the  same  language  in  this  title  be  held  to  ‘clearly  express* 
a purpose  to  extend  this  railway  into  new  streets  and  along 
other  lines  of  railway?  If  it  be  said  the  Legislature  might 
have  meant  this,  the  obvious  answer  is,  that  this  is  a mere 
possibility,  a conjecture,  not  a clear  expression  of  the  intent. 
Nothing  ambiguous  can  be  said  to  be  clear,  and  this  is  a de- 
cisive answer  to  the  argument  that  the  title  is  sufficient  to 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY.  1 7 

lead  to  inquiry.  An  inquiry  into  a dubious  or  uncertain  thing 
is  not  the  purpose  of  the  amendment.  Its  requirement  is 
that  the  subject  shall  be  clearly  expressed.”  The  same 
thought  was  substantially  repeated  in  Dorsey’s  Appeal,2 
where  it  is  said:  “It  would  not  do  to  require  the  title  to  be 
a complete  index  to  the  contents  of  the  bill,  for  this  would 
make  legislation  too  difficult,  and  bring  it  into  constant  dan- 
ger of  being  declared  void.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  title 
should  be  so  certain  as  not  to  mislead.  The  language  of  the 
amendment  is  ‘one  subject  which  shall  be  clearly  expressed 
in  the  title.’  To  be  ‘clearly  expressed’  certainly  does  not 
mean  something  which  is  dubious,  and  therefore  is  not  clearly 
expressed.  If  then  the  title  seems  to  mean  one  thing  while 
the  enactment  as  clearly  refers  to  another,  it  cannot  be  said 
to  be  clearly  expressed.  Now  in  the  present  case  the  words 
leasehold  estates  certainly  do  not  express  estates  of  free- 
hold.” 

Where,  however,  the  term  railway  is  used,  which  may  im- 
port either  a steam  railroad  or  a street  passenger  railway,  or 
both,  if  in  the  plural,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  title  is  not 
clear  where  the  Act  applies  to  a railroad  incorporated  to 
carry  freight  and  passengers,  and  use  steam  as  a motive 
power.3 

A title  which  purports  the  creation  of  the  office  of  County 
Controller  in  certain  counties  does  not  clearly  indicate  a pur- 
pose to  abolish  the  office  of  County  Auditors.  The  fact  that 
the  Constitution  places  “Auditors  or  Controllers”  together 
in  the  disjunctive  in  Article  XIV,  Section  i,  and  the  fact  that 
the  Controllers  of  Philadelphia  and  Allegheny  Counties  per- 
form practically  the  same  duties  as  Auditors  in  other  counties 
is  not  sufficient  to  lead  to  notice  that  the  creation  of  the 
office  of  Controller  was  likely  to  interfere  with,  if  not  to 
abolish,  the  office  of  County  Auditors.4 

The  Act  of  April  22d,  1879,  P.  L.  30,  entitled  “An  Act  ex- 
tending the  powers  and  authority  of  County  Auditors,  au- 
thorizing them  to  settle,  audit,  and  adjust  the  accounts  of 


2 


i8 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


the  Directors  of  the  Poor  of  the  several  counties  of  the  Com- 
monwealth,” clearly  expresses  in  its  title  the  subject-matter.5 

1Union  Passenger  Railway  Company’s  Appeal,  81*  Pa. 
St.  91. 

2Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192. 

3Millvale  Borough  v.  Evergreen  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany, 13 1 Pa.  St.  1. 

Commonwealth  v.  Samuels,  163  Pa.  St.  282;  Common- 
wealth v.  Severn,  164  Pa.  St.  462;  Commonwealth  v.  Sam- 
uels, 14  C.  C.  R.  423,  opinion  of  court  below;  Commonwealth 
v.  Severn,  15  C.  C.  R.  249,  opinion  of  court  below. 

5Nason  v.  School  Directors,  126  Pa.  St.  445. 

The  sufficiency  of  the  title  of  the  Act  of  May  12th,  1897, 
P.  L.  56,  entitled  “An  Act  taxing  gifts,  legacies,  and  inherit- 
ances in  certain  cases  and  providing  for  the  collection 
thereof,”  was  questioned  but  not  decided:  Portuondo’s  Es- 
tate, 19  C.  C.  R.  419;  s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  462. 

The  Act  of  May  22d,  1895,  P.  L.  111,  properly  construed 
creates  no  lien  for  taxes,  but  if  this  were  otherwise  the  title 
is  insufficient  for  that  purpose:  Kenner  v.  Kelly,  19  C.  C.  R. 
348;  Taylor  v.  Bowling,  5 P.  D.  R.  605;  Land  v.  Wack,  5 P. 
D.  R.  606;  Rutt  v.  Burkey,  14  Lane.  L.  R.  11;  Snyder  v. 
Mogart,  17  C.  C.  R.  1;  Wetzel  v.  Goodyear,  5 P.  D.  R.  605; 
Fryer  v.  Metz,  12  Montg.  108;  Frampton’s  Estate,  18  C. 
C.  R.  462.  But  the  notice  provided  for  will  charge  the  fund 
if  duly  given.  The  Act  was  intended  to  cover  two  classes 
of  cases;  first,  where  there  was  a lien  for  taxes  under  pre- 
existing laws;  second,  where  there  was  none,  in  which  case 
the  provision  for  notice  was  operative  to  create  a charge  pur- 
suant to  the  notice:  Provident  Association  v.  Flanagan,  19 
C.  C.  R.  529. 

The  Act  of  June  26th,  1895,  P-  L.  317,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
provide  against  the  adulteration  of  food  and  provide  for  the 
enforcement  thereof,”  has  a sufficient  title  to  cover  all  of  its 
provisions:  Commonwealth  v.  Curry,  4 Super.  Ct.  356;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Hufnal,  4 Super.  Ct.  301 ; and  see  Common- 
wealth v.  Wickert,  19  C.  C.  R.  251 ; Commonwealth  v.  Curry, 
18  C.  C.  R.  513;  Commonwealth  v.  Hartman,  6 P.  D.  R. 
136. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


19 


7.  Fair  Notice  of  the  Scope  of  the  Subject  of  the 

Act  Must  be  Given. 

All  the  cases  agree  that  the  subject  of  the  proposed  legisla- 
tion must  be  so  expressed  in  the  title  as  to  give  notice  of  its 
purpose  to  the  members  of  the  Legislature  and  to  others 
specially  interested.1  If  the  title  gives  notice  of  the  subject 
of  the  Act  so  as  reasonably  to  lead  to  an  inquiry  into  the 
body  of  the  bill,  it  is  all  that  is  necessary.2 

1 Philadelphia  v.  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany, 142  Pa.  St.  484-491;  citing  Commonwealth  v.  Green, 
58  Pa.  St.  226;  Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192;  Beckert  v. 
Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St.  191;  Phcenixville  Road,  109  Pa.  St.  44; 
Sewickley  Borough  v.  Sholes,  118  Pa.  St.  165;  see  also  Alle- 
gheny County  Home’s  Case,  77  Pa.  St.  77;  State  Line  & 
Juniata  R.  R.  Company’s  Appeal,  77  Pa.  St.  429. 

2State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Company’s  Appeal,  77  Pa. 
St.  429;  Esling’s  Appeal,  89  Pa.  St.  205-210;  Blood  v.  Mer- 
celliott,  53  Pa.  St.  391;  Church  Street,  54  Pa.  St.  353;  Dor- 
sey’s Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192;  Mauch  Chunk  v.  McGee,  81 
Pa.  St.  433;  Carothers’  Appeal,  118  Pa.  St.  468. 

Numerous  cases,  beginning  with  Commonwealth  v.  Green, 
state  that  the  title  of  an  Act  of  Assembly  is  not  intended  to 
be  an  index  to  its  contents:  Commonwealth  v.  Green,  Pa. 
St.  226. 

The  Act  of  May  6th,  1887,  P.  L.  84,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
prevent  and  punish  the  making  and  dissemination  of  ob- 
scene literature  and  other  immoral  and  indecent  matter,”  has 
a sufficient  title.  “It  states  the  general  subject  of  the  bill,  and 
gives  sufficient  notice  of  its  contents  and  object.” — Per 
Ewing,  J. : Commonwealth  v.  Havens,  6 C.  C.  R.  545. 

8.  The  Title  Must  be  in  Terms  Sufficiently 

Specific. 

Thus,  the  title  of  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  to  incorporate 
the  Manufacturers’  Improvement  Company,”  was  held  to 
be  too  general,  and  in  effect  misleading,  as  no  indication  was 


20 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


given  either  in  the  name  of  the  corporation  or  otherwise,  of 
provisions  relating  to  the  power  in  the  Act  expressed  over 
the  Loyalsock  Creek,  a public  navigable  stream,  in  improv- 
ing it  and  charging  tolls  for  logs.1  But  the  title  of  an  Act, 
entitled  “An  Act  to  incorporate  the  Empire  Contract  Com- 
pany and  define  the  powers  thereof,”  is  probably  sufficient 
to  cover  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  In  passing  upon 
this  title,  Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “Speaking  for  myself, 
I would  hold  the  title  to  be  neither  insufficient  nor  mislead- 
ing.” It  was  decided  that  the  power  of  eminent  domain  in 
question  was  well  derived  from  the  provisions  of  another 
statute.2  Thus  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  relating  to  the 
Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company,”  is  too  general 
to  indicate  a provision  relieving  the  company  from  a liability 
to  keep  streets  in  repair,3  and  in  another  case  the  title  was 
held  insufficient  to  cover  a provision  reducing  the  rate  of  tax- 
ation of  dividends  for  city  purposes.4  The  title  of  the  Act  of 
May  13th,  1887,  P.  L.  108,  entitled  “An  Act  to  restrain  and 
regulate  the  sale  of  vinous  and  spirituous,  malt,  or  brewed 
liquors,  or  any  admixture  thereof,”  was  held  to  be  sufficient 
to  sustain  the  clause  of  Section  17  of  the  Act,  prohibiting  the 
furnishing  of  liquors  to  minors,  persons  of  known  intem- 
perate habits  or  persons  visibly  affected  by  intoxicating 
drink,  by  sale,  gift,  or  otherwise.5 

1 Rogers  v.  Manufacturers’  Improvement  Company,  109 
Pa.  St.  109. 

2Carothers’s  Appeal,  118  Pa.  St.  468. 

3Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 124  Pa.  St.  219. 

^Philadelphia  v.  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany, 142  Pa.  484. 

Commonwealth  v.  Silverman,  138  Pa.  St.  642;  and  see 
Donley  v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St.  348. 

The  Act  of  March  16th,  1872,  P.  L.  405,  was  entitled  “An 
Act  relating  to  the  County  Commissioners  of  Cambria 
County.”  It  was  objected  to  “for  the  reason  that  the  title 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


21 


does  not  indicate  that  which  is  embraced  in  the  body  of  the 
Act  itself.”  The  title  was  held  to  be  sufficient  to  give  notice 
of  any  legislation  properly  pertaining  to  the  rights,  duties, 
and  powers  of  the  Commissioners.  All  its  provisions  were 
held  to  be  germane  to  a single  subject:  Commonwealth  v. 
Lloyd,  2 Super.  Ct.  6;  s.  p.,  Commonwealth  v.  Dillon,  1 7 C. 
C.  R.  227;  and  see  Bennett  v.  Maloney,  4 Kulp,  537. 

The  Act  of  January  2d,  1871,  P.  L.  1556,  was  entitled  “A 
further  supplement  to  the  Act  incorporating  the  city  of  Har- 
risburg in  the  county  of  Dauphin,  passed  April  ninth,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-nine.”  His  Honor,  Judge 
Pearson,  said:  “We  consider  the  title  of  this  Act  the  same 
as  none,”  because  no  indication  of  the  subject  of  the  supple- 
ment was  given:  In  re  State  St.,  2 Leg.  Chron.  1 (1873). 

9.  The  Title  Must  Not  be  Inconsistent  with  the 
Enactment. 

The  Act  of  May  14th,  1874,  P.  L.  158,  was  entitled  “An 
Act  to  exempt  from  taxation  public  property  used  for  pub- 
lic purposes  and  places  of  religious  worship,  places  of  burial 
not  used  or  held  for  private  or  corporate  profit  and  institu- 
tions of  purely  public  charity,”  and  contained  a proviso  that 
all  property,  real  or  personal,  other  than  that  which  is  in 
actual  use  and  occupation  for  the  purposes  aforesaid,  and 
from  which  any  revenue  or  income  is  derived,  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  taxation,  except  when  exempted  by  law  for  State  pur- 
poses, and  nothing  herein  contained  shall  exempt  the  same 
from  taxation.  This  proviso  upon  a construction  given  in  a 
previous  case,1  having  been  held  to  impose  taxation,  it  was 
held  that  taxation  was  not  properly  the  subject  of  the  Act  as 
expressed  in  the  title,  namely,  exemption,  and  that  the  pro- 
viso was  therefore  void.2 

The  Act  of  May  19th,  1893,  P.  L.  108,  entitled  “An  Act 
to  amend  an  Act,  entitled  a supplement  to  an  Act,  entitled 
'An  Act  for  acknowledging  deeds,’  passed  March  18th,  1775, 
requiring  the  recording  of  certain  conveyances  and  designat- 
ing the  time  within  which  they  shall  be  recorded,”  is  ineffect- 
ive in  those  provisions  which  relate  to  the  manner  of  taking 


22 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


acknowledgments  and  to  the  powers  of  officers  in  relation 
thereto.  “An  attempt  to  remodel  the  law  relating  to  ac- 
knowledgments under  such  a title  would  be  an  attempt  to  do 
that  of  which  the  title  not  only  gave  no  notice  but  against 
which  it  closed  the  door  by  asserting  a different  purpose.”3 

1County  of  Erie  v.  Commissioners  of  Water  Works,  113 
Pa.  St.  368. 

2Sewickley  Borough  v.  Sholes,  118  Pa.  St.  165;  and  see 
Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554,  156  Pa.  St.  539. 

3Davey  v.  Ruffell,  162  Pa.  St.  443. 

The  Act  of  April  9th,  1870,  P.  L.  1068,  was  entitled  “An 
Act  to  punish  the  sale  and  traffic  in  mineral  water  bottles  and 
other  bottles,  and  for  the  protection  of  bottlers  and  venders 
of  mineral  water  and  other  beverages  in  this  Common- 
wealth.” In  the  second  section  of  the  Act  there  was  a pro- 
viso that  the  Act  should  “apply  only  to  the  city  of  Philadel- 
phia,” the  title  was  held  to  be  misleading  and  insufficient,  in 
a case  arising  in  Philadelphia,  by  reason  of  the  difference  be- 
tween the  title  and  the  proviso  relating  to  the  territorial 
scope  of  the  Act:  Commonwealth  v.  Farley,  6 C.  C.  R.  433, 
46  Leg.  Int.  108. 

In  Swaney  v.  Washington  Oil  Company,  7 C.  C.  R.  351, 
the  sufficiency  of  the  title  of  the  Act  of  June  17th,  1887,  P. 
L.  409,  entitled  “An  Act  relating  to  the  liens  of  mechanics, 
laborers,  and  others  upon  leasehold  estates  and  property 
thereon,”  was  doubted.  In  McKeever  v.  Victor  Oil  Com- 
pany, 9 C.  C.  R.  284,  the  title  was  held  to  be  insufficient  be- 
cause it  did  not  create  a lien  upon  leaseholds,  but  only 
upon  the  property  therein  specified  upon  the  leaseholds,  and 
because  the  title  was  silent  as  to  the  extraordinary  remedy 
provided  in  Section  5 to  prevent  the  removal  of  the  property 
off  the  leasehold  after  a lien  was  entered.  In  Titus  v.  Elyria 
Oil  Company,  1 P.  D.  R.  204,  the  same  title  was  also  held  to 
be  insufficient.  The  Act  of  June  3d,  1885,  P.  L.  55,  entitled 
“An  Act  for  the  suppression  of  lottery  gifts  by  store-keepers 
and  others  to  secure  patronage,”  is  insufficient  in  title  in  so 
far  as  it  undertakes  to  prohibit  the  giving  of  tickets  entitling 
the  holders  to  money  or  articles  of  value  as  inducements  to 
purchasers,  because  the  phrase  “lottery  gifts”  does  not  em- 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


brace  anything  which  is  free  from  chance  or  hazard:  Com- 
monwealth v.  Moorhead,  7 C.  C.  R.  513. 

The  Act  of  June  1st,  1883,  P.  L.  52,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
protect  miners  in  the  bituminous  coal  regions  of  this  Com- 
monwealth,” in  its  third  section  imposed  a penalty  for  the 
false  weighing  of  coal.  It  was  held  that  the  provisions  of 
the  third  section  were  not  covered  by  the  title  because  the 
protection  contemplated  or  suggested  by  the  title  is  that 
relating  to  the  dangers  of  the  occupation,  and  not  that  relat- 
ing to  the  misdemeanors  mentioned  in  the  third  section: 
Commonwealth  v.  Hartzell,  17  C.  C.  R.  91,  5 P.  D.  R.  148. 

10.  The  Title  Must  Indicate  the  Effect  of  the  Act 
in  Relation  to  Persons  or  Matters  not  Neces- 
sarily Affected  by  the  General  Legislative 
Purpose. 

This  may  be  first  illustrated  by  cases  involving  titles  re- 
stricted in  expression,  but  the  rule  is  well  established,  and 
has  been  adhered  to  in  numerous  cases  where  the  title  is  gen- 
eral in  expression.  Thus  an  Act  relating  to  liens  of  mechan- 
ics, material  men,  and  laborers  upon  leasehold  estates  and 
property  thereon  was  limited  to  such  leasehold  estates,  and 
freehold  estates,  which  were  within  the  purview  of  the  en- 
acting words,  were  excluded  from  its  operation.1  Thus,  an 
Act,  entitled  “An  Act  providing  for  an  equitable  division  of 
property  between  the  county  of  Allegheny  and  the  city  of 
Pittsburg,”  was  ineffective  in  relation  to  the  city  of  Alle- 
gheny.2 Thus,  an  Act  relating  to  grading,  paving,  and  other- 
wise improving  Troy  Hill  Road  in  the  city  of  Allegheny  was 
inoperative  as  to  that  portion  of  Troy  Hill  Road  extending 
beyond  the  city  limits.3  Thus  an  Act  generally  entitled  “An 
Act  relating  to  boroughs  in  the  county  of  Chester,”  con- 
tained a repealing  clause,  which  in  effect  shifted  the  pay- 
ment of  damages  for  opening  roads  from  boroughs 
upon  the  county.  It  was  held  ineffective  for  that  pur- 
pose. In  this  case,  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “The 

mandatory  clause  of  the  amendment  imperatively  requires 
that  the  subject  of  proposed  legislation,  whatever  it  may  be, 


24 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  the  title  of  the  bill.  As  the 
means  of  notice  to  representatives  as  well  as  their  constitu- 
ents the  latter  is  quite  as  essential  as  the  former.  We  are 
not  called  upon,  however,  to  show  the  necessity  or  vindicate 
the  wisdom  of  the  constitutional  requirement.  It  is  enough 
for  us  to  know  that  it  is  an  express  mandate  of  the  organic 
law  which  the  Legislature  ought  to  obey  and  courts  are 
bound  to  enforce.  While  it  may  be  difficult  to  formulate  a 
rule  by  which  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  title  of 
a bill  must  specialize  its  object,  it  may  be  safely  assumed  that 
the  title  must  not  only  embrace  the  subject  of  proposed  leg- 
islation, but  also  express  the  same  so  clearly  and  fully  as  to 
give  notice  of  the  legislative  purpose  to  those  who  may  be- 
specially  interested  therein.  Unless  it  does  this  it  is  use- 
less.”4 Thus,  where  an  Act  entitled  “An  Act  to  incorporate 
the  Manufacturers’  Improvement  Company”  attempted  to 
destroy  the  status  of  a navigable  stream  as  a public  highway, 
and  to  authorize  the  taking  of  tolls  for  floating  logs,  the  title 
Was  held  insufficient.5  Where  an  Act  entitled  as  relating  to 
assessment  of  lands  divided  by  county  lines  contained  provis- 
ions relating  to  lands  divided  by  township  or  borough  lines, 
it  was  held  ineffective  as  to  the  latter.6  In  so  far  as  an  Act 
entitled  “An  Act  authorizing  the  Town  Council  of  the 
borough  of  Carlisle  to  establish  a Board  of  Health,” 
provided  for  the  payment  of  expenses  by  the  county 
of  Cumberland,  it  was  held  to  be  insufficient.7  The  Act  of 
June  8th,  1893,  entitled  “An  Act  creating  the  office  of 
County  Controller  in  counties  of  this  Commonwealth  con- 
taining 150,000  inhabitants  and  over,  prescribing  his  duties,” 
was  held  to  be  defective  in  title,  in  that  there  was  no  indica- 
tion of  the  purpose  and  effect  of  the  Act  to  abolish  the  office 
of  County  Auditors.8  The  title  of  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act 
to  perfect  the  records  of  deeds,  mortgages,  and  other  instru- 
ments in  certain  cases,”  is  insufficient  to  give  notice  that  the 
fees,  incidents  to  the  work,  were  to  be  a charge  upon  the  sev- 
eral counties.9  The  title  of  an  Act  entitled  “An  Act  to  enable 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


25 

the  Board  of  School  Directors  of  the  borough  of  Coudersport 
in  the  county  of  Potter,  to  establish  and  maintain  a graded 
school”  is  insufficient  to  cover  a provision  as  to  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  territory  of  a certain  road  district  named  in  the 
Act  to  the  school  district.10 

In  Smith  v.  Reading  Street  Passenger  Railway11  it  was. 
doubted  whether  the  Act  of  March  226.,  1887,  P.  L.  8,  enti- 
tled “An  Act  to  provide  for  the  incorporation  and  regulation 
of  motor  power  companies  for  operating  railways  by  cable, 
electric,  or  other  means,”  was  sufficient  in  title  to  validate  a 
provision  authorizing  such  companies  to  lease  the  property 
and  franchise  of  passenger  railway  companies  and  operate 
them.  In  this  case,  Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “It  will  be 
seen  that  the  title  to  this  Act  gives  no  hint  of  a purpose  to 
enlarge  the  powers  of  city  passenger  railways.  It  is  also 
very  clear  that  there  is  no  express  provision  in  the  Act  itself 
that  makes  such  enlargement,  or  undertakes  to  do  so.  The 
■question  raised  is  whether  such  enlargement  of  the  powers 
of  city  passenger  railways  results  by  necessary  implication 
from  the  grant  of  power  to  motor  companies  contained  in 
the  eighth  subdivision  of  the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  1887? 
This  is  a question  of  much  practical  importance  in  the  pres- 
ent state  of  legislation  on  this  subject,  and  it  is  beset  with 
serious  difficulty.”  This  case  was  an  appeal  from  a decree  re- 
fusing a preliminary  injunction.  The  decree  was  affirmed, 
the  decision  of  the  question  being  deferred  until  final  hear- 
ing. 

An  Act  to  provide  for  the  incorporation  and  government 
of  cities  of  a certain  class  is  sufficient  in  title  to  embrace  a 
provision  authorizing  the  annexation  of  adjacent  territory.12 

The  Act  of  June  30th,  1885,  P.  L.  187,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
regulate  the  collection  of  taxes  in  the  several  boroughs  and 
townships  of  this  Commonwealth,”  was  held  applicable  to  the 
collection  of  county  taxes.  Upon  this  point  the  court  below 
said:  “But  we  take  the  words  ‘boroughs  and  townships  of 

this  Commonwealth’  were  meant  to  and  do  include  all  the 


26 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


territory  and  counties  in  the  State.  Boroughs  and  townships 
are  the  territorial  divisions  and  points  by  which  County  Com- 
missioners levy  and  collect  taxes  under  the  general  laws  of 
the  State  . . . these  were  the  limits  of  each  county’s  dupli- 
cate and  collector  before,  as  well  as  since,  the  Act  of  1885.” 
After  stating  the  provisions  of  that  Act,  the  court  added: 
“These  provisions,  together  with  long  usage,  the  title  of  the 
Act  ‘boroughs  and  townships  of  this  Commonwealth’  fairly 
imply  that  county  taxes  were  meant  and  intended,  they  are 
pertinent  to  and  properly  included  in  the  words  ‘boroughs 
and  townships.’  ” The  decree  was  affirmed  without  an  opin- 
ion. The  case  arose  upon  an  appeal  from  the  decree  of  the 
court  below  refusing  a preliminary  injunction.13  In  Com- 
monwealth v.  Lyter,14  which  arose  upon  the  same  Act,  Mr. 
Justice  Fell  said:  “The  precise  question  here  raised  was 

considered  in  Bennett  v.  Hunt,  and  the  constitutionality  of 
the  Act  of  1885  was  distinctly  affirmed.” 

1 Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa.  St.  192. 

2Allegheny  Home’s  Case,  77  Pa.  St.  77. 

3Beckert  v.  City  of  Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St.  191. 

4Road  in  Phcenixville,  109  Pa.  St.  44;  and  see  Oxford  Bor- 
ough St.,  2 P.  D.  R.  327. 

5Rogers  v.  Manufacturers’  Improvement  Company,  109 
Pa.  St.  109;  and  see  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany v.  Philadelphia,  124  Pa.  St.  219,  23  W.  N.  C.  324;  Phil- 
adelphia v.  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company,  142 
Pa.  St.  484,  6 C.  C.  R.  283;  Philadelphia  v.  Spring  Garden 
Farmers’  Market  Company,  161  Pa.  St.  522. 

6La  Plume  v.  Gardner,  148  Pa.  St.  192,  affirming  2 Lack. 
Jur.  28;  and  see  Cassel’s  Appeal,  8 Lane.  Law.  Rev.  260; 
Ruth’s  Appeal,  Id.  264,  1 Lack.  Leg.  Ree.  31 1,  10  W.  N.  C. 
498. 

7Quinn  v.  Cumberland  County,  162  Pa.  St.  55. 

Commonwealth  v.  Samuels,  163  Pa.  St.  282,  14  C.  C.  R. 
423;  Commonwealth  v.  Severn,  164  Pa.  St.  462,  15  C.  C.  R. 
249. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


27 


9Gackenbach  v.  Lehigh  County,  166  Pa.  St.  448;  Pierie  v. 
Philadelphia,  139  Pa.  St.  573,  27  W.  N.  C.  285,  affirming  47 
L.  I.  154. 

l0Payne  v.  School  District,  168  Pa.  St.  386. 

11  Smith  v.  Reading  City  Passenger  Railway  Company,  156 
Pa.  St.  5;  s.  c.,  13  C.  C.  R.  49,  2 P.  D.  R.  490. 

12Harris’s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494. 

13Bennett  v.  Hunt,  148  Pa.  St.  257. 

14Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50,  34  W.  N.  C. 
393;  and  see  Commonwealth  v.  Geesey,  1 Super.  Ct.  502; 
Sanderson  v.  Commissioners,  7 C.  C.  R.  342;  Commonwealth 
v.  Commissioners,  7 C.  C.  R.  173;  s.  c.,  133  Pa.  St.  180. 

In  Little  Equinunk  & Union  Woods  Turnpike  Company, 
2 C.  C.  R.  632,  the  title  of  the  Act  of  June  25th,  1885,  P.  L. 
170,  entitled  “An  Act  authorizing  the  acquisition  of  turnpike 
roads  or  highways  heretofore  or  hereafter  constructed  near 
or  through  any  borough  or  township  in  this  Commonwealth 
upon  which  tolls  are  charged  the  traveling  public,”  was  held 
to  be  insufficient;  said  the  court:  “The  title  to  this 

Act  of  1885  is  more  clearly  in  conflict  with  the  constitutional 
requirements  than  any  of  those  considered  in  the  Pennsylva- 
nia cases.  It  does  not  clearly  express  the  subject  of  the  bill, 
it  is  misleading,  it  is  untrue,  and  if  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision means  anything  or  is  to  serve  any  purpose  whatever, 
this  Act  of  Assembly  falls  under  its  condemnation.  . . . The 
title  contains  no  hint  that  counties  are  in  any  way  affected 
by,  or  interested  in,  the  subject  of  the  bill,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, directs  attention  exclusively  to  boroughs  and  town- 
ships, while  the  Act  itself  contains  no  reference  to  boroughs 
or  townships,  but  as  one  of  its  most  important  features  im- 
poses upon  counties  the  expenses  of  the  proceedings  and 
damages  which  may  be  assessed  in  favor  of  the  owners  of 
turnpikes,  etc.,  when  condemned.” — Seely,  P.  J.,  and  see 
Carbondale  & Prov.  Turnpike,  17  W.  N.  C.  310;  s.  c.,  4 Lane. 
Law  Rev.  361;  and  s.  c.,  22  W.  N.  C.  105,  in  which  the  Su- 
preme Court  said  that  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act  was 
more  than  doubtful,  but  if  it  were  otherwise  it  is  superseded 
by  the  Act  of  June  2d,  1887,  P.  L.  306. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  May  9th,  1889,  P.  L.  162,  entitled 
“An  Act  to  provide  for  the  appointing  of  deputy  coroners 


28 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


in  the  several  counties  of  this  Commonwealth/’  is  insufficient,, 
in  that  it  fails  to  give  notice  as  to  how  such  officers  are  to  be 
appointed  and  paid:  Commonwealth  v.  Grier,  9 C.  C.  R.  444. 

The  Act  of  June  9th,  1891,  P.  L.  248,  entitled  “An  Act  to- 
amend  the  eighth  section  of  the  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  re- 
strain and  regulate  the  sale  of  vinous  and  spirituous,  malt 
and  brewed  liquors,  or  any  admixture  thereof,  approved  May 
13th,  1887,  providing  that  the  license  money  shall  be  paid 
into  the  treasury  of  the  city,  county,  borough,  and  township 
wherever  the  licensed  places  are  situated,  and  increasing  the 
amount  of  license  to  be  paid  in  cities  of  the  first  and  second 
class,”  is  insufficient  in  title  in  so  far  as  it  requires  commis- 
sions of  the  treasurer  to  be  paid  for  the  use  of  the  county,, 
because  the  title  to  the  Act  fails  to  give  notice  of  its  effect 
upon  the  compensation  of  the  treasurer:  South  Bethlehem  v.. 
Hemingway,  16  C.  C.  R.  103. 

The  Act  of  June  6th,  1893,  P.  L.  328,  entitled  “An  Act  pro- 
viding for  the  relief  of  needy,  sick,  injured,  and  in  case  of 
death,  burial  of  indigent  persons  whose  legal  place  of  settle- 
ment is  unknown,”  is  insufficient  in  title.  The  effect  of  the 
Act  was  to  remove  certain  liabilities  of  poor  districts  and 
place  them  upon  counties,  and  to  make  the  county  liable  to< 
the  poor  district  without  an  order  of  relief,  which  effect  was 
not  indicated  in  the  title:  Poor  District  v.  Clearfield  County, 
16  C.  C.  R.  554;  s.  c.,  4 P.  D.  R.  584;  Poor  District  v.  Lu- 
zerne County,  17  C.  C.  R.  83,  5 P.  D.  R.  183. 

The  Act  of  May  9th,  1871,  P.  L.  639,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  streets  in  the  several  boroughs  of  Montgomery 
County,”  has  a sufficient  title.  Mr.  Justice  Gordon,  deliver- 
ing the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  held  that  the  Act 
properly  construed  did  not  in  effect  impose  the  damages 
upon  the  county,  but  that  if  it  did  it  would  have  offended  the 
constitutional  provision  as  to  title's  of  Acts  of  Assembly. 
Mr.  Justice  Paxson  filed  an  opinion,  holding  that  the  Act 
did  in  effect  require  payment  of  damages  by  the  county,  but 
that  the  title  was  sufficient  nevertheless.  In  this  opinion  Mr. 
Justice  Green  concurred.  Either  view  resulted  in  affirming 
the  judgment:  Street  in  Royersford,  2 Montgomery  County 
Law  Rep.  153  (1886). 

The  Act  of  January  2d,  1871,  P.  L.  1856,  entitled  “A  fur- 
ther supplement  to  an  Act  incorporating  the  city  of  Harris- 
burg, in  the  county  of  Dauphin,  passed  April  ninth,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-nine,”  has  an  insufficient 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


29 


title.  It  provided,  among  other  things,  that  the  county  of 
Dauphin  should  build  and  keep  in  repair  a certain  bridge  in 
the  city:  In  re  State  Street,  2 Leg.  Chron.  1. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  March  29th,  1872,  P.  L.  651,  en- 
titled “A  supplement  to  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  authorizing 
the  supervisors  of  New  Castle  Township,  Schuylkill  County, 
to  make,  repair,  and  keep  in  good  order  and  condition  the 
public  roads,  bridges,  and  culverts  in  said  township,’  ” has 
.an  insufficient  title,  in  so  far  as  the  Act  relates  to  Mahanoy 
Township:  Philadelphia  v.  Donahew,  5 Leg.  Gaz.  22,  1 Leg. 
'Chron.  45. 

The  Act  of  March  3d,  1868,  P.  L.  263,  entitled  “An  Act 
relative  to  the  borough  of  Oxford,  in  the  county  of  Chester, 
to  enable  the  borough  authorities  to  widen  Third  Street, 
and  relative  to  the  opening,  widening,  straightening,  and 
arranging  the  line  of  new  buildings  on  the  same  in  said  bor- 
ough,” has  an  insufficient  title  as  to  section  2,  which  im- 
poses damages  on  the  county:  Nutt’s  Avenue,  2 Chester 
County,  49. 

11.  The  Subject  Must  be  Single. 

“An  Act  to  increase  the  boundaries  of  Forest  County,” 
may  properly  provide  for  a change  of  the  county  seat ; the 
two  provisions  form  but  one  subject,  or  rather,  are  parts  of 
the  same  subject.  In  this  case,  Mr.  Justice  Read  said:  “The 
Act  before  us  is  not  open  to  the  objection  that  it  is  an  omni- 
bus bill  and  blends  in  the  same  law  subjects  not  connected 
with  each  other  or  entirely  different.  Nor  could  any  im- 
proper influence  result  from  combining  the  provisions  con- 
tained in  it,  for  the  objects  in  it  are  parts  of  the  same  enter- 
prise, and  neither  the  Legislature  nor  the  public  would  be 
misled  by  the  title.  The  subject  of  the  Act  was  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  county,  by  the  addition  of  new  territory,  and  this 
naturally  included  a relocation  of  the  county  seat.  If  this 
could  not  be  done  in  one  Act,  then  two  Acts  must  have  been 
passed,  one  to  enlarge  the  county,  and  the  other  to  locate 
the  county  seat.  If  it  had  been  the  location  of  a new  county, 
then  provision  must  “have  been  made  for  the  county  seat,  and 
this  shows  the  two  provisions  form  but  one  subject,  or  rather 


30 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


are  parts  of  the  same  subject.”1  A provision,  in  a supple- 
ment to  an  Act  “to  open  and  straighten”  certain  named 
streets, for  the  assessment  of  damages, is  a part  of  one  subject, 
to  wit,  the  opening  and  straightening  of  the  streets.2  In 
Dorsey’s  Appeal,3  Mr.  Justice  Agnew  said:  “The  word 

‘subject’  has  a large  signification,  often  embracing  different 
kinds,  different  classes,  and  various  modes,  all  belonging  to 
the  general  subject.  The  word  estates  is  itself  an  example, 
embracing  fees,  fee  tails,  estates  for  life,  and  estates  for  years, 
commonly  called  leaseholds.  Had  the  qualifying  term  ‘lease- 
holds’ been  omitted  in  this  title,  all  the  various  kinds  of  es- 
tates of  freehold  would  have  been  comprehended  within  the 
title,  and  the  sale  of  a freehold  interest  under  the  lien  would 
have  been  good.  Mere  generality  of  meaning  in  the  title 
ought  not  to  avoid  a law.  For  instance  the  title,  ‘An  Act  re- 
lating to  executions,’  is  quite  general  as  an  expression  of  the 
subject  of  the  Act,  yet  no  one  could  doubt  the  power  of  the 
legislation,  under  this  title,  to  provide  for  the  various  kinds 
of  executions  generally  comprised  within  the  term  execution, 
as  for  example  writs  of  fieri  facias,  liberari  facias,  levari  facias , 
venditioni  exponas,  etc.  But  a restriction  in  a title  which  tends 
to  mislead,  stands  on  a different  footing.”  In  Road  in  Phoe- 
nixville,4  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “In  determining  the 

unity  of  a subject  regard  must,  of  course,  be  had  to  the  ulti- 
mate  object  to  be  attained.  Details  leading  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  that  object  are  cognate  to  the  subject  of  legis- 
lation, and  therefore  form  a part  thereof.”  The  title  of  the 
Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  to  carry  into  effect  Section  5,  Ar- 
ticle XIV,  of  the  Constitution  relative  to  the  salaries  of  county 
officers  is  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  cover  the  definition 
of  who  shall  be  deemed  a county  officer,  in  this  case  the  Con- 
troller of  Philadelphia.  Chief  Justice  Mercur  said:  “The 

designation  of  those  officials  who  should  be  considered 
county  officers  was  a natural  corollary  of  the  title  and  proper 
to  give  due  effect  to  that  part  of  the  Constitution  which  the 
Act  proposes  to  enforce.  All  the  provisions  of  the  Act  relate, 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


31 


and  are  cognate,  to  the  purpose  stated  in  the  title.”5  The 
Act  of  June  2d,  1870,  P.  L.  1318,  entitled  “An  Act  to  author- 
ize turnpike,  plankroad,  and  canal  companies  to  issue  bonds 
and  to  secure  the  same  by  mortgage,  and  to  abandon  por- 
tions of  their  roads  and  lines  for  public  use,”  contains  but 
one  subject.  The  opinion  gives  no  explicit  answer  to  the  ar- 
gument that  the  Act  really  embraced  several  subjects,  but 
merely  points  out  that  the  title  clearly  expressed  the  purpose 
of  the  law.6  The  organization,  government,  and  manage- 
ment of  an  insane  asylum  are  but  one  subject.7  The  title  of 
the  Act  of  May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  133,  viz.:  “An  Act  dividing 
the  cities  of  this  State  into  three  classes,  . . . and  designat- 
ing the  mode  of  ascertaining  and  changing  the  classification 
thereof  . . .”  is  sufficient  to  cover  a section  designating 
when  the  new  offices  shall  be  filled  by  election,  and  when  the 
terms  of  superseded  officers  shall  cease.8  In  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Company  v.  Riblet,9  a distinction  was  marked  between  the 
legislative  intent  as  manifested  by  the  title  and  the  legisla- 
tive subject  and  purpose  as  manifested  by  the  law  itself.  It 
was  argued  in  that  case  that  the  title  showed  an  intention  to 
protect  the  farmers,  the  Act  relating  to  the  fencing  of  rail- 
roads, and  not  the  public  generally.  Mr.  Justice  Sharswood 
said:  “If  the  Act  itself  is  within  the  scope  of  the  lawmakers’ 
authority,  it  must  stand,  and  we  are  bound  to  make  it  stand, 
if  it  will,  upon  any  intendment.  It  is  its  effect,  not  its  pur- 
pose, which  must  determine  its  validity.” 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  May  22d,  1895,  P.  L.  106,  entitled 
“An  Act  amending  Section  9 of  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  in 
relation  to  the  laying  out,  opening,  widening,  straightening, 
extending  or  vacating  streets  and  alleys,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  bridges  in  the  several  municipalities  of  this  Common- 
wealth, the  grading,  paving,  macadamizing,  or  otherwise 
improving  streets  and  alleys,  providing  for  ascertaining  the 
damages  to  private  property  resulting  therefrom,  the  assess- 
ment of  damages,  costs  and  expenses  thereof  upon  the  prop- 
erty benefited,  and  the  construction  of  sewers  and  payment 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


32 

of  the  damages,  costs,  and  expenses  thereof,  including  dam- 
ages to  private  property  resulting  therefrom,”  approved  May 
sixteenth,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
ninety-one,  enabling  municipal  corporations  to  lay  out,  open, 
widen,  extend,  and  vacate  streets,  or  alleys,  upon  petition 
or  without  petition  of  property-owners,”  is  sufficient.  The 
objection  seems  to  have  been  that  the  Act  related  to  more 
than  one  subject.10 

1Blood  v.  Mercelliott,  53  Pa.  St.  391. 

2In  re  Church  Street,  54  Pa.  St.  353. 

3Dorsey’s  Appeal,  72  Pa,  St.  192. 

4In  Road  in  Phoenixville,  109  Pa.  St.  44. 

5Taggart  v.  Commonwealth,  102  Pa.  St.  354. 

Fredericks  v.  Pennsylvania  Canal  Company,  109  Pa. 
St.  50. 

7Clearfield  County  v.  Cameron  Township  Poor  District, 
135  Pa.  St.  86. 

8Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,  137  Pa.  St.  508. 

9 Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Company  v.  Riblet,  66  Pa,  St.  164; 
and  see  In  re  Arrott  Street,  18  W.  N.  C.  121. 

10Dorrance  v.  Dorranceton,  181  Pa.  St.  164. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  March  22d,  1887,  P.  L.  8,  entitled 
“An  Act  for  the  protection  of  livery  stable  keepers,”  is  suffi- 
cient. That  some  of  the  sections  of  the  Act  provide  for  civil 
liability  and  some  for  criminal  does  not  make  it  embrace  two 
subjects:  Commonwealth  v.  Moore,  2 Super.  Ct.  162;  s.  c., 
4 P.  D.  R.  649;  16  C.  C.  R.  481,  1 Lack.  Leg.  N.  267;  and  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Lehr,  16  C.  C.  R.  532.  In  these  cases  the 
lower  courts  held  the  title  to  be  insufficient. 

The  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  204,  entitled  “An  Act 
dividing  cities  of  this  State  into  seven  classes,  providing  for 
the  creation  and  division  of  wards  therein  and  the  annexation 
of  adjacent  territory  thereto,  prescribing  general  regulations 
relative  to  the  passage  of  ordinances  and  giving  out  of  con- 
tracts, the  management  of  finances,  the  terms  and  duties  of 
officers,  and  the  punishment  of  certain  offenses  in  all  of  said 
cities,  and  providing  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of 
cities  of  the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth,  and  seventh  classes,”  has  a 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


33 


sufficient  title:  Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg,  4 C.  C.  R.  86.  This 
Act  was  held  invalid  as  a classification  Act:  In  re  Grant 
Street,  12 1 Pa.  St.  596;  Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266;  Shoe- 
maker v.  Harrisburg,  Id.  285;  Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg,  Id. 
289;  Klugh  v.  Harrisburg,  Id.  289;  Meadville  v.  Dickson, 
129  Pa.  St.  1.  It  seems  that  cities  of  divers  classes  may  be 
legislated  for  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  Act.  In 
Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338,  the  title  of  the  Act 
of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230,  was  objected  to  on  the  ground 
that  the  object  of  the  Act  was  not  clearly  expressed  in  the 
title.  This  objection  was  overruled.  The  title  of  the  Act  was 
“An  Act  dividing  the  cities  of  this  State  into  three  classes, 
regulating  the  passage  of  ordinances,  providing  for  contracts 
for  supplies  and  work  for  said  cities,  authorizing  the  increase 
of  indebtedness,  and  the  creation  of  a sinking  fund  to  redeem 
the  same,  defining  and  punishing  certain  offenses  in  all  of 
said  cities,  and  providing  for  the  incorporation  and  govern- 
ment of  cities  of  the  third  class.”  It  is  a further  subject  of 
remark  that  the  said  Act  in  Section  41,  under  the  head  of 
schools  and  school  controller,  provided  that  the  said  cities  of 
the  third  class  should  constitute  one  school  district,  and  made 
further  provision  as  to  the  powers  of  controllers,  their  man- 
agement of  schools,  their  election,  the  filling  of  vacancies  in, 
and  the  organization  of,  the  board,  etc.  It  may  be  question- 
able whether  legislation  with  reference  to  the  public  schools 
is  germane  to  the  subject  of  the  incorporation  and  govern- 
ment of  cities.  See  Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  173  Pa.  St.  246; 
and  also  Gaston  v.  Graham,  18  C.  C.  R.  265;  Gaston  v.  Mead- 
ville, 5 P.  D.  R.  549;  Baker  v.  McKee,  6 P.  D.  R.  599;  re- 
ported since  the  foregoing  was  written. 

The  Act  of  May  6th,  1872,  P.  L.  1163,  entitled  “An  Act 
to  authorize  the  opening  and  paving  of  certain  portions  of 
Fifteenth,  Sixteenth,  and  Norris  Streets,”  has  a sufficient 
title:  Commonwealth  v.  Dickinson,  30  Leg.  Int.  53,  revers- 
ing Commonwealth  v.  Dickinson,  9 Phila.  561.  The  Act  of 
March  25th,  1873,  P-  L.  330,  entitled  “An  Act  to  authorize 
the  laying  out,  opening,  and  laying  of  water  pipes  in  Volkmar 
Street,  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia,”  contains  but  one  subject: 
Commonwealth  v.  Clovis  & Dickinson,  1 W.  N.  C.  185. 

The  Act  of  April  20th,  1876,  P.  L.  43,  relating  to  appeals 
from  justices  of  the  peace  in  cases  of  recovery  for  wages  of 
manual  labor  has  but  one  subject:  Cochran  v.  McKelvy,  2=; 
P.  L.  J.  120. 

3 


34 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


12.  The  Act  May  Properly  Include  Matters  Ger- 
mane to  the  Subject  Expressed  in  the  Title. 

Pertinent  details,  provisions  relative  to  the  mode  of  ac- 
complishing the  legislative  purpose,  although  the  things  in 
themselves  may  be  diverse,  if  congruous,  naturally  connected, 
cognate,  or  germane  may  be  included.  These  terms  all  indi- 
cate the  same  idea,  and  the  subject-matter  being  considered, 
the  test  is  one  of  common  sense  and  not  strict  logic.  The  chang- 
ing of  the  county  seat  is  germane  to  the  subject  of  changing 
the  county  boundaries,  the  latter  being  expressed  in  the  title.1 
So  is  the  assessment  of  damages  when  the  opening  and  straight- 
ening of  streets  is  expressed.2  So  are  provisions  as  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  a clerk  and  the  summoning  of  a grand  jury 
where  the  establishment  of  a court  of  criminal  jurisdiction 
is  expressed.3  Persons  in  interest  not  parties  to  a suit  may 
be  permitted  to  testify  by  the  terms  of  an  Act  entitled  as  re- 
lating to  parties  in  interest.4  Authority  to  construct  sewers 
and  drains  expressed  in  the  title  will  cover  provisions  as  to 
charge  for  the  use  of  the  same  when  completed.5  An  Act  to 
provide  for  the  erection  of  public  buildings,  as  expressed  in 
the  title,  may  provide  for  the  raising  of  taxes  and  the  occu- 
pation of  a certain  square.6  Provision  for  borrowing  money 
is  germane  to  authority  to  reconstruct  county  bridges.7  A 
generally  entitled  supplement  to  a borough  incorporation 
Act  may  authorize  surveys  of  the  town,  plans,  and  the 
payment  of  an  engineer  for  making  them.8  Designat- 
ing the  city  controller  as  a county  officer  when  city 
and  county  are  co-extensive  is  germane  to  an  Act 
entitled  to  carry  into  effect  the  constitutional  provis- 
ion as  to  the  compensation  of  county  officers.9  All  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  May  13th,  1887,  known  as  the 
Brooks  Law  are  germane  to  the  subject  as  expressed  in  the 
title.10  Costs  are  germane  to  the  subject  of  levy,  collec- 
tion, and  disbursement  of  taxes  and  water  rents.11  Designat- 
ing when  new  offices  shall  be  filled  by  election  and  when  the 
terms  of  superseded  officers  shall  cease,  is  germane  to  a title 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


35 


relating  to  the  classification  of  cities  and  designating  the 
mode  of  changing  the  classification  thereof.12  A provision, 
that  all  dogs  in  this  Commonwealth  shall  hereafter  be  per- 
sonal property  and  a subject  of  larceny,  is  germane  to  the 
title  of  an  Act  for  the  taxation  of  dogs  and  the  protection  of 
sheep,  the  purpose  of  the  Act  being  the  taxation  of  that 
which  was  not  property  at  common  law.13  A provision  for 
recovery  by  the  wife,  of  damages  to  which  the  husband  would 
otherwise  be  entitled  for  loss  of  services,  on  his  filing  a stipu- 
lation releasing  his  right,  is  germane  to  the  title  of  an  Act 
relative  to  actions  brought  by  husband  and  wife,  or  by  the 
wife  alone  for  her  separate  property  in  case  of  desertion.14 
In  this  case,  Chief  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “The  first  clause 
of  the  title  indicates  with  sufficient  clearness  that  one  branch 
of  the  general  subject  on  which  it  was  proposed  to  legislate 
was  in  relation  ‘to  actions  by  husband  and  wife,’  the  details  of 
which  legislation  constitute  the  first  section.  The  other 
branch  of  the  subject  is  sufficiently  indicated  by  the  latter 
clause  of  the  title,  which  relates  to  actions  brought  ‘by  the 
wife  alone  for  her  separate  property  in  cases  of  desertion  ;y 
and  the  legislation  on  that  constitutes  the  second  section  of 
the  Act.  Instead  of  containing  more  than  one  subject,  the 
provisions  of  both  sections  are  cognate,  each,  respectively,, 
relating  not  to  a separate  and  independent  subject  of  legis- 
lation, but  to  branches  of  the  same  general  subject,  namely, 
remedial  legislation  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of 
married  women.” 

Provisions  for  the  annexation  of  territory  and  the  exten- 
sion of  city  limits  are  germane  to  an  Act  entitled  An  Act 
providing  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities  of 
a given  class.15  All  of  the  provisions  of  the  taxing  Act  of 
June  8th,  1891,  P.  L.  229,  are  germane  to  the  title.16  “The 
title  of  the  Act  of  April  20th,  1874,  relating  to  increase  of 
indebtedness  of  municipalities  is  so  manifestly  significant  of 
the  subject  of  the  bill  that  it  would  be  a waste  of  time  to  dis- 
cuss the  question  as  to  whether  it  included  a power  to  in- 


36 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


crease  the  indebtedness.”17  The  purpose  of  the  Act  of  May 
23d,  1891,  supplementary  to  the  Corporation  Act  of  1874, 
and  relating  to  beneficial  associations,  “is  expressed  fully  and 
in  very  explicit  terms  in  the  title.”18  The  Act  of  June  10th, 
1893,  P.  L.  419,  entitled  “An  Act  to  regulate  the  nomina- 
tion and  election  of  public  officers,  requiring  certain  expenses 
incident  thereto  to  be  paid  by  the  several  counties,  and  pun- 
ishing certain  offenses  in  regard  to  such  elections,”  is  in- 
sufficient in  title  in  so  far  as  it  attempts  to  regulate  the  mode 
of  voting  on  questions  of  the  increase  of  municipal  indebted- 
ness.19 This  case  may  be  considered  as  furnishing  an  illus- 
tration of  a well-marked  distinction.  The  subject  of  elec- 
tions is  a single  subject,  and  an  Act  relating  to  elections  with 
a title  sufficiently  general  to  indicate  a purpose  to  legislate 
with  regard  to  all  elections  would  not  be  considered  as  viola- 
tive of  that  branch  of  the  constitutional  provision  in  question 
which  requires  an  Act  to  be  confined  to  a single  subject.  On 
the  other  hand,  when  the  subject  of  legislation  as  indicated 
in  the  title  does  not  comprehend  what  might  have  been  com- 
prehended under  a more  general  title  but  is  confined  to  a 
subdivision  of  a general  subject,  then  a provision  which  might 
be  germane  to  the  general  subject  is  not  germane  to  the  sub- 
ject as  expressed  in  the  title  in  restricted  terms,  as  here,  not 
elections  generally,  but  the  election  of  public  officers. 

1Blood  v.  Mercelliott,  53  Pa.  St.  391. 

2In  re  Church  Street,  54  Pa.  St.  353. 

Commonwealth  v.  Green,  58  Pa.  St.  226. 

4 Yeager  v.  Weaver,  64  Pa.  St.  425. 

5Mauch  Chunk  v.  McGee,  81  Pa.  St.  433. 

6Wheeler  v.  Rice,  83  Pa.  St.  232;  Lea  v.  Brumm,  83  Pa. 

St.  335- 

7Myers  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  217. 

8McKeesport  v.  Owens,  6 W.  N.  C.  492. 

9Taggart  v.  Commonwealth,  102  Pa.  St.  354. 

10Commonwealth  v.  McCandless,  21  W.  N.  C.  162;  4 C.  C. 
R.  1 T9;  10  Cent.  R.  758;  Commonwealth  v.  Sellers,  130  Pa. 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


37 


St.  32;  and  see  Blood  v.  Mercelliott,  53  Pa.  St.  391;  citing 
Parkinson  v.  State,  14  Md.  Rep.  185;  contra,  Commonwealth 
v.  Doll,  6 C.  C.  R.  49;  Commonwealth  v.  Fowler,  18  Phil. 
513- 

nBradley  v.  Pittsburg,  130  Pa.  St.  475. 

12Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,  137  Pa.  St.  108. 

13Commonwealth  v.  Depuy,  148  Pa.  St.  201. 

14Kelly  v.  Mayberry  Township,  154  Pa.  St.  440. 

15Harris’s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494. 

16Commonwealth  v.  Wilkes-Barre  & Scranton  Railway 
Company,  162  Pa.  St.  614;  Commonwealth  v.  Edgerton  Coal 
Company,  164  Pa.  St.  284. 

17 Dean,  J.,  Bruce  v.  Pittsburg,  166  Pa.  St.  152. 

18Mitchell,  J.,  in  Commonwealth  v.  Keystone  Benefit 
Association,  171  Pa.  St.  465. 

19Evans  v.  Willistown  Township,  168  Pa.  St.  578;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Weir,  18  C.  C.  R.  425;  and  see  generally  Com- 
monwealth v.  Wilkes-Barre  & Scranton  Railway.  162  Pa.  St. 
614;  Grubb’s  Appeal,  174  Pa.  St.  187;  Commonwealth  v. 
Morningstar,  144  Pa.  St.  103;  Washington  Borough  v. 
McGeorge,  146  Pa.  St.  248;  City  Sewage  Utilization  Com- 
pany v.  Davis,  8 Phila.  625;  Smith  v.  Baker,  3 P.  D.  R.  626; 
Commonwealth  v.  Nihil,  4 P.  D.  R.  582:  Bruce  v.  Pittsburg, 
166  Pa.  St.  152;  Act  of  May  5th,  1876,  P.  L.  124,  relating  to 
taxation  in  cities  of  the  second  class. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  194,  viz.: 
“An  Act  providing  for  the  licensing  of  wholesales  dealers  in 
intoxicating  liquors,”  properly  includes  the  licensing  of 
brewers  and  distillers.  In  a broad  sense  these  are  also  whole- 
sale dealers:  Doberneck’s  License,  5 C.  C.  R.  454;  s.  c.,  35 
P.  L.  J.  476;  and  see  Commonwealth  v.  Deibert;  12  C.  C.  R. 
504;  s.  c.,  2 D.  R.  53;  Eby’s  Appeal,  70  Pa.  St.  31 1. 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1893,  P-  L-  344,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  husband  and  wife,  enlarging  her  capacity  to  ac- 
quire and  dispose  of  property,  to  sue  and  be  sued,  and  to 
make  a last  will,  and  enabling  them  to  sue  and  to  testify 
against  each  other  in  certain  cases,”  has  a sufficient  title. 


38 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


The  objection  made  was  that  the  title  was  misleading  in  so 
far  as  it  abridged  the  rights  of  the  wife  in  taking  away  her 
right  in  case  of  desertion  to  sue  her  husband  for  defamation 
of  her  character:  Mink  v.  Mink,  16  C.  C.  R.  189. 

The  Act  of  April  17th,  1876,  P.  L.  29,  is  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  appeals  in  cases  of  summary  convictions. ” 
Doubted  whether  this  title  is  sufficient  to  cover  appeals  from 
judgments  for  penalties:  Commonwealth  v.  Swift,  17  G.  C. 
R.  95.  Held  insufficient  for  that  purpose:  Mauch  Chunk  v. 
Betzler,  19  C.  C.  R.  27;  s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  330. 

Railways  upon  rural  highways  are  plainly  compre- 
hended within  the  title  of  the  Act  of  May  14th,  1889, 
P.  L.  21 1,  entitled  “An  Act  to  provide  for  the  incorpo- 
ration and  government  of  street  railway  companies  in  this 
Commonwealth:”  Gettysburg  Battlefield  Association  Case, 
2 P.  D.  R.  649;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Company  v.  Montgomery 
County  Passenger  R.  R.  Company,  3 P.  D.  R.  58.  The  term 
“street  railway  companies”  in  said  Act  is  used  in  the  same 
sense  as  it  is  in  the  Constitution,  Article  XVII,  Section  9, 
and  previous  statutes,  to  wit,  to  designate  the  character  of 
the  railway:  one  to  carry  passengers  only,  and  to  be  located 
on  highways,  and  not  its  location:  Pennsylvania  R.  R. 
Company  v.  Montgomery  County  Passenger  R.  R.  Com- 
pany, Id. 

The  Act  of  April  1st,  1868,  P.  L.  583,  entitled  “An  Act  for 
the  improvement  of  the  borough  of  Norristown,  in  the 
county  of  Montgomery,”  has  a sufficient  title.  The  subject- 
matter  relating  to  the  laying  of  pavements  and  the  construc- 
tion of  sewers  is  germane:  Schall  v.  Norristown,  3 Luz.  Leg. 
Reg.  77;  6 Leg.  Gaz.  167. 

The  third  section  of  the  Act  of  June  10th,  1881,  P.  L.  86, 
entitled  “A  supplement  to  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  pro- 
vide revenue  by  taxation,  approved  the  seventh  day  of  June, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-nine,’  ” is  embraced 
in  the  title.  The  section  relates  to  the  elective  feature  of  the 
bank  tax:  Second  National  Bank  v.  Caldwell,  39  Leg.  Int. 
414;  s.  c.,  13  Fed.  Rep.  429. 

In  Barton  v.  Pittsburg,  4 Brewster,  373  (1870),  an  in- 
junction was  refused  in  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  Alle- 
gheny County,  where  there  was  in  question  a general  appro- 
priation ordinance  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  (so  entitled), 
which  contained  provisions  for  the  assessment  of  taxes  to 
meet  the  appropriation.  The  latter  provisions  were  held  to 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


39 


be  germane.  The  charter  of  Pittsburg  contained  a provision 
similar  to  that  of  Article  III,  Section  6. 

By  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230,  relating  to  cities 
in  Section  3,  it  is  provided  that  no  bill  [ordinance]  shall  be 
passed  containing  more  than  one  subject,  which  shall  be 
clearly  expressed  in  its  title. 

The  Act  of  June  17th,  1887,  P.  L.  413,  has  a sufficient  title: 
Lucas  v.  Ruff,  45  Leg.  Int.  454,  but  it  has  been  held  invalid 
on  other  grounds:  Titusville  Iron  Works  v*  Keystone  Oil 
Company,  122  Pa.  St.  627. 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1881,  P.  L.  70,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
protect  fruit,  gardens,  growing  crops,  grass,  et  cetera,  and  to 
punish  trespass,”  and  the  Act  of  June  18th,  1895,  P.  L.  196, 
amendatory  thereof,  which  recites  the  title  of  the  former  Act 
in  its  title,  have  sufficient  titles.  The  words  “et  cetera ” refer 
to  things  generally  the  same  as  those  specified,  and  the  titles 
are  sufficiently  comprehensive  to  include  provisions  relative 
to  trees:  Commonwealth  v.  Clark,  3 Super.  Ct.  141.  The 
title  of  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1878,  P.  L.  134,  entitled  “A  fur- 
ther supplement  to  an  Act,  entitled ‘An  Act  relating  to  execu- 
tions/ approved  June  sixteenth,  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  thirty-six,  providing  that  one  justice  of  the  peace, 
alderman,  or  magistrate,  shall  act  where  two  are  now  re- 
quired,” has  a sufficient  title.  All  of  its  provisions  are  ger- 
mane to  the  subject:  Wilson  v.  Downing,  4 Super.  Ct.  487. 
The  Act  of  March  14th,  1873,  P.  L.  290,  entitled  “An  Act 
to  confer  upon  M.  H.  the  rights,  powers,  and  privileges  of  a 
son  of  B.  H.,”  has  a sufficient  title  to  cover  an  exemption 
from  the  collateral  inheritance  tax:  Commonwealth  v.  Hen- 
derson, 172  Pa.  St.  135;  37  W.  N.  C.  344. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  May  1st,  1876,  P.  L.  90,  entitled 
“An  Act  supplementary  to  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  pro- 
vide for  the  incorporation  and  regulation  of  certain  corpora- 
tions/ approved  April  twenty-ninth,  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  seventy-four,  relative  to  the  incorporation  and  pow- 
ers of  telegraph  companies  for  the  use  of  individuals,  firms, 
and  corporations,  and  for  fire  alarm,  police,  and  messenger 
business,”  is  sufficient  to  include  the  incorporation  of  tele- 
phone companies  which  are  virtually  telegraph  companies: 
Telephone  Company  v.  Keesey,  5 P.  D.  R.  366;  s.  c.,  York 
Telephone  Company  v.  Keesey,  9 York,  153. 

The  Act  of  May  22d,  1883,  P.  L.  39, entitled  “A  supplement 
to  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  regulating  boroughs/  approved 


40 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


the  third  day  of  April,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  fifty-one,  and  empowering  the  corporate  author- 
ities of  boroughs  to  lay  foot-walks  along  turnpike  roads,  and 
assess  the  cost  of  paving,  curbing,  and  guttering  the  same 
on  the  owners  of  the  adjoining  lands,”  and  the  Act  of  May 
1 6th,  1891,  P.  L.  75,  entitled  “An  Act  in  relation  to  the  lay- 
ing out,  opening,  widening,  straightening,  extending,  or  va- 
cating streets  and  alleys,  and  the  construction  of  bridges  in 
the  several  municipalities  of  this  Commonwealth,  the  grad- 
ing, paving,  macadamizing,  or  otherwise  improving  streets 
and  alleys,  providing  for  ascertaining  the  damages  to  private 
property  resulting  therefrom,  the  assessment  of  the  damages, 
costs,  and  expenses  thereof  upon  the  property  benefited,  and 
the  construction  of  sewers  and  payment  of  the  damages, 
costs,  and  expenses  thereof,  including  damages  to  private 
property  resulting  therefrom,”  have  sufficient  titles.  Drains 
are  component  parts  of  highways  and  streets:  Strohl  v. 
Ephrata,  13  Lane.  L.  R.  1. 

13.  Two  Subjects. 

In  Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,1  the  Act  of  April  12th, 
1867,  P.  L.  1178,  entitled  “An  Act  to  prohibit  the  issuing  of 
licenses  within  two  miles  of  the  Normal  School  at  Mansfield, 
Tioga  County,  Penna,”  was  in  question.  The  defendant  was 
indicted  under  the  second  section  of  the  Act,  which  made  it  a 
misdemeanor  to  sell  liquors  within  the  limits  aforesaid.  The 
defendant  sold  domestic  wines  by  the  bottle,  but  not  for 
drinking  on  his  premises,  which  he  might  lawfully  have  done 
under  the  eighth  section  of  the  Act  of  April  20th,  1858,  P.  L. 
365.  It  was  held  that  the  Act  contained  two  distinct  sub- 
jects, one  of  which  was  referred  to  in  the  title,  and  that  a 
conviction  could  not  be  sustained.  The  title  was  also  held  to 
be  misleading. 


1Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth,  120  Pa.  St.  395;  and  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Frantz,  135  Pa.  St.  389. 

The  Act  of  May  21st,  1879,  P.  L.  72,  entitled  “An  Act  re- 
pealing Section  7 of  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  carry  into 
effect  Section  5 of  Article  XIV,  of  the  Constitution,  relative 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


41 


to  the  salaries  of  county  officers  and  the  payment  of  fees 
received  by  them  into  the  State  or  county  treasury  in  coun- 
ties containing  over  150,000  inhabitants,  approved  the 
thirty-first  day  of  March,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  seventy-six/  and  also  repealing  the  supplement 
to  said  Act,  approved  the  23d  day  of  March,  1877,  and  con- 
ferring upon  Councils  of  cities  of  the  first  class  the  power  of 
fixing  the  number  and  salaries  of  certain  employes,”  con- 
tains “three  distinct  subjects  in  one  title:  First,  Repeal  of 
Section  7 of  the  Act  of  1876;  Second,  Repeal  of  the  supple- 
ment of  1877;  and  third,  giving  Councils  of  cities  of  the  first 
class  power  to  fix  the  number  and  salaries  of  certain  employes 
. . . the  title  is  misleading  and  fails  to  give  notice  of  the 
legislative  purpose.” — Collier,  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Mer- 
cer, 9 C.  C.  R.  461. 

The  Act  of  Mch.  18th,  1869,  P.  L.  393,  and  its  supplement 
of  April  10th,  1869,  P.  L.  828,  contain  more  than  one  subject, 
in  that  a new  mode  of  assessing  damages  is  provided  for.  The 
former  Act  was  entitled  “An  Act  providing  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  superintendents  and  the  election  of  supervisors  of 
highways  in  the  Twenty-second  Ward  of  the  city  of  Phila- 
delphia,” the  second  section  of  which  provided  a mode  for 
the  assessment  of  damages  different  from  the  general  law. 
The  supplement  was  apparently  intended  to  cure  a sup- 
posed defect  in  the  title  of  the  original  Act  in  failing  to  refer 
to  the  matter  of  damages,  and  it  was  entitled  “A  supplement 
to  an  Act  providing  for  the  appointment  of  superintendents 
and  the  election  of  supervisors  of  highways  in  the  Twenty- 
second  Ward  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  approved  March 
eighteenth,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
sixty-nine,  giving  certain  additional  powers  and  imposing 
certain  duties  upon  said  superintendents,  and  regulating  the 
manner  of  assessing  damages  for  opening  streets  in  said 
ward:”  In  re  Hancock  Street,  1 W.  N.  C.  112,  C.  P.  Phila. 

The  Act  of  January  2d,  1871,  P.  L.  1556,  entitled  “A  fur- 
ther supplement  to  an  Act  incorporating  the  city  of  Harris- 
burg, in  the  county  of  Dauphin,  passed  April  9th,  1869,” 
has  an  insufficient  title.  Pearson,  J.,  points  out  that  the 
Act  contains  five  different  subjects  relating:  First,  to  the 

record  of  a plot;  Second,  a new  mode  of  assessing  damages; 
Third,  authorizing  the  opening  of  Front  Street,  and  provid- 
ing a new  mode  of  assessing  damages;  Fourth,  vesting  title  in 
fee  in  the  city  to  what  was  formerly  covered  by  an  easement; 


42 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


and  Fifth,  a provision  that  the  county  of  Dauphin  shall  build 
and  keep  in  repair  a certain  bridge  in  the  city:  In  re  State 
Street,  2 Leg.  Chron.  1 (1873). 

14.  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements  and 
Amendments. 

Where  an  Act  is  entitled  generally  a supplement  to  an  Act 
referred  to  by  its  title,  or  otherwise  sufficiently  identified, 
the  title  of  the  former  is  sufficient.1  A railroad  company  was 
incorporated  by  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  to  incorporate  the 
State  Line  & Juniata  Railroad,”  afterwards  an  Act  was  passed 
entitled  “A  supplement  to  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  in- 
corporate the  State  Line  & Juniata  Railroad.’  ” This  supple- 
ment authorized  the  company  to  locate  their  road  and 
branches  without  reference  to  the  terminal  and  intermediate 
points  mentioned  in  the  original  Act,  and  to  extend  their 
road  as  the  directors  might  judge  would  enable  them  to  make 
proper  connections  with  other  railroads,  and  to  erect  a tele- 
graph line.  Afterwards  an  Act  was  passed,  entitled  “A  fur- 
ther supplement  to  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  incorporate 
the  State  lane  & Juniata  Railroad,’  ” which  gave  the  com- 
pany power  to  build  such  branches,  by  such  routes,  and  to 
such  points  as  the  directors  might  deem  expedient,  to  com- 
mence the  main  line  and  branches  at  any  points  the  directors 
might  determine,  cross  other  roads  at  grade,  build,  and  main- 
tain branches,  etc.  The  validity  of  the  supplementary  leg- 
islation being  in  question,  Mr.  Justice  Paxson  said:  “I11 

Allegheny  Home’s  Appeal  it  was  held  that  ‘if  the  title  fairly 
gives  notice  of  the  subject  of  the  Act  so  as  to  lead  to  inquiry 
Into  the  body  of  the  bill,  it  is  all  that  is  necessary,’  applying 
this  rule  to  the  case  before  us  we  do  not  regard  the  Acts 
referred  to  as  offending  against  the  Constitution,  because 
their  subject  is  not  clearly  set  forth  in  their  titles.  One  of 
said  Acts  is  entitled  ‘A  supplement,’  and  the  other  ‘A  further 
supplement  to  an  Act  entitled  An  Act  to  incorporate  the 
State  Line  & Juniata  Railroad.’  An  examination  of  the  said 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


43 


supplement  discloses  the  fact  that  all  the  legislation  con- 
tained therein  relates  to  the  State  Line  & Juniata  Railroad. 
The  true  rule  is  that  where  the  legislation  in  the  supplement 
is  germane  to  the  title  of  the  original  bill,  the  object  of  such 
supplement  is  sufficiently  expressed  in  the  title.  . . .”2 
In  re  Pottstown  Borough,3  there  was  in  question  the  gen- 
eral borough  law  of  1851,  entitled  “An  Act  for  the  regula- 
tion of  boroughs,”  the  Act  of  June  nth,  1879,  entitled  “A 
supplement  to  an  Act  for  the  regulation  of  boroughs/’  and 
the  Act  of  May  17th,  1883,  entitled  “An  Act  to  amend  (the 
first  section  of  the  last  mentioned  Act)  so  as  to  include  all 
incorporated  boroughs.”  This  legislation  was  sustained  on 
the  ground  that  all  the  provisions  of  the  supplement  and 
amendatory  Act  were  cognate  to  the  subject  of  the  original 
title.  Where  a general  supplement  extended  the  line  of  the 
railroad  and  conferred  powers  under  the  general  railroad  law 
of  1849,  it  was  held  that  the  term  “railway”  in  the  corporate 
style  of  the  company  did  not  necessarily  import  a street 
passenger  railway,  and  that  the  right  to  use  steam  as  a motive 
power  and  to  carry  freight  as  well  as  passengers,  together 
with  the  other  provisions  of  the  Act  were  well  covered  by  the 
title.4  An  apparently  erroneous  recital  of  the  title  of  an  orig- 
inal Act  in  the  title  of  a supplement  caused  by  misplaced  quo- 
tation marks  will  not  vitiate  the  latter  when  the  sense  is 
clear.5  Two  street  railway  companies  merged  under  a new 
name,  to  wit,  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company, 
afterwards  an  Act,  entitled  “An  Act  relating  to  the  Ridge 
Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company,”  was  passed,  which 
contained  a provision  repealing  “all  the  provisions  in  the 
charters  of  the  two  companies  so  consolidated  as  above  re- 
cited, not  included  in  this  Act.”  It  will  be  noticed  that 
neither  of  the  consolidated  companies  was  of  the  corporate 
name  mentioned  in  the  title  of  the  Act.  It  omitted  a pro- 
vision in  the  charter  of  one  of  the  companies  charging  it  with 
the  expense  of  keeping  in  repair  the  streets  and  avenues  tra- 
versed by  it.  The  title  was  held  insufficient  for  this  purpose.6 


44 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


And  in  a subsequent  case,  a provision  reducing  the  rate  ot 
taxation  of  dividends  for  city  purposes  was  held  not  to  be 
covered.7  In  the  latter  case,  the  general  rule  as  to  supple- 
mentary Acts  was  stated  as  follows:  “When  an  Act  of  As- 

sembly is  a supplement  to  a former  Act,  if  the  subject  of  the 
original  Act  is  sufficiently  expressed  in  its  title  and  the  pro- 
visions of  the  supplement  are  germane  to  the  subject  of  the 
original  Act,  the  general  rule  is  that  the  subject  of  the  sup- 
plement is  covered  by  a title  which  contains  a specific  refer- 
ence to  the  original,  by  its  title,  giving  the  date  of  its  ap- 
proval, and  declaring  it  to  be  a supplement  thereto.”  It  will 
be  noticed  that  the  title  involved  in  these  cases  was  not  in 
form  supplementary,  and  that  the  principle  upon  which  the 
title  was  held  insufficient  was  one  equally  applicable  whether 
the  Act  were  original  or  supplementary.  The  Act  of  May 
18th,  1887,  P.  L.  1 18,  was  entitled  “A  supplement  to  an  Act 
relating  to  the  lien  of  mechanics  and  others  upon  buildings.” 
This  title  was  held  to  be  sufficient.  It  was  said:  “While 

said  Act  may  be  objectionable  in  form,  it  is,  nevertheless,  in 
substantial  compliance  with  Section  6 of  Article  III  of  the 
Constitution.  It  not  only  quotes  the  title  of  the  Act  of  June 
1 6th,  1836,  but  it  re-enacts  and  publishes  at  length  so  much 
thereof  as  by  its  supplement  of  May  1st,  1861,  is  extended 
and  amended.”8  The  Act  of  June  2d,  1887,  P.  L.  310,  was 
entitled  “An  Act  supplementary  to  an  Act  approved  April 
29th,  1874,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  provide  for  the  incorporation 
and  regulation  of  certain  corporations,  amending  the  thirty- 
fourth  section  thereof,  extending  its  provisions  to  fuel  com- 
panies, providing  for  their  capital  stock,  and  regulation,  and 
giving  them  power  of  eminent  domain.’  ” The  title  was  held 
to  be  sufficient,  and  the  judgment  of  the  court  below  was 
affirmed  for  the  reasons  given  in  the  opinion  of  his  Plonor, 
Judge  Rice,  who  said:  “After  careful  examination  of  this 

title  we  are  unconvinced  that  it  is  fairly  subject  to  the  objec- 
tion made.  The  title  first  declares  that  the  Act  is  a supple- 
ment to  the  general  Act  providing  for  the  incorporation  and 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


45 


regulation  of  certain  corporations,  and  then  proceeds  to  indi- 
cate the  particulars  in  which  it  supplements  that  Act;  (a) 
by  amending  the  thirty-fourth  section  thereof;  (b),  by  ex- 
tending its  provisions  to  fuel  companies;  (c)  by  providing 
for  their  capital  stock  and  regulation;  (d)  by  giving  them  the 
power  of  eminent  domain.  The  words  ‘amending  the  thirty- 
fourth  section  thereof/  and  ‘extending  its  provisions  to  fuel 
companies/  are  different  branches  of  the  same  general  sub- 
ject, and  we  do  not  think  the  careful  reader  would  conclude, 
without  examining  further,  that  the  latter  clause  was  merely 
explanatory  of  the  former.  Amending  an  Act  or  section  of 
an  Act  is  one  thing,  extending  its  provisions  is  another.  The 
provisions  of  an  Act  may  be  extended  in  the  form  of  an 
amendment,  but  if  that  were  the  sole  purpose  of  which  the 
title  was  to  give  notice,  one  would  naturally  suppose  that  the 
two  clauses  would  have  been  connected  by  the  word  ‘by/  or 
the  words  ‘so  as  to  extend/  or  that  the  words  ‘extending  the 
provisions  of  the  thirty-fourth  section  to  fuel  companies’ 
would  have  been  used  without  inserting  the  first  clause  at 
all.  As  it  was  written,  we  think  the  title  gives  notice  of  an 
amendment  of  the  thirty-fourth  section  beyond  the  mere  ex- 
tension of  its  provisions  to  fuel  companies,  which  was  suffi- 
cient to  lead  legislators  and  others  interested  to  examine 
into  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  and  this,  according  to  the 
great  weight  of  authority,  is  the  test. 

“Fuel  companies  were  expressly  referred  to,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  diverting  attention  and  misleading,  but,  as  it  seems 
to  us,  out  of  abundant  caution,  because  they  had  not  been 
mentioned  in  the  original  Act.”9  This  title,  it  will  be  no- 
ticed, was  in  its  terms  both  general  and  specific. 

1In  re  Church  Street,  54  Pa.  St.  353;  City  Sewage  Utiliza- 
tion Company  v.  Davis,  8 Phila.  625. 

2State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Company’s  Appeal,  77  Pa. 
St.  429;  s.  c.,  Lyon  v.  State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Company, 
1 W.  N.  C.  225,  77  Pa.  St.  429;  see  also  Horstman  v.  Kauf- 
man, 97  Pa.  St.  147;  s.  c.,  8 W.  N.  C.  73;  Leowi  v.  Haedich,  8 


46 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


W.  N.  C.  70;  Beckert  v.  Allegheny,  85  Pa.  St.  19 1 ; McKees- 
port v.  Owens,  6 W.  N.  C.  492;  Craig  v.  First  Presbyterian 
Church,  88  Pa.  St.  42;  Commonwealth  v.  Edgerton  Coal 
Company,  164  Pa.  St.  284;  Ruth’s  Appeal,  10  W.  N.  C.  498, 
8 Lane.  L.  R.  264,  1 Lack.  Leg.  Rec.  31 1. 

3In  re  Pottstown  Borough,  117  Pa.  St.  538,  1 Montgomery 
County,  161;  1 Montgomery  County,  189. 

4Millvale  v.  Evergreen  Railway  Company,  13 1 Pa.  St.  1. 

5Cominonwealth  v.  Taylor,  159  Pa.  St.  451. 

6Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 124  Pa.  St.  219;  23  W.  N.  C.  324. 

Philadelphia  v.  Ridge  Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany, 142  Pa.  St.  484;  6 C.  C.  R.  283. 

Purvis  v.  Ross,  158  Pa.  St.  20;  12  C.  C.  R.  193.  Affirmed 
in  Smyers  v.  Beam,  158  Pa.  St.  57. 

9Luzerne  Water  Company  v.  Toby  Creek  Water  Company, 
148  Pa.  St.  568;  s.  c.  below,  6 Kulp,  237;  and  see  Hoffa’s  Ap- 
peal, 1 Super.  Ct.  357. 

The  Act  of  April  12th,  1875,  P.  L.  40,  is  entitled  “An  Act 
to  permit  the  voters  of  this  Commonwealth  to  vote  every 
three  years  on  the  question  of  granting  licenses  to  sell  in- 
toxicating liquors  and  to  restrain  and  regulate  the  sale  of  the 
same.”  In  sustaining  this  title  the  court  below  said:  “The 
Act  has  but  one  subject  or  purpose,  the  regulation  of  liquor 
traffic;  to  it  every  provision  is  strictly  germane.  The  repeal 
of  the  Act  of  1872,  the  classification  of  retail  licenses,  the 
general  enactments  applicable  to  wholesalers  and  retailers, 
the  special  ones  to  bottlers,  the  penal  provisions,  and  the 
saving  of  local  laws,  are  but  incidents  to  the  main  purpose 
of  the  statute,  which  would  have  been  adequately  expressed 
by  a simple  declaration  of  intent  to  regulate  the  sale  of  in- 
toxicating liquors.” — Endlich,  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Dei- 
bert,  12  C.  C.  R.  504;  s.  c.,  2 P.  D.  R.  446;  2 P.  D.  R.  53. 

The  title  to  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1871,  P.  L.  1096,  en- 
titled “An  Act  entitled  ‘A  supplement  to  an  Act  erecting 
the  village  of  Mount  Joy  and  Richland,  and  their  vicinity,  in 
the  county  of  Lancaster,  into  a borough,  to  be  called  the 
borough  of  Mount  Joy,’  passed  the  tenth  day  of  February, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-one,”  is  sufficient 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


47 


within  the  rule  as  to  original  and  supplemental  legislation. 
In  this  case  the  supplement  put  a charge  upon  the  turn- 
pike: Mount  Joy  v.  Lancaster  Turnpike,  13  Lane.  L.  R.  180. 
The  Act  of  June  1st,  1887,  P.  L.  285,  is  entitled  “A  further 
supplement  to  an  Act,  approved  the  eleventh  day  of  June, 
Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sdventy-nine, 
entitled  ‘A  supplement  to  an  Act  for  the  regulation  of  bor- 
oughs/ approved  the  third  day  of  April,  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  seventy-one,  providing  for  the  adjustment  of 
indebtedness  and  government  of  the  boroughs,  townships, 
and  school  districts  affected  by  changes  of  limits  of  any  bor- 
ough in  the  Commonwealth.”  There  is  no  Act  correspond- 
ing to  the  Act  of  April  3d,  1871,  referred  to  in  this  title;  the 
evident  intention  was  to  amend  the  twenty-third  and  twenty- 
fourth  sections  of  the  General  Borough  Law  of  April  3d, 
1851,  P.  L.  320.  The  title  was  held  sufficient:  Darby  & Col- 
lingdale,  19  C.  C.  R.  315. 

15.  Original  Acts  and  Specific  Supplements  and 
Amendments. 

Where  the  title  of  an  amendatory  or  supplementary  Act  is 
specific  the  maxim  expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius  applies 
as  well  as  it  does  to  the  title  of  an  original  enact- 
ment.1 

1Union  Passenger  Railway  Company’s  Appeal,  81*  Pa. 
St.  91 ; 4 Leg.  Gaz.  381 ; 29  Leg.  Int.  380;  9 Phila.  495;  Phila- 
delphia v.  Spring  Garden  Farmers’  Market  Company,  161 
Pa.  St.  522;  and  see  Sener  v.  Ephrata,  176  Pa.  St.  80;  Rogers 
v.  Glendower  Iron  Works,  17  W.  N.  C.  444;  Evans’s  Appeal, 
152  Pa.  St.  401;  Davey  v.  Ruff  ell,  162  Pa.  St.  443. 

In  Philadelphia  v.  Pepper,  2 C.  C.  R.  287,  an  objection  to 
the  title  of  the  Act  of  June  22d,  1883,  P.  L.  161,  which  was 
a supplementary  Act,  was  overruled.  An  objection  to  the 
Act  on  other  constitutional  grounds  prevailed. 

The  Act  of  June  10th,  1881,  P.  L.  79,  entitled  “A  supple- 
ment to  an  Act  to  amend  and  consolidate  the  several  Acts 
relating  to  game  and  game  fish,  approved  the  third  day  of  June, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-eight,  changing  the 
time  for  hunting  and  killing  deer,  squirrels,  rabbits,  wild  tur- 


48 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


keys,  pheasants,  and  prairie  chickens/’  is  insufficient  in  title 
so  far  as  the  provisions  of  the  said  supplement  relate  to  fish. 
The  specification  in  the  title  of  the  supplementary  Act  does 
not  include  fish,  and  the  Act  is  valid  only  in  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  the  certain  animals  enumerated.  The  maxim  ex- 
pressio  unius,  & c.,  is  applied  in  the  opinion  of  the  court:  Com- 
monwealth v.  Bender,  7 C.  C.  R.  620;  8 W.  N.  C.  73. 

The  Act  of  June  23d,  1885,  P.  L.  141,  was  entitled  “An 
Act  for  the  destruction  of  wolves,  wildcats,  foxes,  minks, 
hawks,  weasels,  and  owls,  in  this  Commonwealth.”  The  Act 
of  May  13th,  1887,  P.  L.  116,  was  entitled  “An  Act  to  repeal 
an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  for  the  destruction  of  wolves,  wild- 
cats, foxes,  minks,  hawks,  weasels,  and  owls,  approved  the 
twenty-third  day  of  June,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
eighty-five/  so  far  as  it  relates  to  foxes,  minks,  hawks,  wea- 
sels, and  owls.”  The  Act  of  April  25th,  1889,  P.  L.  54,  was 
entitled  “An  Act  to  amend  the  provisions  of  the  first  section 
of  an  Act  approved  May  13th,  1887,  entitled  ‘An  Act  for  the 
destruction  of  wolves  and  wildcats.’  ” “The  title  to  the  Act 
as  adopted  not  only  makes  it  amend  an  Act  not  on  the  statute 
books,  but  it  contains  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  bill  has 
anything  to  do  with  foxes  and  minks,  the  real  subject  of  the 
Act:”  Barker,  J.,  Sanders  v.  Cambria  County,  16  C.  C.  R. 
94;  s.  c.,  4 P.  D.  R.  241. 

16.  Repeal  and  Re-enactment. 

The  Act  of  May  13th,  1887,  P.  L.  108,  is  entitled  “An  Act 
to  regulate  and  restrain  the  sale  of  vinous  and  spirituous, 
malt  or  brewed  liquors,  or  any  admixture  thereof.”  This 
Act  in  Section  19  provides  that  all  local  laws  fixing  a license 
rate  or  fee  less  than  is  provided  for  in  this  Act  are  repealed. 
It  was  objected  that  this  title  was  insufficient  to  give  notice 
of  the  repeal  of  local  liquor  laws.  The  contrary  was  held  by 
the  court  below,1  whose  judgment  was  affirmed  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  a per  curiam  opinion.2  The  Act  of  April  7th, 
1877,  P.  L.  83,  was  entitled  “A  further  supplement  to  an  Act  to 
incorporate  the  city  of  Scranton,”  and  provided  for  the  repeal  of 
a clause  of  a special  Act  relating  to  the  collection  of  taxes  in 
said  city.  The  title  was  held  insufficient  to  cover  such  repeal,  in 
an  opinion  of  the  court  below  on  a motion  for  a preliminary 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


49 


injunction,  arid  the  order  was  affirmed  on  appeal  in  a per 
curiam  opinion.  Other  points  were  involved  in  the  case.3 
The  Act  of  June  13th,  1883,  P.  L.  116,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
amend  the  first  section  of  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  for  the 
better  protection  of  the  wages  of  mechanics,  miners,  labor- 
ers, and  others,  approved  the  9th  day  of  April,  1872/  amend- 
ing said  Act  so  that  the  wages  of  servant  girls,  washer- 
women, clerks,  and  others  shall  be  preferred,  and  first  paid 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  the  property  of  insolvent 
debtors  owing  wages  to  such  servants  or  employes,”  enlarged 
the  class  of  wage  claimants  and  re-enacted  a provision  of  the 
Act  of  1872,  requiring  the  filing  of  the  claim  in  the  prothon- 
otary’s  office,  which  had  been  repealed  by  an  Act  of  1874.  It 
was  held  that  the  title  of  the  Act  of  1883  gave  no  notice  of  an 
intention  to  repeal  the  repealing  Act  of  1874,  nor  to  impose 
any  restrictions  upon  wage  claimants,  and  that  therefore 
such  provisions  were  void,  and  as  to  them  the  title  was  mis- 
leading.4 The  Act  of  May  24th,  1893,  P.  L.  124,  entitled 
“An  Act  to  abolish  the  commissioners  of  public  buildings, 
and  to  place  all  public  buildings  heretofore  under  the  con- 
trol of  such  commissioners  under  the  control  of  the  depart- 
ment of  public  works  in  cities  of  the  first  class,”  which  by 
such  title  and  its  first  section  purported  the  abolition  of  the 
said  commissioners — i.  e.,  the  vacation  of  their  offices,  and  the 
transfer  of  the  control  to  the  department  of  public  works, 
thereby  attempting  to  vest  the  powers  of  the  commissioners 
in  such  department,  and  which  in  its  second  section  at- 
tempted to  repeal  the  Act  of  August  5th,  1870,  whereby  the 
commission  was  created  and  its  powers  defined,  was  held  in- 
valid, because  the  latter  purpose  was  not  expressed  in  the 
title,  which  purported  the  contrary,  and  because  the  object 
expressed  in  the  title  was  contrary  to  other  provisions  of 
the  Constitution.5  The  title  of  the  Act  of  June  3d,  1887,  P. 
L.  337,  purported  it  to  be  a supplement  to  an  Act  of  June 
13th,  1883,  which  in  its  title  purported  to  be  an  amendment 
to  the  Act  of  April  9th,  1872.  The  title  of  the  Act  of  1887 
4 


50 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


concluded  “providing  for  the  manner  of  collecting  claims 
when  liens  have  been  filed  against  the  real  estate  of  employ- 
ers.” Section  i of  said  Act  of  1887  recited  the  provision  of 
the  Act  of  1882,  relating  to  the  filing  of  liens  in  the  pro- 
thonotary’s  office,  which  had  been  repealed  by  an  Act  of 
1874,  and  re-enacted  the  same  with  amendments.  The  title 
was  held  sufficient,  and  the  Act  was  held  to  repeal,  by  impli- 
cation, the  Act  of  1 874.°  In  Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,1 * 3 4 5 6 7 
there  was  in  question  an  original  enactment  of  1874,  a sup- 
plement of  1878  re-enacting  and  amending  certain  provisions 
of  the  Act  of  1874,  and  thus  repealing  them,  save  in  so  far  as 
re-enacted;  a supplement  of  1883  to  the  Act  of  1874  not  no- 
ticing the  modifications  effected  by  the  Act  of  1878,  but  re- 
enacting the  original  provisions;  and  a later  Act  of  1889  again 
quoting  the  Act  of  1874  without  reference  to  the  provisions 
of  the  Acts  of  1878  and  1883.  It  was  held  that  the  legisla- 
tion might  all  stand,  the  later  provisions  being  given  effect 
in  order,  and  that  the  title  of  the  Act  of  1878,  P.  L.  51,  en- 
titled “A  supplement  to  an  Act  entitled  'An  Act  to  prescribe 
the  manner  in  which  the  courts  may  divide  boroughs  into 
wards,’  approved  the  14th  day  of  May,  1874,”  was  sufficient 
to  give  notice  of  repeal  of  inconsistent  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  1874,  which  repeal  was  expressed  in  general  terms. 

1 Commonwealth  v.  McCandless,  4 C.  C.  R.  119. 

Commonwealth  v.  McCandless,  21  W.  N.  C.  162;  10  Cent. 
Rep.  758. 

3Ruth’s  Appeal,  io  W.  N.  C.  498;  8 Lane.  L.  R.  264;  1 
Lack.  Leg.  Rec.  31 1. 

4Evans’s  Appeal,  152  Pa.  St.  401. 

5Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554;  156  Pa.  St.  539. 

6Evans’s  Appeal,  152  Pa.  St.  401;  and  see  Rogers  v.  Glen- 
dower  Iron  Works,  17  W.  N.  C.  444. 

7 Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,  159  Pa.  St.  451;  and  see  Ridge 
Avenue  Passenger  Railway  Company  v.  Philadelphia,  124 
Pa.  St.  219;  23  W.  N.  C.  324;  Philadelphia  v.  Ridge  Avenue 
Passenger  Railway  Company,  142  Pa.  St.  484;  6 C.  C.  R.  283; 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


51 


Union  Passenger  Railway  Company’s  Appeal,  81*  Pa.  St. 
91;  4 Leg.  Gaz.  381;  29  Leg.  Int.  380;  9 Phil.  495;  Philadel- 
phia v.  Spring  Garden  Farmers’  Market,  161  Pa.  St.  522;  Bit- 
tinger’s  Estate,  129  Pa.  St.  338;  Del  Busto’s  Estate,  23  W. 
N.  C.  111;  South  Bethlehem  v.  Hemingway,  16  C.  C.  R.  103; 
Commonwealth  v.  Morgan,  178  Pa.  St.  198;  Commonwealth 
v.  Williams,  178  Pa.  St.  21 1;  Commonwealth  v.  Rynkiewicz, 
178  Pa.  St.  213;  Commonwealth  v.  Shoemaker,  178  Pa.  St. 
214;  Commonwealth  v.  Toomey,  178  Pa.  St.  215;  Common- 
wealth v.  Van  Loon,  4 Kulp,  338;  Commonwealth  v.  Dol- 
phin, 2 C.  P.  Rep.  85. 

The  Act  of  May  21st,  1879,  P.  L.  72,  entitled  “An  Act  re- 
pealing Section  7 of  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  carry  into 
effect  Section  5 of  Article  XIV,  of  the  Constitution,  relative 
to  the  salaries  of  county  officers  and  the  payment  of  fees  re- 
ceived by  them  into  the  State  or  county  treasury,  in  counties 
containing  over  150,000  inhabitants,  approved  the  thirty-first 
day  of  March,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy-six,’  and  also  repealing  the  supplement  to  said  Act, 
approved  the  23d  day  of  March,  1877,  and  conferring  upon 
councils  and  cities  of  the  first  class  the  power  of  fixing  the 
number  and  salaries  of  certain  employes,”  contains  “three 
distinct  subjects  in  one  title:  First,  repeal  of  Section  7 of  the 
Act  of  1876;  Second,  repeal  of  the  supplement  of  1877;  and 
third,  giving  councils  of  cities  of  the  first  class  power  to  fix 
the  number  and  salaries  of  certain  employes  . . . the  title 
is  misleading  and  fails  to  give  notice  of  the  legislative  pur- 
pose:” Collier,  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Mercer,  9 C.  C.  R. 
461. 

The  Act  of  March  16th,  1868,  P.  L.  352,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  boroughs  in  the  county  of  Chester,”  repealed  cer- 
tain provisions  of  the  General  Borough  Law  of  1851,  and  its 
supplement  of  1856.  The  title  was  held  sufficient  to  cover 
such  repealing  provisions:  Nutt’s  Avenue,  2 Chester  Co.  49. 

The  title  of  the  Act  of  June  26th,  1895,  P.  L.  343,  enti- 
tled “An  Act  relative  to  bonds,  undertakings,  recognizances, 
guarantees,  and  other  obligations  required  or  permitted  to  be 
made,  given,  tendered,  or  filed  with  surety  or  sureties,  and  to 
the  acceptance  as  surety  or  guarantor  thereupon  of  com- 
panies qualified  to  act  as  such,”  is  insufficient  to  cover  pro- 


52 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


visions  operating  to  repeal  prior  Acts  relating  to  sureties: 
American  Banking  & Trust  Company’s  Petition,  O.  C.  Phila. 
37  W.  N.  C.  297. 

17.  Provisos,  Exceptions,  and  Exemptions. 

A proviso  inconsistent  with  the  title  is  inoperative.1 

1Sewickley  Borough  v.  Sholes,  118  Pa.  St.  165. 

The  Act  of  April  15th,  1891,  P.  L.  17,  was  entitled,  “An 
Act  to  provide  for  an  appeal  by  county  commissioners,  cities, 
or  other  municipalities,  and  all  persons  interested  in  the  dam- 
ages awarded  for  laying  out,  widening,  grading,  opening, 
or  changing  the  lines  or  grades  of  any  public  street,  road,  or 
alley  in  this  Commonwealth,  from  the  decree  of  the  Court  of 
Quarter  Sessions  confirming  the  report  of  the  viewers  assess- 
ing such  damages.”  To  the  first  section  was  added:  “Pro- 

vided, The  appeal  be  taken  within  thirty  days  after  the  final 
confirmation  of  the  report  of  said  jury;  provided,  that  notice 
be  given  to  the  commissioners  of  the  proper  county  or  their 
clerk  of  the  time  and  place  of  holding  such  view.”  The  latter 
proviso  was  held  to  be  void,  because  not  expressed  in  the 
title.  “In  reading  the  title  any  legislator,  commissioner,  or 
other  person  interested,  could  not  know  or  surmise  that  any- 
thing in  the  bill  referred  to  any  proceeding  prior  to  the  time 
of  the  appeal:”  Willard,  J.,  Road  in  Otto  Township,  2 
Super.  Ct.  20.  Affirmed,  181  Pa.  St.  390;  38  W.  N.  C.  328. 

The  Act  of  May  7th,  1891,  P.  L.  44,  was  entitled  “An  Act 
amending  an  Act,  entitled  'An  Act  to  enable  laborers  to  se- 
cure and  collect  their  pay  for  work  done  in  and  about  the 
stocking  of  saw  logs,’  approved  June  twelfth,  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  seventy-nine,  and  further  providing  that 
the  same  shall  apply  to  the  hewing,  making,  and  hauling  of 
square  timber,  and  the  peeling,  skidding,  and  hauling  of 
bark.”  A proviso  to  the  Act  is  that  “When  work  as  aforesaid 
shall  have  been  done  for  a contractor  or  contractors,  and  not 
for  the  owner  or  owners  of  said  saw  logs,  square  timber,  or 
bark,  all  moneys  due  as  aforesaid  shall  be  preferred  and  paid 
to  laborers  as  aforesaid,  and  any  payment  or  payments  so 
made  shall  be  a good  charge  against  the  contractor  or  con- 
tractors in  favor  of  the  owner  or  owners  in  settlement  of  their 
account.”  It  was  claimed  that  this  proviso  sought  to  in- 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


53 


troduce  a new  subject  not  contained  in  the  Act  of  1879,  or 
suggested  by  its  title.  “An  examination  of  the  original  Act, 
however,  shows  that  the  proviso  is  practically  an  amendment 
of  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act,  and  extends  the  general  pro- 
visions of  the  Act  as  to  preference  and  payment  to  laborers 
who  work  for  a contractor  or  contractors,  as  well  as  those 
who  work  for  the  owner  or  owners.  It  introduces  no  new 
subject  into  the  Act,  and  the  title  clearly  and  fully  covers  all 
that  is  contained  in  it:”  Beaver,  J.,  Hofifa’s  Appeal,  1 Su- 
per.  Ct.  357. 

The  Act  of  July  2d,  1895,  P.  L.  428,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
regulate  and  license  public  lodging  houses  in  the  different 
cities  of  this  Commonwealth,”  excepts  from  its  provisions 
wayfarers’  lodges  operated  under  the  Act  of  June  13th,  1883, 
P.  L.  101.  This  Act  was  sustained  in  Commonwealth  v. 
Muir,  1 Super.  Ct.  578.  Affirmed,  180  Pa.  St.  47. 

By  the  terms  of  Section  20  of  the  Act  of  June  30th,  1885, 
P.  L.  193,  entitled  “A  further  supplement  to  an  Act,  enti- 
tled ‘An  Act  to  provide  revenue  by  taxation,’  approved  the 
seventh  day  of  June,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  sev- 
enty-nine,” taxes  laid  upon  manufacturing  corporations  were 
abolished,  except  as  to  corporations  engaged  in  the  manu- 
facture of  malt,  spirituous,  or  vinous  liquors,  or  in  the  manu- 
facture of  gas.  The  title  of  this  Act  was  held  to  be  sufficient 
notwithstanding:  Sanderson  v.  Commissioners,  1 C.  C.  R. 
342;  Hawes  Manufacturing  Company’s  Appeal,  1 Monaghan, 
353. 

The  Act  of  April  9th,  1870,  P.  L.  1068,  was  entitled  “An 
Act  to  punish  the  sale  and  traffic  in  mineral  water  bottles  and 
other  bottles,  and  for  the  protection  of  bottlers  and  venders 
of  mineral  waters  and  other  beverages  in  this  Common- 
wealth.” In  the  second  section  of  the  Act  there  was  a pro- 
viso that  the  Act  should  “apply  only  to  the  city  of  Philadel- 
phia,” the  title  was  held  to  be  insufficient  and  misleading, 
in  a case  arising  in  Philadelphia,  by  reason  of  the  difference 
between  the  title  and  the  proviso  affecting  the  territorial 
scope  of  the  Act:  Commonwealth  v.  Farley,  6 C.  C.  R.  433; 
46  Leg.  Int.  108. 

18.  Appropriation  Bills. 

Related  to  Article  III,  Section  3,  is  Article  III,  Section 
15,  which  provides:  “The  general  appropriation  bill  shall 


54 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


embrace  nothing  but  appropriations  for  the  ordinary  ex- 
penses of  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  departments 
of  the  Commonwealth,  interest  on  the  public  debt  and  for 
the  public  schools;  all  other  appropriations  shall  be  made  by 
separate  bills,  each  embracing  but  one  subject.” 

The  general  appropriation  Act  of  1893,  P.  L.  308,  con- 
tained the  following  item:  “For  the  payment  of  the  salary 

of  a clerk  in  the  offices  of  the  prothonotaries  of  the  Supreme 
Court  for  the  Eastern  and  Western  Districts,  respectively, 
two  years,  the  sum  of  four  thousand  eight  hundred  dollars, 
or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary.” 

Upon  a mandamus  against  the  Auditor-General  the  ques- 
tion stated  for  the  judgment  of  the  court  was  whether  or 
not,  under  the  terms  of  the  said  Act,  the  appropriation  there- 
in made  for  a clerk  in  the  office  of  the  prothonotaries  of  the 
Supreme  Court  for  the  Eastern  and  Western  Districts,  re- 
spectively, may  be  lawfully  paid  by  the  auditing  and  fiscal 
officers  of  the  Commonwealth  without  further  legislation 
formally  establishing  such  an  office.  By  the  judgment  of  the 
Supreme  Court  a mandamus  was  awarded.1  Mr.  Justice 
Mitchell,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said:  “It 

is  uncontroverted,  therefore,  that  the  Legislature  could  do 
the  substantial  thing,  and  the  only  question  is  whether  it 
could  do  it  in  the  present  form.  In  general  it  will  not  be  dis- 
puted that  the  Legislature  is  the  exclusive  judge  of  the  form 
in  which  its  enactment  shall  be  put,  and  its  mandate  in  that 
respect  cannot  be  questioned  unless  it  transgresses  a plain 
prohibition  in  the  Constitution.  The  only  provision  invoked 
here  is  Section  15,  of  Article  III,  'the  general  appropriation 
bill  shall  embrace  nothing  but  appropriations  for  the  ordi- 
nary expenses  of  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  de- 
partments of  the  Commonwealth,’  etc.  The  history  and  pur- 
pose of  that  section  are  well  known.  It  was  aimed  at  the 
objectionable  practice  of  putting  a measure  of  doubtful 
strength  on  its  own  merits,  into  the  general  appropriation 
bill,  in  legislative  phrase  tacking  it  on  as  a rider,  in  order  to 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


55 


* 

compel  members  to  vote  for  it  or  bring  the  wheels  of  gov- 
ernment to  a stop.  The  same  constitutional  intent  is  em- 
bodied in  Section  16  of  Article  IV,  giving  the  Governor  po  wer 
to  disapprove  separate  items  of  appropriation  bills.  It  is  the 
practice  of  thus  forcing  the  passage  of  extraneous  matters 
not  germane  to  the  purpose  of  the  bill  itself  that  was  in- 
tended to  be  abolished.  As  to  general  legislation  the  same 
object  among  others  was  secured  by  the  provision  of  Section 
3 of  Article  III,  that  ‘no  bill,  except  general  appropriation 
bills,  shall  be  passed,  containing  more  than  one  subject.’ 
General  appropriation  bills  from  their  nature  usually  cover  a 
number  of  items,  not  all  relating  strictly  to  one  subject.  They 
were,  therefore,  excepted  from  the  requirement  of  Section  3, 
and  this  exception  necessitated  the  special  Section  15  re- 
lating to  them.  The  object  of  both  is  the  same.  Is  the 
present  measure  within  the  mischief  that  was  intended  to  be 
prohibited?  The  instances  cited  by  the  appellant  covering  a 
period  of  twenty  years  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu- 
tion show  the  legislative  understanding  on  the  subject,  and 
we  may  fairly  infer  that  of  the  executive  also,  as  the  various 
Acts  cited  were  approved  by  the  Governors.  Such  under- 
standing and  practice  are  not,  of  course,  binding  on  the  ju- 
diciary, who  are  the  ultimate  authority  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  Constitution;  but,  as  the  view  of  the  two  co-ordinate 
branches  of  the  government,  they  are  entitled  to  respectful 
consideration  and  persuasive  force  if  the  matter  be  at  all  in 
doubt. 

“It  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  Constitution  meant  to  com- 
pel the  Legislature  even  to  supervise  all  the  details  of  the 
government.  That  is  properly  the  function  of  the  executive 
and  judicial  branches.  What  work  there  is  to  be  done,  and 
what  clerical  force  there  is  to  do  it,  is  a question  of  detail  as  to 
which  much  must  necessarily  be  left  to  the  head  of  each  depart- 
ment. It  is  clearly  the  executive  province  to  keep  a general 
control  over  the  expenditure  of  the  public  funds,  but  this  it 
does  so  long  as  no  money  is  paid  out  without  a previous  ap- 


56 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


propriation  for  that  purpose.  Wftile  it  thus  holds  the  purse 
strings  it  controls  the  whole  subject  as  completely  as  its 
proper  functions  under  the  Constitution  demand.  In  pass- 
ing general  appropriation  bills  the  Constitution  limits  them 
to  the  ‘ordinary  expenses  of  the  executive,  legislative,  and 
judicial  departments,’  and  some  other  enumerated  matters, 
and  every  valid  appropriation  in  this  form  must  appear  to  be 
reasonably  with  the  description  of  ‘ordinary  expenses,’ 
but  it  would  be  sticking  in  the  bark  to  require  a separate  bill 
to  be  passed  every  time  an  additional  clerk  was  to  be  ap- 
pointed in  a public  department.  In  regard  to  the  particular 
item  under  consideration,  it  appears  to  be  intended  to  pay 
for  part  of  the  regular  and  ordinary  work  of  the  offices  named, 
and  therefore  to  be  for  their  ordinary  expenses.  It  is  a rec- 
ognition by  the  Legislature  that  the  prothonotary  cannot  do 
the  whole  work  of  his  office  proprio  manu,  and  an  authority 
to  him  to  have  a portion  of  it  done  at  the  public  cost.  By 
such  recognition  and  authority  it  becomes  a part  of  the  or- 
dinary expenses  of  his  office,  and  that  his  office  is  a part  of  the 
judicial  department  of  the  Commonwealth  does  not  admit  of 
question.  As  already  said,  it  is  conceded  on  all  hands  that 
the  Legislature  had  ample  power  to  do  the  substantial  thing 
that  it  did,  to  wit,  to  authorize  the  appointment  of  a clerk 
in  the  office  of  the  prothonotary  and  provide  for  his  salary 
out  of  the  public  treasury,  and  as  the  purpose  of  such  ap- 
pointment and  the  duties  of  the  appointee  were  to  secure  the 
performance  of  the  regular  and  ordinary  work  of  the  office, 
we  are  of  opinion  that  the  Legislature  might  constitutionally 
do  it  in  the  form  they  did,  by  an  item  in  the  general  appro- 
priation bill  for  the  judicial  department.” 

1 Commonwealth  v.  Gregg,  161  Pa.  St.  582. 


II. 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE 

TO 

FORMER  LEGISLATION. 


Art.  Ill,  Sec.  6.  No  law  shall  be  revived,  amended,  or  the 
provisions  thereof  extended,  or  conferred,  by  a reference  to 
its  title  only;  but  so  much  thereof  as  is  revived,  amended, 
extended,  or  conferred  shall  be  re-enacted  and  published  at 
length.  Constitution. 


CONTENTS. 


1.  The  object  of  the  provision. 

2.  The  provision  is  mandatory. 

3.  It  is  not  necessary  to  recite  at  length  the  pre-existing 

statute,  or  portions  thereof,  the  provisions  of  which 
are  revived,  amended,  extended,  or  conferred. 

4.  Express  amendments  by  way  of  addition  must  recite, 

in  full,  the  provisions  to  which  the  additions  are 
made. 

5.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  independent  enact- 

ments. 

6.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  supplements. 

7.  The  provision  does  not  apply  to  repeals. 

8.  The  provision  does  not  apply  in  cases  of  revival  of  a 

pre-existing  statute  by  reason  of  the  repeal  of  a re- 
pealing Act. 

9.  Independent  enactments  referring  to  pre-existing 

law. 

10.  The  provision  cannot  be  evaded  by  an  expository 

statute. 

11.  Re-enactment  of  former  statute  by  way  of  amend- 

ment, without  regarding  intervening  repeal  or 
amendment. 

12.  Making  a local  statute  general  where  the  local  stat- 

ute, enacted  prior  to  1874,  extended  the  provisions 
of  a pre-existing  statute. 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE 


TO 

FORMER  LEGISLATION. 


i.  The  Object  of  the  Provision. 

“The  constitutional  provision  has  reference  to  express 
amendments  only.  Its  object,  like  that  of  Section  2 [3]  of 
the  same  Article,  requiring  each  Act  to  have  its  subject 
clearly  expressed  in  its  title,  was  to  secure  to  the  legislators 
themselves  and  others  interested,  direct  notice  in  immediate 
connection  with  proposed  legislation  of  its  object  and  pur- 
pose.”1 “The  mischief  designed  to  be  remedied  was  the  en- 
actment of  amendatory  statutes  in  terms  so  blind  that  legis- 
lators themselves  were  sometimes  deceived  in  regard  to  their 
effect,  and  the  public,  from  the  difficulty  in  making  compari- 
son, failed  to  become  apprised  of  the  changes  made  in  the 
laws.”2  Enactments  should  be  self-explanatory  and  self-sus- 
taining.3 

1Per  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell,  Stuart’s  Appeal,  163  Pa.  St. 
210. 

2Cooley,  J.,  in  People  v.  Mahaney,  13  Michigan,  197. 
Quoted  by  White,  J.,  the  writer  of  Article  III,  Section  6; 
Purvis  v.  Ross,  12  C.  C.  R.  193. 

3Barrett’s  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  486;  Titusville  Iron  Works 
v.  Keystone  Oil  Company,  122  Pa.  St.  627. 

It  is  said  in  the  syllabus,  Norristown  v.  Citizens’  Passen- 
ger Railway  Company,  148  Pa.  St.  87,  that  the  provision  in 
question  applies  to  borough  ordinances  for  the  reason  that 
borough  councils  cannot  do  what  the  Legislature  is  forbid- 
den to  do.  Such  a dictum  is  found  in  the  opinion  of  the  court 

61 


62 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


below,  together  with  other  reasons,  probably  sufficient  to  sus- 
tain the  judgment,  which  was  affirmed  in  a per  curiam  opin- 
ion. There  is  an  obvious  distinction  between  limitations 
upon  legislative  forms  and  limitations  upon  legislative  power. 
Nor  does  it  follow  that  limitations  such  as  these  upon  the 
General  Assembly  are  also  limitations  upon  the  legislative 
authorities  of  municipalities.  See  Baldwin  v.  Philadelphia, 
99  Pa.  St.  164;  Klingler  v.  Bickel,  117  Pa.  St.  326;  McCor- 
mick v.  Fayette  County,  150  Pa.  St.  190. 

2.  The  Provision  is  Mandatory. 

That  the  provision  is  mandatory  is  shown  by  all  of  the  de- 
cided cases  in  which  a statute  has  been  declared  void  for  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  the  constitutional  requirement. 

3.  It  is  not  Necessary  to  Recite  at  Length  the 

Pre-existing  Statute,  or  Portions  Thereof, 
the  Provisions  of  Which  are  Revived, 
Amended,  Extended,  or  Conferred. 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1881,  P.  L.  60,  was  entitled  an  Act 
declaratory  of  the  meaning  of  and  amending  the  thirteenth 
section  of  another  Act,  the  title  of  which  was  recited,  ap- 
proved May  23d,  1874.  The  Act  of  1881,  which  contained 
but  one  section,  declared  that  the  thirteenth  section  of  the 
Act,  the  title  of  which  was  again  recited,  is  hereby  amended, 
and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  true  intent  and  meaning 
of  the  same  is  and  shall  be  as  follows:  Amended  Section  13 
was  then  set  forth  without  more.  The  Act  did  not  recite 
Section  13  of  the  pre-existing  Act  of  1874.  Said  Mr.  Justice 
Paxson,  referring  to  Section  13  of  the  Act  of  1874,  P.  L.  231 : 
“As  this  section,  however,  is  expressly  repealed  by  the  Act 
of  June  8th,  1881,  P.  L.  68  [60]  we  need  not  further  refer 
to  it.  The  said  Act  of  June  8th,  1881,  repeals,  though  in  the 
most  bungling  manner,  the  thirteenth  section  of  the  Act  of 
1874.  The  title  as  well  as  the  body  of  said  Act  professes  to 
•declare  the  meaning  of  the  said  section  of  the  Act  of  1874, 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


63 


and  if  this  were  all,  the  Act  of  1881  would  conflict  with  Sec- 
tion 6 of  Article  III  of  the  Constitution,  which  declares  that 
‘no  law  shall  be  revived,  amended,  or  the  provisions  thereof 
extended  or  conferred  by  a reference  to  its  title  only,  but  so 
much  thereof  as  is  revived,  amended,  extended,  or  conferred 
shall  be  re-enacted  and  published  at  length.’  It  is  for  the 
courts  to  declare  the  ‘meaning’  of  an  Act  of  the  Legislature. 
But  the  Act  of  1881  goes  further  and  amends  the  thirteenth 
section  of  the  Act  of  1874,  and  we  may  reject  as  surplusage, 
or  harmless  verbiage,  so  much  of  it  as  professes  to  attach  a 
meaning  to  the  Act  of  1874.”1  Reference  to  the  Act  of  1881, 
P.  L.  60,  will  show  that  it  contains  no  words  of  repeal.  The 
express  repeal  referred  to  by  the  learned  justice  is  that  which 
follows  as  the  consequence  of  the  enactment  of  an  amended 
and  superseding  section. 

The  Act  of  June  10th,  1881,  P.  L.  86,  entitled  “A  supple- 
ment to  an  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  provide  revenue  by  taxa- 
tion, approved  the  seventh  day  of  June,  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  seventy-nine,’  ” “does  not  violate  the  provision 
in  question;  the  recital  at  length  of  the  provision  to  be 
amended  is  unnecessary;  it  is  sufficient  if  the  law  in  its 
amended  form  is  re-enacted  and  published  at  length.”2 

2East  Grant  Street,  121  Pa.  St.  596. 

2Per  Acheson,  J.,  Second  National  Bank  of  Titusville  v. 
Caldwell,  39  Leg.  Int.  414;  s.  c.,  13  Fed.  Rep.  429. 

s.  p.  Commonwealth  v.  Fleckner,  17  C.  C.  R.  671,  8 Kulp, 
225,  a case  arising  on  the  Act  of  June  12th,  1878,  P.  L.  196, 
supplementary  to  the  Act  of  March  31st,  i860,  by  amending 
the  116th,  117th,  118th,  and  119th  sections.  The  sections 
were  not  recited  at  length,  but  the  Act  of  1878  in  separate 
sections  referring  to  them  respectively  declared  that  they  were 
thereby  amended  so  as  to  read  as  follows: — thereupon  setting 
forth  each  section  as  amended.  And  see  Loftus  v.  Farmers’ 
and  Mechanics’  National  Bank,  133  Pa.  St.  97;  opinion  of 
court  below,  page  101 ; s.  c.,  25  W.  N.  C.  459;  46  L.  I.  46;  Act 
of  March  19th,  1875,  P.  L.  24:  Wilson  v.  Downing,  4 Super. 
Ct.  487;  Act  of  May  24th,  1878,  P.  L.  134. 


64 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


4.  Express  Amendments  by  way  of  Addition  Must 

Recite  in  Full  the  Provision  to  Which  the 

Addition  is  Made. 

The  Act  of  May  1st,  1876,  P.  L.  93,  provided  that  the 
second  section  of  the  Act  of  April  16th,  1875,  P.  L.  55,  which 
was  recited  by  its  title,  “be  amended  by  adding  thereto  as 
follows:”  Here  followed  the  amendment  which  included 
only  the  matter  to  be  added  to  the  section  without  a recital 
of  the  section  itself.  This  Act  was  held  void  because  it  failed 
to  re-enact  and  publish  at  length  so  much  of  the  Act  of  1875 
as  was  amended.1 

Barrett’s  Appeal,  116  Pa.  St.  486;  and  see  Loftus  v.  Farm- 
ers’ and  Mechanics’  National  Bank,  133  Pa.  St.  97;  opinion  of 
court  below,  page  101;  s.  c.,  25  W.  N.  C.  459;  46  L.  I.  46. 

5.  The  Provision  Does  Not  Apply  to  Independent 

Enactments. 

The  eleventh  elapse  of  Section  1 of  Article  VII  of  the  Act 
of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  208,  contained  provisions  as  to  grad- 
ing, paving,  and  curbing  of  streets.  These  provisions  were 
made  simply  and  affirmatively  without  any  express  reference 
to  other  legislation.  It  was  objected  that  this  clause  was 
invalid  because  it  was  an  extension  or  amendment  of  a pro- 
vision of  the  Act  of  June  2d,  1874,  which  was  not  published 
at  length;  “but  the  eleventh  clause  of  Section  1 of  Article 
VII  of  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  is  neither  a revival,  an 
amendment,  an  extension,  or  a conferring  in  the  sense  of  the 
Constitution;  it  is  part  of  an  Act  of  the  General  Assembly, 
which  is  itself  the  highest  exercise  of  legislative  power,  and 
repeals  Acts  inconsistent  with  itself,  or  supplied  by  its  pro- 
visions. The  objection,  therefore,  is  not  applicable.”1  The 
Act  in  question  was  subsequently  declared  invalid  as  a classi- 
fication Act.2 

The  Act  of  June  1st,  1879,  P.  L.  150,  entitled  “A  supple- 
ment to  an  Act  for  the  regulation  of  boroughs,  approved  the 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


65 


3d  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1851,”  vested  in  the  courts  of  Quarter 
Sessions  power  to  alter  the  limits  of  any  borough  incorpo- 
rated under  the  general  borough  law,  and  provided  a 
method  of  procedure  in  such  cases.  This  method  of  pro- 
cedure was  practically  a re-enactment  of  the  provisions  of  a 
former  statute  not  referred  to  in  the  Act  of  1879,  which  was 
held  to  be  a valid  Act.3 

xPer  Gibson,  J.,  Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg,  4 C.  C.  R.  86. 

2Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

3Pottstown  Borough,  1 Montgomery  County,  161,  Id.  189, 
1 17  Pa.  St.  538;  s.  p.,  Lansdale  Borough,  1 Montgomery 
County,  192. 

6.  The  Provision  Does  not  Apply  to  Supplements. 

The  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  P.  L.  15,  was  entitled  a sup- 
plement to  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  relating  to  the  classi- 
fication of  cities  and  contained  six  sections  in  the  form  of 
original  enactments  upon  various  matters.  “The  objection, 
which  seeks  to  break  down  the  whole  of  the  Act  of  1875,  that 
it  violates  Section  6,  Article  III  of  the  Constitution  in  that 
it  is  amendatory  of  the  Act  of  1874,  and,  therefore,  im- 
properly drawn,  because  the  Act  of  1874  is  not  re-enacted 
and  published  at  length,  is  not  well  taken.  Simply  because 
a law,  properly  expressed  by  title  as  a supplement  to  an  Act, 
the  title  of  which  is  fully  set  forth,  by  construction  is  inci- 
dentally amendatory  of  the  previous  Act,  or  even  necessarily 
so  when  germane  to  the  whole  subject-matter,  is  therefore 
within  the  provision  of  the  sixth  section,  Article  III,  would 
be  a construction  which  would  create  a greater  evil  than  that 
section  was  sought  to  remedy.  All  supplements  are  more  or 
less  amendatory.  It  was  never  intended  that,  because  an 
Act  had  this  character,  it  must  necessarily  include  all  ver- 
biage of  previous  legislation  within  its  language.  The  object 
of  the  section  was  to  give  a clear  idea  to  legislators  and  citi- 
zens of  what  was  intended  as  law,  and  to  prevent  the  cover- 
5 


66 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


in g up  of  a design  by  reference  to  title  only.”1  The  revenue 
Act  of  June  30th,  1885,  P.  L.  193,  abolished  taxes  on  manu- 
facturing corporations  with  some  exceptions.  It  was  ob- 
jected that  this  was  in  violation  of  the  provision  in  question, 
but  the  objection  was  overruled  in  the  following  language: 
“We  apprehend  that  the  Legislature  complied  wholly  with  the 
spirit  of  Section  6,  Article  III,  in  thus  stating  their  intention. 
Clearness  of  apprehension  was  the  object  sought  by  that  sec- 
tion. An  exact  and  literal  repetition  of  all  the  revenue  laws 
in  the  body  of  this  section,  and  a re-enacting  of  them,  leaving 
out  the  manufacturing  companies,  would  rather  tend  to  con- 
fusion and  want  of  clearness.  If  such  were  to  be  the  rule, 
the  repealing  clause  appended  to  Acts  of  Assembly  would 
have  no  force.  As  we  said,  Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Connolly 
v.  Plalstead  (preceding  case),  decided  at  this  term,  every  sup- 
plement to  an  Act  is,  in  a sense,  amendatory.  The  sixth  sec- 
tion of  Article  III  sought  to  remedy  an  evil,  not  create  one.”2 
Where  the  real  purpose  is  to  amend  or  extend  the  provisions 
of  a former  statute  the  constitutional  provision  is  not  evaded 
by  styling  the  Act  a supplement,  thus,  the  Act  of  June  8th, 
1891,  P.  L.  247,  is  entitled  “A  further  supplement  to  an  Act, 
entitled  ‘An  Act  extending  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of 
this  Commonwealth  in  cases  of  divorce,  approved  the  ninth 
day  of  March,  A.  D.  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty- 
five.’  ” It  enacts  that  the  jurisdiction  conferred  in  and  by 
said  Act  to  which  it  is  a supplement  “is  hereby  extended  to 
all  cases  of  divorce,  from  the  bonds  of  matrimony  and. from 
bed  and  board,  and  for  the  causes  therein  mentioned,  when 
it  shall  be  shown,”  etc.  The  Act  was  held  invalid.3 

1Hand,  P.  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  1 C.  C.  R.  335; 
s.  c.,  2 C.  P.  Rep.  247. 

2Hand,  P.  J.,  Sanderson  v.  Commissioners,  1 C.  C.  R.  342. 

3Oakley  v.  Oakley,  1 P.  D.  R.  781;  s.  c.,  11  C.  C.  R.  572; 
Burdick  v.  Burdick,  2 P.  D.  R.  622;  see  generally  Pottstown 
Borough,  1 Montgomery  County,  161;  Id.  189;  Lansdale 
Borough,  1 Montgomery  County,  192. 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


67 


7.  The  Provision  Does  not  Apply  to  Repeals. 

A section  enacted  at  length  intended  to  supply  or  amend  a 
corresponding  section  of  a pre-existing  statute  and  thus  op- 
erating by  way  of  repeal  of  such  pre-existing  statute  need  not 
be  accompanied  by  a recital  at  length  of  such  pre-existing 
section.1  Neither  is  it  necessary  that  an  independent  enact- 
ment, either  original  or  by  way  of  supplement,  which  in  ef- 
fect repeals  pre-existing  statutes,  should  recite  or  refer  to 
such  pre-existing  statutes.2  Nor  does  the  provision  in  ques- 
tion apply  to  a repealing  statute,  which  in  terms  repeals,  by 
reference  to  its  title  only,  a previous  statute.3 

xEast  Grant  Street,  12 1 Pa.  St.  596;  Evans’s  Appeal,  152 
Pa.  St.  401. 

2Sanderson  v.  Commissioners,  1 C.  C.  R.  342. 

3Commonwealth  v.  Evans,  6 Kulp,  145;  and  see  Loftus  v. 
Farmers’  and  Mechanics’  National  Bank,  133  Pa.  St.  97;  opin- 
ion of  court  below,  page  101;  s.  c.,  25  W.  N.  C.  459,  affirming 
46  L.  I.  4b. 

The  Act  of  May  5th,  1876,  P.  L.  124,  fixed  the  salaries  of 
assessors  in  cities  of  the  second  class.  The  Act  of  June  14th, 
1887,  P.  L.  397,  empowered  the  city  councils  of  these  cities 
to  fix  the  salaries  of  all  city  officers.  This  repealed  the  Act  of 
1876  to  that  extent  by  implication,  and  the  affirmative  pro- 
vision conferring  the  power  on  councils  was  not  in  violation 
of  Article  III,  Section  6:  Commonwealth  v.  Morrow,  40  P. 
L.  J.  327. 

8.  The  Provision  Does  not  Apply  in  Cases  of  Re- 

vival of  a Pre-existing  Statute  by  Reason  of 
the  Repeal  of  a Repealing  Act. 

The  Act  of  July  5th,  1883,  P.  L.  181,  repealed  the  Act  of 
May  2 1 st,  1879,  P.  L.  72.  The  latter  statute  repealed  the 
seventh  section  of  the  Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  P.  L.  13. 
The  question  being  whether  the  seventh  section  of  the  Act 
of  March  31st,  1876,  was  in  force,  it  was  decided  in  the 
affirmative,  under  the  common-law  rule,  that  the  repeal  of  a 


68 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


repealing  Act  revives  the  former  law,  and  in  reply  to  the  ob- 
jection that  such  revival  by  implication  was  contrary  to  the 
constitutional  provision  in  question,  it  was  said,  “To  compel 
the  publication  and  re-enactment  of  all  statutes  which  are 
restored  by  reason  of  the  repeal  of  others  would  seem  to  be 
unnecessary  as  well  as  impracticable.”1 

“The  Constitution  does  not  make  the  obviously  imprac- 
ticable requirement  that  every  Act  shall  recite  all  other  Acts 
that  its  operation  may  incidentally  affect,  either  by  way  of 
repeal,  modification,  extension,  or  supply.  The  harmony  or 
repugnance  of  Acts  not  passed  with  reference  to  the  same 
subject  can  only  be  effectually  developed  by  the  clash  of  con- 
flicting interests  and  litigation,  and  the  settlement  of  such 
questions  belong  to  the  judicial,  not  the  legislative  depart- 
ment.”2 

1 Woodward,  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Evans,  6 Kulp,  145. 

2Per  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell,  Stuart's  Appeal,  163  Pa.  St. 
210. 

The  Act  of  April  3d,  1872,  P.  L.  843,  which  was  a local 
law  for  the  county  of  Allegheny  providing  a license  rate  or 
fee  lower  than  that  which  was  provided  by  the  general  license 
law  of  May  13th,  1887,  P.  L.  108,  was  repealed  by  the  Act  of 
1887.  It  being  contended  that  the  effect  of  the  repeal  of  the 
Act  of  1872  was  to  revive  a former  local  Act  of  February 
26th,  1855,  P.  L.  321,  it  was  held  that  such  was  not  the  ef- 
fect. One  of  the  judges  gave  as  a reason  that  such  implied 
revival  would  be  a violation  of  Article  III,  Section  6.  Both 
judges  agreed  that  repealing  the  local  statute  would  not  have 
the  effect  of  re-enacting  a local  law:  Durr  v.  Commonwealth, 
3 C.  C.  R.  525;  and  see  Commonwealth  v.  Kelly,  5 Kulp,  533; 
Wishart  v.  Leslie,  36  P.  L.  J.  223. 

9.  Independent  Enactments  Referring  to  Pre- 
existing Law. 

A pre-existing  statute  may  be  referred  to  by  way  of  illus- 
tration, and  such  was  held  to  be  the  effect  of  the  reference  to 
the  Act  of  1806,  in  the  procedure  Act  of  May  25th,  1887,  P. 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


69 


L.  271. 1 In  this  case  it  was  said:  “Reference  to  the  Act  of 
1806  might  well  have  been  omitted,  and  yet  the  third  section 
of  the  Act  of  1887  would  contain  a complete  grant  of  the 
right  to  file  a statement  instead  of  a formal  narr.  It  must  be 
a concise  statement  of  the  plaintiff’s  demand.  If  this  were 
all  that  is  required,  it  would  be  sufficient.  It  is  unnecessary 
to  describe  the  details  of  the  statement  in  a statute.  That 
is  a matter  which  has  usually  been  left  to  the  courts  to  regu- 
late. But  the  Act  of  1887  goes  further,  and  requires  in 
assumpsit  a copy  of  the  note,  contract,  book  entries,  or  ref- 
erence to  the  records  on  which  the  plaintiff’s  claim  is  founded, 
and  not  merely  a statement  of  the  date  and  amount  thereof 
as  authorized  by  the  Act  of  1806;  while  in  trespass  a concise 
statement  of  the  plaintiff’s  demand  is  all  that  is  required. 
Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Act  of  1887  contains  all  the  es- 
sentials of  a complete  statute  without  any  aid  from  the  Act 
of  1806.  We  are  of  the  opinion,  therefore,  that  the  third 
section  of  the  Act  of  1887  is  not  unconstitutional.” 

The  Act  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  which  was  entitled 
an  Act  in  relation  to  the  government  of  cities  of  the  second 
class,  provided  in  Section  3 that  all  executive  powers  and 
duties  of  the  several  officers  of  the  city  should  be  assigned, 
by  ordinance,  to  the  appropriate  department  therein  pro- 
vided for,  and,  when  so  assigned,  all  departments,  bureaus, 
and  officers  now  existing  should  be  abolished.  The  Act  con- 
tinued: 

Sec.  4.  There  shall  be  the  following  executive  depart- 
ments, the  heads  of  which  shall  be  chosen  by  city  councils: 

I.  Department  of  Public  Safety.  II.  Department  of  Pub- 
lic Works.  III.  Department  of  Charities.  Sec.  5.  For  the 
purpose  of  redistributing  the  powers  conferred  anid  duties 
imposed  upon  the  officers,  departments,  and  boards  of  the 
city  government,  contained  in  existing  laws,  ordinances,  and 
regulations,  not  repealed  or  supplied  by  the  provisions  of  this 
Act,  every  power  heretofore  conferred  or  duty  imposed  upon 
any  municipal  executive  officer,  not  inconsistent  with  the 


70 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  be  deemed  and  construed  to  be 
the  power  or  duty  of  the  proper  department,  board,  or  offi- 
cer, who  shall  have  control  of  the  subject-matter  in  the  ap- 
propriate department  hereby  created  or  authorized.  Sec. 
6.  Whenever  words  are  used  in  any  existing  law,  ordinance, 
resolution,  or  contract  in  force  prior  hereto  referring  to  any 
department  or  officer  of  city  government,  and  such  law,  or- 
dinance, or  resolution  is  not  supplied  or  repealed  by  this  Act, 
they  shall  be  deemed  to  mean  and  apply  to  the  proper  officer 
and  department  having  relation  to  the  subject-matter, 
whether  named  in  this  Act  or  in  the  ordinance  reorganizing 
the  departments.  Sec.  7.  The  police  power  of  taking  in- 
formation, making  arrests  and  preservation  of  the  peace, 
heretofore  vested  in  the  Mayor,  shall  hereafter  vest  in  the 
Mayor  and  five  police  magistrates,  all  of  whom  shall  not  be 
of  the  same  political  party,  to  be  appointed  by  the  Mayor, 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  city  councils,  in  such  districts 
of  the  city  as  shall,  by  ordinance,  be  designated,  whose  term 
of  office  shall  be  during  good  behavior,  and  until  a successsor 
be  appointed  and  approved.  The  said  magistrates  shall  each 
receive  such  salary  as  may  be  fixed  by  ordinance,  and  they 
shall  pay  into  the  city  treasury  all  costs  and  fines  received 
by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  as  police  magistrates, 
and  make  such  reports  as  may  be  required  by  ordinance. 

In  Pittsburg’s  Petition,2  which  was  a case  arising  upon  the 
petition  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  for  the  appointment  of  a 
board  of  viewers  for  sewer  improvements,  Mr.  Justice  Wil- 
liams said:  “The  other  position  taken  is  that  Sections  1, 

5,  6,  7,  and  9 offend  against  Section  6,  Article  III,  of  the 
Constitution,  which  declares  that  ‘no  law  shall  be  revived, 
amended,  extended,  or  conferred  by  a reference  to  its  title 
only,  but  so  much  thereof  as  is  revived,  amended,  extended, 
or  conferred  shall  be  re-enacted  and  published  at  length.’ 
The  first  section  is  thought  to  violate  this  provision,  by  the 
declaration  that  the  legislative  powers  of  cities  of  the  second 
class  shall  be  vested  as  heretofore  in  two  branches.  This  does 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


71 


not  extend  or  confer  powers  previously  exercised  in  some 
other  way  to  the  two  branches  of  the  councils,  but  leaves 
the  legislative  power  just  where  it  was  before,  with  no  change 
in  its  extent,  in  the  body  exercising  it  or  in  the  name  or  title 
of  that  body.  The  city  councils  possessed  the  power  before 
the  city  came  into  the  second  class,  and  when  it  came  it 
brought  its  councils  with  it,  just  as  it  brought  its  Mayor, 
with  their  powers  and  titles  unchanged.  Such  a declaration 
does  not  violate  the  Constitution  in  any  particular.  The 
same  thing  may  be  said  of  the  ninth  section,  which  declares 
that  certain  offices  named,  including  that  of  city  treasurer 
and  controller,  ‘shall  remain  as  heretofore,  except  as  herein 
otherwise  provided/  These  offices,  with  the  incumbents, 
came  also  with  the  city  into  the  new  scheme  of  government, 
and  became  a part  of  it,  as  did  the  Mayor  and  councils.  So 
far  as  new  duties  were  put  upon  them,  or  old  ones  taken 
away,  the  Act  made  the  necessary  provisions,  but  where  no 
change  was  made,  the  officers  assumed  the  responsibilities 
and  discharged  the  duties  belonging  to  them,  just  as  though 
no  change  in  class  had  taken  place.  Nothing  was  added  to 
or  taken  from  their  functions  or  powers,  except  by  express 
words. 

“The  objection  made  to  the  fifth,  sixth,  and  seventh  sec- 
tions is  much  more  serious.  These  sections  do  undertake  to 
confer  powers,  previously  exercised  by  a number  of  officers 
whose  offices  are  discontinued,  upon  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments created  by  the  Act.  They  undertake  to  extend  to 
these  new  officers  all  the  Acts  of  Assembly  relating  to  the 
duties  and  powers  of  all  these  unnamed  and  abolished  offices, 
without  even  a reference  to  their  dates,  their  titles,  or  their 
subject-matter.  To  understand  what  was,  and  what  was  not, 
within  their  control,  it  would  be  necessary  to  digest  all  the 
local  laws  relating  to  all  the  officers  whose  functions  are  thus 
gathered  up  and  dropped  into  the  hands  of  the  ‘heads  of  de- 
partments.’ This  mode  of  defining  the  powers  of  a newly- 
created  officer  is  in  violation  of  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of 


72 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


the  constitutional  provision,  and  cannot  be  sustained:  Titus- 
ville Iron  Works  v.  Oil  Company,  122  Pa.  St.  627;  Donohugh 
v.  Roberts,  11  W.  N.  C.  186.” 

The  Act  of  April  22d,  1889,  P.  L.  39,  entitled  “A  further 
supplement  to  an  Act  regulating  boroughs  . . . authorizing 
the  corporate  authorities  to  levy  and  collect  a license  tax  on 
hacks,  carriages,  and  other  vehicles  carrying  persons  or  prop- 
erty for  pay,”  etc.,  being  in  question,  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett 
said:  “The  first  section  of  the  Act  empowers  the  council  of 
every  borough  ‘to  enact  ordinances  establishing  reasonable 
rates  of  license  tax  on  all  hacks,  carriages,  omnibuses,  and 
other  vehicles  used  in  carrying  persons  or  property  for  pay, 
and  limit  the  compensation  for  the  same  within  the  limits  of 
said  borough.’  The  second  section  provides  ‘that  said  ordi- 
nance shall  be  enforced  as  other  borough  ordinances  are  by 
law  enforced,  and  the  license  tax  shall  be  collected  as  other 
licenses,  taxes,  fines,  and  penalties  are  now  authorized  by  law 
to  be  collected.’  The  power  of  the  Legislature  to  pass  such 
an  Act  cannot  be  questioned.  There  is  nothing  either  in  the 
title  or  in  the  body  of  the  Act  that  offends  against  any  pro- 
vision of  the  Constitution.”3  In  the  court  below,  McIl- 
vaine,  P.  J.,  said:  “The  Act  might  well  be  characterized  as 
‘a  bunglesome  piece  of  legislation,’  yet  we  are  not  satisfied 
that  it  is  wholly  unconstitutional.  It  is  true  that  the  enact- 
ment of  the  first  section  is  broader  than  the  title,  and  so  far  as 
the  power  conferred  on  town  councils  to  ‘limit  the  compensa- 
tion’ for  the  use  of  hacks,  etc.,  is  concerned,  it  must  be  held  to 
be  unconstitutional.  But,  striking  this  out  of  the  first  section, 
it  leaves  the  enactment  the  same  as  expressed  in  the  title  of 
the  Act,  and  hence  not  repugnant  to  the  clause  of  the  Con- 
stitution which  provides  that  the  title  of  an  Act  shall  clearly 
express  the  subject  thereof:  Section  3,  Article  III.  Neither 
do  we  think  the  Act  repugnant  to  Section  6,  Article  III,  of 
the  Constitution,  for  it  does  not  revive,  amend,  extend,  or 
confer  the  provisions  of  an  existing  law.  It  is  a supplement 
of  the  Act  of  1851,  and  simply  adds  one  more  power  to  the 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


73: 

many  already  conferred  on  the  corporate  officers  of  a bor- 
ough. There  can  be  no  doubt  that  ‘an  entire  Act  is  not  nec- 
essarily unconstitutional,  because  the  title  fails  to  give  notice 
of  some  particular  matter  contained  therein.’  The  rule  has- 
been  to  sustain  the  portion  of  which  the  title  gives  notice: 
Dewhurst  v.  Allegheny  City,  95  Pa.  St.  437,  and  cases  there 
cited.  The  first  section  of  the  Act  confers  the  power  on 
town  councils  ‘to  enact  ordinances  establishing  reasonable 
rates  of  license  tax  on  all  hacks,  carriages,  omnibuses,  and 
other  vehicles  used  in  carrying  persons  or  property  for  pay, 
within  the  limits  of  boroughs.’  The  title  of  the  Act  gives  full 
notice  of  this  enactment,  and  the  first  section  of  the  Act  is 
thus  far  constitutional  and  must  be  sustained. 

“The  second  section,  in  its  provision  that  the  license  tax 
shall  be  collected  as  other  licenses,  taxes,  fines,  and  penalties 
are  now  authorized  by  law  to  be  collected,  cannot  all  stand, 
because  taxes  and  fines  and  penalties  are  not  collected  in  the 
same  way,  but  in  a totally  different  way.  To  say  that  a li- 
cense tax  shall  be  collected  as  taxes  are  collected,  and  to  say 
that  a license  shall  be  collected  as  fines  and  penalties  are  col- 
lected, is  to  prescribe  two  ways  of  collecting  the  license  tax 
which  are  irreconcilably  repugnant.  And,  as  but  one  way  of 
collecting  the  license  tax  was  evidently  intended  to  be 
pointed  out,  the  rule  is  to  take  the  last  way  pointed  out;  that 
is,  the  license  tax  is  to  be  collected  as  fines  and  penalties  are 
collected,  before  a justice  of  the  peace  under  Section  7,  Act 
of  April  15th,  1835:  Packer  v.  Railroad  Company,  19  Pa.  St. 
211.”4 

The  Act  of  February  14th,  1881,  P.  L.  3,  relating  to  the 
fees  of  the  receiver  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class,  provided 
that  he  should  have  all  powers  and  privileges  and  be  subject 
to  all  the  duties  and  liabilities  conferred  or  imposed  on  the 
collector  of  outstanding  or  delinquent  taxes,  by  any  or  all 
Acts  of  Assembly  heretofore  passed.  This  provision  was 
held  to  be  in  violation  of  Article  III,  Section  6.5 

The  Act  of  June  17th,  1887,  P-  L.  409,  entitled  “An  Act 


74 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


relating  to  the  lien  of  mechanics  and  others  upon  leasehold 
estates  and  property  thereon,'*’  provided  in  Section  4,  that 
“all  proceedings  under  this  Act  to  enforce  collection  of  claims 
shall  be  as  is  now  provided  by  law.”  This  provision  was  held 
to  be  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision  in  question, 
and  it  was  further  held,  that  as  no  rights  or  privileges  were 
conferred  which  could  be  enforced  without  Section  4,  the  Act 
must  fall  in  its  entirety.6 

1Arnold,  J.,  Krause  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Company,  4 
C.  C.  R.  64;  s.  p.,  Kauffman  v.  Jacobs,  4 C.  C.  R.  462;  Contra, 
Doud  v.  Insurance  Company,  6 C.  C.  R.  329;  Reeves  v.  Ed- 
sall,  1 Lack.  Jur.  96. 

2Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401;  and  see  Perkins  v. 
Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  539,  156  Pa.  St.  554;  Act  of  May 
24th,  1893,  P.  L.  124. 

3Washington  Borough  v.  McGeorge,  146  Pa.  St.  248. 

4Washington  Borough  v.  McGeorge,  146  Pa.  St.  248. 

5Donohugh  v.  Roberts,  11  W.  N.  C.  186,  C.  P.  Phila. 

6McKeever  v.  Victor  Oil  Company,  9 C.  C.  R.  284; 
Swaney  v.  Washington  Oil  Company,  7 C.  C.  R.  351 ; Titus  v. 
Elyria  Oil  Company,  1 P.  D.  R.  204. 


The  Act  of  June  10th,  1881,  P.  L.  93,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
enable  the  High  Sheriff  of  any  county  of  this  Commonwealth 
to  have  an  interpleader  on  a claim  of  property  by  a third  per- 
son levied  on  by  the  sheriff  on  a writ  of  foreign  attachment, 
enacted  that  Section  9 of  the  Act  of  April  10th,  1848,  re- 
ferred to  by  its  title,  and  Section  1 of  the  Act  of  March  10th, 
1858,  referred  to  by  its  title,  be  extended  and  applied  to 
claims  made  where  property  had  been  seized  under  process 
of  foreign  attachment.  This  Act  was  held  void:  Reynolds 
Lumber  Company  v.  Reynolds,  4 P.  D.  R.  573;  s.  c.,  12  Lane. 
Law  Rev.  383,  6 Delaware  County,  255. 

As  tending  to  show  the  legislative  practice  upon  this  sub- 
ject and  its  importance  and  difficulty,  the  following  references 
gathered  by  a cursory  reading  of  the  last  volume  of  the 
Pamphlet  Laws  (1895)  are  made.  The  learned  reader  must 
judge  of  the  validity  of  the  provisions  cited: 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


75 


Act  in  relation  to  the  Banking  Department,  Section  4, 
page  6,  “any  wilful  false  swearing  in  any  inquiry  thereunder 
shall  be  perjury,  and  subject,  upon  conviction  thereof,  to  the 
same  punishment  as  provided  by  existing  laws  for  the  punish- 
ment of  perjury/’ 

Act  to  establish  a department  of  agriculture,  Section  1, 
page  1 7,  “Said  Secretary  shall  be  ex-ofhcio  Secretary  of  the 
State  Board  of  Agriculture,  and  shall  succeed  to  all  the 
powers  and  duties  now  conferred  by  law  upon  the  Secretary 
of  said  Board.”  Section  2,  page  18,  “Said  report  and  bulle- 
tins shall  be  printed  by  the  State  Printer  in  the  same  manner 
as  other  public  documents.”  Section  3,  page  18,  “The  said 
Secretary  shall  also  be  and  is  hereby  charged  with  the  ad- 
ministration of  all  laws  designed  to  prevent  fraud  or  adul- 
teration in  the  preparation,  manufacture,  or  sale  of  articles  of 
food,  the  inspection,  sale,  or  transportation  of  the  agricultu- 
ral products,  or  imitations  thereof,  and  all  laws  relating  to 
diseases  of  domestic  animals,  and  to  the  manufacture  and  in- 
spection of  commercial  fertilizers.”  Section  4,  page  19,  “The 
Dairy  and  Food  Commissioner  shall,  under  the  direction  of 
the  Secretary,  perform  the  duties  prescribed  by  an  Act  ap- 
proved May  twenty-sixth,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
ninety-three.” 

Act  to  provide  for  additional  employes  and  officers  of  the 
House,  Section  1,  page  22,  provides  for  certain  clerks  and 
doorkeepers,  “whose  compensation  and  mileage  shall  be  the 
same  as  the  compensation  and  mileage  now  paid  to  the  tran- 
scribing clerks  and  assistant  doorkeepers.”  Certain  janitors 
“whose  compensation  and  mileage  shall  be  the  same  as  the 
compensation  and  mileage  now  paid  to  the  janitor  of  the 
committee-rooms  and  basement.”  » 

Act  to  establish  a separate  orphans’  court  in  the  county  of 
Schuylkill,  Section  1,  page  31,  “A  judge  shall  be  elected  and 
commissioned  for  the  same  term  and  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  judges  of  the  courts  of  common  pleas  of  said  county,  and 
the  annual  salary  of  said  judge  shall  be  the  same  as  is  paid  to 
the  judges  of  the  courts  of  common  pleas  in  said  county,  to 
be  paid  in  the  same  manner  as  the  salaries  of  said  judges  of 
the  courts  of  common  pleas  are  now  or  may  be  by  law  pay- 
able.” Section  4,  page  31,  “The  said  court  shall  have  and  ex- 
ercise all  the  jurisdiction  and  powers  now  vested  in  or  which 
may  hereafter  be  conferred  upon  the  orphans’  and  registers’ 
courts  of  said  county.” 


y6  VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 

Tenement  House  Act,  Section  5,  page  35,  “The  deputy  in- 
spectors, now  and  hereafter  appointed  under  the  provisions 
of  this  Act,  shall  have  the  same  powers  and  compensation  as 
those  appointed  under  the  provisions  of  the  Factory  Act,  ap- 
proved June  third,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 
three,  and  shall  be  subject  in  like  manner  to  the  orders  of  the 
Factory  Inspector.” 

Act  with  reference  to  Boards  of  Commissioners  of  Normal 
Schools,  Section  2,  page  41,  “The  expenses  incurred  by  the 
members  of  the  several  boards  of  examiners  shall  be  paid  by 
the  State,  as  provided  by  existing  laws.” 

City  annexation  Act,  Section  1,  page  48,  “The  said  tickets 
so  received  shall  be  counted  and  return  thereof  made  to  the 
prothonotary  of  said  county,  duly  certified  in  the  manner 
required  by  law,  and  in  receiving,  counting,  and  making  re- 
turns of  the  votes  cast,  the  officers  and  clerks  conducting  said 
election  shall  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth 
regulating  general  elections,  and  all  the  electors,  election 
officers,  and  clerks  voting  at  or  in  attendance  upon  said  elec- 
tion shall  be  subject  to  all  the  requirements  and  liable  to  all 
the  penalties  imposed  by  the  election  laws  of  this  Common- 
wealth.” Section  1,  page  49,  councils,  “Shall  be  elected  at 
the  February  election  in  said  year  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  ninety-eight,  under  the  provisions  of  the  laws  regu- 
lating the  election  of  such  councilmen  of  cities  of  the  second 
class,  . . . the  terms  of  all  officers  hereafter  elected  or  ap- 
pointed in  the  municipality  proposed  to  be  annexed  under 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  the  city  aforesaid,  shall  cease 
and  determine  upon  the  day  such  annexation  takes  effect, 
and  all  the  duties  devolving  upon  such  officers  shall  there- 
after be  assumed  and  performed  by  the  proper  officers  of  said 
city  of  the  second  class.”  Section  2,  page  50,  “Said  ballots 
shall  be  prepared  and  distributed  in  accordance  with  the  gen- 
eral law  relating  to  the  election  of  public  officers.”  Section 
3,  page  50,  “The  said  election  officers  shall  make  returns  of 
said  election  and  the  same  shall  be  counted  and  duly  certi- 
fied according  to  law.” 

Annexation  Act,  Section  1,  page  57,  “The  said  tickets  so 
received  shall  be  counted  and  a return  thereof  made  to  the 
prothonotary  of  said  county,  duly  certified  in  the  manner  re- 
quired by  law;  and  in  receiving,  counting,  and  making  re- 
turns of  the  votes  cast,  the  officers  and  clerks  conducting 
said  election  shall  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  this  Common- 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


77 


wealth  regulating  general  elections  for  public  officers;  and  all 
the  electors,  officers,  and  clerks  voting  at  or  in  attendance 
upon  said  election  shall  be  subject  to  all  the  requirements  and 
liable  to  all  the  penalties  imposed  by  the  election  law  of  this 
Commonwealth. ” Section  i,  page  58,  “Who  shall  organize 
in  the  manner  provided  by  law  on  the  first  Monday  of  March 
next  ensuing  their  election.”  Section  2,  page  59,  “Said  bal- 
lot shall  be  printed  and  distributed  in  accordance  with  the 
general  law  relating  to  the  election  of  public  officers.” 

Compulsory  School  Law,  Section  2,  page  73,  “To  be  ap- 
plied and  accounted  for  by  such  treasurers  in  the  same  way 
as  other  moneys  raised  for  school  purposes;  such  fines  shall 
be  collected  by  a process  of  law  similar  to  the  collection  of 
other  fines.”  Section  4,  page  74,  “And  the  said  assessors 
shall  be  paid  a per  diem  compensation  for  their  services,  a 
sum  equal  to  the  compensation  paid  under  existing  laws  for 
assessors  of  election.” 

Act  relating  to  indexing  writs  of  scire  facias,  Section  1, 
page  84,  “To  enter  upon  the  judgment  docket  or  index  all 
writs  of  scire  facias  upon  mechanics’  liens  in  the  same  manner 
as  writs  of  scire  facias  upon  judgments  are  now  required  to 
be  entered.” 

Convict  Labor  Commission  Act,  Section  1,  page  87. 
“Vouchers  for  such  expenses  shall  be  paid  upon  the  warrant 
of  the  chairman  of  said  commission  drawn  upon  the  State 
Treasurer  and  audited  by  the  Auditor-General  in  the  usual 
way.” 

Act  to  establish  the  State  Live  Stock  Sanitary  Board,  Sec- 
tion 1,  page  9 1,  “This  board  shall  consist  of  . . . and  the 
State  Veterinarian,  who  shall  be  a competent  and  qualified 
person  as  provided  in  the  Act,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  create 
a department  of  agriculture  and  define  its  duties.’  ” Section 
7,  page  92,  “All  necessary  expenses  . . . shall  be  paid  by  the 
State  Treasurer  upon  the  warrant  of  the  Auditor-General  in 
the  manner  now  provided  by  law.” 

Amendment  of  Street  Railway  Act,  Section  14,  page  94, 
“With  the  right  of  appeal  now  secured  under  Section  8,  Arti- 
cle XVI,  of  the  Constitution,  and  of  an  Act  for  the  further 
regulation  of  appeals  from  assessment  of  damages  to  owners 
of  property  taken  for  public  use,  passed  June  thirteenth,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-four.” 

See  Act  to  provide  for  the  taking  of  recognizance  and  oath 
on  certiorari , page  100. 


78 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


Act  relating  to  county  solicitors,  Section  3,  page  102, 
“Shall  perform  all  duties  now  enjoined  by  law  upon  county 
solicitors.” 

Life  saving  companies,  Section  5,  page  104,  “Said  fine  to 
be  recovered  by  suit  as  other  fines  and  taxes  are  now  by  law 
recoverable.” 

Street  Act,  Section  2,  page  106,  “In  exercising  the  power 
aforesaid  all  proceedings  for  the  ascertainment  of  damages 
and  the  assessment  of  benefits  incident  thereto  shall  be  as 
now  provided  by  law  in  reference  to  payment  of  costs,  dam- 
ages, and  expenses  of  public  improvements  within  municipal 
corporations.” 

Act  relating  to  poor  and  road  taxes,  Section  1,  page  111, 
“To  collect  either  road  or  poor  taxes  by  levy  and  sale  in  the 
same  manner  as  school  and  county  taxes  are  now  by  law  col- 
lected.” 

Recording  Act,  Section  2,  page  113,  “In  the -same  manner 
and  subject  to  the  same  rights  and  restrictions  as  to  the  time 
and  manner  of  recording  and  indexing  the  same  as  is  now 
provided  by  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth  for  the  proving, 
acknowledging,  and  recording  of  deeds.” 

Act  as  to  recording  plans,  Section  1,  page  124,  “Said  sum 
or  sums  to  be  recovered  as  debts  of  like  amount  are  by  law 
recoverable.” 

Act  to  provide  for  the  employment  of  a stenographer  in 
the  Adjutant-General’s  department,  Section  1,  page  127, 
“And  the  stenographer  so  selected  and  appointed  shall  be 
paid  in  the  same  manner  as  other  clerks  and  employes  of  the 
State  government.” 

Act  as  to  tipstaves,  Section  1,  page  129,  “Shall  be  paid  in 
the  same  manner  as  such  tipstaves  are  now  paid.” 

Elevator  Act,  Section  2,  page  129,  “Said  fine  to  be  col- 
lected as  other  debts  due  the  Commonwealth.” 

Public  safety  Act,  Section  43,  page  166,  “By  the  same 
process  and  proceedings  and  under  the  same  restrictions  as 
are  now  provided  for  or  required  by  law  for  the  collection  of 
any  fines  or  penalties  in  such  city.” 

Appropriation  Act,  Section  1,  page  167,  “The  said  appro- 
priation to  be  paid  upon  the  warrant  of  the  Auditor-General 
drawn  in  the  usual  manner.” 

Library  Act,  Section  2,  page  170,  “Such  tax  to  be  levied 
and  collected  in  the  like  manner  with  the  general  taxes  of 
said  cities  and  to  be  known  as  a library  fund.” 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


29 


Judicial  apportionment  Act,  Section  2,  page  193,  “The 
election  of  judges  shall  be  held  and  conducted  in  the  several 
election  districts  in  the  same  manner  in  all  respects  as  elec- 
tions for  representatives  are  or  shall  be  held  and  conducted, 
and  by  the  same  judges,  inspectors,  and  other  officers,  under 
provisions  of  existing  laws  regulating  elections  in  this  Com- 
monwealth.” Section  7,  page  194,  “The  said  additional  law 
judge  shall  possess  the  same  qualifications  which  are  required 
by  the  Constitution  and  laws  for  the  president  judge  of  said 
district,  and  shall  hold  his  office  for  a like  term  and  by  the 
same  tenure,  and  shall  have  the  same  powers,  authority,  and 
jurisdiction,  and  shall  be  subject  to  the  same  duties,  restric- 
tions, and  penalties,  and  shall  receive  the  same  compensa- 
tion as  the  president  judge  of  said  district.” 

Superior  Court  Act,  Section  1,  page  212,  “The  vote  for 
said  office  shall  be  cast  and  counted  according  to  law.”  Sec- 
tion 3,  page  213,  “The  necessary  dockets,  books,  seals,  sta- 
tionery, and  other  supplies  shall  be  obtained  and  furnished 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  in  the  same  manner 
as  books  and  supplies  are  furnished  to  his  own  department.” 
Section  1 1,  page  220,  “The  compensation  of  each  judge  in  the 
Superior  Court  shall  be  seven  thousand  five  hundred  dollars 
per  annum,  to  be  paid  quarterly,  upon  the  certificate  of  the 
judge,  according  to  the  practice  of  the  accounting  depart- 
ments of  the  Commonwealth.” 

Ship  canal  Act,  Section  5,  page  223,  “They  shall,  if  author- 
ized by  a majority  of  the  stockholders  at  a meeting  called 
for  that  purpose  in  the  manner  provided  by  law,  file  with  the 
Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  a certificate  setting  forth 
the  amount  of  such  increase.” 

Repealing  Act,  Section  2,  page  242,  “That  the  provisions 
of  the  general  road  laws  of  this  Commonwealth  are  hereby 
extended  to  the  township  of  Apolacon,  in  the  county  of  Sus- 
quehanna, any  law  or  part  of  any  law  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing.” 

School  Act,  Section  3,  page  245,  “The  township  auditors 
shall  pass  upon  such  bills,  and  their  action  thereon  shall  have 
the  same  effect  as  upon  other  expenditures  of  such  school 
boards.” 

Act  as  to  indexing  Federal  judgments,  Section  1,  page 
247.  Transcripts  of  judgments  of  the  Federal  courts  duly 
certified  are  to  be  “indexed  in  the  same  manner  as  tran- 
scripts of  records  of  judgments  and  decrees  obtained  in  any 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


So 

of  the  courts  of  general  jurisdiction  of  this  State  are  entered 
and  indexed,  to  make  them  liens,  and  (prothonotaries)  are 
authorized  to  charge  and  receive  the  same  fees  for  the  same.” 
Poor  Law,  Section  i,  page  271,  “That  said  county  shall,  in 
all  cases,  have  full  recourse  to  recover  all  expenses  incurred 
in  behalf  of  said  person  so  committed,  from  the  parties  or 
persons  or  poor  district  properly  chargeable  therewith  under 
the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth.” 

Act  as  to  witnesses,  Section  1,  page  279,  “Testimony  . . . 
may  be  taken  upon  a rule  entered  in  the  office  of  the  prothon- 
otary  of  the  court  of  common  pleas  in  the  county  where  such 
cause  or  matter  is  pending  in  like  manner  as  rules  are  now 
entered  for  the  taking  of  testimony  of  witnesses  residing 
within  the  Commonwealth  upon  notice  to  be  given  to  the 
other  side  in  like  manner  as  now  provided  by  existing  law  or 
rule  of  court.” 

Memorial  Day  Act,  Section  1,  page  298,  “To  pay  the  same 
out  of  such  moneys  in  their  respective  treasuries  as  are  not 
otherwise  appropriated,  in  the  manner  appropriations  are 
-now  made  and  paid.” 

Corporation  Act,  Clause  7,  page  313,  “Subject  to  the  same 
penalties  for  obstructions  thereof  as  may  now  or  shall  here- 
after be  enforced  for  the  obstruction  of  public  streets  in  the 
municipality  in  which  said  approaches  may  be  located.” 

Pure  Food  Act,  Section  6,  page  318,  “The  agent  of  the  De- 
partment of  Agriculture,  known  as  the  Dairy  and  Food  Com- 
missioner of  this  State,  shall  be  charged  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  all  the  provisions  of  this  Act  and  shall  have  the 
same  power  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  this  Act  that  is  given 
Tim  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  the  Act  by  which  he  receives 
"his  appointment.” 

Indigent  insane  Act,  Section  1,  page  321,  “Shall  hereafter 
be  entitled  to  the  same  allowance  for  the  care  and  treatment 
of  the  indigent  insane  as  is  given  by  the  Commonwealth  to 
State  hospitals  for  the  insane,  under  the  conditions  pre- 
scribed by  the  Act  of  Assembly,  approved  June  thirteenth, 
-one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-three.” 

Night  watchman  Act,  Section  1,  page  333,  “All  persons 
■so  appointed  with  the  approval  aforesaid,  as  night  watchmen 
shall  have,  exercise,  and  enjoy  all  the  rights,  powers,  and 
privileges  now  vested  by  law  in  constables  or  police  officers 
♦duly  elected  or  appointed  in  said  cities  or  boroughs.” 

Road  Law,  Section  14,  page  341,  “All  warrants  for  the 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


8l 


payment  of  any  portion  of  the  money  raised  for  the  purposes 
aforesaid  shall  be  issued  by  the  said  commissioners,  or  a ma- 
jority of  them,  in  the  manner  now  provided  by  law  in  the 
several  counties.” 

Park  Act,  Section  2,  page  350,  “In  exercising  the  power 
aforesaid  all  proceedings  for  ascertaining  damages  and  as- 
sessing the  benefits  incident  thereto  shall  be  in  accordance 
with  the  law  authorizing  cities  of  this  Commonwealth  to  ac- 
quire, by  purchase,  or  otherwise,  private  property  for  public 
park  purposes.” 

Stock  brokers’  Act,  Section  3,  page  398,  “Which  penalty 
shall  be  collected  on  an  account  settled  by  the  accountant 
officers  as  taxes  on  bank  dividends  are  now  collected  and 
settled.” 

Insurance  Act,  Section  2,  page  402,  “Any  company  enti- 
tled to  the  benefits  of  this  Act  and  desirous  of  availing  itself 
of  the  same,  shall  furnish  the  affidavit  as  to  paid-up  capital 
required  by  the  said  supplementary  Act,  and  conform  to  all 
other  conditions  and  requirements  thereof  applicable  to  com- 
panies organized  under  the  provisions  of  the  said  Act,  ap- 
proved the  twenty-ninth  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1874,  and  the 
aforesaid  supplement  thereto.” 

Controllers’  Act,  Section  15,  page  407,  “That  all  duties  de- 
volved on  the  county  auditors  by  the  Act  of  April  fifteenth, 
one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty-four,  and  all  powers 
conferred  on  them  by  said  Act  shall  be  performed  and  exer- 
cised by  the  county  controller  so  far  as  regards  county  ac- 
counts and  State  taxes  for  which  the  county  is  or  may  be  lia- 
ble, and  all  other  accounts  with  the  treasurer  with  the  Com- 
monwealth shall  be  audited  by  the  auditor  of  the  accounts 
of  prothonotaries,  clerks,  et  cetera,  appointed  by  the  court 
of  common  pleas  under  the  Act  of  April  twenty-first,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-six,  and  its  supplements. 
And  the  report  required  by  the  seventh  section  of  this  Act 
shall  have  the  same  effect  as  the  report  of  the  auditors  under 
said  Act  of  the  fifteenth  of  April,  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four,  with  like  rights  of  appeal  therefrom.” 

Teachers’  institute  Act,  Section  9,  page  416,  “The  superin- 
tendent of  the  schools  of  said  city  or  borough  shall  have 
power  to  call  a teachers’  institute  and  to  draw  from  the 
county  treasury  money  for  the  support  of  the  same  in  like 
manner  and  to  the  same  extent  as  the  county  superintend- 
ents of  this  Commonwealth  are  now  empowered  to  do.” 

6 


82 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


Act  relating  to  board  of  commissioners  of  public  grounds 
and  buildings,  Section  2,  page  423,  “The  superintendent  of 
construction  shall  be  paid  a per  diem  salary  out  of  the  fund 
appropriated  for  the  improvement  which  he  is  to  supervise  in 
like  manner  as  superintendents  are  now  paid  out  of  said  fund 
by  the  architect  or  trustees  of  the  institute  so  benefited.” 

Consideration  of  the  foregoing,  which  instances  many  phases 
of  legislation  and  illustrates  many  difficulties  in  the  drafting 
of  bills,  may  lead  to  question  whether  the  two  clauses 
of  Article  III,  Section  6,  should  not  be  construed  together  by 
regarding  the  second  as  an  amplification  of  the  first  for  greater 
emphasis,  and  thus  limiting  the  scope  of  the  article  to  cases 
wherein  the  attempt  is  to  revive,  amend,  or  extend  or  confer 
the  provisions  of,  specific  statutes  directly  referred  to. 

Article  III,  Section  6,  may  be  regarded  as  owing  its  origin, 
in  part,  to  that  stress  for  reform  which  had  for  its  principal 
object  the  eradication  of  local  and  special  legislation.  So  re- 
garded, it  may  be  placed  with  a number  of  other  cumula- 
tive provisions  found  in  the  next  article,  which  deals  with  that 
subject.  One  of  the  greatest  abuses  in  legislative  practice  in 
connection  with  local  and  special  bills  was  the  covering  up 
of  snakes  under  the  form  of  legislation  prohibited  by  Section 
6.  But  after  the  substance  had  been  prohibited  it  was  in  vain 
to  denounce  the  form,  and  hence  it  follows  that,  under  pres- 
ent conditions,  Section  6 must  be  so  construed  as  not  unduly 
to  hamper  general  legislation.  It  was  intended  to  remove  a 
mischief,  not  to  create  one. 

Legislation  upon  general,  as  distinguished  from  special  and 
single  subjects,  which  involves  not  one  but  many  other  laws, 
is  always  difficult,  and  its  effect  must  usually  be  settled  by 
litigation.  The  necessity  for  the  comparison  and  construc- 
tion of  laws  by  the  judiciary  cannot  be  removed  in  such  cases 
by  a constitutional  provision.  Statutes  related  to  or  forming 
part  of  a system,  or  designed  to  transform  it  at  a given  point, 
or  to  reproduce  it  with  modifications,  or  under  other  author- 
ity, cannot  always  be  self-sustaining  or  self-explanatory.  They 
must  usually  be  expressed  in  general  terms  and  can  never  be 
understood  save  in  connection  with  the  system  to  which  they 
relate.  This  observation  may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to 
the  instance  given  above  relating  to  the  creation  of  a separate 
orphans’  court  in  the  county  of  Schuylkill.  If  the  section  be 
deemed  applicable  to  such  a case,  then  a statute  must  be 
drafted  comparing  in  size  with  a volume  of  the  Pamphlet  Laws, 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


83 


and  being  enacted,  its  validity  is  imperiled  under  Article  V, 
Section  26,  by  the  smallest  deviation  either  of  defect  or  ex- 
cess, from  existing  law  relating  to  the  jurisdiction  and  prac- 
tice of  orphans’  courts. 

10.  The  Provision  Cannot  be  Evaded  by  an  Exposi- 
tory Statute. 

The  Act  of  June  17th,  1887,  P.  L.  413,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  the  liens  of  mechanics  and  others  upon  buildings,” 
enacts  in  its  first  section  that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of 
Assembly  of  June  sixteenth,  Anno  Domini  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  thirty-six,  entitled  “An  Act  relating  to 
the  lien  of  mechanics  and  others  upon  buildings,”  and  the 
Act  of  Assembly  of  April  sixteenth,  Anno  Domini  one  thou- 
sand eight  hundred  and  forty-five,  entitled  “An  Act  concern- 
ing sheriffs’  and  coroners’  sales  and  for  other  purposes,”  ac- 
cording to  the  true  intent  and  meaning  thereof,  shall  be  con- 
strued to  include  claims  for  labor  done  by  mechanics  and 
laborers  in  the  erection  or  construction  of  a building,  as  liens 
are  now  allowed  for  material  furnished:  Provided,  That  no 
lien  will  be  allowed  for  a sum  less  than  ten  dollars. 

In  Titusville  Iron  Works  v.  Keystone  Oil  Company,1  Mr. 
Justice  Williams  said:  “The  first  section  declares  that  the 
provisions  of  the  Acts  of  1836  and  1845  shall  be  construed  to 
include  claims  for  labor  done  by  mechanics  and  others  in 
the  erection  and  construction  of  buildings — i.  e.,  for  all  labor 
done,  no  matter  at  whose  instance  or  upon  whose  credit  it 
was  done.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a plainer  violation 
of  the  constitutional  provision.”  He  further  said:  “Exposi- 
tory statutes,  and  statutes  directing  the  courts  what  con- 
struction should  be  given  to  previous  legislation  were  not 
uncommon  prior  to  1874,  and  the  courts,  while  pronouncing 
all  such  legislation  to  be  judicial  in  its  character  and  void  as 
to  any  retroactive  effect  intended,  yet  sought  to  give  effect 
to  the  legislative  will  however  expressed  as  to  future  cases. 
As  the  Constitution  prescribed  no  form  or  order  into  which 
the  legislative  expression  was  to  be  cast,  the  court  sought  to 


84 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


give  effect  to  the  purpose,  however  expressed.  But  the  Con- 
stitution of  1874,  Section  6,  of  Article  III,  already  referred 
to,  requires  all  statutes  to  be  self-explanatory  and  complete 
in  their  provisions,  and  forbids  the  extension,  amendment, 
revival,  or  the  use  of  any  other  method  of  conferring  the  ben- 
efits of  previous  legislation  short  of  a re-enactment  at  length. 
This  effectually  closes  the  old  and  well-worn  short-cut  route, 
and  we  cannot,  no  matter  how  much  inclined  we  might  be  to 
do  so,  give  effect,  even  as  to  future  cases,  to  expository  Acts 
like  that  under  consideration.  They  are  void  as  an  unauthor- 
ized exercise  of  judicial  power,  and  they  are  void  because  of 
the  infraction  of  Section  6,  of  Article  III. 

“It  has  been  suggested  that  the  second  section  of  the  Act 
might  stand,  though  the  first  should,  for  the  reasons  given, 
fall.  We  do  not  think  so.  An  examination  of  the  Act  as  a 
whole  shows  that  its  provisions  all  relate  to  the  same  class 
of  claimants,  and  were  intended  to  add  for  the  benefit  of  that 
class  some  provisions  not  found  in  the  Acts  of  1836  and  1845. 
If,  as  we  hold,  these  claimants  are  not  brought  under  the 
Acts  referred  to  by  the  first  section,  the  remaining  sections 
have  nothing  on  which  they  can  take  effect.  They  are  a 
headless  trunk,  and  our  system  of  liens  for  the  benefit  of  me- 
chanics and  materialmen  remains  as  it  was  before  the  Act  of 
1887  was  passed.” 

1 Titusville  Iron  Works  v.  Keystone  Oil  Company,  122  Pa. 
St.  627;  and  see  East  Grant  Street,  121  Pa.  St.  596;  Gardner 
v.  Gibson,  21  W.  N.  C.  121;  Roth  v.  Hobson,  5 C.  C.  R.  17; 
21  W.  N.  C.  64;  Phillip’s  Estate,  6 C.  C.  R.  499;  Bennett  v. 
Maloney,  5 Kulp,  537. 

11.  Re-enactment  of  Former  Statute  by  way  of 
Amendment  Without  Regarding  Intervening 
Repeal  or  Amendment. 

The  third  proviso  to  the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  April 
9th,  1872,  P.  L.  47,  entitled  “An  Act  for  the  better  protection 
of  the  wages  of  mechanics,  laborers,  and  others,”  required 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


85 


that  claims  should  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the  prothonotary 
of  the  proper  county  in  the  same  manner  as  mechanics’  liens. 
This  proviso  was  repealed  by  the  second  section  of  the  sup- 
plementary Act  of  May  8th,  1874,  P.  L.  120.  The  Act  of 
Tune  13th,  1883,  P.  L.  116,  indicated  by  its  title  a purpose 
to  amend  the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  1872  so  that  the 
wages  of  servant  girls,  washerwomen,  clerks,  and  others, 
should  also  be  preferred,  and  its  obvious  purpose  was  to  ex- 
tend to  new  classes  of  claims  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of 
1872. 

The  draftsman  of  the  Act  of  1883  copied  the  whole  of  the 
first  section  of  the  Act  of  1872,  interpolating  such  words  as 
were  requisite  to  extend  the  same  to  include  the  new  classes 
of  wage  claimants,  but  copied  and  so  caused  to  be  re-enacted 
the  third  proviso  which  had  been  repealed  by  the  Act  of  1874. 
The  title  gave  no  notice  of  this,  and  the  Act  of  1883  was  held 
inoperative  as  to  the  said  proviso.  In  a case  arising  upon 
this  statute,1  the  learned  auditor,  Hon.  Charles  R.  Buckalew, 
said:  “But  independent  of  any  constitutional  question  aris- 
ing upon  this  statute,  we  may  be  greatly  aided  in  its  con- 
struction by  considering  the  title  in  connection  with  the  body 
of  the  Act,  as  will  be  apparent  upon  an  examination  of  the 
latter.  The  Act  of  1883  recites  as  existing  law  the  whole  of 
the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  1872  in  its  original  form,  and 
appears  also  to  leave  the  whole  of  it  in  force.  The  section 
is  left  unchanged  in  the  second  recital  except  by  the  insertion 
of  additional  words  conformed  to  the  title,  and  which  words 
have  no  necessary  connection  with  the  proviso.  That  the 
Act  was  carelessly  drawn  appears  from  both  text  and  title, 
and  from  the  known  relations  of  the  Act  to  both  prior  and 
subsequent  laws.  It  begins  by  saying,  ‘so  much’  of  the  first 
section  of  the  Act  of  1872,  which  reads  ‘as  follows,’  and  then 
proceeds  to  recite  the  section  at  full  length,  so  that  the  ‘so 
much’  is  found  to  be  the  whole,  and  to  include  that  part  of 
the  original  section  which  had  been  previously  repealed.  Af- 
ter the  recital  of  the  section,  the  Act  goes  on  to  say  that  the 


86 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


section  ‘is  hereby  amended  to  read  as  follows,’  and  proceeds 
to  recite  over  again  precisely  the  same  form  of  section  with 
an  addition  of  the  interpolated  words  above  mentioned.  By 
this  language,  upon  the  face  of  the  Act,  it  already  appears 
that  the  amendment  intended  was  the  interpolated  words  and 
nothing  else. 

“The  section  read  before  without  them,  and  it  was  to  read 
with  them,  but  otherwise  exactly  as  before.  It  may  be  added 
that  the  implication  from  the  face  of  the  Act  that  the  proviso 
was  to  be  law  in  future  is  no  stronger  than  the  implication 
that  it  was  existing  law  when  the  Act  was  passed — an  impli- 
cation which  we  know  to  be  false.  We  get  away  from  diffi- 
culties by  rejecting  both  implications,  and  accepting  the  re- 
citals of  the  old  section — outside  of  the  new  matter  inserted 
— as  formal  and  not  as  enactive  parts  of  an  amendatory  law. 
There  was  apparently  a bungling  attempt  to  adapt  a form  of 
the  new  statute  to  the  requirements  of  the  sixth  section  of 
the  third  Article  of  the  Constitution,  which  resulted  in  re- 
citing and  republishing  both  the  existing  and  repealed  parts 
of  the  old  section  which  it  was  proposed  to  amend.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  the  writer  of  the  Act  did  not  intend,  at  the  outset, 
to  copy  or  recite  the  whole  of  the  old  section,  or  revive  or 
enact  the  whole,  but  only  to  recite  so  much  of  it  as  he  in- 
tended to  amend  by  the  new  matter  indicated  in  the  title; 
but  afterwards  by  mistake,  or  in  supposed  conformity  with 
constitutional  form  required  for  an  amendatory  Act,  the  en- 
tire section  was  copied  and  republished  in  the  new  Act.  The 
Act  of  1883  has  no  repealing  clause,  nor  any  reference  what- 
ever to  the  repealing  Act  of  1874.  But  that  Act  of  1874  was 
too  conspicuous  and  important  to  have  been  overlooked 
when  the  Act  of  1883  was  under  consideration,  if  attention 
was  at  all  directed  to  the  question  of  filing  labor  claims. 
Therefore,  the  fact  that  the  Act  of  1874  was  not  repealed  in 
express  terms  is  strong  evidence  that  it  was  to  remain  un- 
disturbed. Repeals  by  implication  are  not  favored  by  the 
law,  and  when  admitted  the  repugnancy  of  the  new  statute 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE.  87 

to  a former  one  must  be  clear,  palpable,  and  beyond  honest 
dispute.” 

A still  more  complicated  state  of  legislation  is  found  in 
another  case,2  which  involved  an  original  enactment  of  1874, 
a supplement  of  1878,  amending  the  Act  of  1874,  by  provid- 
ing that  a certain  part  should  read  as  provided  in  the  supple- 
ment, thus  repealing  the  original  provisions,  save  as  amended, 
and  a supplement  of  1883,  in  which  no  notice  was  taken  of 
the  repeal  by  the  supplement  of  1878,  but  which  adopted  the 
original  provisions  of  1874,  a part  of  which  had  been  included 
in  the  supplement  of  1878,  and  re-enacted  them  as  intended  to 
be  amended  by  the  said  supplement  of  1883.  It  was  held  that 
the  supplements  of  1878  and  1883  might  both  stand,  except 
in  so  far  as  the  provisions  of  the  supplement  of  1883  were 
inconsistent  with  those  of  1878.  In  1889  another  supple- 
ment was  passed  which  again  quoted  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1874,  without  reference  to  the  previous  enactments 
of  1878  and  1883.  It  was  held  that  all  three  enactments 
might  stand  and  be  given  effect  in  order,  the  later  provisions 
prevailing  over  the  earlier. 

The  Act  of  April  4th,  1789,  Sm.  L.  331,  relating  to  the 
lien  of  judgments,  was  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  26th, 
1827,  P.  L.  129.  The  Act  of  February  24th,  1834,  Section 
25,  P.  L.  77,  provided  that  the  lien  of  a judgment  should 
continue  to  bind  the  estate  of  a decedent  for  five  years  with- 
out revival,  and  during  that  term  judgments  should  take 
rank  according  to  their  priority  at  the  time  of  death. 

The  Act  of  June  1st,  1887,  P-  L.  289,  amended  the  Act  of 
1827,  by  adding  a clause  preventing  the  continuance  of  the 
lien  of  a judgment  as  against  a terre  tenant  whose  deed  is  re- 
corded, unless  he  be  named  as  terre  tenant  in  the  original  scire 
facias.  In  a case  involving  the  application  of  this  legislation,3 
Mr.  Justice  Mitchell  said:  “This  appears  to  be  the  whole 
scope  of  the  amendment,  but  in  obedience  to  the  constitu- 
tional requirement  the  Act  quotes  the  whole  of  section  first 
of  the  Act  of  1827,  and  then  re-enacts  it  in  the  same  words, 


88 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


with  the  addition  above  mentioned.  In  so  doing  it  neces- 
sarily re-enacts  the  words  'and  no  judgment  shall  continue 
a lien  . . . for  a longer  period  than  five  years  . . . unless 
revived,’  etc.,  and  the  argument  is  strongly  urged  by  appel- 
lant, first,  that  the  Act  of  February  24th,  1834,  continuing 
the  lien  of  judgments  against  the  lands  of  a decedent,  being 
in  pari  materia , is  repealed  by  the  general  negative  words  of 
the  Act  of  1887,  and,  secondly,  that  it  cannot  be  considered 
as  excepted  from  such  effect,  and  allowed  to  remain  as  an 
amendment  to  the  Act  of  1827,  because  it  is  not  're-enacted 
and  published  at  length,’  as  required  by  Section  6,  of  Article 
III,  of  the  Constitution. 

"The  second  proposition  may  be  disposed  of  first.  The  Act 
of  1887  does  not  undertake  to  amend  the  Act  of  1834,  and 
therefore  did  not  need  to  repeat  its  terms.  The  constitu- 
tional provision  has  reference  to  express  amendments  only. 
Its  object,  like  that  of  Section  2,  of  the  same  article,  requiring 
each  Act  to  have  its  subject  clearly  expressed  in  the  title,  was 
to  secure  to  the  legislators  themselves  and  others  interested, 
direct  notice,  in  immediate  connection  with  proposed  legisla- 
tion, of  its  object  and  purpose.  The  Constitution  does  not 
make  the  obviously  impracticable  requirement  that  every  Act 
shall  recite  all  other  Acts  that  its  operation  may  incidentally 
affect,  either  by  way  of  repeal,  modification,  extension,  or 
supply.  The  harmony  of  repugnance  of  Acts  not  passed  with 
reference  to  the  same  subject  can  only  be  effectually  devel- 
oped by  the  clash  of  conflicting  interests  in  litigation,  and  the 
settlement  of  such  questions  belongs  to  the  judicial,  not  the 
legislative  department.  No  constitutional  provision  is  in- 
volved in  the  present  case. 

"The  words  of  the  Act  of  1887,  'no  judgment  shall  continue 
a lien,’  etc.,  are  general  and  negative,  and  prima  facie  there- 
fore repeal  everything  in  conflict  with  them.  But  they  are 
not  to  be  extended  to  subjects  not  within  the  legislative  in- 
tent. They  are  part  of  the  Act  of  1827,  and  are  re-enacted 
without  change,  pro  forma,  in  order  to  add  the  subsequent 


ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


89 


provision  about  terre  tenants . . . . The  Act  of  1834  was 
entitled  ‘An  Act  relating  to  executors  and  administrators/ 
and  not  only  its  title,  but  its  seventy  carefully  drawn  sec- 
tions show  that  it  was  intended  to  deal  directly  only  with  that 
subject,  and  touched  the  subject  of  judgments  only  incident- 
ally in  connection  with  the  estates  of  decedents.  The  Legis- 
lature, therefore,  in  1887  had  before  it  a clear  distinction  be- 
tween classes  of  judgments,  existing  for  more  than  half  a 
century  under  separate  statutes,  and  when  under  such  cir- 
cumstances it  took  up  one  of  those  statutes  for  amendment, 
we  must  assume  that  it  legislated  with  that  established  dis- 
tinction in  view,  until  it  shows  a clear  intention  to  disregard 
or  abolish  it.  Notwithstanding,  therefore,  the  generality  and 
the  negative  character  of  the  language  of  the  Act  of  1887  we 
are  of  opinion  it  has  not  affected  the  Act  of  1834.” 

1 Rogers  v.  Glendower  Iron  Works,  17  W.  N.  C.  444. 

Commonwealth  v.  Taylor,  159  Pa.  St.  451. 

3Stuart’s  Appeal,  163  Pa.  St.  210. 

12.  Making  a Local  Statute  General  Where  the 
Local  Statute,  Enacted  Prior  to  1874,  Ex- 
tended the  Provisions  of  a Pre-existing 
Statute. 

The  Act  of  May  1st,  1861,  P.  L.  550,  was  entitled  a sup- 
plement to  an  Act  relating  to  the  liens  of  mechanics  and 
others  upon  buildings,  approved  the  16th  day  of  June,  1836, 
so  far  as  it  relates  to  certain  counties,  and  enacted  in  its  first 
and  only  section  that  the  said  recited  Act  and  its  supplements 
shall  hereafter  be  held  and  taken  to  apply  to  repairs,  altera- 
tions, etc.,  provided  that  this  Act  shall  apply  only  to  Chester, 
Delaware,  and  Berks  counties.  • 

The  Act  of  May  18th,  1887,  P.  L.  118,  entitled  “A  supple- 
ment to  an  Act  relating  to  the  liens  of  mechanics  and  others 
upon  buildings,”  recited  the  title  as  well  as  the  first  and  only 
section  as  above,  and  declared  that  the  same  be  and  is  hereby 


90 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


extended  to  all  the  counties  of  the  Commonwealth.  The 
validity  of  this  Act  was  sustained.  Said  White,  P.  J.:  “It 
must  be  remembered  when  the  Act  of  1861  was  passed  it  was 
entirely  constitutional  to  extend  the  provisions  of  existing 
statutes  by  reference  to  their  title  only,  and  such  was  a pre- 
vailing practice  of  legislation.  Being  then  a valid  Act  so  as 
to  extend  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1836  by  reference  to  its 
title,  the  Legislature  of  1887,  under  the  new  rule  prescribed 
by  the  existing  Constitution  could  extend  this  Act  of  1861 
and  give  it  full  effect  throughout  the  State  by  re-enacting 
and  publishing  it  at  length  as  was  done.  ...  It  was  not  nec- 
essary to  re-enact  and  publish  at  length  again  the  Act  of 
1836,  to  require  this  to  have  been  done  by  the  Act  of  1887 
would  have  denied  practically  the  validity  of  the  form  of  the 
Act  of  1861.”1 

The  Supreme  Court  in  a per  curiam  opinion  affirming  the 
judgment  of  the  court  below  said:  “While  said  Act  may  be 
objectionable  in  form,  it  is,  nevertheless,  in  substantial  com- 
pliance with  Section  6,  of  Article  III,  of  the  Constitution. 
It  not  only  quotes  the  title  of  the  Act  of  June  16th,  1836, 
but  it  re-enacts  and  publishes  at  length  so  much  thereof  as 
by  its  supplement  of  May  1st,  1861,  is  extended  and 
amended.”2 

xPurvis  v.  Ross,  12  C.  C.  R.  193. 

2Purvis  v.  Ross,  158  Pa.  St.  20;  Smyers  v.  Beam,  158  Pa. 
St.  57. 


III. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


Article  I,  Section  5.  Elections  shall  be  free  and  equal,  and 
no  power,  civil  or  military,  shall  at  any  time  interfere  to  pre- 
vent the  free  exercise  of  the  right  of  suffrage. 

Article  III,  Section  7.  The  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass 
any  local  or  special  law. 

(1)  Authorizing  the  creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of 
liens. 

(2)  Regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships,, 
wards,  boroughs,  or  school  districts. 

(3)  Changing  the  names  of  persons  or  places. 

(4)  Changing  the  venue  in  civil  or  criminal  cases. 

(5)  Authorizing  the  laying  out,  opening,  altering,  or 
maintaining  roads,  highways,  streets,  or  alleys. 

(6)  Relating  to  ferries  or  bridges,  or  incorporating  ferry 
or  bridge  companies,  except  for  the  erection  of  bridges  cross- 
ing streams  which  form  boundaries  between  this  and  any 
other  State. 

(7)  Vacating  roads,  town-plats,  streets,  or  alleys. 

(8)  Relating  to  cemeteries,  graveyards,  or  public 
grounds  not  of  the  State. 

(9)  Authorizing  the  adoption  or  legitimation  of  children. 

(10)  Locating  or  changing  county  seats,  erecting  new 
counties,  or  changing  county  lines. 

(11)  Incorporating  cities,  towns,  or  villages,  or  changing 
their  charters. 


9i 


92 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


(12)  For  the  opening  and  conducting  of  elections,  or  fix- 
ing or  changing  the  place  of  voting. 

(13)  Granting  divorces. 

(14)  Erecting  new  townships  or  boroughs,  changing 
township  lines,  borough  limits,  or  school  districts. 

(15)  Creating  offices,  or  prescribing  the  powers  and  du- 
ties of  officers  in  counties,  cities,  boroughs,  townships,  elec- 
tion, or  school  districts. 

(16)  Changing  the  law  of  descent  or  succession. 

(17)  Regulating  the  practice  or  jurisdiction  of,  or  chang- 
ing the  rules  of  evidence  in,  any  judicial  proceeding  or  in- 
quiry before  courts,  aldermen,  justices  of  the  peace,  sheriffs, 
commissioners,  arbitrators,  auditors,  masters  in  chancery,  or 
other  tribunals,  or  providing  or  changing  methods  for  the 
collection  of  debts  or  the  enforcing  of  judgments,  or  prescrib- 
ing the  effect  of  judicial  sales  of  real  estate. 

(18)  Regulating  the  fees  or  extending  the  powers  and 
duties  of  aldermen,  justices  of  the  peace,  magistrates,  or  con- 
stables. 

(19)  Regulating  the  management  of  public  schools,  the 
building  or  repairing  of  school-houses,  and  the  raising  of 
money  for  such  purposes. 

(20)  Fixing  the  rate  of  interest. 

(21)  Affecting  the  estates  of  minors  or  persons  under  dis- 
ability, except  after  due  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest,  to  be 
recited  in  the  special  enactment. 

(22)  Remitting  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures,  or  refund- 
ing moneys  legally  paid  into  the  treasury. 

(23)  Exempting  property  from  taxation. 

(24)  Regulating  labor,  trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing. 

(25)  Creating  corporations,  or  amending,  renewing,  or 
extending  the  charters  thereof. 

(26)  Granting  to  any  corporation,  association,  or  indi- 
vidual any  special  or  exclusive  privilege  or  immunity,  or  to 
any  corporation,  association,  or  individual  the  right  to  lay 
<lown  a railroad  track. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


93 


(27)  Nor  shall  the  General  Assembly  indirectly  enact  such 
special  or  local  law  by  the  partial  repeal  of  a general  law,  but 
laws  repealing  local  or  special  Acts  may  be  passed. 

(28)  Nor  shall  any  law  be  passed  granting  powers  or 
privileges  in  any  case,  where  the  granting  of  such  powers 
and  privileges  shall  have  been  provided  for  by  general  law, 
nor  where  the  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  grant  the  same,  or 
give  the  relief  asked  for. 

Article  III,  Section  8.  No  local  or  special  bill  shall  be 
passed  unless  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor  shall 
have  been  published  in  the  locality  where  the  matter  or  the 
thing  to  be  affected  may  be  situated,  which  notice  shall  be  at 
least  thirty  days  prior  to  the  introduction  into  the  General 
Assembly  of  such  bill,  and  in  the  manner  to  be  provided  by 
law;  the  evidence  of  such  notice  having  been  published  shall 
be  exhibited  in  the  General  Assembly  before  such  Act  shall 
be  passed. 

Article  III,  Section  21.  . . . No  Act  shall  prescribe  any 
limitation  of  time  within  which  suits  may  be  brought  against 
corporations  for  injuries  to  persons  or  property,  or  for  other 
causes,  different  from  those  fixed  by  general  laws  regulating 
actions  against  natural  persons;  and  such  Acts  now  existing 
are  avoided. 

Article  V,  Section  26.  All  laws  relating  to  courts  shall  be 
general  and  of  uniform  operation,  and  the  organization,  juris- 
diction, and  powers  of  all  courts  of  the  same  class  or  grade, 
so  far  as  regulated  by  law,  and  the  force  and  effect  of  the  pro- 
cess and  judgments  of  such  courts,  shall  be  uniform;  and  the 
General  Assembly  is  hereby  prohibited  from  creating  other 
courts  to  exercise  the  powers  vested  by  this  Constitution  in 
the  judges  of  the  courts  of  common  pleas  and  orphans’  courts. 

Article  VIII,  Section  7.  All  laws  regulating  the  holding 
of  elections  by  the  citizens,  or  for  the  registration  of  electors, 
shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  State,  but  no  elector  shall 
be  deprived  of  the  privilege  of  voting  by  reason  of  his  name 
not  being  registered. 


94 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


Article  V,  Section  17.  . . . The  General  Assembly  shall 
by  general  law  designate  the  courts  and  judges  by  whom  the 
several  classes  of  election  contests  shall  be  tried,  and  regulate 
the  manner  of  trial  and  all  matters  incident  thereto.  . . . 

Article  IX,  Section  1.  All  taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the 
same  class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  au- 
thority levying  the  tax,  and  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under 
general  laws  ; but  the  General  Assembly  may  by  general  laws 
exempt  from  taxation  public  property  used  for  public  pur- 
poses, actual  places  of  religious  worship,  places  of  burial  not 
used  or  held  for  private  or  corporate  profit,  and  institutions 
of  purely  public  charity. 

Article  XVI,  Section  7.  . . . The  stock  and  indebtedness 
of  corporations  shall  not  be  increased  except  in  pursuance  of 
general  law.  . . . 

Article  XVI,  Section  18.  Any  association  or  corporation 
organized  for  the  purpose,  or  any  individual,  shall  have  the 
right  to  construct  and  maintain  lines  of  telegraph  within  this 
State,  and  to  connect  the  same  with  other  lines;  and  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  shall,  by  general  law,  of  uniform  operation, 
provide  reasonable  regulations  to  give  full  effect  to  this  sec- 
tion. . . . 


Constitution. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

1.  The  constitutional  provisions  generally. 

2.  What  is  meant  by  a special  or  local  law. 

3.  The  constitutional  provisions  are  to  be  so  construed 

as  to  prevent  the  mischief  designed  to  be  remedied 
by  their  adoption. 

4.  The  provisions  as  to  local  and  special  legislation  ap- 

ply only  to  the  General  Assembly. 

5.  A law  is  general  which  contains  an  exception  render- 

ing it  apparently  special,  if  the  exception  be  made 
pursuant  to  a special  constitutional  provision. 

6.  A law  is  general,  though  its  operation  may  be  im- 

peded by  pre-existing  special  laws,  and  hence  such 
laws  may  be  saved  by  exception. 

7.  A law  may  be  general  as  to  a class  of  persons,  and 

therefore  valid,  although  special  or  local  as  to  its 
subject-matter. 

8.  A general  law  may  contain  special  provisions  neces- 

sary to  render  it  effective. 

1.  The  Constitutional  Provisions  Generally. 

The  constitutional  provisions  related  to  the  present  sub- 
ject are  of  two  kinds,  affirmative  and  negative.  Those  of 

95 


96 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


Article  III,  Section  7,  are  negative.  The  article  begins,  “The 
General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  law,” 
and  proceeds  to  enumerate  the  subjects  within  the  prohibi- 
tion. The  provision  of  Article  III,  Section  21,  as  to  limita- 
tion of  suits  is  negative.  Other  provisions  are  affirmative; 
thus,  Article  V,  Section  26,  declares  that  all  laws  relating 
to  courts  shall  be  general  and  of  uniform  operation,  and  the 
organization,  jurisdiction,  and  powers  of  all  courts  of  the 
same  class  or  grade,  so  far  as  regulated  by  law,  and  the  force 
and  effect  of  the  process  and  judgments  of  such  courts,  shall 
be  uniform.  These  provisions  may  be  considered  in  connec- 
tion with  the  negative  provisions  of  Article  III,  Section  7, 
upon  judicial  subjects.  Article  VIII,  Section  7,  declares  that 
all  laws  regulating  the  holding  of  elections  by  the  citizens, 
or  for  the  registration  of  voters  shall  be  uniform  throughout 
the  State.  Upon  the  same  subject,  Article  III,  Section  7, 
prohibits  local  and  special  laws  for  the  opening  and  conduct- 
ing of  elections,  or  fixing  or  changing  the  places  of  voting. 
The  Bill  of  Rights  provides  that  all  elections  shall  be  free 
and  equal.  Article  VIII,  Section  17,  requires  the  General 
Assembly  to  designate,  by  general  law,  the  courts  and  judges 
by  whom  the  several  classes  of  election  contests  shall  be  tried, 
and  regulate  the  manner  of  trial  and  all  matters  incident 
thereto.  Article  IX,  Section  1,  requires  that  all  taxes  shall 
be  levied  and  collected  under  general  laws,  and  provides  that 
exemptions  so  far  as  permitted  shall  be  likewise  made.  A 
prohibition  as  to  exempting  property  from  taxation  is  to  be 
found  in  Article  III,  Section  7.  By  Article  XVI,  Section  12,, 
certain  matters  relating  to  telegraphs  are  to  be  subjected  to 
reasonable  regulation  by  general  law  of  uniform  operation. 
The  affirmative  provisions  are  usually  general.  The  negative 
provisions  are  usually  specific. 

The  prohibition,  in  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  local  or  special 
laws  changing  the  law  of  descent  or  succession,  or  fixing  the 
rate  of  interest,  are  related  to  the  provisions  already  referred 
to  designed  to  secure  uniformity  of  law.  Other  provisions  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


97 


the  same  section  may  be  classified  as  relating  to  govermental 
affairs,  either  political,  executive,  or  administrative,  such  as 
those  relating  to  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships,  bor- 
oughs, wards,  and  school  districts;  to  roads,  highways, 
streets,  alleys,  ferries,  bridges,  town-plats,  cemeteries,  grave- 
yards, and  public  grounds  not  of  the  State;  to  elections;  to 
changing  the  names  of  persons  or  places  and  to  the  release  of 
fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures.  Others  relate  to  more  purely 
legislative  matters,  such  as  those  relating  to  the  estates  of 
minors  and  persons  under  disability,  to  regulating  labor, 
trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing;  to  the  creation  of  corpora- 
tions, or  the  altering  or  amending  their  charters;  to  grant- 
ing special  privileges  or  immunities,  or  granting  powers 
or  privileges  where  the  granting  of  such  powers  and 
privileges  shall  have  been  provided  for  by  general  laws, 
or  where  the  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  grant  the  relief 
asked  for,  and  to  evasions  by  partial  repeal  of  general  law. 
Other  provisions  relate  to  the  judicial  power,  such  as  those 
relating  to  liens,  divorces,  venue,  adoption,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  the  practice,  jurisdiction,  and  procedure  of  judicial 
tribunals. 

In  this  connection  reference  may  be  made  to  certain  pro- 
visions made  in  the  singular;  thus,  in  Article  IX,  Section  8, 
“any  city  the  debt  of  which  now  exceeds  seven  per  centum  of 
such  assessed  valuation  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  increase  the 
same  three  per  centum  in  the  aggregate  at  any  one  time  upon 
such  valuation ;”  and  in  Article  XVI,  Section  io,  “the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  shall  have  the  power  to  revoke  or  annul  any 
charter  of  incorporation,”  &c.,  and  in  Article  III,  Section  27, 
“any  county  or  municipality  may  appoint  (inspection)  officers 
when  authorized  by  law.”  How  far  these  special  provisions 
may  be  regarded  as  exceptions  to  the  general  declarations 
elsewhere  made  upon  the  same  subjects  and  whether  they 
authorize  special  laws,  may  be  a question.1 

Other  provisions  expressly  contemplate  exceptional 
special  legislation;  for  example,  Article  V,  Section  6,  relating 
7 


98 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


to  increasing  the  number  of  courts  or  judges;  Article  V,  Sec- 
tion 22,  relating  to  the  establishment  of  separate  orphans’ 
courts;  Article  V,  Section  12,  relating  to  magistrates  courts 
in  Philadelphia. 

1 Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338-351,  wherein  Mr. 
Justice  Paxson  ( arguendo ) said:  “If  the  complainants  were 
right  in  their  position  in  regard  to  the  classification  of  cities, 
and  that  the  Act  classifying  cities  is  a special  Act  applicable 
to  Philadelphia  alone,  it  would  not  help  them.  The  Legisla- 
ture is  authorized  by  the  express  terms  of  the  Constitution  to 
empower  by  special  Act  a city  to  increase  its  debt.  The  lan- 
guage of  that  instrument  is  ‘but  any  city,  the  debt  of  which 
exceeds  seven  per  centum,  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  in- 
crease the  same.’  It  was  entirely  competent  for  the  Legis- 
lature to  have  passed  an  Act  authorizing  the  city  of  Phila- 
delphia, by  name,  to  increase  its  debt.”  The  provision  re- 
ferred to  was  exceptional  and  temporary.  A city  whose  in- 
debtedness exceeded  seven  per  centum  at  the  time  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  but  passed  afterward  below  that 
limit,  fell  into  the  category  of  all  the  other  cities  of  the  Com- 
monwealth, was  thereafter  governed  by  the  general  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution,  and  could  not  act  under  this  one: 
Pepper  v.  Philadelphia,  181  Pa.  St.  566;  s.  c.,  below,  6 P.  D. 
R.  317. 

2.  What  is  Meant  by  a Special  or  Local  Law. 

A special  law  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution  is 
one  applicable  to  less  than  a class  of  subjects.  A local  law  is 
one  applicable  to  less  than  a class  of  places;  it  is  a special  law 
of  local  application.  Both  definitions  involve  the  principle 
of  classification,  and  a right  understanding  of  this  principle 
frequently  solves  all  difficulty  in  the  application  of  the  con- 
stitutional provisions.  Instances  of  prohibited  special  legis- 
lation tending  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  definition  may  be 
found  in  Article  III,  Section  7,  as  follows:  Laws  changing 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


99 


the  names  of  persons  or  places;  authorizing  the  adoption  or 
legitimation  of  children;  granting  divorces;  creating  corpora- 
tions, or  amending,  renewing,  or  extending  the  charters 
thereof;  granting  to  any  corporation,  association,  or  indi- 
vidual any  special  or  exclusive  privilege  or  immunity,  or  to 
any  corporation,  association,  or  individual  the  right  to  lay 
down  a railroad  track.  Instances  of  prohibited  legislation, 
both  local  and  special,  may  be  found  in  the  same  section  as 
follows:  Laws  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  town- 
ships, wards,  boroughs,  or  school  districts;  authorizing  the 
laying  out,  opening,  altering,  or  maintaining  roads,  highways, 
streets,  or  alleys;  vacating  roads,  town-plats,  streets,  or  al- 
leys; relating  to  cemeteries,  graveyards,  or  public  grounds 
not  of  the  State;  locating  or  changing  county  seats,  erecting 
new  counties,  or  changing  county  lines;  incorporating  cities, 
towns,  or  villages,  or  changing  their  charters;  erecting  new 
townships  or  boroughs,  changing  township  lines,  borough 
limits,  or  school  districts;  regulating  the  management  of  pub- 
lic schools,  the  building  or  repairing  of  school  houses,  and  the 
raising  of  money  for  such  purposes. 

“All  legislation  is  necessarily  based  on  a classification  of 
its  subjects,  and  when  such  classification  is  fairly  made,  laws 
enacted  in  conformity  thereto  cannot  be  properly  charac- 
terized as  either  local  or  special.  A law  prescribing  the  mode 
of  incorporating  all  railroad  companies  is  special,  in  the  nar- 
row sense  that  it  is  confined  in  its  operations  to  one  kind  of 
corporations  only,  and,  by  the  same  test,  a law  providing 
a single  system  for  organization  and  government  of  boroughs 
in  the  State  would  be  a local  law,  but  every  one  conversant 
with  the  meaning  of  those  words,  when  used  in  that  connec- 
tion, would  unhesitatingly  pronounce  such  statutes  general 
laws:”  Sterrett,  J.,  Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

“The  subject  of  this  statute  is,  therefore,  street  railway 
companies,  which  is  a subject  for  general  legislation,  while  the 
statute  professes  to  deal  only  with  a limited  number  of  these 
railways,  and  these  are  selected  by  reference  to  their  location 
in  certain  cities.  Under  the  guise  of  a general  law  we  have 
here  one  which  is  special,  because  it  relates  to  a few  members 


IOO 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


of  the  general  class  of  corporations  known  as  street  railway 
companies,  and  local  because  its  operations  are  confined  to 
particular  localities,  viz.,  cities  of  the  second  and  third  class:” 
Williams,  J.,  Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118 
Pa.  St.  192. 

“We  have  repeatedly  held  that  the  power  to  classify  being 
conceded,  the  conclusion  that  an  Act  passed  for  a class  was 
not  a local  law  within  the  prohibition  of  the  Constitution 
was  irresistible.  It  may  not  be  a general  law  in  the  same 
sense  that  one  applicable  to  the  Commonwealth  at  large  is 
general;  but  it  is  general,  in  another  and  strictly  legal  sense, 
since  it  embraces  all  the  members  of  a class  which  the  Legis- 
lature has  created,  without  any  violation  of  the  fundamental 
law,  and  which  is  therefore  a proper  subject  for  legislation:” 
Per  Williams,  J.,  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa. 
St.  244. 

“A11  Act  of  Assembly  that  relates  to  a subject  within  the 
purposes  of  classification  is  a general  law,  although  it  may 
be  operative  in  a very  small  portion  of  the  territory  of  the 
State,  if  it  relates  to  all  the  cities  of  a given  class.  For  ex- 
ample, an  Act  relating  to  the  lighting  of  streets  in  cities  of 
the  third  class  would  be  a general  law  for  the  following  rea- 
sons: (a)  It  relates  to  the  exercise  of  ‘corporate  powers;’  (b) 
It  affects  all  the  cities  of  a given  class  in  the  same  manner; 
(c)  It  affects  the  inhabitants  and  property-owners  in  such 
cities,  because  of  their  residence  and  ownership  therein,  and 
the  circumstances  and  needs  that  are  peculiar  to  the  class  to 
which  their  city  belongs.  But  a law  that  should  provide  that 
all  applications  made  by  guardians,  administrators,  and  exec- 
utors for  leave  to  sell  the  real  estate  of  a decedent  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debts,  in  cities  of  the  third  class,  should  be  made, 
not  in  the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  petitioner’s  ac- 
counts, but  in  the  court  of  quarter  sessions  would  be  a local 
law,  and  therefore  unconstitutional.  It  would  be  applicable 
to  the  same  sub-divisions  of  territory  as  the  law  relating  to 
the  lighting  of  streets,  but  it  would  relate  to  the  exercise 
of  no  corporate  power  residing  in  a city,  nor  to  the  duties  of 
any  municipal  officer,  nor  to  the  needs  or  welfare  of  citizens 
of  a city  of  the  third  class,  as  distinguished  from  other  citi- 
zens of  the  Commonwealth.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would 
affect  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State  courts,  modify  the  duties 
of  public  officers  whose  functions  are  not  local,  but  general, 
and  touch  the  inhabitants  of  cities  of  the  given  class  in  the 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


IOI 


exercise  and  enjoyment  of  their  rights  as  citizens  of  the  State, 
not  as  dwellers  in  the  municipality:”  Per  Williams,  J.,  Wy- 
oming Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494. 

“It  was  not,  then,  a general  Act,  applicable  to  every  part 
of  the  Commonwealth.  It  did  apply  to  a great  number  of 
counties,  but  there  is  no  dividing  line  between  a local  and  a 
general  statute.  It  must  be  either  the  one  or  the  other.  If 
it  apply  to  the  whole  State  it  is  general.  If  to  a part  only,  it 
is  local.  As  a legal  principle  it  is  as  effectually  local  when  it 
applies  to  sixty-five  counties  out  of  the  sixty-seven,  as  if  it 
applied  to  one  county  only.  The  exclusion  of  a single  county 
from  the  operation  of  the  Act  makes  it  local:”  Per  Mercur,. 
J.,  Davis  v.  Clark,  106  Pa.  St.  377. 

“The  Act  in  question  is  clearly  local;  it  applies  to  the 
township  of  Ayr  only.  It  gives  no  power  or  authority  to 
the  officials  of  any  other  township  or  district.  The  exer- 
cise of  all  power  thereby  given  is  restricted  within  the  bounds 
of  the  one  school  district.  It  is  also  special.  The  tax  was 
to  be  levied  and  collected  for  one  specific  purpose;  that  pur- 
pose was  to  pay  a certain  sum  of  money  to  the  persons  named 
in  the  Act.  The  money  could  not  be  used  for  any  other  or 
different  purpose:”  Per  Mercur,,  J.,  Montgomery  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 91  Pa.  St.  125. 


3.  The  Constitutional  Provisions  are  to  be  so  Con- 
strued as  to  Prevent  the  Mischief  Designed 
to  be  Remedied  by  Their  Adoption. 

In  Ayars’  Appeal,1  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “During 

the  session  of  the  Legislature  immediately  preceding  the 
adoption  of  the  present  Constitution,  nearly  one  hundred  and 
fifty  local  or  special  laws  were  enacted  for  the  city  of  Phila- 
delphia, more  than  one-third  that  number  for  the  city  of 
Pittsburg,  and  for  other  municipal  divisions  of  the  State, 
about  the  same  proportion.  This  was  by  no  means  ex- 
ceptional. The  pernicious  system  of  special  legislation,  prac- 
ticed for  many  years  before,  had  become  so  general  and  deep- 
rooted  and  the  evils  resulting  therefrom  so  alarming  that 
the  people  of  the  Commonwealth  determined  to  apply  the 
only  remedy  that  promised  any  hope  of  relief.  Doubtless,  it 


102 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


was  a proper  appreciation  of  the  magnitude  of  these  evils  as 
much  as  anything  else  that  called  into  existence  the  conven- 
tion that  framed  the  present  Constitution,  and  induced  its 
adoption  by  an  overwhelming  vote.  One  of  the  manifest  ob- 
jects of  that  instrument  was  to  eradicate  that  species  of  leg- 
islation, and  substitute,  in  lieu  of  it,  general  laws  whenever 
it  was  possible  to  do  so.  This  is  so  clearly  apparent  that  no 
unbiased  mind  can  contemplate  the  seventh  section  of  Article 
III,  and  kindred  provisions,  without  reaching  that  conclu- 
sion. That  section  contains  a schedule  of  nearly  fifty  prolific 
subjects  of  previous  special  and  local  legislation,  and  ordains 
that  'The  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special 
law/  relating  to  either  of  them.  As  an  additional  safeguard 
in  cases  where  special  legislation  is  not  expressly  prohibited, 
the  next  section  declares  ‘No  local  or  special  bill  shall  be 
passed  unless  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor  shall 
have  been  published/  etc.” 

This  point  is  further  illustrated  by  the  remarks  of 
Mr.  Justice  Paxson  in  the  case  of  Morrison  v.  Bach- 
ert:2  “Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitu- 
tion there  was  hardly  an  approach  to  uniformity  in  the 
fees  of  public  officers  throughout  the  State.  Local  Acts 
had  been  procured  for  many  of  the  counties,  in  some  in- 
stances through  the  influence  of  the  officers  themselves,  fix- 
ing the  fees  more  in  harmony  with  their  own  greed  than  the 
interests  of  the  people,  who  may  fairly  be  presumed  to  have 
known  nothing  of  it  until  they  came  to  pay  the  fees.  It  was 
to  cut  this  system  up,  root  and  branch,  with  other  evils  of 
like  nature,  that  the  clause  in  question  was  inserted  in  the 
Constitution.  It  was  a wise  provision,  and  will  be  sternly  en- 
forced. It  is  our  purpose  to  adhere  rigidly  to  that  instru- 
ment that  the  people  may  not  be  deprived  of  its  benefits.  It 
ought  to  be  unnecessary  for  this  court  to  make  this  judicial 
declaration,  but  it  is  proper  to  do  so,  in  view  of  the  amount 
of  legislation  which  is  periodically  placed  upon  the  statute- 
book  in  entire  disregard  of  the  fundamental  law.  Much  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


103 


this  legislation  may  remain  unchallenged  for  years,  only  to 
be  overturned  when  it  reaches  this  court.  In  the  meantime, 
parties  may  have  acted  upon  it,  rights  may  have  grown  up, 
and  the  inconveniences  and  losses  entailed  thereby  may  not 
be  inconsiderable.  As  we  view  it,  this  note  of  warning  at 
this  time  is  needed.” 

It  is  further  illustrated  by  the  remarks  of  Mr.  Justice 
Green,  in  Appeal  of  the  City  of  Scranton  School  District:3 
“It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  enforce  the  Constitution  as 
they  find  it.  Attempts  in  covert  modes  to  defeat  its  plain  pro- 
visions must  be  set  aside  with  the  same  certainty  as  when 
the  methods  are  open.  Even  if  the  intention  be  innocent  and 
yet  the  legislation  comes  within  the  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion it  must  not  be  tolerated.” 

In  Ayars’  Appeal  {supra),  it  was  further  remarked  by  the 
learned  justice:  “The  purpose  of  the  provision  under  con- 

sideration was  not  to  limit  legislation,  but  merely  to  prohibit 
doing,  by  local  or  special  laws,  that  which  can  be  accom- 
plished by  general  laws.  It  relates  not  to  the  substance,  but 
to  the  method  of  legislation,  and  imperatively  demands  the 
enactment  of  general  instead  of  local  or  special  laws,  when- 
ever the  former  are  at  all  practicable.” 

In  harmony  with  the  foregoing  is  the  construction  placed 
upon  the  word  “affairs”  in  the  second  clause  of  Section  7,  of 
Article  III.  Thus,  in  Morrison  v.  Bachert  {supra),  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Paxson  said:  “It  was  held  by  the  learned  judge  of  the 
court  below,  however,  that  an  Act  regulating  the  fees  of  the 
prothonotary  or  other  county  officers  was  not  a law  ‘regulat- 
ing the  affairs  of  counties/  and  he  defines  the  ‘affairs  of  coun- 
ties’ to  be  such  ‘as  concern  counties  in  their  governmental 
and  corporate  capacity.’  This  will  not  do.  It  is  too  narrow 
a construction  of  the  Constitution.  That  instrument  was  in- 
tended for  the  benefit  of  the  people,  and  must  receive  a lib- 
eral construction.  ‘A  constitution  is  not  to  receive  a tech- 
nical construction,  like  a common-law  instrument  or  statute. 
It  is  to  be  interpreted  so  as  to  carry  out  the  great  principles 


104 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


of  government,  and  not  to  defeat  them:’  Commonwealth  v. 
Clark,  7 W.  & S.  127.  When  it  speaks  of  the  affairs  of  a 
county,  it  means  such  affairs  as  affect  the  people  of  that 
county.  The  prothonotary  is  a county  officer,  while  his  fees,, 
when  received  by  him,  are  his  private  property,  they  are  paid 
by  the  people  of  the  county,  not  indeed  assessed  upon  all  the 
taxpayers  as  a salary  would  be,  but  upon  all  citizens  who  have 
business  with  the  office  or  litigation  in  the  courts.  As  every 
citizen  of  the  county  may  be  affected  by  such  an  Act,  and 
most  of  them  surely  will  be,  how  can  we  say  that  it  concerns, 
no  one  but  the  officer  entitled  to  the  fees? 

“The  word  ‘affairs’  is  one  of  broad  signification,  and  the 
convention  used  it  understandingly.  Mr.  Buckalew,  who  was. 
a prominent  member  of  that  body,  thus  refers  to  the  subject 
in  his  very  excellent  work  on  the  Constitution,  at  page  72: 
Tn  the  Pennsylvania  provision  the  word  “affairs”  is  the  im- 
portant one  to  be  examined.  It  was  obviously  borrowed 
from  the  Constitutions  which  were,  in  1873,  of  most  recent 
formation,  in  which  it  was  made  to  supply  the  word  “busi- 
ness,” found  in  the  earlier  Constitutions  above  mentioned. 
The  substitution  of  a French  for  a Saxon  word — “affairs”  for 
“business”- — was  probably  made  in  consequence  of  judicial 
opinions  which  had  assigned  a somewhat  restricted  effect  to. 
the  word  business,  as  found  in  the  earlier  Constitutions,  and 
was  intended  to  give  to  the  prohibition  upon  local  legisla- 
tion a more  extended  application.’  ” 

In  Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth,4  wherein  was  in  ques- 
tion an  Act  for  the  relief  of  individuals  who  had  advanced 
moneys  in  commutation  for  men  drafted  into  the  military 
service  to  fill  the  quota  of  the  township,  and  who  had  not 
been  fully  reimbursed  therefor,  by  providing  money  to  pay 
the  deficiencies,  to  be  raised  from  taxpayers  of  the  township, 
it  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Mercur:  “It  is  contended  that  this 
Act  of  Assembly  does  not  profess  ‘to  regulate  the  affairs’  of 
the  township  or  school  district.  Affair  is  well  defined  to  be 
business,  something  to  be  transacted,  matter,  concern. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  IO5 

Public  affairs  are  matters  relating  to  government.  It 
is  clear  that  the  Act  does  profess  to  deal  with  the  affairs  of 
the  district.  It  imposes  this  specific  business  on  the  district, 
which  it  was  not  chargeable  with  before.  It  gives  to  the  col- 
lector of  this  tax  authority  to  pay  over  to  persons  to  whom  he 
could  not  pay  before.  It  imposes  taxes  on  the  people  which 
they  were  not  legally  chargeable  with  before.  It  is  then  a 
matter  which  concerns  every  person  in  the  district,  who  was 
thereby  made  subject  to  this  additional  taxation.  One  of 
the  highest  attributes  of  governmental  power  is  thereby  ap- 
plied to  them.  Their  property  is  to  be  taken  from  them  and 
given  to  others.  It  does  then  relate  to  the  public  affairs  of 
the  district.  It  seeks  to  regulate  them  by  designating  the 
manner  in  which,  and  the  persons  by  whom,  these  affairs  shall 
be  conducted.  It  gives  relief  where  no  legal  remedy  existed 
before,  and  directs  and  regulates  the  action  of  the  officers 
of  the  district.  Thus  it  is  a special  Act  for  a special  purpose 
to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the  school  district,  and  is  in  clear 
violation  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution.  As 
this  is  decisive  of' the  case  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider 
whether  the  Act  is  in  conflict  with  Article  IX,  Section  1, 
which  declares  all  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under 
general  laws.” 

*Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

2Morrison  v.  Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322;  and  see  City  of 
Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.-  St.  191. 

3Scranton  School  District’s  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St.  176. 

4Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa.  St.  125. 

In  Scranton  v.  Silkman  (supra),  in  which  the  judgment  was 
reversed,  his  Honor,  Judge  Hand,  in  the  court  below,  at- 
tempted to  distinguish  matters  of  taxation  from  other  mat- 
ters purely  local.  He  said:  “The  matter  of  taxation,  in  all 

its  branches,  is  pre-eminently  a State  affair.  The  power  is  a 
sovereign  power.  The  subject-matter  of  assessment,  the 
levying  and  collection  of  taxes  is  wholly  within  the  power  of 
the  State.  It  is  the  internal  administration  and  manage- 


io6 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ment  of  counties,  cities,  townships,  wards,  boroughs,  or 
school  districts  that  is  aimed  at  in  the  regulation  of  those 
affairs,  not  the  sovereign  power  and  regulation  of  taxation 
with  all  its  vital  governmental  concomitants.” 

“Constitutions  are  popular  as  well  as  legal  instruments, 
and  are  to  be  judged  in  full  view  of  the  facts  which  attend 
their  formation,  and  with  reference  to  the  announced  objects 
of  those  who  made  them.  Especially  in  considering  those 
parts  of  the  Constitution,  which,  like  the  seventh  section  of 
the  third  article,  consist  of  general  propositions  in  very  con- 
densed form,  and  consequently  without  the  qualifications  and 
explanations  which  they  require,  we  are  to  avoid  the  mischief 
of  sticking  fast  in  technical  construction  and  losing  grasp 
upon  the  true  meaning  of  the  matter  before  us.  And  we  are 
to  remember  also  that  the  numerous  and  stringent  provisions 
of  this  seventh  section,  detracting  as  they  do  largely  from 
the  powers  of  government, are  not  to  be  strained  beyond  their 
obvious  or  necessary  meaning.  Exceptions  from  the  general 
grant  of  legislative  power  must  be  expressed  with  distinct- 
ness or  be  clearly  implied.  They  are  not  to  be  carried  beyond 
the  proper  import  of  the  words  used,  nor,  where  they  admit 
of  more  than  one  meaning,  are  they  to  be  taken  in  a sense 
which  shall  defeat  or  impair  any  power  which  apparently  the 
convention  intended  to  preserve:”  Buckalew  on  the  Consti- 
tution, 99. 

In  speaking  of  the  classification  of  cities,  Mr.  Justice  Pax- 
son  said:  “If  the  classification  of  cities  is  in  violation  of 
the  Constitution,  it  follows,  of  necessity,  that  Philadelphia, 
as  a city  of  the  first  class,  must  be  denied  the  legislation  nec- 
essary to  its  present  prosperity  and  future  development,  or 
that  the  small  inland  cities  must  be  burdened  with  legislation 
wholly  unsuited  to  their  needs.  For  if  the  Constitution 
means  what  the  complainants  aver  that  it  does,  Philadelphia 
can  have  no  legislation  that  is  not  common  to  all  other  cities 
of  the  State.  And  for  this  there  is  absolutely  no  remedy  but  a 
change  in  the  organic  law  itself. 

“This  is  a serious  question.  We  have  but  to  turn  to  the 
statute-book  to  realize  the  vast  amount  of  legislation  in  the 
past,  special  to  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  We  speak  not  now 
of  what  is  popularly  known  as  special  legislation,  private 
Acts,  etc.,  but  of  proper  legislation,  affecting  the  whole 
city,  and  indispensable  to  its  prosperity.  We  may  instance 
the  laws  in  regard  to  the  quarantine,  lazaretto,  board  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  IO7 

health,  and  other  matters  connected  with  the  sanitary  condi- 
tion of  the  city,  the  laws  in  regard  to  shipping  and  pilotage 
as  affecting  its  commerce,  laws  concerning  its  trade,  such  as 
those  that  relate  to  mercantile  appraisers,  inspectors  of  flour, 
bark,  beef  and  pork,  butter  and  lard,  domestic  distilled  spirits, 
flaxseed,  leather,  tobacco,  petroleum,  and  the  laws  in  regard 
to  building  inspectors,  the  storage  and  sale  of  gunpowder, 
laws  affecting  its  political  condition,  as  by  the  division  and 
subdivision  of  wards,  and  the  establishing  of  ratio  of  repre- 
sentation in  councils.  We  have  but  to  glance  at  this  legis- 
lation to  see  that  the  most  of  it  is  wholly  unsuited  to  small 
inland  cities,  and  that  to  inflict  it  upon  them  would  be  little 
short  of  a calamity.  Must  the  city  of  Scranton,  over  ioo  miles 
from  tide-water,  with  a stream  hardly  large  enough  to  float 
a batteau,  be  subjected  to  quarantine  regulations,  and  have 
its  lazaretto?  Must  the  legislation  for  a great  commercial 
and  manufacturing  city,  with  a population  approaching 
1,000,000,  be  regulated  by  the  wants  or  necessities  of  an  in- 
land city  of  10,000  inhabitants?  If  the  Constitution  answers 
this  question  affirmatively,  we  are  bound  by  it,  however  much 
we  might  question  its  wisdom.  But  no  such  construction  is 
to  be  gathered  from  its  terms,  and  we  will  not  presume  that 
the  framers  of  that  instrument,  or  the  people  who  ratified  it, 
intended  that  the  machinery  of  their  State  government 
should  be  so  bolted  and  riveted  down  by  the  fundamental  law 
as  to  be  unable  to  move  and  perform  its  necessary  functions:” 
Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338-350. 

4.  The  Provisions  as  to  Local  and  Special  Legis- 
lation Apply  Only  to  the  General  Assembly. 

The  constitutional  limitations  relating  to  local  and  special 
legislation  govern  the  General  Assembly;  they  are  not  limi- 
tations upon  the  legislative  power  of  a municipality.  A mu- 
nicipal ordinance  is  not  a law  within  the  meaning  of  the  Con- 
stitution when  that  term  is  used  with  reference  to  the  subject 
under  consideration.  In  Klingler  v.  Bickel,1  there  was  in 
question  the  validity  of  a borough  ordinance,  prohibiting 
the  erection  of  wooden  buildings  within  certain  prescribed 
limits,  enacted  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  June  3d, 
1885,  P.  L.  55.  The  court  below  held  that  the  ordinance  was 


io8 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


invalid  because  it  prohibited  the  erection  of  such  buildings 
in  only  a portion  of  the  borough,  that  under  the  provision  of 
the  Constitution  prohibiting  special  or  local  legislation 
it  was  beyond  the  power  of  the  council  as  it  was  beyond  the 
power  of  the  Legislature  to  legislate  for  only  a portion  of 
the  borough. 

Said  Mr.  Justice  Paxson:  “Granted  the  constitutional 
prohibition  and  that  under  it  the  Legislature  may  not  pass 
any  law  ‘regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  townships,  wards, 
boroughs,  or  school  districts,’  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
when  the  Legislature  by  a general  law  confers  upon  a bor- 
ough the  power  of  regulating  its  local  affairs  it  may  not  do  so 
by  ordinances  that  are  special  in  their  character.  The  object 
of  the  constitutional  provision  was  clearly  to  prevent  the 
Legislature  from  interfering  in  local  affairs  by  means  of 
special  legislation,  and,  if  the  town  councils  of  cities  and  bor- 
oughs cannot  regulate  them,  they  are  in  a bad  way  indeed. 
The  principle  contended  for  would  prevent  the  town  coun- 
cils of  a city  or  borough  from  passing  an  ordinance  to  pave 
one  street,  unless  it  also  provided  for  the  paving  of  all  the 
other  streets  within  the  limits  of  the  municipality.  In  Bald- 
win v.  The  City  of  Philadelphia,  99  Pa.  St.  164,  it  was  de- 
cided that  an  ordinance  of  the  city  was  not  a ‘law’  within  the 
meaning  of  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  declares 
that  ‘no  law  shall  extend  the  term  of  any  public  officer,  or  in- 
crease or  diminish  his  salary  or  emoluments  after  his  election 
or  appointment.’  The  reasoning  of  that  case  applies  equally 
to  that  section  of  the  Constitution  prohibiting  special  legis- 
lation.” 

The  declaration  of  Article  IX,  Section  1,  is  more  compre- 
hensive; it  is  that  “all  taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same 
class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority 
levying  the  tax.” 

1Klingler  v.  Bickel,  117  Pa.  St.  326;  and  see  Norristown  v. 
Citizens’  Passenger  Railway  Company,  148  Pa.  St.  87;  s.  c., 
below,  9 C.  C.  R.  102;  McCormick  v.  Fayette  County,  150 
Pa.  St.  191. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


109 


5.  A Law  is  General  Which  Contains  an  Exception 
Rendering  it  Apparently  Special,  if  the  Ex- 
ception be  Made  Pursuant  to  a Special  Con- 
stitutional Provision. 

The  Act  of  July  7th,  1879,  P.  L.  194,  enlarging  the  civil 
jurisdiction  of  justices  of  the  peace  to  three  hundred  dollars 
is  not  rendered  local  or  special  by  the  exclusion  of  cities  of 
the  first  class  from  its  operation  if  in  this  Act  the  term  “cities 
of  the  first  class”  refers  only  to  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  as 
in  that  city  the  office  of  alderman  is  abolished  and  magis- 
trates provided  for  whose  civil  jurisdiction  is  limited  by  the 
Constitution  (Article  V,  Section  11)  to  one  hundred  dollars; 
“were  it  not  for  this  provision  it  would  be  impossible  to  hold 
that  the  exception  means  only  Philadelphia,”  and  the  Act 
would  therefore  be  local.1 

This  rule  is  not  applicable,  however,  where  the  exception 
has  reference  to  a special  pre-existing  statutory  provision. 
The  Act  of  May  24th,  1878,  P.  L.  133,  was  entitled  “A  sup- 
plement to  an  Act  approved  April  20th,  1876,  entitled  'An 
Act  authorizing  appeals  from  assessments  in  this  Common- 
wealth to  the  court  of  common  pleas,’  and  limiting  taxa- 
tion without  the  approval  of  the  court  of  quarter  sessions, 
until  the  next  triennial  assessment,  where  the  county  valua- 
tion has  been  raised  to  exceed  three  hundred  and  fifty  per 
cent.”  The  first  section  of  this  Act  limited  its  effect  to  coun- 
ties of  less  than  five  hundred  thousand  inhabitants.  This  Act 
was  held  invalid.2  In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Green  said: 
“There  is  no  doubt  much  force  in  the  consideration  that  the 
only  county  which  is  now  excluded  has  a system  of  appeal  of 
its  own,  and  the  present  law  practically  makes  the  right  gen- 
eral which  was  before  local.  But  the  difficulty  we  experience 
is  that  we  cannot  consistently  hold  a principle  of  construc- 
tion applicable  in  one  case  and  not  applicable  to  another 
where  the  same  conditions  exist.  It  is,  perhaps,  unfortunate 
that  we  are  obliged  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  Davis  v.  Clark  to 
the  present  case,  because  we  thereby  deprive  a large  class  of 


no 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


citizens  of  a valuable  privilege.  But  the  remedy  is  with  the 
Legislature  and  not  with  us.  It  is  far  better  that  the  law- 
making power  should  itself  correct  the  mischief  by  a new 
and  proper  enactment  than  that  the  judicial  department  of 
the  government  should  pursue  a shifting,  tortuous  policy  by 
executing  a rule  of  construction  in  one  case  and  refusing  it 
in  another  when  the  circumstances  of  the  two  are  the  same.”  . 

1 Wilkes-Barre  v.  Myers,  113  Pa.  St.  395;  s.  p.,  Wissler  v. 
Becker,  2 C.  C.  R.  103;  Johnson  v.  Beacham,  2 C.  C.  R.  108. 

2Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191. 

The  Act  of  April  20th,  1876,  P.  L.  44,  entitled  “An  Act 
authorizing  appeals  from  assessments  in  this  Commonwealth 
to  the  court  of  common  pleas,”  provided  that  remedy  in  fa- 
vor of  any  owner  of  real  estate  in  counties  of  less  than  five 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants,  in  cases  of  decision  by  the 
county  commissioners.  The  Act  of  May  24th,  1878,  P.  L. 
133,  supplementary  to  the  foregoing  included  the  like  remedy 
in  cases  of  decision  in  any  city  of  the  third  class. 

The  objection  was  made  in  the  foregoing  case  by  plea  to 
the  jurisdiction  grounded  on  the  invalidity  of  the  Act  of  1878. 
It  was  admitted  that  the  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  P.  L.  15, 
had  been  accepted  by  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  ex- 
cept Lancaster,  Allegheny,  and  Wilkes-Barre,  prior  to  1878. 

The  opinion  of  his  Honor,  Judge  Hand,  affirmed  the  valid- 
ity of  the  Acts  in  question  for  reasons,  among  others,  which 
may  be  summarized  as  follows:  1.  A classification  was  made, 
based  on  population,  which  had  been  recognized  as  proper, 
and  which  was  in  fact  justified,  operating  as  it  did  to  leave 
Philadelphia  in  a class  by  itself.  2.  The  Act  of  1876  and  its 
supplement  made  that  general  which  was  before  special,  be- 
cause Philadelphia  had  a similar  provision  for  appeals.  3.  It 
was  not  local  nor  special  for  that  reason,  and  because  taxa- 
tion was  an  incident  of  sovereignty,  an  affair  of  State,  and 
cities  and  counties  were  mere  instrumentalities.  The  consti- 
tutional provision  intends  only  such  affairs  as  are  peculiar  to 
and  belong  to  the  internal  management  of  the  different  sub- 
ordinate political  divisions  of  the  State.  4.  The  supplement 
is  valid  because  it  applies  to  all  cities  of  the  third  class.  5. 
The  remedy  is  given  to  all  owners  of  real  estate  in  the  Com- 
monwealth. It  is  not  confined  to  resident  owners. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


Ill 


6.  A Law  is  General  Though  its  Operation  May  be 
Impeded  by  Pre-existing  Special  Laws,  and 
Hence  Such  Laws  May  be  Saved  by  Exception. 

It  may  be  stated  as  a general  rule,  subject  to  the  exception 
that  certain  provisions  may  be  construed  as  self-efficient,  that 
the  Constitution  of  1874  operated  prospectively,  and  that  it 
did  not  affect  pre-existing  legislation,  either  general,  local,  or 
special.1 

In  the  case  of  Lehigh  Iron  Company  v.  Lower  Macungie 
Township  (supra),  the  question  was  whether  a special  Act  of 
February  25th,  1870,  which  authorized  a township  to  collect 
a tax  from  owners  of  ore  beds  for  “every  ton  of  ore  mined  and 
carried  away  with  teams”  over  the  roads  in  the  township  was 
abrogated  by  Article  IX,  Section  1,  of  the  Constitution, 
which  declares  that  all  taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same 
class  of  subjects  and  shall  be  levied  under  general  laws.  It 
was  held  that  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  in  question 
was  not  operative  upon  pre-existing  local  legislation. 

In  this  case  Chief  Justice  Agnew  said:  “The  only  question 
now  before  us  is,  therefore,  upon  the  effect  of  the  first  section 
of  the  ninth  article  of  the  new  Constitution  upon  such  legisla- 
tion. It  is  contended  that  this  section  is  a repeal,  per  se,  of 
the  Act  under  which  this  tax  is  sought  to  be  levied  and  col- 
lected. It  is  a question  of  very  great  concern  to  the  whole 
State,  for  if  the  position  taken  by  the  plaintiff  in  error  be 
true,  some  of  the  most  important  laws  of  the  State  have  fal- 
len long  since,  and  all  acts  done  under  them  have  been  un- 
lawful and  void.  An  example  may  be  found  in  the  Act 
known  as  the  Venango  County  Tax  Law,  enacted  many  years 
ago,  and  extended  from  time  to  time  to  other  counties,  until 
now  it  is  the  law  of  probably  one-third  of  the  counties  in  the 
State.  This  is  the  law  which  makes  the  treasurer  of  the 
county  the  collector  of  the  State  and  county  taxes,  sends  him 
out  into  the  different  townships  to  receive  from  the  people, 
and  requires  him  to  place  all  uncollected  taxes,  on  the  first 
day  of  September,  in  the  hands  of  the  several  constables  for 


1 12 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


collection,  with  an  addition  of  five  per  cent,  to  the  taxes  of 
such  person  to  pay  the  expense  of  collection.  It  allows  the 
taxpayer  a reduction  of  five  per  cent,  for  prompt  payment 
before  the  first  of  August,  and  grace  by  payment  of  the  sim- 
ple amount  between  the  first  of  August  and  the  first  of  Sep- 
tember. The  constables  give  bond  and  sureties  for  collection. 
This  is  undoubtedly  the  cheapest  and  best  system  of  collec- 
tion in  the  State,  but  it  is  unquestionably  special.  Many 
other  laws  for  particular  localities  might  be  mentioned. 

“In  view  of  the  wide  and  extended  effects  of  an  immediate 
repeal,  ipso  facto,  by  the  adoption  of  the  new  Constitution, 
it  behooves  us  to  be  careful  in  the  interpretation  of  the  sec- 
tions mentioned.  Upon  all  the  consideration  we  can  give  to 
this  subject,  after  a very  careful  argument  to  assist  us,  we  are 
of  opinion  that  Section  i,  of  Article  IX,  is  not  immediately 
operative,  but  was  intended  by  the  convention  to  be  manda- 
tory upon  the  Legislature  to  enact  laws  framed  upon  its 
special  intent,  and  to  repeal  all  laws  inconsistent  therewith, 
leaving  the  Legislature,  in  the  exercise  of  a sound  and  wise 
discretion,  to  time  the  repeal  after  proper  general  laws  shall 
have  been  passed.  Any  other  interpretation  would  lead  to 
most  ruinous  results.  So  much  may  be  deduced  from  a com- 
prehensive view  of  the  section  itself  and  its  consequences, 
in  the  absence  of  any  language  in  it  to  evidence  an  intent  to 
make  it  a repeal  per  se.  But  beyond  this  there  is  strong  evi- 
dence in  the  immediate  context  that  the  convention  had  a 
different  intention.  A part  of  Section  i is  the  declaration,  by 
way  of  exception  to  its  generality,  of  the  power  of  the  As- 
sembly to  exempt  certain  classes  of  property  from  taxation. 
This  is  followed  immediately  by  Section  2,  which  provides 
that  ‘all  laws  exempting  property  from  taxation  other  than 
the  property  above  enumerated,  shall  be  void.’  Thus  the  sub- 
ject of  repeal  was  directly  before  the  mind  of  the  convention, 
and  was  limited  to  laws  relating  to  exemption  only.  The 
subject  of  the  second  section,  being  directly  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  first,  indeed  might  have  been  incorporated 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  II3 

with  it,  and  this  subject  being  that  of  repeal,  it  is  conclusive 
evidence  to  our  minds  that  the  convention  did  not  intend 
to  repeal  special  tax  laws,  but  to  let  them  stand  until  the 
Legislature  had  enacted  a proper  general  system  of  taxation 
to  take  their  places.  The  eminent  men  who  composed 
that  body  could  not  fail  to  perceive  the  utter  confusion 
into  which  the  State  would  have  been  thrown  by  a repeal 
per  se. 

“These  views  derive  confirmation  from  other  portions  of 
the  instrument.  The  exception  in  the  seventh  section  of  the 
third  article,  relative  to  legislation,  giving  power  to  repeal 
special  and  local  Acts,  strongly  indicates  the  intent  that  such 
local  and  special  Acts  should  remain  until  legislation  had 
been  adopted  to  harmonize  these  local  and  special  provisions 
with  the  general  laws  so  adopted.  There  are  also  instances 
of  immediate  repeal  of  existing  laws,  for  example,  Article  III, 
Section  21,  relating  to  damages  for  personal  injuries,  and 
Section  22,  relating  to  investments  by  executors,  etc.  Ar- 
ticle XVI,  Section  1,  relating  to  certain  existing  charters  of 
incorporation,  and  the  section  relating  to  exemption  laws, 
already  alluded  to  (Section  2,  Article  IX).  Then  we  have  the 
second  and  thirty-first  sections  of  the  schedule  bearing  di- 
rectly upon  the  question.  The  former  continues  in  force  all 
laws  not  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution,  and  all  rights, 
actions,  prosecutions,  and  contracts.  This  express  provision 
must  have  its  due  operation,  unless  inconsistency  plainly  ap- 
pears. The  other  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  Legislature  at  its 
first  session,  or  as  soon  as  may  be,  to  pass  such  laws  as  may  be 
necessary  to  carry  the  Constitution  into  full  force  and  effect. 
This  section  also  necessarily  appeals  to  the  conscience  of  the 
members,  by  their  oath  of  office,  to  perform  this  necessary 
duty,  and  to  bring  the  laws  of  the  State  into  perfect  accord 
with  the  Constitution,  which  is  the  highest  evidence  of  the 
will  of  the  people.  With  the  Legislature,  therefore,  this  duty 
remains  to  provide  general  laws  for  uniform  taxation,  and 
to  harmonize  all  parts  of  the  State  by  repealing  local  and 
8 


H4 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


special  provisions  that  stand  out  upon  the  body  politic  as 
incongruous  excrescences.” 

The  Act  of  June  25th,  1885,  P.  L.  187,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  the  collection  of  taxes  in  the  several  boroughs 
and  townships  of  this  Commonwealth,”  does  not  violate  Ar- 
ticle III,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution,  relating  to  local  and 
special  legislation,  nor  Article  IX,  Section  1,  requiring  uni- 
formity in  the  levy  and  collection  of  taxes.2  The  last  section 
of  the  Act  of  1885  concluded  thus:  “This  Act  shall  not  apply 
to  any  taxes,  the  collection  of  which  is  regulated  by  a local 
law.”  Said  Mr.  Justice  Clark,  in  Evans  v.  Phillipi,3  wherein 
the  validity  of  this  Act  was  in  question:  “The  single  ques- 
tion then  is  whether  or  not  a statute,  although  general  in 
form,  is  to  be  treated  as  a local  one  simply  because  of  the  in- 
tervention of  some  local  statute  unrepealed,  which  prevents 
it  from  taking  general  effect.  There  is  an  obvious  distinc- 
tion between  a statute  which  upon  its  face  is  local  and  special, 
and  one  which  although  general  in  form  is  thus  obstructed  in 
its  application;  in  the  one  case  the  local  law  cannot  become 
general,  except  by  a re-enactment  in  general  form,  whilst  in 
the  other  by  the  repeal  of  the  local  law  the  special  subject 
affected  by  it  is  brought  under  the  general  law,  the  opera- 
tion of  which  was  previously  obstructed.” 

The  Act  of  May  13th,  1887,  P.  L.  108,  known  as  the 
“Brooks  High  License  Law,”  provides  in  the  nineteenth  sec- 
tion that  none  of  its  provisions  “shall  be  held  to  authorize  the 
sale  of  any  spirituous,  vinous,  malt,  or  brewed  liquors,  or 
any  admixture  thereof,  in  any  city,  county,  borough,  or  town- 
ship, having  special  prohibitory  laws.”  The  purpose  of  this 
was  to  avoid  any  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  the  Legisla- 
ture to  leave  intact  special  prohibitory  laws  enacted  prior  to 
the  adoption  of  the  present  Constitution.  The  provision  did 
not  render  the  statute  a local  statute.4 

The  Act  of  May  18th,  1889,  P.  L.  129,  entitled  “Fixing 
the  number  of  road  and  bridge  viewers,”  contained  a pro- 
vision that  “this  Act  shall  not  apply  to  counties  having  local 
Acts  inconsistent  herewith.”  The  Act  was  sustained.5 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 1 5 

1 Lehigh  Iron  Company  v.  Lower  Macungie  Township,  81 
Pa.  St.  482;  and  see  Hays  v.  Commonwealth,  82  Pa.  St.  518; 
Ahl  v.  Rhoads,  84  Pa.  St.  319;  Indiana  County  v.  Agricult- 
ural Society,  85  Pa.  St.  357;  Perot’s  Appeal,  86  Pa.  St.  335; 
Allegheny  County  v.  Gibson,  90  Pa.  St.  397;  Philadelphia  v. 
Wright,  100  Pa.  St.  235;  Pierce  v.  Commonwealth,  104  Pa. 
St.  150;  Commonwealth  v.  Handley,  106  Pa.  St.  245;  Cahill’s 
Petition,  no  Pa.  St.  167;  Beaumont  v.  Wilkes-Barre,  142 
Pa.  St.  198. 

Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50. 

3Evans  v.  Phillipi,  117  Pa.  St.  226;  and  see  Bennett  v. 
Hunt,  148  Pa.  St.  257;  Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St. 
50- 

Commonwealth  v.  Sellers,  130  Pa.  St.  32;  and  see  Com- 
monwealth v.  McCandless,  4 C.  C.  R.  119;  Affirmed  10  Cent. 
Rep.  758;  s.  c.,  21  W.  N.  C.  162;  Commonwealth  v.  Haag,  6 
C.  C.  R.  1 18. 

5Road  in  Cheltenham  Township,  140  Pa.  St.  136;  s.  c.,  7 
Montgomery  County  Rep.  42;  and  see  Sewer  Street,  8 C. 
C.  R.  226. 

For  cases  relating  to  the  Act  of  June  25th,  1885,  P.  L. 
187,  the  validity  of  which  was  sustained  in  Evans  v.  Phillipi 
{supra),  see  Evans  v.  Wittmer,  2 C.  C.  R.  612,  4 Lane.  Law. 
Rev.  105,  in  which  the  Act  was  held  invalid;  Keim  v.  Devitt, 
3 C.  C.  R.  250,  in  which  the  Act  was  held  valid;  Hannick’s 
Bond,  3 C.  C.  R.  254;  s.  c.,  Collector’s  Bond,  4 Lane.  Law 
Review,  166,  in  which  the  Act  was  held  invalid;  Common- 
wealth v.  Commissioners,  7 C.  C.  R.  173,  in  which  the  Act 
was  held  invalid;  Commonwealth  v.  Swab,  8 C.  C.  R.  111,  in 
which  the  Act  was  said  to  be  invalid  in  so  far  .as  it  regulated 
the  collection  of  State  and  county  taxes,  but  valid  in  so  far 
as  it  related  to  such  taxes  as  were  local  within  each  borough 
or  township  not  included  in  State  or  county  taxes.  In  Com- 
monwealth v.  Frutchey,  1 P.  D.  R.  153,  11  C.  C.  R.  112,  the 
validity  of  this  Act  was  sustained  as  not  in  conflict  with  Ar- 
ticle III,  Section  7,  nor  Article  IX,  Section  1 ; and  see  Swa- 
tara  Twp.  School  District’s  Appeal,  1 Super.  Ct.  502. 

The  distinction  between  a general  statute  containing  a 
saving  clause  excepting  local  and  special  laws,  and  a statute 


ii6 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


excluding  cities  or  counties  where  local  or  special  statutory 
provisions  on  the  same  subject  happen  to  exist,  is  obvious. 
In  the  former  case  the  exception  is  unnecessary,  under  the 
rule  that  a general  statute  will  not  repeal  a pre-existing 
special  statute  on  the  same  subject,  and  a direct  repeal  of  the 
special  statute  will  ipso  facto  extend  the  operation  of  the  gen- 
eral law  to  the  locality  formerly  governed  by  the  special  stat- 
ute. In  the  latter  case  the  statute  is  invalid  on  its  face,  being' 
expressly  local,  its  generality  is  sought  to  be  helped  out  by 
enactments  dehors  the  statute  itself,  and  a repeal  of  these 
enactments  would  not  extend  the  statute  to  the  excepted 
places,  for  the  exclusion  is  permanent  and  express. 

A law  is  general  which  is  applicable  to  all  cases  except 
those  pending  at  the  time  of  its  passage.  The  exclusion  of 
all  retroactive  force  does  not  detract  from  its  general  char- 
acter: Land  Company  v.  Weidner,  169  Pa.  St.  359. 

As  to  the  rule  of  construction  applied  in  cases  where  the 
Legislature,  in  execution  of  the  duty  imposed  by  the  Con- 
stitution, enacts  general  laws,  and  as  to  their  effect  upon 
pre-existing  local  legislation,  see  Chapter  II,  Section  16, 
Questions  of  Repeal. 

7.  A Law  May  be  General  as  to  a Class  of  Persons, 
and  Therefore  Valid,  Although  Special  or 
Local  as  to  its  Subject-matter. 

The  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  P.  L.  24,  made  it  lawful  for 
any  married  woman  owning  any  of  the  loans  of  this  Common- 
wealth or  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  or  any  of  the  loans,  or 
share  or  shares  of  the  capital  stock  of  any  corporation  created 
by  or  under  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth,  to  sell  and  trans- 
fer the  same,  with  like  effect  as  if  she  were  not  married.  This 
Act,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  loans  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  is 
not  a regulation  of  the  affairs  of  that  city  within  the  meaning 
of  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  a general 
law  enlarging  the  powers  of  married  women  so  as  to  regu- 
late the  mode  of  transfer  of  certain  kinds  of  property  owing 
their  existence  to  Pennsylvania  law,  and  having  their  legal 
situs  in  this  Commonwealth.  Being  a regulation  of  property 
made  for  the  public  safety  and  convenience  in  the  transaction 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 1 7 

of  business,  it  is  applicable  to  all  owners  of  the  classes  of 
property  named,  though  it  may  thus  accidentally  enlarge  the 
powers  of  some  foreign  or  non-resident  wives.1 

^oftus  v.  Farmers’  & Mechanics’  National  Bank,  133  Pa. 
St.  97;  s.  c.,  below,  46  Leg.  Int.  46,  s.  c.,  25  W.  N.  C.  459. 

In  this  case  it  was  argued  that  the  words  “or  of  the  city 
of  Philadelphia”  might  be  stricken  out  without  impairing 
the  statute,  because  without  them  it  would  still  apply  to  the 
loans  of  all  corporations  of  every  kind.  The  case  involved 
other  questions  of  some  difficulty,  and  that  upon  the  validity 
of  the  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  does  not  seem  by  the  report 
to  have  been  fully  argued. 

In  Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191,  his  Honor,  Judge 
Hand,  in  the  court  below,  suggested,  among  other  reasons 
for  sustaining  the  Acts  of  1876  and  1878  allowing  appeals 
from  assessments  in  cities  of  the  third  class  and  in  counties 
of  less  than  500,000  inhabitants,  that  as  the  remedy  was  given 
to  all  owners  of  real  estate  within  the  Commonwealth,  and 
was  not  confined  to  residents  of  the  proper  city  or  county 
the  Act  was  general.  But  these  Acts  were  held  invalid. 

In  Williams  v.  People,  24  N.  Y.  405,  there  is  a dictum  that 
an  Act  making  theft  from  the  person  of  property  under  $25 
in  value  grand  larceny  if  committed  in  the  city  of  New  York 
was  general,  as  it  concerned  every  one  who  might  go  to  that 
city,  and  in  fact  it  was  probably  intended  rather  for  the  pro- 
tection of  unsophisticated  strangers  than  of  the  more  wide- 
awake city  folk.  The  principle  suggested  has  been  followed 
in  other  New  York  cases,  and  these  hold  as  general  laws  ex- 
tending to  all  persons  doing  or  omitting  to  do  an  act  within 
the  territorial  limits  described  in  the  statutes:  Binney  Restr. 
on  Local  and  Special  Leg.  in  the  U.  S.  36. 

8.  A General  Law  May  Contain  Special  Provisions 
Necessary  to  Render  it  Effective. 

The  fact  that  the  Act  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  fixed 
certain  dates  for  the  doing  of  things  necessary  to  put  the 
city  government  in  operation,  compliance  with  which  direc- 
tion was  possible  only  in  the  city  of  Pittsburg,  the  then  sole 
city  of  its  class,  and  made  no  corresponding  provision  for 


1 18 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


cities  afterward  coming  into  it,  did  not  render  the  Act  in- 
valid as  a local  law.1  In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Williams 
said:  “It  is  urged  that  Sections  i,  2,  10,  and  20  make  the  Act 
local  by  fixing  dates  at  which  acts  necessary  to  put  the  gov- 
ernment in  operation  are  to  be  done,  which  were  possible  only 
to  one  city,  the  city  of  Pittsburg,  and  which  are  impossible 
to  the  city  of  Allegheny,  which  has  come  into  the  class  since 
the  Act  was  passed.  The  reply  to  this  objection  is  that,  at 
the  date  when  the  Act  became  a law,  there  was  but  one  city 
in  the  second  class.  If  there  had  been  several  such  cities  the 
terms  employed  would  have  been  applied  to  all  alike.  It  was 
necessary,  in  order  to  give  effect  in  the  change  of  the  system 
of  municipal  government,  that  a definite  time  should  be  fixed 
upon  at  which  the  change  should  take  place  and  the  new 
system  be  put  in  operation.  The  trouble  with  the  Act  is  not 
that  it  made  such  a provision  for  cities  then  entitled  to  a 
place  in  the  second  class,  but  that  it  did  not  also  make  similar 
provisions  for  cities  that  should  thereafter  be  entitled  to  come 
into  the  class.  We  cannot  hold,  however,  that  the  failure 
to  provide  a date  for  the  organization  of  cities  afterwards  to 
come  into  the  class,  deprives  such  cities  of  the  benefit  of  the 
law,  or  renders  it  local,  and  so  inoperative  in  the  cities  to 
which  it  would  otherwise  be  applicable.  It  may  be  that  dates 
following  the  proclamation  of  the  Governor  showing  a given 
city  to  be  entitled  to  become  a city  of  the  second  class,  cor- 
responding with  the  dates  following  the  passage  of  the  Act 
which  were  fixed  for  the  cities  then  in  the  class  would  be 
properly  adopted.  Something  like  this  was  done  in  Shurley 
v.  Railroad  Company,  12 1 Pa.  St.  51 1.  But  if  this  should  be 
thought  inadmissible  and  further  legislation  should  be  re- 
sorted to  we  do  not  see  that  the  conclusion  of  the  appellants 
would  follow.  The  Act  of  1887  is  general  in  terms,  and  it 
is  clearly  applicable  to  all  the  members  of  the  class  as  it  was 
then  composed,  and  answered  the  test  laid  down  in  Weinman 
v.  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St.  192,  and  kindred  cases.” 


1Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 19 

The  Act  in  question  in  this  case  was  entitled  “An  Act  in 
relation  to  the  government  of  cities  of  the  second  class.”  The 
first  section  provided  that  on  and  after  April  1st,  1888,  the 
councils  should  be  constituted  in  a certain  manner;  the  sec- 
ond provided  that  at  the  February  election  of  1889  the  mem- 
bers of  select  council  should  be  classified  as  to  length  of  term 
of  service,  and  made  other  provisions  for  the  years  1890  and 
1892  to  carry  out  the  classification;  the  tenth  section  pro- 
vided that  before  January  1st,  1892,  councils  by  ordinance 
should  provide  for  the  carrying  the  Act  into  effect  by  electing 
heads  of  departments,  etc.,  and  the  twentieth  section  pro- 
vided that  heads  of  departments  should  give  security  for  the 
faithful  discharge  of  duty  prior  to  February  1st,  1888. 


CHAPTER  II. 


CLASSIFICATION  AND  MINOR  TOPICS. 

1.  Classification  generally. 

2.  The  principle  of  classification  is  not  as  a rule  affected 

by  the  Constitution. 

3.  What  is  a proper  classification  is  generally  a judicial 

question. 

4.  There  can  be  no  classification  of  cities  or  counties 

save  by  population. 

5.  Classification  of  cities,  counties,  or  other  subdivisions 

must  be  complete  in  order  to  justify  legislation  for 
a given  class  of  either. 

6.  Classification  must  not  be  pretended,  false,  evasive, 

nor  excessive. 

7.  Classification  by  population  must  not  work  exclusion 

but  must  be  operative  from  time  to  time,  so  as  by 
change  of  population  the  subject  may  pass  from 
class  to  class. 

8.  Transition  from  class  to  class. 

9.  Option  under  classification  Acts. 

10.  Option  as  related  to  local  and  special  legislation. 

11.  Legislation  for  cities  by  classes  must  be  confined  to 

municipal  matters  proper. 

12.  What  are  municipal  matters  proper,  and  what  are  not. 

13.  Acts  of  Assembly  void  in  part. 

14.  Validity  of  things  executed  under  invalid  Acts  of  As- 

sembly. 

15.  Curative  statutes. 

16.  Questions  of  repeal. 

120 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


121 


i.  Classification  Generally. 

It  pertains  to  the  province  of  a general  treatise  upon  con- 
stitutional law  to  state  the  doctrine  relating  to  the  power 
of  the  Legislature  to  enact  special  or  particular  statutes  in 
cases  not  embraced  within  the  specific  limitations  under  dis- 
cussion, and  likewise  to  state  the  limitations  upon  the  power 
to  classify  subjects  of  legislation.  The  general  subject  is 
implicated,  among  others,  with  the  provisions  of  the  Bill  of 
Rights  and  those  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution.1 

It  may,  however,  be  remarked  generally,  that  the  principle 
of  classification,  like  many  others  pertaining  to  the  exercise 
of  governmental  power,  is  incapable  of  definition.  No  form 
of  words  can  state  the  power,  with  its  limitations,  in  such 
manner  as  to  furnish  in  advance  a rule  for  every  case  that  may 
arise.  Like  the  police  power  and  the  power  of  taxation,  its 
limitations  can  be  found  only  in  the  particular  instances 
where  some  one  or  more,  out  of  the  many  constitutional  pro- 
visions intended  to  secure  the  rights  of  the  citizen  and  the 
orderly  administration  of  governmental  affairs  are  touched. 

The  prohibitions  of  special,  as  distinguished  from  local  leg- 
islation, include  two  things:  Primarily,  or  in  the  first  in- 

stance, such  special  or  private  legislation  as  was  formerly  sus- 
tained as  not  violative  of  other  constitutional  provisions,  e.  g.r 
granting  divorces,  changing  the  names  of  persons  or  places, 
creating  corporations,  etc.;  secondarily,  or  cumulatively,  such 
special  or  private  legislation  as  would  not  formerly  have  been 
sustained  because  violative  of  other  constitutional  provisions. 
This  may  be  illustrated  by  the  cases  cited  below  and  by  the 
decisions  relating  to  the  power  to  classify  subjects  for  pur- 
poses of  taxation.  It  is  true  the  Constitution  recognizes  the 
power  to  classify  in  immediate  connection  with  the  require- 
ment that  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under  general 
laws,  but  this  tends  only  to  illustrate  more  clearly  what  is 
here  attempted  to  be  pointed  out,  to  wit,  that  as  to  matters 
within  the  latter  branch  of  the  distinction  the  effect  of  other 


122 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


constitutional  provisions  must  be  determined  before  the 
added  prohibitions  contained  in  the  particular  clauses  treated 
can  be  applied. 

For  the  present  purpose  it  has  been  deemed  sufficient  to 
consider  the  principle  of  classification  so  far  as  it  has  been 
involved  in  cases  arising  under  the  present  Constitution 
in  connection  with  the  particular  constitutional  provisions 
under  consideration. 

xSee  Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias,  181  Pa.  St.  126;  s.  c., 
3 Super  Ct.  364;  Gulf,  etc.,  Railway  Company  v.  Ellis,  165 
U.  S.  150. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias  {supra),  the  provisions  of 
the  Act  of  June  16th,  1891,  P.  L.  313,  amendatory  of  the  Act 
of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  190,  imposing  penalties  for  en- 
gaging in  the  business  of  druggist  without  being  registered 
were  in  question.  The  statute  included  such  as  opened  or 
carried  on  the  business  as  manager,  and  the  case  was  decided 
upon  another  point.  In  the  opinion  Mr.  Justice  Williams 
said:  “The  constitutional  question  raised  over  the  exception 
in  behalf  of  the  widows,  administrators,  and  executors  of  reg- 
istered pharmacists  is  not  necessarily  involved  in  this  case. 
The  general  scope  and  provisions  of  the  Act  of  June  16th, 
1891,  are  within  a proper  exercise  of  the  police  power.  Their 
object  is  the  protection  of  the  public  health.  The  require- 
ment that  one  conducting  such  a trade  should  have  such 
chemical  and  pharmaceutical  knowledge  as  to  qualify  him 
to  handle  intelligently  the  dangerous  commodities  in  which 
he  deals  is  reasonable.  It  can  be  supported  without  regard 
to  the  exception  which  is  a repeal  pro  tanto  of  the  prohibition 
which  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  statute  to  make.  The  ex- 
ception makes  a discrimination  between  equally  unqualified 
parties,  giving  to  one  exception  from  the  operation  of  a rule 
enforced  against  the  other.  This  is  not  protection  to  the 
public,  but  rank  injustice  to  individuals.  There  is  no  reason 
why  the  administrator  or  widow  of  a pharmacist  should  be 
permitted  to  manage  a business  of  which  he  or  she  knows 
nothing  than  why  any  other  administrator  or  widow  should 
be  allowed  to  do  so.  If  the  reason  of  the  exception  is  sym- 
pathy for  a widow  then  all  widows  are  prima  facie  equally  en- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


123 


titled  to  sympathy  and  have  the  same  reason  to  claim  ex- 
emption from  the  operation  of  the  law.  The  exception  would 
seem  to  fall  squarely  under  the  rule  laid  down  in  Sayre  Bor- 
ough v.  Phillips,  148  Pa.  St.  488.  It  is  a discrimination  made 
between  those  who  are  equal  under  the  law.  It  is  an  arbitrary 
gift  to  one,  and  an  arbitrary  denial  to  another,  which  cannot 
be  upheld.  It  declares  that  all  widows  except  the  widow 
of  the  pharmacist  shall  be  subject  to  the  prohibition  of  the 
statute.  All  administrators  and  executors  except  they  rep- 
resent the  estate  of  a deceased  registered  pharmacist  shall 
be  within  the  prohibition.  They  must  show  their  qualifica- 
tions to  conduct  the  trade  or  retire  from  it.  If,  however,  the 
deceased  proprietor  was  competent  under  the  law,  his  widow, 
administrator,  or  executor  may  conduct  the  business,  no 
matter  how  grossly  incompetent  he  or  she  may  be.  But  this 
question  is  not  before  us  in  this  case.” 

In  Gulf,  etc.,  Railway  Company  v.  Ellis  {supra),  the  pro- 
vision of  an  Act  of  the  State  of  Texas  giving  an  attorney’s 
fee  of  ten  dollars  in  addition  to  costs  of  suit  in  certain  cases 
for  the  killing  of  stock  against  railway  companies,  was  in 
question.  The  provision  was  held  invalid.  In  this  case  Mr. 
Justice  Brewer  said:  “The  Supreme  Court  of  the  State 

considered  this  statute  as  a whole  and  held  it  valid,  and  as 
such  it  is  presented  to  us  for  consideration.  Considered  as 
such  it  is  simply  a statute  imposing  a penalty  upon  railway 
corporations  for  a failure  to  pay  certain  debts.  No  individu- 
als are  thus  punished,  and  no  other  corporations.  The  Act 
singles  out  a certain  class  of  debtors  and  punishes  them  when 
for  like  delinquencies  it  punishes  no  others.  They  are  not 
treated  as  other  debtors,  or  equally  with  other  debtors.  They 
cannot  appeal  to  the  courts  as  other  litigants  under  like  con- 
ditions and  with  like  protection.  If  litigation  terminates  ad- 
versely to  them,  they  are  mulcted  in  the  attorney’s  fees  of 
the  successful  plaintiff;  if  it  terminates  in  their  favor,  they  re- 
cover no  attorney’s  fees.  It  is  no  sufficient  answer  to  say 
that  they  are  punished  only  when  adjudged  to  be  in  the 
wrong.  They  do  not  enter  the  courts  upon  equal  terms. 
They  must  pay  attorney’s  fees  if  wrong;  they  do  not  recover 
any  if  right;  while  their  adversaries  recover  if  right  and  pay 
nothing  if  wrong.  In  the  suits,  therefore,  to  which  they  are 
parties  they  are  discriminated  against,  and  are  not  treated 
as  others.  They  do  not  stand  equal  before  the  law.  They 
do  not  receive  its  equal  protection.  All  this  is  obvious  from 


124 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


a mere  inspection  of  the  statute.”  . . . “But  it  is  said  that  it 
is  not  within  the  scope  of  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  with- 
hold from  States  the  power  of  classification,  and  that  if  the 
law  deals  alike  with  all  of  a certain  class  it  is  not  obnoxious, 
to  the  charge  of  a denial  of  equal  protection.  While,  as  a 
general  proposition,  this  is  undeniably  true  (Hayes  v.  Mis- 
souri, 120  U.  S.  68;  Railway  Company  v.  Mackey,  127  U.  S. 
205;  Walston  v.  Nevin,  128  U.  S.  578;  Bell’s  Gap  Railroad  v. 
Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232;  Pacific  Express  Company  v. 
Seibert,  142  U.  S.  339;  Giozza  v.  Tiernan,  148  U.  S.  657; 
Columbia  Southern  Railway  v.  Wright,  151  U.  S.  470; 
Marchant  v.  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  153  U.  S.  380;  St.  Louis 
& San  Francisco  Railway  v.  Mathews,  165  U.  S.  1)  yet  it  is 
equally  true  that  such  classification  cannot  be  made  arbi- 
trarily. The  State  may  not  say  that  all  white  men  shall  be 
subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  attorney’s  fees  of  parties  suc- 
cessfully suing  them  and  all  black  men  not.  It  may  not  say 
that  all  men  beyond  a certain  age  shall  be  alone  thus  sub- 
jected, or  all  men  possessed  of  a certain  wealth.  These  are 
distinctions  which  do  not  furnish  any  proper  basis  for  the  at- 
tempted classification.  That  must  always  rest  upon  some 
difference  which  bears  a reasonable  and  just  relation  to  the 
act  in  respect  to  which  the  classification  is  proposed,  and 
can  never  be  made  arbitrarily  and  without  any  such  basis. 

“As  well  said  by  Black,  J.,  in  State  v.  Loomis,  1 1 5 Mis- 
souri, 307,  314,  in  which  a statute  making  it  a misdemeanor 
for  any  corporation  engaged  in  manufacturing  or  mining  to 
issue  in  payment  of  the  wages  of  its  employes  any  order, 
check,  etc.,  payable  otherwise  than  in  lawful  money  of  the 
United  States,  unless  negotiable  and  redeemable  at  its  face 
value  in  cash  or  in  goods  and  supplies  at  the  option  of  the 
holder  at  the  store  or  other  place  of  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion, was  held  class  legislation  and  void.  ‘Classification 
for  legislative  purposes  must  have  some  reasonable  basis 
upon  which  to  stand.  It  must  be  evident  that  differences 
which  would  serve  for  a classification  for  some  purposes  fur- 
nish no  reason  whatever  for  a classification  for  legislative 
purposes.  The  differences  which  will  support  class  legisla- 
tion must  be  such  as  in  the  nature  of  things  furnish  a rea- 
sonable basis  for  separate  laws  and  regulations.  Thus,  the 
Legislature  may  fix  the  age  at  which  persons  shall  be  deemed 
competent  to  contract  for  themselves,  but  no  one  will  claim 
that  competency  to  contract  can  be  made  to  depend  upon 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  I25 

stature  or  color  of  the  hair.  Such  a classification  for  such  a 
purpose  would  be  arbitrary  and  a piece  of  legislative  des- 
potism, and  therefore  not  a law  of  the  land.’ 

“In  Vanzandt  v.  Waddel,  2 Yerger,  260,  270,  Catron,  J. 
(afterwards  Mr.  Justice  Catron  of  this  court),  speaking  for 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee,  declared:  ‘Every  partial  or 
private  law,  which  directly  purposes  to  destroy  or  affect  in- 
dividual rights,  or  does  the  same  thing  by  affording  remedies 
leading  to  similar  consequences,  is  unconstitutional  and  void. 
Were  this  otherwise  odious  individuals  and  corporate  bodies 
would  be  governed  by  one  rule,  and  the  mass  of  the  com- 
munity who  made  the  law  by  another/ 

“In  Dibrell  v.  Morris’s  Heirs,  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee, 
15  S.  W.  Rep.  87,  95,  Baxter,  Special  Judge,  reviewing  at 
some  length  cases  of  classification,  closes  the  review  with 
these  words:  ‘We  conclude  upon  a review  of  the  cases 

referred  to  above,  that,  whether  a statute  be  public  or 
private,  general  or  special,  in  form,  if  it  attempts  to  create 
distinctions  and  classifications  between  the  citizens  of  this 
State,  the  basis  of  such  classification  must  be  natural  and  not 
arbitrary.’ 

“In  Bell’s  Gap  Railroad  v.  Pennsylvania,  134  U.  S.  232,  the 
question  was  presented  as  to  the  power  of  the  State  to  clas- 
sify for  purposes  of  taxation,  and  while  it  was  conceded  that 
a large  discretion  in  these  respects  was  vested  in  the  various 
Legislatures,  the  fact  of  a limit  to  such  discretion  was  rec- 
ognized, the  court,  by  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  saying,  on  page 
237:  ‘All  such  regulations,  and  those  of  like  character,  so 
long  as  they  proceed  within  reasonable  limits  and  general 
usage,  are  within  the  discretion  of  the  State  Legislature  or 
the  people  of  the  State  in  framing  their  Constitution.  But 
clear  and  hostile  discriminations  against  particular  persons 
and  classes,  especially  such  as  are  of  an  unusual  character, 
unknown  to  the  practice  of  our  governments,  might  be  ob- 
noxious to  the  constitutional  prohibition.’ 

“It  is,  of  course,  proper  that  every  debtor  should  pay  his 
debts,  and  there  might  be  no  impropriety  in  giving  to  every 
successful  suitor  attorney’s  fees.  Such  a provision  would 
bear  a reasonable  relation  to  the  delinquency  of  the  debtor, 
and  would  certainly  create  no  inequality  of  right  or  protec- 
tion. But  before  a distinction  can  be  made  between  debtors, 
and  one  be  punished  for  a failure  to  pay  his  debts,  while  an- 
other is  permitted  to  become  in  like  manner  delinquent  with- 


126 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


out  any  punishment,  there  must  be  some  difference  in  the  ob- 
ligation to  pay,  some  reason  why  the  duty  of  payment  is 
more  imperative  in  the  one  instance  than  in  the  other. 

“If  it  be  said  that  this  penalty  is  cast  only  upon  corpora- 
tions, that  to  them  special  privileges  are  granted,  and  therefore 
upon  them  special  burdens  may  be  imposed,  it  is  a sufficient 
answer  to  say  that  the  penalty  is  not  imposed  upon  all  cor- 
porations. The  burden  does  not  go  with  the  privilege.  Only 
railroads  of  all  corporations  are  selected  to  bear  this  penalty. 
The  rule  of  equality  is  ignored. 

“It  may  be  said  that  certain  corporations  are  chartered  for 
charitable,  educational,  or  religious  purposes,  and  abundant 
reason  for  not  visiting  them  with  a penalty  for  the  non-pay- 
ment of  debts  is  found  in  the  fact  that  their  chartered  privi- 
leges are  not  given  for  pecuniary  profit.  But  the  penalty  is 
not  imposed  upon  all  business  corporations,  all  chartered  for 
the  purpose  of  private  gain.  The  banking  corporations,  the 
manufacturing  corporations  and  others  like  them  are  exempt. 
Further,  the  penalty  is  imposed  not  upon  all  corporations 
charged  with  the  quasi  public  duty  of  transportation,  but  only 
upon  those  charged  with  a particular  form  of  that  duty.  So 
the  classification  is  not  based  upon  any  idea  of  special  privi- 
leges by  way  of  incorporation,  nor  of  special  privileges  given 
thereby  for  purposes  of  private  gain,  nor  even  of  such  privi- 
leges granted  for  the  discharge  of  one  general  class  of  public 
duties. 

“But  if  the  classification  is  not  based  upon  the  idea  of 
special  privileges,  can  it  be  sustained  upon  the  basis  of  the 
business  in  which  the  corporations  to  be  punished  are  en- 
gaged? That  such  corporations  may  be  classified  for  some 
purposes  is  unquestioned.  The  business  in  which  they  are 
engaged  is  of  a peculiarly  dangerous  nature,  and  the  Legisla- 
ture, in  the  exercise  of  its  police  powers,  may  justly  require 
many  things  to  be  done  by  them  in  order  to  secure  life  and 
property.  Fencing  of  railroad  tracks,  use  of  safety  couplers, 
and  a multitude  of  other  things  easily'  suggest  themselves. 
And  any  classification  for  the  imposition  of  sucli  special  du- 
ties— duties  arising  out  of  the  peculiar  business  in  which  they 
are  engaged — is  a just  classification,  and  not  one  within  the 
prohibition  of  the  fourteenth  amendment.  Thus  it  is  fre- 
quently required  that  they  fence  their  tracks,  and  as  a penalty 
for  a failure  to  fence  double  damages  in  case  of  loss  are  in- 
flicted: Missouri  Pacific  Railway  v.  Humes,  115  U.  S.  512. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


127 


But  this  and  all  kindred  cases  proceed  upon  the  theory  of  a 
special  duty  resting  upon  railroad  corporations  by  reason  of 
the  business  in  which  they  are  engaged — a duty  not  resting 
upon  others;  a duty  which  can  be  enforced  by  the  Legislature 
in  any  proper  manner,  and  whether  it  enforces  it  by  penalties 
in  the  way  of  fines  coming  to  the  State,  or  by  double  damages 
to  a party  injured,  is  immaterial.  It  is  all  done  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  the  police  power  of  the  State  and  with  a view  to  en- 
force just  and  reasonable  police  regulations. 

“While  this  action  is  for  stock  killed,  the  recovery  of  attor- 
ney’s fees  cannot  be  sustained  upon  the  theory  just  sug- 
gested. There  is  no  fence  law  in  Texas.  The  Legislature  of 
the  State  has  not  deemed  it  necessary  for  the  protection  of 
life  or  property  to  require  railroads  to  fence  their  tracks,  and 
as  no  duty  is  imposed,  there  can  be  no  penalty  for  non-per- 
formance. Indeed,  the  statute  does  not  proceed  upon  any 
such  theory,  it  is  broader  in  its  scope.  Its  object  is  to  com- 
pel the  payment  of  the  several  classes  of  debts  named,  and 
was  so  regarded  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State. 

“But  a mere  statute  to  compel  the  payment  of  indebted- 
ness does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  police  regulations. 
The  hazardous  business  of  railroading  carries  with  it  no 
special  necessity  for  the  prompt  payment  of  debts.  That  is  a 
duty  resting  upon  all  debtors,  and  while  in  certain  cases 
there  may  be  a peculiar  obligation  which  may  be  enforced  by 
penalties,  yet  nothing  of  that  kind  springs  from  the  mere 
work  of  railroad  transportation.  Statutes  have  been  sus- 
tained giving  special  protection  to  the  claims  of  laborers  and 
mechanics,  but  no  such  idea  underlies  this  legislation.  It 
does  not  aim  to  protect  the  laborer  or  the  mechanic  alone, 
for  its  benefits  are  conferred  upon  every  individual  in  the 
State,  rich  or  poor,  high  or  low,  who  has  a claim  of  the  char- 
acter described.  It  is  not  a statute  for  the  protection  of  par- 
ticular classes  of  individuals  supposed  to  need  protection,  but 
for  the  punishment  of  certain  corporations  on  account  of 
their  delinquency. 

“Neither  can  it  be  sustained  as  a proper  means  of  enforcing 
the  payment  of  small  debts  and  preventing  any  unnecessary 
litigation  in  respect  to  them,  because  it  does  not  impose  the 
penalty  in  all  cases  where  the  amount  in  controversy  is  within 
the  limit  named  in  the  statute.  Indeed,  the  statute  arbitra- 
rily singles  out  one  class  of  debtors  and  punishes  it  for  a fail- 
ure to  perform  certain  duties — duties  which  are  equally 


128 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


obligatory  upon  all  debtors;  a punishment  not  visited  by  rea- 
son of  the  failure  to  comply  with  any  proper  police  regula- 
tions, or  for  the  protection  of  the  laboring  classes  or  to  pre- 
vent litigation  about  trifling  matters,  or  in  consequence  of 
any  special  corporate  privileges  bestowed  by  the  State.  Un- 
less the  Legislature  may  arbitrarily  select  one  corporation  or 
one  class  of  corporations,  one  individual  or  one  class  of  indi- 
viduals, and  visit  a penalty  upon  them  which  is  not  imposed 
upon  others  guilty  of  like  delinquency  this  statute  cannot  be 
sustained. 

“But  arbitrary  selection  can  never  be  justified  by  calling  it 
classification.  The  equal  protection  demanded  by  the  four- 
teenth amendment  forbids  this.  No  language  is  more  worthy 
of  frequent  and  thoughtful  consideration  than  these  words  of 
Mr.  Justice  Matthews,  speaking  for  this  court,  in  Yick  Wo. 
v.  Hopkins,  118  U.  S.  356,  369:  ‘When  we  consider  the  na- 
ture and  the  theory  of  our  institutions  of  government,  the 
principles  upon  which  they  are  supposed  to  rest,  and  review 
the  history  of  their  development,  we  are  constrained  to  con- 
clude that  they  do  not  mean  to  leave  room  for  the  play  and 
action  of  purely  personal  and  arbitrary  power.’  The  first 
official  action  of  this  nation  declared  the  foundation  of  gov- 
ernment in  these  words:  ‘We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 

evident,  that  all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed 
by  their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights,  that  among 
these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.’  While 
such  declaration  of  principles  may  not  have  the  force  of  or- 
ganic law,  or  be  made  the  basis  of  judicial  decision  as  to  the 
limits  of  right  and  duty,  and  while  in  all  cases  reference  must 
be  had  to  the  organic  law  of  the  nation  for  such  limits,  yet  the 
latter  is  but  the  body  and  the  letter  of  which  the  former  is 
the  thought  and  spirit,  and  it  is  always  safe  to  read  the  let- 
ter of  the  Constitution  in  the  spirit  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence.  No  duty  rests  more  imperatively  upon  the 
courts  than  the  enforcement  of  those  constitutional  provis- 
ions intended  to  secure  that  equality  of  rights  which  is  the 
foundation  of  free  government.” 

And  see  Bill  of  Rights,  Article  I,  Section  1,  of  the  Con- 
stitution: All  men  are  born  equally  free  and  independent, 

and  have  certain  inherent  and  indefeasible  rights,  among 
which  are  those  of  enjoying  and  defending  life  and  liberty, 
of  acquiring,  possessing,  and  protecting  property  and  repu- 
tation, and  of  pursuing  their  own  happiness. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


I29 


A late  case  upon  the  subject  is  that  wherein  the  Act  of 
June  15th,  1897,  P.  L.  166,  known  as  the  Alien  Tax  Law,  was 
declared  invalid  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States: 
Fraser  v.  McConway,  6 P.  D.  R.  555. 

2.  The  Principle  of  Classification  is  not,  as  a Rule, 
Affected  by  the  Constitution. 

The  constitutional  provisions  do  not,  as  a rule,  abridge 
the  power  of  the  General  Assembly  with  reference  to  the  clas- 
sification of  subjects  and  the  enactment  of  laws  relating  to 
such  classes.1  The  Constitution  itself,  however,  has  made  a 
classification  of  some  subjects,  and  such  classification  is  prob- 
ably final  for  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  thus  made.2  The 
Constitution  recognizes  the  power  of  classification  in  Article 
IX,  Section  1,3  and  where  a classification  is  found  in  the  Con- 
stitution, laws  based  on  such  classification  cannot  be  special 
or  local.4 

1 Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338;  Kittanning  Coal 
Company  v.  Commonwealth,  79  Pa.  St.  100;  Kitty  Roup’s 
Case,  81*  Pa.  St.  21 1 ; Kilgore  v.  Magee,  85  Pa.  St.  401 ; Com- 
monwealth v.  Delaware  Div.  Canal  Company,  123  Pa.  St. 
594;  Kennedy  v.  Agricultural  Insurance  Company,  165  Pa. 
St.  179. 

2McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  243;  Morrison  v. 
Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322. 

3 Avars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

4Rymer  v.  Luzerne  County,  142  Pa.  St.  108;  Reid  v. 
Smoulter,  128  Pa.  St.  324;  Commonwealth  v.  Anderson,  178 
Pa.  St.  171. 

In  Evans  v.  Phillippi,  117  Pa.  St.  226,  Mr.  Justice  Clark 
said:  “A  law  is  said  to  be  local  and  special,  however,  not 

under  the  new  Constitution,  or  of  any  decision  under  it,  but 
because  it  falls  within  the  proper  definition  of  a local  law  both 
before  and  since  1874.”  In  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa. 
St.  338,  Mr.  Justice  Paxson  said:  “We  are  aware  that  it 

does  not  follow  that  because  classification  is  resorted  to  in 

9 


I3O  VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 

the  organic  law,  the  Legislature  may  exercise  the  same 
power.  But  the  power  existed  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution;  it  had  been  exercised  by  the  Legislature 
from  the  foundation  of  the  government;  it  was  incident  to 
legislation,  and  its  exercise  was  necessary  to  the  promotion  of 
the  public  welfare.  The  true  question  is,  not  whether  classi- 
fication is  authorized  by  the  terms  of  the  Constitution,  but 
whether  it  is  expressly  prohibited.  In  no  part  of  that  instru- 
ment can  any  such  prohibition  be  found.  For  the  purpose 
of  taxation,  real  estate  may  be  classified.  Thus,  timber  lands, 
arable  lands,  mineral  lands,  urban  and  rural,  may  be  divided 
into  distinct  classes,  and  subjected  to  different  rates.  In 
like  manner  other  subjects,  trades,  occupations,  and  profes- 
sions may  be  classified.  And  not  only  things  but  persons 
may  be  so  divided.  The  genus  homo  is  a subject  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution.  Will  it  be  contended  that  as 
to  this  there  can  be  no  classification?  No  laws  affecting  the 
personal  and  property  rights  of  minors  as  distinguished  from 
adults?  Or  of  males  as  distinguished  from  females?  Or,  in 
the  case  of  the  latter,  no  distinction  between  a feme  covert 
and  a single  woman?  What  becomes  of  all  our  legislation 
in  regard  to  the  rights  of  married  women  if  there  can  be  no 
classification?  and  where  is  the  power  to  provide  any  future 
safeguards  for  their  separate  estate?  These  illustrations 
might  be  multiplied  indefinitely  were  it  necessary.” 

In  Kittanning  Coal  Company  v.  Commonwealth  {supra), 
Chief  Justice  Agnew  said:  “It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  mo- 
ment we  concede  the  power  to  classify,  we  have  disposed  of 
the  question  of  uniformity,  for  then  all  that  is  required  by  the 
Constitution  is  uniformity  of  taxes  among  members  of  the 
class.  Now  the  power  to  classify  is  not  only  retained  in  clear 
language,butwas  held  by  the  court  to  be  continued  in  the  case 
of  Kitty  Roup  v.  The  City  of  Pittsburg.  This  power  was 
possessed  under  the  Constitution  of  1790,  had  been  exercised 
in  numerous  laws,  and  existed  when  the  new  Constitution 
was  framed  and  adopted.  Thus,  real  estate  had  been  classi- 
fied as  seated  and  unseated,  and  by  various  kinds,  as  houses, 
lands,  lots  of  ground,  ground-rents,  mills,  manufactories,  fur- 
naces, ferries,  and  others.  The  classification  of  personal  prop- 
erty was  equally  various,  to  wit:  slaves,  horses,  mules,  cattle, 
carriages,  watches,  bonds,  mortgages,  stocks,  moneys  at  in- 
terest, profits,  etc.  Some  trades,  professions,  callings,  and 
even  single  men  were  taxed  by  classification.  Taxes  were 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  I3I 

laid  in  various  forms,  as  rates  on  values,  rates  on  dividends, 
or  profits,  and  by  specific  sums  on  specified  articles.  These 
things  were  well  known  to  the  convention  of  1873,  yet  no 
change  was  made  in  the  power  to  classify,  but  it  was  recog- 
nized by  saying  that  all  taxes  shall  be  uniform  on  the  same 
class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority 
levying  the  tax,  by  the  latter  clause,  even  extending  the 
power  to  classify  by  limiting  the  class  to  certain  bounds.  We 
must  conclude,  therefore,  that  a classification  of  coal  mining 
and  purchasing  and  selling  companies  is  .not  beyond  the  legis- 
lative power,  and  the  tax  being  clearly  uniform  upon  their 
business  measured  by  the  extent  of  it,  is  not  only  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Constitution,  but  is  equal  and  just.” 

The  Constitution  furnishes  a number  of  instances  recog- 
nizing classification  or  in  which  legislation  must  follow  a 
given  classification. 

Thus,  in  Section  5,  of  Article  V,  whenever  a county  shall 
contain  40,000  inhabitants  it  shall  constitute  a separate  ju- 
dicial district.  In  Section  12,  Article  V,  in  Philadelphia  there 
shall  be  established  for  every  30,000  inhabitants  one  court  not 
of  record  for  police  and  civil  causes.  In  Section  27,  Article 
V,  in  every  county  wherein  the  population  shall  exceed 
150,000  the  General  Assembly  shall  establish  a separate  or- 
phans’ court.  In  Section  5,  Article  XIV,  in  counties  con- 
taining over  150,000  inhabitants  all  county  officers  shall  be 
paid  by  salary.  In  Section  1,  Article  XV,  cities  may  be  char- 
tered whenever  a majority  of  the  electors  of  any  town  or  bor- 
ough having  a population  of  at  least  10,000  shall  vote  at  any 
general  election  in  favor  of  the  same.  In  Section  17,  Article 
II,  every  city  entitled  to  more  than  four  representatives  and 
every  county  having  more  than  100,000  shall  be  divided  into 
districts  of  compact  and  contiguous  territory,  etc.  In  Arti- 
cle VIII,  Section  17,  the  General  Assembly  shall  by  general 
law  designate  the  courts  and  judges  by  whom  the  several 
classes  of  election  contests  shall  be  tried.  Article  IX,  Section 
1,  all  taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects. 

In  McCarty  v.  Commonwealth  (supra),  Mr.  Justice  Gor- 
don said:  “Moreover  as  by  the  Constitution  itself,  the  coun- 
ties, with  reference  to  the  fees  of  their  officers,  have  been  clas- 
sified, we  think  a further  attempt  in  that  direction  not  per- 
missible. By  this  Act  (the  one  in  question)  the  Legislature 
seems  to  have  undertaken  to  correct  or  modify  the  provisions 
of  the  Constitution.  That  instrument  provides  that  in  coun- 


i32 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ties  having  a population  of  over  150,000  their  officers  shall 
be  salaried,  and  the  attempt  is  here  to  simply  enlarge  this 
class  by  adding  to  it  counties  exceeding  in  population 
100,000.”  In  another  part  of  the  opinion  he  queried:  “Where 
then  is  the  special  necessity  for  the  subdivision  of  this  second 
class?” 

In  Rymer  v.  Luzerne  County  {supra),  the  Act  of  March 
31st,  1876,  P.  L.  17,  regulating  the  compensation  of  county 
officers  in  counties  having  over  150,000  was  in  question.  As 
to  this  Act  the  court  remarked:  “The  Act  of  1876  is  neither 
a local  nor  a special  law,  for  the  reason  that  it  applies  to  all 
counties  of  a certain  class,  and  that  class  created  by  the 
Constitution  itself.” 

It  will  be  observed  the  Act  of  1876  classified  counties 
of  over  150,000  and  fixed  a different  scale  of  salaries  for  each 
class. 

The  Act  of  May  6th,  1874,  P.  L.  125,  relating  to  the  com- 
pensation of  clerks  of  the  orphans’  court,  registers  of  wills, 
recorders  of  deeds,  etc.,  does  not  violate  Article  IX  of  the 
Constitution  providing  for  uniformity  of  taxation,  or  Article 
III,  Section  7,  forbidding  the  Legislature  to  pass  “any  local 
or  special  law  . . . regulating  the  affairs  of  counties.”  The 
Act  requires  that  clerks  of  the  orphans’  court,  registers  of 
wills,  recorders  of  deeds,  etc.,  “of  this  Commonwealth  shall 
pay  into  the  treasury  for  the  use  of  the  Commonwealth,  after 
deducting  all  necessary  clerk  hire  and  office  expenses,  fifty 
per  centum  on  the  amount  of  any  excess  over  and  above  the 
sum  of  $2,000,  which  shall  be  found  by  the  auditor  appointed 
by  the  court  to  settle  accounts  of  county  officers  to  have  been 
received  by  any  office  in  any  one  year:  Provided,  if  two  or 
more  of  said  offices  shall  be  held  by  one  person,  the  auditor- 
general  shall  add  together  the  fees  received  in  the  offices  so 
held,  and  shall  charge  the  same  percentage  on  the  aggregate 
amount  of  fees  received  by  such  person  holding  more  than 
one  of  said  offices.”  Held  also,  that  in  ascertaining  what 
amount  should  be  paid  to  the  Commonwealth  by  a person 
holding  two  offices  only  one  salary  should  be  deducted  from 
the  gross  receipts:  Commonwealth  v.  Anderson,  178  Pa.  St. 

171- 

In  the  foregoing  case  his  Honor,  Judge  McPherson,  in 
the  court  below  said:  “The  defendant’s  argument  is  that  the 
body  of  the  Act  of  1874  repeals  all  preceding  Acts  on  this  sub- 
ject, because  it  provides  a new  system  for  taxing  the  fees  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


133 


officers  in  counties  having  less  than  150,000  inhabitants;  but 
that  the  proviso  of  the  Act  is  void  because  it  offends  against 
Article  IX  of  the  Constitution  providing  for  uniformity  of 
taxation,  and  against  Article  III,  Section  7,  forbidding  the 
Legislature  to  pass  ‘any  local  or  special  law  . . . regulating 
the  affairs  of  counties.  . . 

“In  our  opinion  this  position  is  unsound  throughout.  It 
is  not  the  proviso,  however,  but  the  whole  Act  which  the  de- 
fendant ought  to  attack,  if  he  desires  to  insist  upon  an  alleged 
violation  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  for  it  is  not  the  proviso 
but  the  body  of  the  Act  which  confines  its  scope  to  counties 
having  a specified  population.  But  whatever  may  be  his 
point  of  attack  we  believe  that  the  Act  of  1874  does  not  of- 
fend against  Article  III,  Section  7,  because  it  is  not  a local 
or  special  law.  It  applies  to  all  the  counties  of  the  State  con- 
taining less  than  150,000  inhabitants,  and  while  statutes  upon 
certain  other  subjects  having  a similarly  restricted  scope  have 
been  held  to  be  unconstitutional  in  several  cases,  which  it  is 
not  necessary  to  cite,  the  Act  in  question  is  valid  because 
it  is  restricted  by  the  Constitution  itself  to  the  class  or  subject 
with  which  it  deals,  and  therefore  it  is  not  within  the  reason 
of  these  decisions.  In  effect  this  was  declared  in  Morrison  v. 
Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322.  The  subject  of  the  Act  then  under 
consideration  was  the  fees  which  the  citizens  of  the  State 
should  pay  in  consideration  of  the  services  rendered  by  cer- 
tain officers.  The  statute  was  held  to  be  unconstitutional 
because  it  excluded  permanently  from  its  provision  every 
county  containing  more  than  150,000  inhabitants;  its  subject 
being  clearly  a county  affair  upon  which  local  legislation  was 
prohibited.  But  the  court  was  careful  to  distinguish  between 
a fee  considered  as  a sum  which  the  citizen  is  to  pay  and  a fee 
considered  as  the  sum  which  the  officer  is  to  receive.  In  the 
latter  aspect  the  Constitution  itself  has  made  a classification 
which  the  Legislature  is  not  at  liberty  to  disregard.  ‘It  is  fur- 
ther to  be  observed,’  Mr.  Justice  Paxson  says,  on  page  330: 
‘That  so  far  as  the  compensation  to  county  officers  is  con- 
cerned the  Constitution  has  classified  the  counties  of  the 
State.’ 

“Moreover  the  Act  of  1874  does  not  in  any  respect 
regulate  ‘the  affairs  of  counties.’  It  does  not  increase  or  di- 
minish the  fees  which  the  officers  are  to  receive — thus  affect- 
ing the  people  who  pay,  as  well  as  the  officer  who  earns,  the 
fees.  Leaving  the  amount  of  his  fees  to  be  determined  by 


134 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


other  statutes,  the  Act  of  1874  is  concerned  simply  with  the 
subject  of  taxation  by  the  State  upon  the  receipts  of  the 
office.  This  treats  a fee  as  the  compensation  of  the  officer, 
and  taxes  it  in  his  hands  as  his  property.  From  this  point  of 
view  his  fees  are  in  no  sense  a county  affair.  The  Act  affects 
the  profits  of  the  officer  and  the  receipts  of  the  State  treas- 
ury, but,  except  remotely,  no  other  consideration  is  involved. 
Therefore,  even  if  the  Act  is  to  be  regarded  as  local  it  is  not 
forbidden  by  the  clause  to  which  we  have  just  referred.” 

Classification  of  coal  mines  as  anthracite  and  bituminous 
is  proper,  including  a definition  of  what  shall  constitute  such 
mines;  legislation  for  each  class  having  relation  to  the  health 
and  safety  of  persons  employed  therein  is  valid:  Durkin  v. 
Kingston  Coal  Company,  171  Pa.  St.  193;  Commonwealth 
v.  Jones,  4 Super.  Ct.  362.  In  the  case  last  cited  his  Honor, 
Judge  Smith,  remarked:  “Speaking  for  myself,  I regard  it 

important,  in  considering  the  constitutional  prohibition  of 
‘any  local  or  special  law’  upon  the  subjects  enumerated  in 
Article  III,  Section  7,  to  take  into  account  the  provision  of 
Article  XVI,  Section  3,  that  ‘the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
of  the  State  shall  never  be  abridged.’ 

“It  is  difficult  to  regard  the  latter  provision  as  merely 
aimed  at  a legislative  abridgment  of  the  police  power  of  the 
State.  The  Legislature  may  forbear  or  neglect  to  exercise 
the  police  power,  but  no  legislative  enactment  on  the  subject 
can  abridge  the  power  of  a subsequent  Legislature  in  the 
premises,  and,  as  this  principle  exists  independent  of  the  con- 
stitutional provision,  it  was  unnecessary  as  a limitation  on  the 
power  of  the  Legislature. 

“These  prohibitive  provisions  are  to  be  so  construed  that 
both  shall  stand  if  possible.  If  the  prohibition  of  local  or 
special  legislation  includes  the  exercise  of  the  police  power 
in  relation  to  local  or  special  subjects  it  is  a serious  abridg- 
ment of  that  power.  The  broad  and  unqualified  terms  of  the 
section  relating  to  the  police  power  would  seem  to  imply 
that  no  abridgment  in  any  manner  was  intended.  Full  effect 
may  be  given  to  this  section  by  regarding  it  as  a qualification 
of  the  prohibition  of  local  or  special  legislation,  in  the 
nature  of  a proviso,  excepting  from  that  prohibition  the 
exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  State  on  the  subjects 
embraced  in  it.  Such  a construction  would  harmonize  the 
two  constitutional  prohibitions  and  permit  an  unabridged 
exercise  of  the  police  power  on  all  matters  within  its  scope, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


135 


whether  general,  or  local  and  special,  leaving  to  judicial  con- 
struction, as  heretofore,  the  character  and  limitations  of  that 
power. 

“In  this  view  the  Act  of  1893,  even  if  local  or  special  in 
its  application,  may  be  sustained  as  an  exercise  of  the  police 
power  of  the  State  for  the  protection  of  life,  health,  and  prop- 
erty in  the  mining  operations  to  which  it  relates.  But  it  is 
unnecessary  to  rule  the  present  case  on  this  construction  of 
these  constitutional  provisions.” 

The  Act  of  June  20th,  1883,  P.  L.  134,  requiring  foreign 
insurance  companies  to  appoint  a State  agent  on  whom  pro- 
cess may  be  served  is  not  special.  Foreign  insurance  com- 
panies licensed  to  transact  business  in  this  State,  are  essen- 
tially a distinct  class  of  corporations  justifying  and  requiring 
legislation  appropriate  to  the  class  itself:  Kennedy  v.  Agri- 
cultural Insurance  Company,  165  Pa.  St.  179.  And  such  a 
classification  is  proper  for  purposes  of  taxation:  Germania 
Insurance  Company  v.  Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  513. 


3.  What  is  a Proper  Classification  is  Generally  a 
Judicial  Question. 

Upon  this  subject  it  was  remarked  by  Mr.  Justice  Ster- 
rett  in  Ayars’  Appeal.1 

“It  has  also  been  suggested  that  the  question  of  necessity 
for  classification  and  the  extent  thereof,  as  well  as  of  what 
are  local  or  special  laws,  is  a legislative  and  not  a judicial 
question.  The  answer  to  that  is  obvious.  The  people,  in 
their  wisdom,  have  seen  fit  not  only  to  prescribe  the  form  of 
enacting  laws,  but  also  as  to  certain  subjects,  the  method  of 
legislation,  by  ordaining  that  no  local  or  special  law  relating 
to  those  subjects  shall  be  passed.  Whether,  in  any  given 
case,  the  Legislature  has  transcended  its  power  and  passed 
a law  in  conflict  with  that  limitation  is  essentially  a question 
of  law,  and  must  necessarily  be  decided  by  the  courts.  To 
warrant  the  conclusion  that  the  people,  in  ordaining  such 
limitations,  intended  to  invest  their  law-makers  with  judicial 
power,  and  thus  make  them  final  arbitrators  of  the  validity 
of  their  own  acts,  would  require  the  clearest  and  most  em- 


136 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


phatic  language  to  that  effect.  No  such  intention  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  Constitution,  and  none  can  be  inferred  from 
any  of  its  provisions.  That  these  limitations  were  designed 
to  establish  a fixed  and  permanent  rule  cannot  be  doubted; 
but,  if  the  ultimate  application  of  that  rule  were  to  rest  solely 
in  the  judgment  of  the  body  on  which  it  was  intended  to 
operate,  nothing  could  be  more  flexible.” 

The  foregoing  had  reference  to  the  classification  of  cities, 
sustained  upon  the  ground  of  necessity,  and  limited  thereby, 
upon  which  it  was  further  remarked  after  referring  to  cer- 
tain cases  wherein  classification  of  cities  had  been  sustained: 
“Some  of  the  cases  above  cited  have  been  quoted  at  consid- 
erable length  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  this  court 
never  intended  to  sanction  classification  as  a pretext  for 
special  or  local  legislation.  On  the  contrary,  the  underlying 
principle  of  all  the  cases  is  that  classification'  with  the  view 
of  legislating  for  either  class  separately,  is  essentially  uncon- 
stitutional, unless  a necessity  therefor  exists,  a necessity 
springing  from  manifest  peculiarities,  clearly  distinguishing 
those  of  one  class  from  each  of  the  other  classes,  and  impera- 
tively demanding  legislation  for  each  class,  separately,  that 
would  be  useless  and  detrimental  to  the  others.  Laws  en- 
acted in  pursuance  of  such  classification  and  for  such  pur- 
poses are,  properly  speaking,  neither  local  nor  special.  They 
are  general  laws,  because  they  apply  alike  to  all  that  are  sim- 
ilarly situated  as  to  their  peculiar  necessities.” 

The  different  grounds  of  classification  are  recognized  by 
Mr.  Justice  Gordon  in  McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,2  where 
he  said:  “It  is  admitted  that  classification,  even  where  not 

specially  recognized  by  nature,  custom,  the  laws  of  trade,  or 
the  Constitution,  must,  in  certain  cases,  be  adopted  ex  neces- 
sitate.” 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Delaware  Division  Canal  Company,5 
Mr.  Justice  Clark  remarked:  “Classification  for  purposes 

of  taxation,  as  a general  rule  is  a matter  for  the  Legis- 
lature.” 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


137 


The  sum  of  the  matter  probably  is  that  the  subject  of  clas- 
sification is  legislative  in  the  first  instance,  that  as  legislative 
power  is  necessarily  exercised  through  a classification  of  sub- 
jects (for  a law  operating  at  once  and  alike  upon  all  subjects 
is  inconceivable),  a legislative  classification  is  presumed  to  be 
valid  and  to  have  been  made  in  the  exercise  of  a wise  discre- 
tion and  for  sufficient  and  proper  reasons,  unless  an  infringe- 
ment of  some  provision  of  the  State  or  Federal  Constitution 
appears.  Whether  there  is  such  infringement  is  for  the 
court. 

1Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

2McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  243. 

3Commonwealth  v.  Delaware  Division  Canal  Company,  123 
Pa.  St.  594. 


This  subject  may  be  further  illustrated  by  the  remarks  of 
Mr.  Justice  Clark,  in  the  case  of  Commonwealth  v.  Dela- 
ware Division  Canal  Company,  123  Pa.  St.  594,  with  reference 
to  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power: 

“The  new  Constitution  does  not  withdraw  the  power  of 
classification  from  the  Legislature  (Kitty  Roup’s  Case,  81* 
Pa.  St.  21 1 ; Kittanning  Coal  Company  v.  Commonwealth, 
79  Pa.  St.  100);  indeed,  the  power  is  necessarily  implied  in  the 
constitutional  provision  to  which  the  fourth  section  of  the 
Act  of  1885  ls  supposed  to  be  obnoxious.  The  power  to  im- 
pose taxes  for  the  support  of  the  government,  subject  to  the 
limitations  of  the  Constitution,  still  belongs  to  the  Legisla- 
ture; the  selection  of  the  subjects,  their  classification,  and 
the  methods  of  collection  are  purely  legislative  matters. 
When  the  action  of  the  Legislature,  with  respect  to  these 
matters,  is  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution,  it  would  cer- 
tainly be  a case  of  the  grossest  inequality,  which  would 
call  for  the  intervention  of  the  courts:  Kelly  v.  City  of  Pitts- 
burg, 85  Pa.  St.  170.  It  may  be  conceded,  however,  that 
classification  should  be  made  according  to  some  reasonable, 
practical  rule,  drawn  from  experience,  which  would  prevent 
a gross  inequality  in  the  burdens  of  taxation.  Tt  must,’  in 
the  language  of  Mr.  Justice  Agnew,  Visit  all  alike  in  a rea- 
sonably practicable  way,  of  which  the  Legislature  may  judge. 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


138 

but  within  the  limits  of  what  is  taxation.  Like  the  rain,  it 
may  fall  upon  the  people  in  districts  and  by  turns,  but  still 
it  must  be  public  in  its  purpose  and  reasonably  just  and  equal 
in  its  distribution,  and  cannot  sacrifice  individual  right  by  a 
palpably  unjust  exaction.  To  do  so  is  confiscation,  not  taxa- 
tion; extortion,  not  assessment,  and  falls  within  the  clearly 
implied  restriction  in  the  Bill  of  Rights:’  Washington 
Avenue,  69  Pa.  St.  352. 

“Absolute  equality  is,  of  course,  unattainable;  a mere  ap- 
proximate equality  is  all  that  can  reasonably  be  expected. 
A mere  diversity  in  the  methods  of  assessment  and  collection, 
however,  if  these  methods  are  provided  by  general  laws,  vio- 
lates no  rule  of  right,  if  when  these  methods  are  applied  the 
results  are  practically  uniform.  If  there  is  a substantial  uni- 
formity, however  different  the  procedure,  there  is  a compli- 
ance with  the  constitutional  provisions:  Fox’s  Appeal,  112 
Pa.  St.  353;  even  when  there  be  some  disparity  of  results,  if 
uniformity  is  the  purpose  of  the  Legislature,  there  is  a sub- 
stantial compliance:  Hunter’s  Appeal,  18  W.  N.  41 1,  394; 
Loughlin’s  Appeal,  19  W.  N.  517.  Nor  is  classification  nec- 
essarily based  upon  any  essential  differences  in  the  nature  or, 
indeed,  the  condition  of  the  various  subjects;  it  may  be  based 
as  well  upon  the  want  of  adaptability  to  the  same  methods  of 
taxation,  or  upon  the  impracticability  of  applying  to  the 
various  subjects  the  same  methods,  so  as  to  produce  just  and 
reasonably  uniform  results,  or  it  may  be  based  upon  well- 
grounded  considerations  of  public  policy. 

“Hence  it  is  that  some  classes  of  corporations  are  taxed 
upon  net  earnings,  or  income;  others  upon  capital  stock,  the 
value  thereof  to  be  ascertained  by  their  annual  dividends,  or 
in  a certain  event  upon  the  actual  value  of  the  shares;  others 
upon  their  gross  receipts;  insurance  companies  upon  the 
gross  amount  of  their  premiums;  coal  and  mining  companies 
at  a specific  sum  for  every  ton  of  coal  mined,  etc. 

“Real  estate,  for  taxation,  has  been  classified  as  seated  and 
unseated,  and  for  municipal  purposes  may,  perhaps,  admit  of 
further  classification:  Kitty  Roup’s  Case  (supra).  Collateral 
inheritances  are  distinguished  from  those  that  are  direct,  the 
former  being  subject  to  taxation,  the  latter  not.  Foreign  in- 
surance companies  have  been  distinguished  from  domestic 
companies,  and  taxed  independently  and  differently:  Ger- 
mania Insurance  Company  v.  Commonwealth,  85  Pa.  St.  513. 
So  trades,  professions,  callings,  and  even  single  men  have 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


139 


been  taxed  by  classification,  and  it  has  been  said  that  profes- 
sional men  may  be  classified  as  physicians,  lawyers,  clergy- 
men, etc.;  tradesmen  as  merchants,  mechanics,  etc.;  and  other 
persons  as  bankers,  manufacturers,  etc.;  and  a uniform  tax 
assessed  upon  each  class:  Banger’s  Appeal,  109  Pa.  St.  79. 
Not  only  have  taxes  been  laid  in  all  these  various  forms,  rated 
on  values,  on  dividends  or  profits,  on  premiums,  on  net  earn- 
ings, and  on  gross  receipts,  but  also  by  specific  sums  on  spe- 
cific articles.  The  road-bed,  station-house,  rolling  stock,  and 
equipments  of  a railroad  company;  the  canal-bed,  and  berm 
banks,  the  locks,  lock-houses,  etc.,  of  a canal  company;  the 
banking-house  or  place  of  business  of  a banking  company, 
etc.,  are  withdrawn  from  the  ordinary  processes  of  general 
taxation  and  are  reached  in  a tax  upon  capital  stock,  which 
has  always  been  regarded  as  a tax  upon  the  property  and  as- 
sets. These  several  classifications  and  departures  from  uni- 
formity in  methods  were  intended  simply  to  bring  about  a 
just  uniformity  in  results.  So  places  of  amusement  and  the 
luxuries  of  life  may  be  taxed  in  relief  of  the  necessaries. 
Household  and  kitchen  furniture,  gold  and  silver  plate,  ex- 
ceeding a certain  value,  pleasure  carriages,  and  gold  and  sil- 
ver watches,  kept  for  use,  prior  to  the  Act  of  May  13th,  1887, 
P.  L.  1 14,  were  selected  from  the  like  articles  in  trade,  and 
from  other  articles  of  personal  property,  and  with  money  at 
interest,  were  subjected  to  a special  tax.  Illustrations  might 
be  multiplied  to  show  that  classification  does  not  depend 
upon  differences  in  the  physical  nature  or  condition  of  the 
subjects  selected,  but  upon  a variety  of  considerations.” 


4.  There  Can  be  no  Classification  of  Cities  or 
Counties  Save  by  Population. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Patton,1  Mr.  Justice  Paxson  said: 
“There  can  be  no  proper  classification  of  cities  or  counties 
except  by  population.  The  moment  we  resort  to  geograph- 
ical distinctions  we  enter  the  domain  of  special  legislation, 
for  the  reason  that  such  classification  operates  upon  certain 
cities  or  counties  to  the  perpetual  exclusion  of  all  others.” 

Commonwealth  v.  Patton,  88  Pa.  St.  258. 


140 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


5.  Classification  of  Cities,  Counties,  or  Other 
Sub-divisions,  Must  be  Complete  in  Order  to 
Justify  Legislation  for  a Given  Class  of 
Either. 

The  Constitution,  Article  XIV,  Section  5,  requires  the 
compensation  of  county  officers  to  be  salaries  instead  of  fees, 
in  counties  having  a population  of  over  150,000  inhabitants, 
thus  in  effect  classifying  counties  for  this  purpose  and  mak- 
ing one  class  of  those  having  over,  and  another  of  those  hav- 
ing under  the  specified  population. 

The  Act  of  June  22d,  1883,  P.  L.  139,  undertook  to  ex- 
tend the  salary  system  to  counties  containing  over  100,000 
and  less  than  150,000  inhabitants,  by  provisions  similar  to 
those  of  the  Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  P.  L.  13,  enacted  to 
carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  Article  XIV,  Section  5, 
of  the  Constitution  relating  to  the  compensation  of  county 
officers  in  counties  having  over  150,000  inhabitants.  It  was 
held  invalid  because  among  other  reasons  it  related  to  less 
than  a constitutional  class.1 

A similar  Act  of  June  12th,  1878,  P.  L.  187,  was  held  in- 
valid which  applied  to  counties  having  over  10,000  and  less 
than  150,000  inhabitants.2 

The  Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  above  mentioned,  makes  a 
sub-classification  of  counties  having  over  1 50,000  inhabitants, 
and  provides  a different  scale  of  salaries  for  each  sub-class. 
As  shown  elsewhere  this  Act  is  valid,  and  the  foregoing  cases 
suggest  what  is  not  explicitly  stated,  to  wit,  that  a similar 
Act  relating  to  all  counties  having  less  than  150,000  inhab- 
itants, containing  sub-classes  with  an  appropriate  scale  of  sal- 
aries for  each  class,  might  be  valid.  But  in  the  two  cases 
cited  the  classification  was  not  complete.  In  the  last  case 
cited,  Mr.  Justice  Gordon  said:  “General  legislation  for  all 
the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  as  a single  class  having  been 
regarded  as  impossible,  the  Legislature  first  divided  these 
municipalities  into  several  distinct  classes,  and  then  provided 
laws  and  regulations  adapted  to  each  class.  This,  as  we  have 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


141 


seen,  was  recognized  as  legitimate  and  proper.  There  is  here, 
however,  a new  and  complete  classification,  and  not  a mere 
cutting  out  of  one  or  more  cities,  designated  by  popu- 
lation, from  the  general  class,  and  in  this  the  Act  of  1874 
is  distinguished  from  that  of  1883,  in  which  no  general  clas- 
sification is  attempted,  but  a special  legislation  adopted  for 
certain  counties  selected  from  all  others,  and  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  their  populations  rather  than  by  their  names.  Under 
the  rulings  in  Davis  v.  Clark,  10  Out.  377;  Commonwealth  v. 
Patton,  7 Norris,  260,  and  Scowden’s  Appeal,  15  Id.  425,  this 
is  not  allowable.” 

1McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  243. 

2Morrison  v.  Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322. 

6.  Classification  Must  not  be  Pretended,  False, 
Evasive  nor  Excessive. 

The  Act  of  April  18th,  1878,  P.  L.  29,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
provide  for  the  holding  of  courts  in  certain  cities  of  this  Com- 
monwealth,” enacted  “that  in  all  counties  of  this  Common- 
wealth where  there  is  a population  of  more  than  60,000  in- 
habitants, and  in  which  there  shall  be  any  city  incorporated 
at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  this  Act  with  a population  ex- 
ceeding 8,000  inhabitants,  situate  at  a distance  from  the 
county  seat  of  more  than  twenty-seven  miles  by  the  usually 
traveled  public  road,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  president 
judge  ...  to  make  an  order  providing  for  the  holding  of 
one  week  of  court  or  more  . . . for  the  trial  of  criminal  or 
civil  cases  in  the  said  city.”  This  Act  was  held  to  be  invalid 
as  a local  law  under  a false  and  pretended  classification.1  In 
this  case  Mr.  Justice  Paxson,  after  quoting  the  above,  said: 
“This  is  classification  run  mad.  Why  not  say  all  counties 
named  Crawford,  with  a population  exceeding  60,000,  that 
contain  a city  called  Titusville,  with  a population  of  over 
8,000,  and  situated  twenty-seven  miles  from  the  county  seat? 
Or  all  counties  with  a population  over  60,000  watered  by  a 


142 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


certain  river  or  bounded  by  a certain  mountain?  There  can 
be  no  proper  classification  of  cities  or  counties  except  by  pop- 
ulation. The  moment  we  resort  to  geographical  distinctions 
we  enter  the  domain  of  special  legislation,  for  the  reason  that 
such  classification  operates  upon  certain  cities  or  counties  to 
the  perpetual  exclusion  of  all  others.” 

The  Act  of  June  12th,  1879,  P.  L.  174,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
provide  for  the  holding  of  courts  in  certain  cities  of  this  Com- 
monwealth,” was  made  applicable  in  all  counties  where  there 
is  or  may  hereafter  be,  a population  of  not  less  than  60,000 
inhabitants,  and  in  which  there  is  now,  or  may  hereafter  be, 
an  incorporated  city  of  the  fifth  class,  subject  to  the  provis- 
ions of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  A.  D.  one  thousand  eight  hun- 
dred and  seventy-four,  and  the  supplements  thereto,  or  which 
may  hereafter  be  incorporated  under  said  Acts.  This  Act 
was  held  to  be  invalid,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that  it  was  evi- 
dently framed  to  avoid  the  difficulty  encountered  by  the  Act 
of  April  18th,  1878.  Said  Mr.  Justice  Paxson:  “It  requires 
but  a glance  at  the  Act  to  see  that  it  is  an  attempt  to  evade 
the  Constitution.  It  is  special  legislation  under  the  at- 
tempted disguise  of  a general  law.  Of  all  forms  of  special 
legislation  this  is  the  most  vicious.”2 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1891,  P.  L.  216,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
prevent  the  pollution  of  the  water  of  streams  supplying  cities 
of  this  Commonwealth,”  provided  that  it  should  be  unlawful 
to  hereafter  establish  any  cemetery  upon  lands  located  within 
one  mile  from  any  city  of  the  first  class  of  this  Common- 
wealth, the  drainage  from  which  empties  or  passes  into  any 
stream  from  which  the  supply  of  water  is  obtained.  This  Act 
was  held  to  be  invalid.3  Said  Mr.  Justice  Williams:  “It  is 
not  alleged  by  the  applicant  that  this  Act  is  a general  law 
in  the  primary  sense  of  the  words,  for  it  does  not  apply  to  the 
State  at  large,  but  it  is  contended  that  it  is  a general  law 
in  a secondary  or  restricted  sense  because  of  the  classification 
of  cities,  and  because  its  provisions  relate  to  cities  of  the  first 
class.  If,  however,  we  look  into  its  provisions,  we  shall  find 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


143 


that  they  do  not  relate  to  cities  of  the  first  class  or  any  other 
class.  They  relate  distinctly  and  clearly  to  a strip  of  terri- 
tory lying  on  the  outside  of  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  having 
a breadth  of  one  mile,  and  a drainage  into  any  stream  from 
which  the  water  supply  of  the  city  is  obtained.  No  municipal 
power,  or  duty,  or  officer  is  the  subject  of  legislative  regula- 
tion by  this  Act,  but  it  lays  its  hand  on  cemeteries  and  for- 
bids their  establishment  within  this  narrow  strip  of  territory. 
Now  cemeteries  may  be  more  numerous  and  more  necessary 
in  the  neighborhood  of  cities  than  in  the  country,  but  it  will 
hardly  be  asserted  that  they  are  part  of  the  municipal  ma- 
chinery of  a city,  even  when  located  within  its  limits.  This 
Act  does  not  undertake,  however,  to  deal  with  cemeteries 
within  cities  of  the  first  class,  but  with  those  that  are  wholly 
outside  of  them.  It  does  not  attempt  to  deal  with  all  ceme- 
teries that  are  outside,  but  only  with  those  that  are  within 
one  mile  from  the  city  lines.  Even  this  limited  territory  is  sub- 
divided so  that  in  the  neighborhood  of  Philadelphia  the  law 
is  applicable  to  those  cemeteries  lying  in  the  valley  of  the 
Schuylkill,  but  it  is  not  applicable  to  those  in  the  valley  of 
the  Delaware.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a better  ex- 
ample of  a law  both  local  and  special  than  this.” 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1893,  P.  L.  42,  entitled  “An  Act  au- 
thorizing the  regulating,  taking,  use,  and  occupancy  of  cer- 
tain public  burial  places,  under  certain  circumstances,  for 
places  of  common  school  education,”  is  invalid.4  The  judg- 
ment in  this  case  was  affirmed  upon  the  opinion  of  the  court 
below,  in  which  it  was  said:  “We  think  the  Act  of  Assem- 
bly unconstitutional  because  it  is  a local  and  special  Act  reg- 
ulating the  affairs  of  a school  district,  as  well  as  relating  to  a 
graveyard  not  of  the  State.  Its  very  title  shows  that  it  is 
special  and  not  general.  It  is  entitled  ‘An  Act  authorizing 
the  taking,  use,  and  occupancy  of  certain  public  burial 
grounds,  under  certain  circumstances. ’ It  is  well  known  that 
this  Act  of  Assembly  was  prepared  and  its  passage  procured 
for  this  particular  case,  to  enable  this  school  board  to  take 


144 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


this  burial  ground,  and  that  this  was  done  after  a special  law 
avowedly  for  the  same  purpose  had  been  vetoed  by  the  Gov- 
ernor. It  is  special  legislation  in  the  guise  of  a general  law — 
the  most  specious  and  vicious  form  that  special  legislation 
can  assume.  That  this  particular  school  district  and  this  par- 
ticular burial  ground  were  intended  to  be  affected  is  made 
manifest  by  the  first  section  of  the  Act,  in  which  all  words  of 
general  operative  effect  are  so  hedged  in  and  limited  by  other 
words,  confining  their  operation  as  to  render  it  extremely 
probable  that  there  is  no  other  graveyard  in  the  Common- 
wealth within  the  operation  of  the  Act.  Certainly  they  must 
be  very  few  in  number.  The  Act  would  have  been  little,  if 
any,  more  apparently  special  if  it  had  enacted  that  ‘when- 
ever the  school  board  of  York  City  desired  to  occupy  the 
Potter’s  Field  therein,  it  should  be  lawful  for  them,’  etc. 
Localization  and  specialization  may  be  produced  by  matter  of 
description,  geographical  or  otherwise,  or  by  words  of  limi- 
tation confining  the  operation  of  general  terms  to  an  individ- 
ualized subject-matter.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Patton,  88 
Pa.  St.  258;  Philadelphia  v.  Cemetery  Company,  162  Pa.  St. 
105;  Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St. 
192.” 

Where  an  Act  is  general  in  form,  but  its  provisions  are 
such  as  to  be  inoperative,  except  in  a certain  city,  and  in  re- 
lation to  a particular  building  there,  it  is  local;  thus,  the  Act 
of  May  24th,  1893,  P.  L.  124,  entitled  “An  Act  to  abolish 
commissioners  of  public  buildings,  and  to  place  all  public 
buildings  heretofore  under  the  control  of  such  commission- 
ers, under  the  control  of  the  department  of  public  works  in 
cities  of  the  first  class,”  is  a local  Act,  it  applies  solely  to 
Philadelphia,  and  to  but  one  particular  building  in  that  city, 
and  regulates  the  affairs  of  that  city  by  placing  in  the  control 
of  the  department  of  public  works  a particular  building.5 

The  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  204,  dividing  the  cities 
of  the  State  into  seven  classes,  and  providing  for  the  incorpo- 
ration and  government  of  cities  of  the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


145 


and  seventh  classes,  was  held  invalid  because  the  attempted 
classification  was  unnecessary  and  excessive.  The  classifi- 
cation was  (VII)  under  10,000  (VI),  10,000  to  20,000  (V), 

20.000  to  45,000  (IV),  45,000  to  75,000  (HI),  75,000  to 

150.000  (II),  150,000  to  600,000,  and  (I)  over  600, ooo.6  The 
same  cases  held  the  Act  of  April  nth,  1876,  P.  L.  20,  to  be 
invalid  for  the  same  reasons.  By  this  Act,  an  amendment  of 
the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230,  the  number  of  classes 
of  cities  was  increased  to  five. 

In  Avars’  Appeal,  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “The  broad 
ground  on  which  the  court  was  asked  to  declare  the  Act  un- 
constitutional is,  that  under  the  specious  guise  of  classifica- 
tion, it  is  local  and  special  legislation  pure  and  simple,  and, 
without  pretense  of  necessity,  opens  wide  the  door  for  fur- 
ther legislation  of  the  same  vicious  and  inhibited  character. 
It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  escape  from  that  position. 

Classification  is  not  expressly  forbidden  by  the  Constitu- 
tion. On  the  contrary,  it  is  distinctly  recognized  for  certain 
purposes.  For  example,  Article  IX,  Section  1,  declares,  “All 
taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the  same  class  of  subjects,  within 
the  territorial  limits  of  the  authority  levying  the  tax,  and 
shall  be  levied  and  collected  under  general  laws.”  Thus, 
by  necessary  implication,  authority  is  given  to  classify  prop- 
erty for  the  purpose  of  taxation,  but  by  express  mandate  of 
the  last  clause  above  quoted,  all  taxes  must  be  levied  and 
collected  under  general  and  not  special  or  local  laws.  All 
legislation  is  necessarily  based  on  a classification  of  its  sub- 
jects, and  when  such  classification  is  fairly  made,  laws  en- 
acted in  conformity  thereto  cannot  be  properly  characterized 
as  either  local  or  special.  A law  prescribing  the  mode  of  in- 
corporating all  railroad  companies  is  special,  in  the  narrow 
sense  that  it  is  confined  in  its  operations  to  one  kind  of  cor- 
porations only,  and,  by  the  same  test,  a law  providing  a sin- 
gle system  for  organization  and  government  of  boroughs  in 
the  State  would  be  a local  law,  but  every  one  conversant  with 
the  meaning  of  those  words,  when  used  in  that  connection, 
10 


146 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


would  unhesitatingly  pronounce  such  statutes  general  laws. 
But,  as  was  said  in  Scowden’s  Appeal  (supra),  “classification 
which  is  grounded  on  no  necessity  and  has  for  its  sole  object 
an  evasion  of  the  Constitution”  is  quite  a different  thing. 

“The  Act  of  1874,  dividing  the  cities  of  the  State  into  three 
classes,  viz.:  those  containing  over  three  hundred  thousand 
population,  those  containing  less  than  three  hundred  thou- 
sand and  exceeding  one  hundred  thousand,  and  those  con- 
taining less  than  one  hundred  thousand  and  exceeding  ten 
thousand,  was  sustained,  as  to  such  of  its  provisions  as  have 
been  involved  in  adjudicated  cases,  because.it  was  considered 
within  the  spirit  if  not  the  letter  of  the  Constitution.  As  to 
the  number  of  classes  created,  that  Act  appears  to  have  cov- 
ered the  entire  ground  of  classification.  It  provided  for  all 
existing  as  well  as  every  conceivable  prospective  necessity. 
It  is  impossible  to  suggest  any  legislation  that  has  or  may 
hereafter  become  necessary  for  any  member  of  either  class, 
that  cannot,  without  detriment  to  other  members  of  same 
class,  be  made  applicable  to  all  of  them.  If  classification  had 
stopped  where  the  Act  of  1874  left  it  it  would  have  been  well, 
but  it  did  not.  Without  the  slightest  foundation  in  neces- 
sity, the  number  of  classes  were  soon  increased  to  five,  and 
afterwards  to  seven,  and  if  the  vicious  principle  on  which 
that  was  done  be  recognized  by  the  courts,  the  number  may 
at  any  time  be  further  increased  until  it  equals  the  number  of 
cities  in  the  Commonwealth.  The  only  possible  purpose  of 
such  classification  is  evasion  of  the  constitutional  limitation, 
and  as  such  it  ought  to  be  unhesitatingly  condemned. 

“The  fact  that  the  extended  classification  of  1876,  and 
more  especially  that  of  1887,  is  unnecessary,  and  therefore 
unwarranted,  is  manifest  from  an  inspection  of  the  Acts  them- 
selves. With  very  few  and  quite  unimportant  exceptions  the 
charter  powers  of  the  fourth  to  seventh  classes,  inclusive, 
under  the  latter  Act,  are  precisely  similar.  There  is  nothing 
in  either  of  the  points  of  difference  that  can  possibly  be  re- 
garded as  essential.  Aside  from  the  improper  consideration 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


147 


that  five  classes  furnish  greater  facilities  for  special  legisla- 
tion than  one  class  would  do,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
the  last  four  classes  from  being  included  in  the  third  class 
established  by  the  Act  of  1874,  which  comprises  all  cities  of 
more  than  ten  and  less  than  one  hundred  thousand  popula- 
tion. Their  needs  are  all  so  similar  that  no  charter  power 
required  for  either  of  them  would  be  unnecessary  or  detri- 
mental to  any  of  the  others.  The  larger  cities  of  such  a class — 
that  is,  a class  embracing  all  cities  over  ten  and  less  than  one 
hundred  thousand  population — would  doubtless  require  a 
larger  representation  in  each  branch  of  councils,  but  that,  of 
course,  would  be  easily  regulated  by  the  adoption  of  a suita- 
ble ward  and  population  basis  of  representation. ” 

Commonwealth  v.  Patton,  88  Pa.  St.  258. 

2Scowden’s  Appeal,  96  Pa.  St.  422. 

Philadelphia  v.  Westminster  Cemetery  Company,  162  Pa. 
St.  105;  s.  c.,  3 P.  D.  R.  1 5 1 . 

City  of  York  School  District’s  Appeal,  169  Pa.  St.  70;  s.  c. 
below  sub  nom  In  re  Potter’s  Field,  8 York,  145. 

Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554. 

6In  re  Grant  Street,  121  Pa.  St.  596;  Avars’  Appeal,  122 
Pa.  St.  266;  and  see  Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg,  122  Pa.  St. 
285;  Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg,  122  Pa.  St.  289;  Klugh  v.  Har- 
risburg, 1 22  Pa.  St.  289. 

7.  Classification  by  Population  Must  Not  Work 
Exclusion,  but  Must  be  Operative  from  Time 
to  Time  so  as  by  Change  of  Population  the 
Subject  may  Pass  from  Class  to  Class. 

The  Act  of  June  28th,  1879,  P-  L*  182,  extending  the  pro- 
visions of  the  mechanics’  lien  law  to  leasehold  estates,  con- 
tained in  the  sixth  section  a proviso  that  the  Act  should  not 
apply  to  counties  having  a population  of  over  200,000  inhab- 
itants. The  Act  was  held  to  be  local  because  certain  counties 
were  excluded  by  the  proviso.1  In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Mer- 


148 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


cur  said:  “The  difficulty  here  is  not  of  classification  only; 

within  reasonable  limits  and  for  some  purposes  classification 
is  allowable.  It  has  been  sustained  on  the  basis  of  popula- 
tion of  counties  on  the  assumption  that  those  having  a small 
population  may  ultimately  have  one  much  larger.  Here  the 
larger  are  excluded.  We  cannot  assume  that  their  popula- 
tion will  ever  be  reduced  to  less  than  the  number  named. 
They  are,  therefore,  practically  and  permanently  excluded 
by  the  intent  and  purpose  of  this  Act,  which  is  special  in  its 
terms  and  local  in  its  effect. ” 

The  requirement  that  classification  must  be  complete  in- 
cludes the  principle  that  each  member  of  a class  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  transition  from  class  to  class  according  to  circum- 
stances. The  very  theory  of  the  generality  of  the  city  and 
other  like  classification  Acts  also  implies  this,  otherwise  spe- 
cific cities  would  be  selected  by  population  rather  than  by 
name.  And  such  in  fact  is  the  practical  operation  of  such 
laws.2 

1 Davis  v.  Clark,  106  Pa.  St.  377;  and  see  McCarty  v.  Com- 
monwealth, no  Pa.  St.  243;  Morrison  v.  Bachert,  112  Pa. 
St.  322;  City  of  Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191;  Ry- 
mer  v.  Luzerne  County,  142  Pa.  St.  108. 

2Monroe  v.  Luzerne  County,  103  Pa.  St.  278;  Luzerne 
County  v.  Glennon,  109  Pa.  St.  564;  Guldin  v.  Schuylkill 
County,  149  Pa.  St.  210;  Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,  137  Pa. 
St.  508;  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244. 

8.  Transition  from  Class  to  Class. 

Luzerne  County  having  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  a population  in  excess  of  150,000  was  subject  to 
the  provisions  of  the  salary  Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  P.  L. 
13,  enacted  to  carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  Article  XIV, 
Section  5,  in  relation  to  the  compensation  of  county  officers. 
By  the  erection  of  the  county  of  Lackawanna  out  of  the 
county  of  Luzerne  in  1878  the  latter  had  a population  of  less 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


149 


than  150,000  inhabitants.  The  effect  of  this,  without  legisla- 
tion, was  to  restore  the  operation  of  the  fee  system,  as  gov- 
erned by  the  existing  statutes,  in  the  county  of  Lu- 
zerne. In  the  case  of  Monroe  v.  The  County  of  Luzerne,1 
the  facts  as  to  population  appeared  in  the  case-stated,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff,  who  entered  upon  his  duties  as 
prothonotary  in  January,  1880,  was  not  entitled  to  salary 
under  the  Act  of  1876.  Referring  to  the  Act  of  1876,  Chief 
Justice  Mercur  said:  “This  Act  is  general  in  its  terms.  It 
is  designed  to  apply  to  counties  then  containing  the  requi- 
site population,  and  also  to  those  that  might  thereafter  ac- 
quire it;  whenever  the  effort  is  made  to  apply  this  Act  to  an 
officer  of  any  particular  county,  the  fact  to  be  ascertained  is 
whether  the  county  contained  sufficient  population  at  the 
time  the  officer  entered  upon  the  duties  of  his  office.  What- 
ever the  population  may  previously  have  been  or  what  it  may 
thereafter  become,  does  not  control  the  case.  By  what  mode 
that  population  shall  be  ascertained  does  not  arise  in  this 
case.” 

The  recorder  of  deeds  who  entered  upon  his  duties  in  Jan- 
uary, 1884,  was  a party  in  a subsequent  suit  to  determine  the 
status  of  the  county  officers  of  Luzerne  County.  The  census 
of  1880  showed  a population  of  the  county  of  133,066,  and 
the  case-stated  set  forth  that  when  the  incumbent  entered 
on  his  official  duties  the  population  of  the  county  was  over 
150,000,  “based  upon  the  reasons  set  forth  in  the  following 
paragraph,”  which  deduced  the  conclusion  from  a compari- 
son of  inhabitants  and  taxables  in  1880  with  the  tax- 
ables  in  1883.  The  terms  of  the  case-stated  were  not 
regarded  as  furnishing  an  admission  of  population,  and 
the  office  was  held  to  be  still  subject  to  the  fee  sys- 
tem.2 Mr.  Justice  Sterrett  said:  “The  only  legally- 

recognized  method  of  determining  the  population  of  any 
particular  county  or  district  is  by  resorting  to  the  last  pre- 
ceding decennial  census;  and,  according  to  that  the  popula- 
tion of  Luzerne  County  is  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty/ 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


150 

thousand.  We  do  not  say  it  is  not  competent  for  the  Legis- 
lature to  provide  some  other  or  additional  mode  of  deter- 
mining the  fact;  but,  until  some  other  legal  provision  is  made, 
we  must  be  governed  by  the  only-recognized  rule  applicable 
to  the  subject.  In  Luzerne  County  v.  Griffith,  1 Kulp,  297, 
this  court  said:  ‘In  the  absence  of  express  legislative  declara- 
tion of  the  fact,  or  of  any  other  method  provided  by  the 
Legislature  for  ascertaining  it,  the  last  preceding  decennial 
census  is  to  be  resorted  to  as  the  best  evidence  of  the  popu- 
lation of  a county  in  case  of  classification  of  counties  by  pop- 
ulation.’ 

“In  the  light  of  existing  legislation,  we  have  no  doubt  that 
for  the  purposes  of  classification  under  the  various  salary 
Acts,  each  county  must  remain  in  the  class  in  which  the  last 
census  found  it  until  it  is  transferred  to  another  class  by  a 
subsequent  census.  The  United  States  decennial  census  is 
the  only  official  determination  of  population  that  we  now 
have,  and  the  inconvenience  and  injustice  that  would  neces- 
sarily arise  from  accepting  any  unofficial  guide  to  the  classi- 
fication of  counties,  for  salary  purposes,  cannot  well  be  over- 
estimated. Legislative  and  judicial  apportionments  are  both 
based  on  population  determined  by  the  last  preceding  cen- 
sus. The  Constitution  provides  that  ‘whenever  a county 
shall  contain  forty  thousand  inhabitants’  it  shall  constitute  a 
separate  judicial  district;  but,  in  Commonwealth  ex  rel.  Chase 
v.  Harding,  6 Norris,  351,  we  held  that  such  separate  dis- 
tricts can  only  be  formed  after  a decennial  census  showing 
the  requisite  population.  The  cases,  it  is  true,  are  not  exactly 
parallel,  but  the  analogy  is  very  close.” 

By  the  census  of  1890  it  appeared  that  Luzerne  County 
had  a population  in  excess  of  150,000  and  the  salary  system 
was  consequently  restored.3  By  the  same  census  taken  in 
June,  1890,  it  appeared  that  the  county  of  Schuylkill  had  a 
population  in  excess  of  150,000.  The  coroner  elected  in  1889 
who  entered  upon  his  office  in  January,  1890,  was  party  to  a 
suit  to  determine  the  compensation  of  the  officers  of  that 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 5 I 

county.  The  claim  was  that  the  Act  of  1876  governed  his 
compensation  for  1891,  notwithstanding  the  provision  of  Ar- 
ticle III,  Section  13,  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that 
no  law  shall  increase  or  diminish  the  salary  or  emoluments 
of  a public  officer  after  his  election  or  appointment.  The 
court  below  was  of  opinion  that  the  case  was  within  the  Act 
of  1876,  and  that  the  constitutional  provision  must  be  con- 
strued to  mean  a law  passed  after  the  election  or  appointment 
of  the  officer.  But  the  Supreme  Court  held  otherwise  and 
the  judgment  was  reversed.4 

In  Pittsburg’s  Petition,5  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  the 
Act  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  in  relation  to  the  govern- 
ment of  cities  of  the  second  class  fixed  certain  dates  for  the 
doing  of  things  necessary  to  put  the  city  government  in  op- 
eration, compliance  with  which  direction  was  possible  only 
in  the  city  of  Pittsburg,  the  then  sole  city  of  that  class,  and 
made  no  corresponding  provision  for  cities  afterwards  coming 
into  it,  did  not  render  the  Act  invalid  as  a local  law. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,6  Chief  Justice  Paxson  said: 
“It  has  been  ascertained,  in  the  manner  required  by  law,  that 
the  city  of  Allegheny  has  now  a population  which  entitled  it, 
under  the  classification  Acts  of  1874  and  1889,  to  become  a 
city  of  the  second  class.  Prior  to  the  last  census  it  was  a 
city  of  the  third  class.  It  now  passes  from  the  one  class  to 
the  other,  by  reason  of  its  growth  in  population,  without 
shock  or  disturbance.  It  is  the  first  event  of  the  kind  in  the 
political  history  of  the  State,  and  is  not  without  interest. 

“It  is  conceded  that  up  to  the  present  time  the  city  of  Alle- 
gheny has  been  governed  by  the  special  Act  of  March  31st, 
1870,  P.  L.  717,  entitled  ‘An  Act  to  reduce  the  charter  of 
the  city  of  Allegheny,  and  the  several  Acts  amendatory 
thereof,  into  one  Act.’  By  that  Act  the  powers  of  the  mu- 
nicipal government  were  vested  in  the  Mayor  and  select  and 
common  councils.  The  select  council  was  composed  of  two 
members  from  each  ward,  to  serve  for  a term  of  two  years, 
which  term  was  increased  by  the  Act  of  1881  to  four  years. 


152 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


There  being  thirteen  wards  in  the  city,  the  number  of  select 
councilmen  had  hitherto  been  twenty-six. 

“It  is  also  conceded  that  the  city  of  Allegheny,  while  it  has 
been  a city  of  the  third  class,  under  the  classification  Acts 
aforesaid,  has  never  accepted  the  provisions  of  the  general 
city  laws  of  1874,  and  hence,  as  was  decided  in  Henry  Street, 
123  Pa.  St.  347,  was  not  governed  by  their  provisions,  but 
remained  subject  to  the  said  special  Act  of  1870. 

“The  transition  from  the  one  class  to  the  other  works  no 
change  in  its  government  except  such  as  the  law  makes  nec- 
essary to  adjust  it  to  the  class  into  which  it  goes.  It  repeals 
no  ordinances;  it  vacates  no  offices  except  those  which  it 
abolishes,  and  makes  no  vacancies  to  be  filled  except  by 
the  creation  of  new  offices.  The  offices  of  Mayor,  and  of  se- 
lect and  common  councils  are  common  to  each  class  of  cities. 
The  mere  fact  of  the  transition  does  not  necessarily  unseat 
the  persons  legally  filling  such  offices  at  the  time  it  occurs,  but 
they  serve  out  their  official  terms  for  which  they  were  elected, 
and  their  successors  are  elected  under  the  laws  regulating 
the  class  into  which  the  city  has  moved.  In  the  meantime 
the  officers,  whose  terms  have  not  expired,  become  possessed 
of  all  the  powers  and  are  subject  to  all  the  duties  pertaining 
to  the  offices  held  by  them  in  cities  of  the  class  to  which  it 
has  advanced.  In  other  words,  the  machinery  of  the  old 
government  is  to  be  used  in  adjusting  the  city  to  its  position 
under  the  new.  Were  it  otherwise,  were  all  offices  to  be  sud- 
denly vacated,  we  would  have  chaos.  We  would  have  a city 
without  a Mayor,  without  councils,  without  heads  of  depart- 
ments, without  police  officers  to  preserve  the  public  peace, 
and  no  one  authorized  to  set  in  motion  the  machinery  by 
which  the  new  government  can  be  organized.” 

The  precise  question  for  determination,  in  this  case,  was 
whether  it  is  the  duty  of  the  respondent,  as  Mayor  of  the 
city,  to  issue  his  official  proclamation,  ordering  the  election, 
at  the  next  municipal  election,  of  one  member  of  select  coun- 
cil from  each  ward  in  the  city.  The  court  below  was  of  opin- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 53 

ion  that  such  election  was  necessary,  and  awarded  a man- 
damus ordering  the  Mayor  to  issue  his  proclamation  therefor. 
From  this  decision  the  Mayor  appealed.  It  was  held  in  view 
of  the  situation  of  the  municipal  government  that  a proper 
application  of  the  statutory  law  did  not  require  an  election, 
and  the  judgment  below  was  reversed. 

Counsel  in  this  case  submitted  a further  question,  to  wit, 
whether  under  the  Act  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  pro- 
viding for  the  choice  by  city  councils  of  heads  of  depart- 
ments of  public  safety,  public  works,  and  charities,  these  re- 
spective officers  should  be  elected  by  the  councils  of  the  new 
or  old  city?  The  court  said:  “Upon  this  point  we  are  in 

no  doubt.  The  present  councils  are  the  councils  of  the  new 
city,  if  I may  use  a term  which  does  not  quite  accurately 
describe  the  situation.  The  city  remains  the  same.  It 
merely  passes  from  one  condition  to  another.  It  enters  the 
new  with  all  its  ordinances;  all  its  officers  whose  offices  have 
not  been  abolished;  all  of  its  contracts  in  full  force,  and  sim- 
ply conforms  for  the  future  to  the  new  regulations  which  the 
law  declares  shall  supersede  the  old.  The  machinery  of  the 
latter,  as  before  observed,  must  be  used  to  start  the  city 
under  its  new  government. 

“We  are  of  opinion  that  the  present  councils  should  pro- 
ceed to  elect  the  heads  of  departments.” 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,7  a case  arising  upon  the 
transition  of  the  city  of  Allegheny  into  the  second  class  of 
cities,  Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “This  appeal  presents 

a single  question.  It  is  one  of  considerable  practical  import- 
ance and  has  not  yet  been  definitely  settled  by  decision.  The 
Act  of  1874  divided  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  into 
three  classes  upon  the  basis  of  population.  It  also  provided 
that  when  any  city  of  a lower  class  had  reached  the  limit  of 
population  for  the  class  above  it,  this  fact  when  properly  as- 
certained should  be  certified  by  the  Governor  to  the  councils 
of  the  city,  and  upon  the  recording  of  such  certificate  upon 
the  records  of  councils,  the  city  must  pass,  eo  instanti,  into 


154 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


the  class  in  which  its  population  entitled  it  to  be.  We  are 
now  to  inquire  how  much  of  the  legislation  peculiar  to  city, 
or  to  the  class  of  cities  out  of  which  it  goes,  it  can  take  with 
it  into  the  new  class  of  which  it  becomes  a member,  and  how 
much  it  must  leave  behind?  In  answering  this  question  we 
should  consider,  first,  the  objects  of  classification  as  declared 
by  the  Legislature;  and,  next,  the  several  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1874,  and  supplementary  legislation,  by  which  these 
declared  objects  are  carried  into  practical  operation. 

“The  first  section  of  the  Act  of  1874  sets  out  very  clearly 
the  object  of  classification.  It  is  to  regulate  the  exercise  of 
certain  corporate  powers,  and  the  number,  character,  powers, 
and  duties  of  certain  corporate  officers  in  the  cities  composing 
the  several  classes.  The  same  section  declares  that  ‘the  cor- 
porate powers  and  the  number,  character,  powers,  and  duties 
of  the  officers  of  cities  of  the  several  classes  now  in  exist- 
ence by  virtue  of  the  laws  of  this  Commonwealth  shall 
be  and  remain  as  now  provided  by  law  except  where  other- 
wise provided  by  this  Act.’  Here  is  a very  plain  declaration 
of  legislative  intent  to  recast  the  governments  of  cities  in 
such  particulars  as  might  be  necessary  to  their  classification, 
and  to  secure  uniformity  in  the  general  outline  of  the  mu- 
nicipal government,  provided  for  all  the  members  of  each 
class.  Here  is  also  an  equally  plain  declaration  of  the  legisla- 
tive purpose  to  leave  each  city  in  the  full  enjoyment  of  all 
its  powers,  rights,  and  privileges  not  superseded  by  the  uni- 
form scheme  or  plan  of  municipal  government  provided  for 
the  class  into  which  such  city  may  come.  As  was  held  in 
Commonwealth  ex  rel.  v.  Wyman,  137  Pa.  St.  508,  the  transi- 
tion of  a city  from  one  class  to  another  works  such  change  in 
its  government  as  the  law  makes  necessary  to  adjust  it  to 
the  class  into  which  it  goes.  In  other  respects  it  works  no 
change,  but  the  city  brings  its  municipal  belongings  with  it 
into  the  new  class.  It  would  seem  that  we  are  thus  provided 
with  an  answer  to  our  question  by  the  Act  of  1874.  So  far 
as  the  legislation  affecting  a city  of  the  third  class  conflicts 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


155 


with  the  uniform  general  plan  of  municipal  government  pro- 
vided for  cities  of  the  second  class,  so  far  it  must,  upon  its 
transition  into  that  class,  leave  its  former  system  behind  it; 
else  it  could  not  adjust  itself  to  the  class  into  which  it  has 
come,  and  the  whole  scheme  of  classification  would  fall.  So 
far  as  its  former  legislation  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  legisla- 
tive plan  of  government  for  the  new  class  so  far  it  remains 
in  full  force. 

“Let  us  now  apply  this  test  to  the  case  before  us.  The  city 
of  Allegheny  was  provided,  while  it  was  a city  of  the  third 
class,  with  a system  for  the  levy  and  collection  of  its  taxes. 
The  law  has  provided  a very  different  system  for  cities  of  the 
second  class.  The  two  cannot  stand  together.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  in  order  to  adjust  itself  to  the  class  into  which 
it  has  come,  this  city  must  leave  its  old  system  behind  it,  and 
take  on  that  which  the  law  has  prescribed  for  it  as  a member 
of  the  second  class.  This  is  rendered  still  more  apparent 
when  we  remember  that  the  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes 
is  one  of  the  ‘corporate  powers’  which  the  classification  Acts 
have  undertaken  to  regulate;  and  that  the  officers  through 
whom  such  levy  and  collection  are  made,  are  ‘corporate  offi- 
cers,’ whose  powers  and  duties  are  defined  and  adjusted  by 
the  same  Acts.  If  no  provision  for  the  levy  and  collection  of 
taxes  in  cities  of  the  second  class  had  been  made,  the  system 
previously  in  existence  in  such  cities  would  have  remained 
undisturbed  under  the  express  declaration  of  the  first  sec- 
tion of  the  Act  of  1874,  but  to  the  extent  to  which  the  law 
has  regulated  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power,  or  modified 
the  powers  and  duties  of  the  officers  through  whom  it  is  ex- 
ercised, to  that  extent  the  old  system  is  superseded  by  the 
new,  and  upon  the  transition  of  a city  from  the  lower  to  the 
higher  class  it  exchanges  its  outgrown  municipal  dress  for 
that  which  the  law  has  provided  for  every  member  of  the  class 
into  which  it  comes.  If  this  was  not  so,  the  very  objects  of 
classification  would  be  defeated  and,  instead  of  uniformity 
among  the  members  of  each  class,  we  should  have  the  same 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


156 

diversity  in  the  organization  and  administration  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  cities  as  existed  when  the  Act  of  1874  was 
adopted.  Under  the  letter  of  the  Constitution  cities  consti- 
tuted a single  class,  and  as  local  legislation  regulating  mu- 
nicipal affairs  was  forbidden,  classification  became  necessary 
to  avoid  intolerable  inconvenience  and  hardship:  Wheeler  v. 
The  City,  77  Pa.  St.  338.  Instead  of  one  form  of  municipal 
government  for  all  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  we  now 
have  three  forms,  one  for  each  class,  and  to  the  forms  so  pro- 
vided every  member  of  each  class  must  conform.  A reason 
for  this  is  found  in  the  fact  that  since  1874  local  legislation 
regulating  the  affairs  of  a city  is  forbidden  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, so  that  legislation  for  that  purpose  can  be  had  only  for  a 
class,  and  must  be  applicable  to  every  member  of  the  class.” 

1 Monroe  v.  County  of  Luzerne,  103  Pa.  St.  278;  and  see 
County  v.  Griffith,  1 Kulp,  297. 

2Luzerne  County  v.  Glennon,  109  Pa.  St.  564;  s.  p.  Guldin 
v.  Schuylkill  County,  149  Pa.  St.  210. 

3Rymer  v.  Luzerne  County,  142  Pa.  St.  108. 

4 Guldin  v.  Schuylkill  County,  149  Pa.  St.  210;  s.  p.  Com- 
monwealth v.  Comrey,  149  Pa.  St.  216. 

5Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401. 

Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,  137  Pa.  St.  508. 

Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244. 

9.  Option  Under  Classification  Acts. 

Option  under  classification  Acts  was  not  at  first  regarded 
as  admissible.  The  question  first  arose  in  the  case  of  the  Ap- 
peal of  the  City  of  Scranton  School  District,1  which  brought 
in  question  certain  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1874,  and  the  sup- 
plement thereto  of  March  18th,  1875,  P.  L.  15.  In  this  case 
the  plaintiff  claimed  the  benefit  of  that  provision  of  the  first 
section  of  the  Act  of  1875  which  directed  that  in  cities  of  the 
third  class,  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  all  real  estate  and 
the  improvements  thereon  should  be  classified  and  arranged 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


157 


in  three  classes  upon  which  different  rates  of  assessment 
should  be  imposed.  The  rate  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  was  less 
than  the  full  rate  levied  upon  the  assessed  valuation  made 
for  city  purposes,  at  which  the  defendant,  the  school  district, 
had  caused  the  school  tax  to  be  assessed.  The  proviso  to 
the  fifth  section  of  the  Act  of  March  15th,  1875,  excluded 
from  the  operation  of  the  Act  all  cities  of  the  third  class,  and 
all  cities  containing  less  than  ten  thousand  population,  pre- 
viously incorporated,  which  did  not  accept  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  by  an  ordinance  duly  passed.  Accepting  cities 
therefore  were  subject  to  the  methods  of  assessment  and  col- 
lection prescribed  by  the  first  five  sections  of  the  Act,  while 
different  methods  would  prevail  in  non-accepting  cities. 
These  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1875  were  held  to  be  invalid 
on  the  ground  that  the  diversities  proceeding  from  the  opera- 
tion of  the  law  rendered  it  local  and  special. 

The  case  of  Reading  v.  Savage,2  arose  upon  the  provis- 
ion of  Section  57  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230, 
making  the  Act  applicable  to  such  cities  of  the  third  class  or 
any  city  of  under  10,000  inhabitants  theretofore  incorporated 
as  might  accept  its  provisions.  The  city  of  Reading  had  ac- 
cepted the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  case  was  upon  a 
lien  filed  thereunder.  The  defense  was  that  the  acceptance 
was  invalid.  Under  former  legislation  the  city  was  without 
power  to  enforce  such  a claim  as  that  for  which  the  lien  had 
been  filed.  The  court  below  sustained  the  defense  upon  the 
authority  of  the  Appeal  of  City  of  Scranton  School  District 
{supra),  from  which  the  following  principle  was  deduced: 
“Wherever  the  provisions  of  an  Act  are  compulsorily  binding 
upon  every  city  of  the  particular  classification  the  legisla- 
tion is  general  and  constitutional.  Whenever  the  provisions 
are  binding  at  the  option  of  the  local  authorities  the  legisla- 
tion is  special,  local,  and  unconstitutional.”  The  judgment 
was  affirmed  in  a per  curiam  opinion  adopting  the  opinion  of 
the  court  below.  Upon  reargument,  ordered  by  the  court  of 
its  own  motion,  the  judgment  was  reversed.3 


158 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


In  the  opinion  the  distinction  between  the  provision  of 
the  Act  of  1875  in  question  in  the  Scranton  case,  and  that  of 
the  Act  of  1874,  in  question  in  the  case  before  the  court,  was 
pointed  out;  the  former  was  said  to  be  a disabling,  the  latter  an 
enabling  provision.  The  former  tended  to  diversity.  Cities  of 
the  third  class  under  the  Act  of  1874  might  or  might  not  ac- 
cept the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1875.  Hence  its  results  were 
special  and  local.  It  did  not  necessarily  govern  a constitutional 
class.  The  Act  of  1874  being  a general  law  without  words  of 
repeal  did  not  take  away  the  pre-existing  legislation  gov- 
erning those  cities  whose  population  made  them  eligible  to 
the  third  class.  The  option  was  the  means  whereby  the  city 
by  proper  action  might  avail  itself  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1874.  As  city  after  city  might  do  this  the  results 
tended  to  uniformity,  such  cities  thereupon  became  subject 
to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1874  and  of  such  subsequent 
legislation  as  might  relate  to  cities  of  the  third  class.  Non- 
accepting cities  remained  subject  to  their  old  charters  beyond 
the  reach  of  improvement  by  legislation  except  upon  condi- 
tion of  renouncing  them  and  accepting  the  uniform  provis- 
ions of  the  Act  of  1874. 

The  city  of  Meadville  was  originally  incorporated  under 
the  Act  of  February  15th,  1866,  P.  L.  57,  and  its  supple- 
ments. Under  this  legislation  it  was  without  authority  to 
assess  the  cost  of  sewers  on  adjoining  property.  The  Act  of 
April  nth,  1876,  P.  L.  20,  supplementary  to  and  amendatory 
of  the  Act  of  1874,  amending  the  fifty-seventh  section  and 
others,  provided  that  any  city  of  the  third,  fourth,  or  fifth 
class  might  accept  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  or  of  any  por- 
tion or  portions  thereof,  by  ordinance  reciting  the  provis- 
ions adopted.  The  city  of  Meadville  had  adopted  such  por- 
tions, among  others,  as  related  to  sewer  assessments.  In  a 
case  arising  on  such  an  assessment  the  defense  was  sustained 
by  reason  of  the  invalidity  of  the  Act  of  1876,  upon  the  au- 
thority of  Avars’  Appeal.  Such  a lien  was  held  to  depend 
upon  statutory  authority  for  its  creation.  As  the  Act  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


159 


1876  was  void  the  question  whether  a partial  acceptance  of 
the  Act  of  1876  might  be  sustained  was  not  reached.4 

The  city  of  Wilkes-Ban;e  was  eligible  to  the  third  class  of 
cities  under  the  Act  of  1874,  but  had  not  accepted  its  pro- 
visions. The  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  274,  entitled  “An 
Act  constituting  each  city  of  the  third  class  a single  school 
district,  providing  for  the  election  of  its  school  controllers, 
the  levy  and  collection  of  taxes  and  the  management  of  its 
affairs,”  provided  in  Section  9 that  any  city  of  the  third  class 
now  incorporated  may  accept  and  become  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  by  resolution  of  its  school  boards.  The 
boards  of  the  city  of  Wilkes-Barre  having  accepted  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Act  its  validity  was  questioned  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Reynolds.5 

After  referring  to  the  above  provision  Mr.  Justice  Clark 
said:  “It  is  plain  that  this  provision  is  precisely  similar,  in 

effect,  to  the  Act  of  1875,  which  was  passed  upon  in  Scran- 
ton School  District’s  Appeal  (supra):  its  tendency  is  not  to 
uniformity,  but  to  diversity;  its  results  are  not  general,  but 
special  and  local.  It  will  be  observed  that  ‘any  city  of  the 
third  class,’  incorporated  before  its  passage,  whether  by  spe- 
cial charter  or  under  the  general  law  of  1874,  may  accept  its 
provisions,  and  any  of  such  cities  may  refuse  to  accept  them. 
Wilkes-Barre  is  a city  of  the  third  class  by  special  charter. 
The  local  authorities  of  the  city  have  not  yet  accepted  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  of  1874,  but  desire  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  Act  of  1889,  which  is  not  an  amendment  to  the  Act  of 
1874,  but  an  original  Act.  If  the  Act  of  1889  is  sustained, 
we  are  liable  to  have  cities  of  the  third  class:  (1)  by  special 

charter  as  before;  (2)  by  special  charter  and  under  the  Act  of 
1889;  (3)  under  the  general  Act  of  1874;  and  (4)  under  the 
Acts  of  1874  and  1889.  Another  such  statute  would  double 
these  possibilities,  and  each  succeeding  similar  enactment 
would  double  the  possibilities  then  existing.  This  diversity, 
thus  increasing  in  a geometrical  ratio,  would  result  in  a con- 
fusion and  disorder  with  which  the  evils  of  undisguised  special 


i6o 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


legislation  cannot  be  compared.  In  order  to  procure  special 
legislation  upon  any  subject  relating  to  the  government  of 
cities,  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  procure  the  passage  of  a 
law,  in  general  form,  with  the  specific  and  special  features 
desired,  with  a provision  that  it  would  apply  only  to  such 
cities  as  might  accept  it,  and  it  would  be  possible,  in  this  form 
of  legislation,  for  each  city  of  the  third  class  in  the  State  to 
have,  to  some  extent,  it  own  peculiar  system,  with  like  effect 
as  if  enacted  by  special  law. 

“The  Legislature,  in  the  Act  of  1874,  provided  a general 
system,  upon  which  are  found  all  the  cities  thereafter  incor- 
porated, and  upon  which  are  to  be  put,  ultimately,  all  other 
cities  of  the  third  class,  as  beads  are  put  upon  a string.  The 
system  may  be  strengthened  or  extended,  but  it  cannot  be 
parted  or  divided.  The  loose  beads,  as  they  are  taken  up, 
must  be  put  upon  the  string,  and  not  upon  one  of  the  strands 
of  which  the  string  consists.  The  system,  under  the  Con- 
stitution, is  necessarily  an  entirety;  and  the  special  charter 
city,  in  passing  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  provisions,  under 
an  elective  clause  such  as  is  contained  in  the  Act  of  1874, 
must  decide  to  take  all  or  none  of  them. 

“We  are  of  opinion,  therefore,  that  the  Act  of  May  23d, 
1889,  is  in  contravention  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  State,  and  that  upon  this  ground  the 
entire  Act  is  void.  In  this  view  of  the  case,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  consider  the  Act  with  reference  to  the  other  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  referred  to.” 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Denworth,6  the  Acts  of  March  24th, 
1877,  and  its  supplements  of  May  1st,  1879,  P.  L.  44,  and 
February  14th,  1881,  P.  L.  26,  were  held  invalid.  The  first 
Act  was  entitled  “An  Act  creating  and  defining  the  duties 
and  powers  of  a recorder  for  cities  whose  population  does  not 
exceed  30,000,  and  is  not  less  than  8,500,  which  accepts  the 
provisions  of  this  Act.”  After  providing  for  the  exercise  of 
the  office  of  recorder  in  such  cities  the  Act  in  Section  14  pro- 
vided, “That  this  Act  shall  only  apply  to  cities  whose  popu- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


161 


lation  does  not  exceed  30,000,  and  is  not  less  than  8,500, 
which  shall  by  ordinance,  duly  adopted  by  the  council  or 
councils  thereof,  and  approved  by  the  Mayor,  accept  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act.”  The  supplement  of  1879  enlarged  the 
jurisdiction  of  city  recorders  and  made  further  regulations 
as  to  the  exercise  thereof.  In  Section  9 of  the  supplement 
it  was  provided,  “That  so  much  of  the  first  section  of  the  Act 
to  which  this  is  a supplement,  as  reads  ‘That  the  several  cities 
of  this  Commonwealth,  whose  population  does  not  exceed 
30,000  and  is  not  less  than  8,500/  be  and  the  same  is  hereby 
amended  to  read,  ‘That  the  several  cities  of  this  Common- 
wealth, whose  population  does  not  exceed  17,000  and  is  not 
less  than  10,000/  Provided,  That  the  provisions  of  this 
amendment  shall  not  affect  any  city  which  has  heretofore 
accepted  the  provisions  of  the  Act  to  which  this  is  a supple- 
ment and  elected  a recorder.”  The  supplement  of  1881 
amended  the  said  Section  9 of  the  supplement  of  1879  so  as 
to  read:  • “That  the  several  cities  of  this  Commonwealth 
whose  population  does  not  exceed  17,000,  and  is  not  less 
than  10,000,  and  in  addition  thereto  all  cities  of  the 
fifth  class  organized  and  incorporated  in  this  Common- 
wealth under  and  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  May  24th,  1874,  and  its  supplements,  which 
have  heretofore  or  may  hereafter  accept  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  to  which  this  is  an  amendment  and  its  supple- 
ments.” The  defendant  was  in  the  exercise  of  the  office  of 
recorder  in  the  city  of  Williamsport  under  color  of  this  legis- 
lation. The  population  of  Williamsport  was  not  more  than 
30,000,  and  not  less  than  8,500,  and  it  had  accepted  the  pro- 
visions of  the  foregoing  legislation,  and  the  case  was  a writ 
of  quo  warranto  against  the  recorder  to  test  its  validity. 
In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  McCollum  said:  “The  statutes 

under  which  the  appellant  claims  title  to  the  office  of  recorder 
are  in  palpable  conflict  with  Section  7,  Article  III,  of  the 
Constitution.  They  are  local  because  confined  in  their  opera- 
tions to  cities  of  a specified  population,  which  shall  accept 
1 1 


1 62 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


them  by  ordinance  duly  adopted  by  councils  and  approved 
by  the  Mayor.  Whether  they  shall  apply  to  a city  of  the 
class  described  depends  on  the  action  of  its  municipal  officers, 
and  in  consequence  thereof,  one  city  of  the  class  may  be  sub- 
ject to  their  provisions,  and  other  cities  of  the  same  class 
be  exempt  from  them.  Without  further  elaboration  of  the 
subject,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  of  this  legislation  that  it  is  such 
as  was  condemned  in  Scranton  School  District’s  Appeal,  113 
Pa.  St.  176.” 

The  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  277,  which  was  entitled 
uAn  Act  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities  of 
the  third  class”  made  provision  for  the  annexation  of  terri- 
tory to  such  cities.  In  Harris’s  Appeal,7  the  validity  of  pro- 
ceedings to  annex  certain  territory  to  the  city  of  Scranton 
under  this  legislation  was  in  question.  In  this  case,  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Williams  said:  “The  new  Constitution  provided  for 

the  government  of  the  Commonwealth  by  general  laws  and 
denied  to  the  Legislature  the  power  to  pass  local  laws  on 
many  subjects.  Cities  under  constitutional  provisions  con- 
stituted one  class,  to  be  legislated  for  in  future  by  laws  appli- 
cable to  all  alike.  To  relieve  against  this  hardship  the  classi- 
fication Act  was  passed  during  the  following  session  of  the 
Legislature.  The  cities  were  divided  into  three  classes  upon 
the  basis  of  population.  There  was  at  that  time  but  one  city 
in  the  first  and  one  in  the  second  class.  Legislation  for  these 
classes  was  therefore  easy  of  accomplishment,  but  in  the  third 
class,  there  were  many  cities  each  of  which  was  provided,  at 
the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1874,  with  a form  of 
government  of  its  own  selection.  These  differed  quite  widely 
in  the,  terms  and  duties  of  some  of  the  municipal  offices,  and 
in  the  powers  possessed  by  the  municipalities.  The  effort  to 
reduce  all  these,  at  one  time,  to  a uniform  frame  of  govern- 
ment was  one  that  would  be  attended  necessarily  with  some 
inconvenience.  The  Act  was  made  to  take  effect  upon  all 
cities  to  be  incorporated  after  its  passage,  and  upon  all  those 
previously  incorporated,  when  and  as  fast  as  they  should  sev- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  163 

erally  elect  to  come  in  under  its  provisions.  The  expecta- 
tion entertained  by  the  lawmakers  was  that  within  a few  years 
all  the  cities  of  the  third  class,- then  existing,  would  come, 
by  election,  into  the  class,  and  adopt  the  frame  of  municipal 
government  provided  by  the  Act  of  1874.  This  expectation 
has  been  largely  realized.  A few  cities  still  cling  to  their  old 
charters,  but  much  the  larger  part  of  them  have  adopted  the 
provisions  of  that  Act  and  are  members  of  the  third  class,  not 
only  by  reason  of  their  population,  but  by  reason  of  the  char- 
acter of  their  municipal  organization.  The  class  is  a steadily 
increasing  one,  and  the  number  of  cities  standing  outside  of 
it  is  steadily  decreasing.  The  tendency  is  toward  absolute 
uniformity.  Legislation  for  cities  of  the  third  class  is  appli- 
cable to  all  the  members  of  that  class,  and  it  is  general,  within 
the  definition  we  have  frequently  given  to  the  phrase  ‘a  gen- 
eral law,’  since  1874.  If,  as  is  said  by  the  appellant’s  counsel, 
Wilkes-Barre  is  not  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of 
1889,  it  is  because  'that  city  is  still  outside  the  class  for  which 
the  Act  of  1889  was  framed.  It  is  for  some  purposes  a city 
of  the  third  class  under  the  classification  Act,  but  for  pur- 
poses of  local  government  it  remains  under  its  charter  and  its 
system  of  local  laws  that  were  in  force  prior  to  1874.  For 
these  purposes,  therefore,  it  is  not  a member  of  the  class,  and 
is  not  affected  by  the  legislation  provided  for  the  class  as  it 
exists  under  the  provisions  of  the  law  of  1874.  For  purposes 
of  classification  all  cities  not  belonging  to  the  first  or  second 
class  belong  to  the  third.  For  purposes  of  municipal  govern- 
ment only  so  many  of  these  belong  to  the  third  class  in  the 
legislative  sense  of  the  words,  as  have  taken  on  the  municipal 
uniform  which  the  Legislature  has  provided  for  the  class.  It 
follows  logically  from  what  has  now  been  said  that  the  Act  of 
1889,  being  for  the  class  and  applicable  to  every  member  of  it, 
is  general,  and  is  not  open  to  the  objection  which  the  appel- 
lants urged  against  it.” 

The  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230,  is  not  operative  in 
any  city  of  the  third  class  which  has  not  accepted  its  pro- 


164 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


visions.8  In  the  case  cited  Mr.  Justice  Clark  said:  “It  is 
contended,  however,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  in  error,  that 
even  if  this  be  so,  by  the  thirteenth  section  of  the  more  recent 
Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230,  the  exclusive  control  and 
direction  of  the  opening,  widening,  narrowing,  vacating,  etc., 
of  all  streets,  etc.,  within  the  limits  of  all  cities  in  this  Com- 
monwealth is  vested  in  'the  municipal  authorities  and  the 
courts  Having  jurisdiction’  in  such  cases,  that  this  jurisdiction 
must  be  exercised  by  the  courts  in  conjunction  with  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities,  and  that  as  the  city  of  Allegheny  has  in 
no  way  consented  to  or  recommended  the  vacation  of  Henry 
Street,  the  courts  cannot  entertain  jurisdiction.  Without  en- 
tering into  a discussion  of  the  purpose  of  this  provision  of 
the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  it  is  a sufficient  answer  to  this 
contention  that  the  city  of  Allegheny  has  not  accepted  or 
become  subject  to  the  Act  of  1874  nor  to  the  Act  of  April 
nth,  1876,  P.  L.  21,  which  is  a supplement  thereto.  It  is 
true  that  certain  sections  of  this  Act  of  1874  might  appear  to 
apply  to  all  cities  whether  its  provisions  have  been  formally 
accepted  or  not,  but  a careful  reading  of  the  statute  shows 
that  these  sections  are  applicable  only  to  all  cities  of  whatever 
class  which  by  the  terms  of  the  Act  or  by  their  acceptance 
have  become  subject  to  its  provision. 

“The  design  of  the  Act  of  1874  was  to  establish  a uniform 
and  general  system  of  government  for  all  the  cities  of  the 
Commonwealth;  it  was  not  designed,  however,  to  work  a re- 
peal of  any  municipal  charter  previously  created  by  special 
enactment;  yet,  when  the  municipality  voluntarily  relin- 
quishes the  same  and  accepts  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of 
1874,  in  the  manner  designated  therein,  or  suffers  a repeal  of 
its  charter,  the  effect  in  either  case  is  to  bring  the  city  or  its 
inhabitants  within  the  provisions  of  the  general  law  of  the 
State.  The  Act  applies  not  only  to  any  city  accepting  its 
provisions,  but  to  all  cities  hereafter  to  be  created;  it  may 
be  said,  therefore,  to  apply  to  all  cities  of  the  Commonwealth, 
as  ultimately  all  may  become  subject  to  it  without  the  re- 
enactment of  any  of  its  provisions. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  1 65 

“As  it  is  admitted  that  the  city  of  Allegheny  has  never  in 
any  way  become  subject  to  the  Act  of  1874,  no  question 
arises  upon  the  proper  construction  of  the  thirteenth  section 
or  upon  the  constitutionality  of  that  Act;  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  consider  those  questions  when  they  are  properly 
presented.” 

1 Appeal  of  City  of  Scranton  School  District,  1 13  Pa.  St.  176. 

2Reading  v.  Savage,  120  Pa.  St.  198;  followed  in  Hoopes 
v.  Scranton,  1 Wilcox,  189. 

3Reading  v.  Savage,  124  Pa.  St.  328. 

4Meadville  v.  Dickson,  129  Pa.  St.  1. 

Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds,  137  Pa.  St.  389;  and  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds  (below),  8 C.  C.  R.  568. 

Commonwealth  v.  Denworth,  145  Pa.  St.  172. 

7 Harris’s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494. 

8In  re  Henry  Street,  123  Pa.  St.  346;  and  see  generally 
Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  2 C.  P.  Rep.  247,  1 C.  C.  R.  335; 
s.  c.,  reversed,  18  W.  N.  C.  385;  s.  c.,  2 C.  P.  Rep.  247;  Van 
Storch  v.  Scranton,  3 C.  C.  R.  571  3 C.  C.  R.  567. 

In  Sixteenth  Street  Opening,  4 C.  C.  R.  124,  it  was  held 
that  a city  was  not  estopped  from  asserting  the  invalidity 
of  an  option  provision  by  having  acted  under  it. 

10.  Option  as  Related  to  Local  and  Special  Legis- 
lation. 

The  Act  of  June  23d,  1885,  P.  L.  142,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
repeal  the  first  section  of  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  for  regu- 
lating and  maintaining  of  fences,  approved  A.  D.  1700,’  re- 
pealed the  first  section  of  the  Act  referred  to  in  its  first  sec- 
tion, and  in  its  second  section  further  provided  that  in  any 
county  wherein  a majority  voted  in  favor  of  repeal,  the  Act 
should  forthwith  take  effect,  but  that  the  same  should  not 
take  effect  in  any  county  until  it  had  been  ascertained  that 
the  provisions  thereof  were  deemed  expedient  and  desired 
therein  by  such  an  election. 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 66 

In  Frost  v.  Cherry,1  this  Act  was  held  to  be  invalid.  Mr. 
Justice  Paxson  said:  “It  is  contended,  and  the  learned 

judge  below  so  held,  that  the  Act  is  in  conflict  with  Section  7, 
Article  III,  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides,  inter  alia, 
that  The  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special 
law  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships, 
wards,  boroughs,  or  school  districts.’ 

‘The word  affairs, as  used  in  the  Constitution,  has  received 
a judicial  construction  by  this  court.  In  Morrison  v.  Bach- 
ert,  1 12  Pa.  St.  322,  it  was  said:  ‘When  it  (the  Constitution), 
speaks  of  the  affairs  of  a county,  it  means  such  affairs  as  af- 
fect the  people  of  that  county.’  We  accordingly  held  in  that 
case  that  an  Act  to  ascertain  and  appoint  the  fees  to  be  re- 
ceived by  prothonotaries  and  other  county  officers  was  an 
Act  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties;  while  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Patton,  88  Pa.  St.  258,  and  in  Scowden’s  Appeal, 
96  Pa.  St.  422,  we  ruled  that  an  Act  of  Assembly  which  au- 
thorized the  holding  of  special  sessions  of  the  courts  of  Craw- 
ford County,  away  from  the  county  seat,  offended  against 
this  clause  in  the  Constitution.  The  particular  device  re- 
sorted to  in  these  cases  to  evade  the  constitutional  prohibi- 
tion was  classification. 

“The  Act  of  1885  concerns  the  great  body  of  the  people  of 
the  county.  It  affects  every  farmer,  almost  every  lot-holder 
and  every  person  who  keeps  horses  or  cattle,  sheep,  hogs,  or 
goats.  It  would  seem  difficult  to  frame  an  Act  which  should 
more  generally  concern  the  people.  Moreover,  it  prescribes 
certain  duties  to  the  sheriff,  the  commissioners,  and  all  the 
election  officers.  How  then  can  it  be  said  that  it  does  not 
relate  to  the  ‘affairs’  of  counties  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution? 

“Is  it  a local  law?  Upon  this  point  we  are  free  from  doubt. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  first  section,  repealing  the  Act 
of  1700,  does  not  go  into  effect  in  any  county  by  its  own 
force.  If  it  did  we  might  sustain  it  even  if  the  rest  of  the 
Act  were  unconstitutional.  But  the  first  section  is  tied  to 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


167 


the  second  section  by  an  umbilical  cord.  If  we  cut  it  they 
both  perish.  The  first  section  is  only  effective  after  a vote 
in  favor  of  it,  then  the  Act  takes  effect  in  such  county;  if  the 
majority  should  be  against  it  the  Act  does  not  take  effect. 
Thus,  it  may  very  well  happen  that  Venango  County  may 
vote  in  favor  of  the  repeal  and  its  adjoining  counties  vote 
against  it.  We  would  then  have  one  law  in  Venango  County 
regulating  fences,  and  a different  law  in  the  adjoining  coun- 
ties, both  local  laws,  the  very  thing  prohibited  by  the  Consti- 
tution. Nor  would  it  make  any  difference  were  every  county 
in  the  State  to  vote  the  same  way.  The  test  is  not  results, 
but  possibilities.  The  machinery  to  test  the  sense  of  the  peo- 
ple can  only  be  put  in  operation  by  the  county  commission- 
ers, and  when  so  moved,  the  fact  that  it  may  be  rendered 
local  in  its  effects  is  fatal  to  the  bill.  In  City  of  Scranton 
School  District’s  Appeal,  113  Pa.  St.  176,  it  was  said  by  Mr. 
Justice  Green,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court:  ‘The 

circumstance  that  the  power  to  determine  the  question  is 
delegated  to  another  body  does  not  at  all  affect  the  ques- 
tion. The  practical  result  is  the  same;  the  law  of  1875  will  be 
limited  to  the  one  or  more  cities  that  do  accept  and  that  makes 
it  local.  All  our  recent  decisions  are  to  the  effect  that  if  local 
results  either  are  or  may  be  produced  by  a piece  of  legisla- 
tion it  offends  against  this  provision  of  the  Constitution  and 
is  void.’  Citing  Commonwealth  v.  Patton  {supra),  and  other 
cases.  Scranton  School  District’s  Appeal  is  upon  all  fours 
with  the  case  in  hand.  The  Act  of  1875  there  referred  to  was 
an  Act  for  the  assessment,  levy,  and  collection  of  all  taxes 
authorized  to  be  collected  in  certain  cities,  and  to  which  by 
the  proviso  of  the  fifth  section  no  city  of  the  third  class  shall 
become  subject  until  they  are  accepted  by  ordinance  of  coun- 
cils, approved  by  the  Mayor,  and  it  was  held  that  the  first 
five  sections  thereof  were  thus  limited  to  the  one  or  more 
cities  that  accept,  and  were  therefore  local  and  in  conflict 
with  Section  7,  Article  III,  of  the  Constitution. 

“If  there  is  anything  now  settled  in  the  Constitution  it  is 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 68 

that  the  Legislature  can  no  longer  pass  a valid  local  or  spe- 
cial law  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships, 
wards,  boroughs,  or  school  districts.  And  what  the  Legis- 
lature may  not  do  directly,  it  cannot  accomplish  by  indirec- 
tion, as  by  classification  resting  upon  no  necessity  nor  reason 
of  public  policy,  or  by  calling  in  the  aid  of  the  people  at  the 
polls  to  breathe  life  into  an  otherwise  dead  statute. 

“I  have  not  considered  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  question 
of  the  delegation  of  power.  The  Act  of  1885  is  in  such  direct 
conflict  with  Section  7,  Article  III,  of  the  Constitution,  that 
the  learned  judge  below  could  not  have  done  otherwise  than 
declare  it  void  for  that  reason.” 

The  Act  of  June  12th,  1893,  P.  L.  451,  was  entitled  “An  Act 
enabling  the  taxpayers  of  townships  and  road  districts  to  con- 
tract for  making  at  their  own  expense  the  roads,  and  paying 
salaries  of  township  or  road  district  officers,  and  thereby  pre- 
venting the  levy  and  collection  of  road  taxes  therein.”  The 
Act  provided  that  any  one  or  more  taxpayers  of  any  town- 
ship might  acquire  the  right  to  make  and  repair  the  roads 
of  the  township  on  petition  to  the  court  of  quarter  sessions, 
setting  forth  certain  facts,  viz.,  that  the  petitioners  are  own- 
ers of  property  and  taxpayers;  the  approximate  number  of 
miles  of  roads  in  the  township;  ability  of  petitioners  to  make 
and  repair  the  roads;  and  further,  filing  a bond  in  a sum 
equal  to  $500  for  every  mile  of  road  in  the  township  with 
approved  sureties;  thereupon,  the  court,  on  being  satisfied  of 
the  good  faith  of  petitioners,  might  grant  the  prayer,  and 
direct  the  road  supervisors  to  enter  into  a contract  with  the 
petitioners  for  the  making  and  repair  of  the  roads  of  the 
township  for  the  ensuing  fiscal  year.  This  Act  was  held  to 
be  valid.2  In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Dean  said:  “It  is  not 

questioned  that  townships  are  a class  of  municipal  sub- 
divisions of  the  State,  and  laws  applicable  to  all  townships 
alike  are  general  and  constitutional  laws.  But  it  is  argued 
this  law  would  be  productive  of  local  results,  and  therefore  is 
a local  law.  That  is,  some  townships  would  take  advantage 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


169 


of  its  provisions,  and  contract  for  making  and  repairing  their 
roads,  while  others  would  go  on  under  the  old  law,  and  have 
the  work  done  as  heretofore,  directly  by  the  supervisors. 
Hence,  in  different  townships,  the  work  would  be  done  under 
two  different  systems,  depending  on  the  notions  of  the  tax- 
payers of  the  many  townships  of  the  Commonwealth.  But 
this  fact,  even  if  it  were  undoubted,  would  not  necessarily  be 
local  legislation.  Nearly  all  the  laws  which,  since  its  adop- 
tion, have  been  declared  obnoxious  to  the  constitutional  in- 
hibition of  Section  7,  Article  III,  have  been  those  which 
sought  to  accomplish  a local  result  under  the  guise  of  a nom- 
inally general  law,  and  which,  from  the  language  of  the  stat- 
ute and  its  subject,  could  have  no  other  result,  or  which,  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  case,  could  not  have  a general  applica- 
tion. In  these  cases  the  Act,  though  general  in  terms,  was 
so  worded  that  it  could  only  relate  to  some  members  of  a 
class,  which  members  were  identified  by  a geographical  loca- 
tion, a territorial  area,  or  a limit  of  population,  which  made 
them  beneficiaries  of  the  law,  and  excluded  all  others  of  the 
same  class.  But  there  is  not  a single  township  in  the  State 
which  does  not  come  under  this  law.  If  the  Act  had  been 
the  first  one  passed  on  the  subject  and  had  enacted  that,  in 
all  the  townships  of  the  State,  public  roads  should  be  made 
and  kept  in  repair  by  the  supervisors:  1,  By  the  assessment 

of  a money  tax,  collected  and  expended  by  them;  2,  or  by 
the  labor  of  the  taxpayers  of  each  township  to  the  value  of 
their  tax,  under  the  direction  of  the  supervisors;  3,  or  by  con- 
tract of  supervisors  with  a taxpayer  or  taxpayers,  with  the 
approval  of  the  court  of  quarter  sessions,  the  law  would,  un- 
questionably, have  been  general.  But  there  being  three  dif- 
ferent methods  of  doing  the  same  thing,  the  roads  might  have 
been  made  and  repaired  in  three  different  ways  by  three  ad- 
joining townships.  The  duty  of  each  township  would  have 
been  the  same,  to  make  and  repair  the  roads  within  its 
boundaries;  the  object  of  the  law,  with  respect  to  each,  would 
have  been  the  same,  to  secure  reasonably  good  roads.  That 


170 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


any  township  might  adopt  any  one  of  three  lawful  methods 
to  effect  the  general  purpose,  it  seems  to  us,  could  not  change 
its  general  character.  Here  not  a single  township  is  excluded 
from  the  operation  of  the  law  because  of  any  local  peculiarity. 
That  taxpayers  will  differ  in  opinion  as  to  benefits  from  it, 
and,  in  consequence,  some  townships  will  adopt  the  new 
method,  while  others  adhere  to  the  old,  is  not  a local  result, 
but  merely  an  exhibition  of  that  tendency  of  the  human  mind 
to  reach  different  political  conclusions  from  the  same  facts.” 
He  further  said:  “Testing  this  law  by  its  effect  it  operates 

upon  all  townships  whose  taxpayers  choose  to  invoke  it  in 
precisely  the  same  manner.  It  in  substance  does  nothing 
more  than  permit  the  taxpayers  to  contract  for  all  road  work, 
where  before  nothing  could  be  contracted,  except  such  as 
the  taxpayers  did  not  choose  to  do.  The  duty  of  supervis- 
ion in  the  supervisor  remains  the  same. 

“We  may  say  here  that,  on  this  subject,  we  adhere  to  the 
principle  of  construction  announced  in  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa. 
St.  257,  Tn  order  that  a given  Act  of  Assembly  relating  to  a 
class  of  cities  may  escape  the  charge  of  being  a local  Act  . . . 
it  is  necessary  it  should  be  applicable  to  all  members  of  the 
class  to  which  it  relates,  and  must  be  directed  to  the  exist- 
ence and  regulation  of  municipal  powers,  and  to  matters  of 
local  government.’  Or  as  is  said  in  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia, 
77  Pa.  St.  348:  'A  statute  which  relates  to  persons  or  things 
as  a class  is  a general  law,  while  a statute  which  relates  to 
particular  persons  or  things  of  a class  is  special,  and  comes 
within  the  constitutional  provision.’  ” 

The  subject  of  option  as  discussed  in  the  cases  in  this  and 
the  foregoing  section  may  be  presented  in  the  following  sum- 
mary: Option  laws  are,  as  a rule,  invalid,  because  they  pro- 
duce, or  may  produce,  diversity  of  laws  in  different  localities; 
but  that  is  not  an  option  which  applies  alike  to  a given  class 
of  localities  and  which  gives  to  the  governing  or  administra- 
tive authorities  of  each  a choice  of  several  modes  of  accom- 
plishing the  same  result,  either  of  which  may  be  adopted  from 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


171 

time  to  time  according  to  the  determination  of  the  proper 
authority.  An  option  may  be  offered,  however,  to  a class  of 
localities  governed  by  special  laws,  to  remain  as  they  are,  be- 
yond the  reach  of  any  but  general  legislation,  save  by  way  of 
repeal;  or  to  accept  the  provisions  of  a general  system  gov- 
erning the  class  to  which  they  belong.  The  exercise  of  this 
option  tends  from  diversity  to  uniformity.  But  the  change 
of  system  to  be  effected  by  the  exercise  of  the  option  must 
be  complete.  It  cannot  relate  to  a single  function  nor  to  a 
single  branch  of  government  or  administration,  for  this  tends 
from  diversity  to  greater  diversity,  nor  can  the  option  be  of- 
fered to  less  than  a class,  nor  to  a different  class  than  as  de- 
fined by  the  general  classification  Acts,  for  this  would  be  to 
confound  classification. 

. 1 Frost  v.  Cherry,  122  Pa.  St.  417,  4 C.  C.  R.  579. 

2Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Company’s  Appeal,  164  Pa.  St.  44; 
reversing  s.  c.,  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Company’s  Petition,  3 
P.  D.  R.  610;  Philadelphia  Coal  & Iron  Company’s  Peti- 
tion, 164  Pa.  St.  248. 

As  related  to  the  subject  of  option  the  following  constitu- 
tional provisions  are  referred  to: 

Article  V,  Section  2,  Clause  2.  No  township,  ward,  dis- 
trict, or  borough  shall  elect  more  than  two  justices  of  the 
peace,  Or  aldermen,  without  the  consent  of  a majority  of  the 
qualified  electors  within  such  township,  ward,  or  borough. 

Article  XV,  Section  1.  Cities  may  be  chartered  whenever 
a majority  of  the  electors  of  any  town  or  borough  having  a 
population  of  at  least  10,000  shall  vote  at  any  general  elec- 
tion in  favor  of  the  same. 

The  former  provision  was  derived  from  the  amendment  of 
1838,  Article  VI,  Section  7.  The  Constitution  of  1776  con- 
tained something  like  it.  Chapter  II,  Section  30,  “If  any  city 
or  county,  ward,  township,  or  district  in  this  Commonwealth 
incline  to  change  the  manner  of  appointing  their  justices  of 
the  peace  as  settled  by  this  article  the  General  Assembly  may 
make  laws  to  regulate  the  same  agreeable  to  the  desire  of  a 
majority  of  the  freeholders  of  the  city  or  county,  ward,  town- 
ship, or  district  so  applying.” 


172 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


The  sixteenth  section  of  the  Act  of  May  8th,  1876,  P.  L. 
149,  amended  by  the  sixth  section  of  the  Act  of  March  24th, 
1877,  P.  L.  40,  entitled  “A  supplement  to  an  Act,  entitled 
‘An  Act  to  provide  for  the  erection  of  a poor-house,  and  for 
the  support  of  the  poor  in  the  several  counties  of  the  Com- 
monwealth,’ approved  May  8th,  1876,”  is  invalid  in  that  the 
application  of  the  Act  is  made  to  depend  upon  the  adoption 
of  it  by  the  voters  of  the  county  or  district:  Taxpayers’  Pe- 
tition, 26  P.  L.  J.  146. 

11.  Legislation  for  Cities  by  Classes  Must  be  Con- 
fined to  Municipal  Matters  Proper. 

By  the  Act  of  1874,  as  has  already  appeared,  cities  were 
divided  into  three  classes.  This  classification  was  sustained, 
and  laws  relating  to  either  class  and  to  municipal  purposes 
were  held  valid.  The  Act  of  1876  created  five  classes  of  cities 
and  the  Act  of  1887  seven.  These  Acts  were  held  void  as  cre- 
ating an  undue  and  unnecessary  multiplication  of  classes.  The 
option  features  of  various  Acts  were  passed  upon  and  sus- 
tained or  held  invalid  as  they  did  or  did  not  tend  to  uniform- 
ity. The  remaining  feature  of  city  legislation  is  that  indi- 
cated above.  So  far  as  Adts  relating  to  classes  of  cities  per- 
tain to  municipal  purposes  they  are  valid,  but  so  far  as  they 
relate  to  other  purposes  within  the  prohibitions  of  the  Con- 
stitution against  local  and  special  legislation  they  are  invalid. 

In  Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,1  the  Act  of  June 
27th,  1883,  P.  L.  1 61,  which  provided  that  every  writ  of  scire 
facias  “issued  upon  a municipal  claim  for  the  recovery  of  any 
sum  of  money,  the  subject  of  a municipal  claim  in  cities  of 
the  first  class,  shall  have  the  additional  force  and  effect  of  a 
writ  of  scire  facias  to  revive  and  continue  the  lien  of  said  claim 
for  a period  of  five  years  from  the  date  of  said  writ,”  was  held 
invalid  as  a local  and  special  law  within  the  prohibition  of 
such  laws,  authorizing  the  creation,  extension,  or  impairing 
of  liens.  The  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  does  not  point 
out  the  distinction  between  municipal  and  non-municipal 
purposes,  but  in  the  opinion  below  it  was  said  by  his  Honor, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


173 


Judge  Arnold,  “It  is  my  opinion  that  classification  of  cities 
and  laws  confined  thereto  are  permissible  only  in  matters 
relating  to  their  municipal  government,  but  the  rights  of 
persons  and  property  must  be  secured  by  general  laws,  which 
must  be  uniform  and  in  force  everywhere  throughout  the 
State.” 

The  distinction  was  first  pointed  out  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  case  of  Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Com- 
pany,2 in  which  was  in  question  the  Act  of  March  19th,  1879, 
P.  L.  9,  entitled  “An  Act  to  provide  for  the  incorporation  and 
for  the  government  and  regulation  of  street  railway  com- 
panies now  incorporated,  or  which  may  hereafter  be  incorpo- 
rated in  cities  of  the  second  and  third  classes  in  this  Com- 
monwealth.” It  was  held  to  be  both  local  and  special.  Said 
Mr.  Justice  Williams:  “The  subject  of  this  statute  is  there- 
fore street  railway  companies,  which  is  a subject  for  general 
legislation,  while  the  statute  professes  to  deal  only  with  a 
limited  number  of  these  railways,  and  these  are  selected  by 
reference  to  their  location  in  certain  cities.  Under  the  guise 
of  a general  law  we  have  here  (one  which  is  special,  because 
it  relates  to  a few  members  of 'the  general  class  of  corporations 
known  as  street  railway  companies,  and  local  because  its  op- 
erations are  confined  to  particular  localities,  viz.,  cities  of  the 
second  and  third  class.  The  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
which  forbid  local  and  special  legislation  cannot  be  brushed 
aside  so  easily. 

“It  is  urged  that  this  statute  is  sustainable  under  the  de- 
cisions of  this  court,  recognizing  the  power  of  the  Legisla- 
ture to  classify  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  for  purposes 
of  municipal  government,  but  those  cases  rest  upon  a very 
different  principle  from  that  involved  in  the  present  case. 
For  purposes  of  local  government  the  State  is  divided  into 
counties,  townships,  and  other  municipal  and  quasi  municipal 
corporations.  Each  class  of  these  subdivisions  has  purposes 
to  subserve  that  are  peculiar  to  it,  and  needs  to  be  invested 
with  the  powers  necessary  to  that  end.  Generally  speaking, 


174 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


all  the  members  of  each  class  have  the  same  local  functions  to 
perform.  Classification,  therefore,  upon  this  basis  has  been 
recognized,  and  a statute  relating  to  all  the  townships,  all 
the  school  districts,  or  all  the  members  of  any  particular  class 
of  the  municipal  divisions  of  the  State  has  been  held  to  be 
constitutional. 

“It  has  been  found  desirable  to  divide  cities  into  classes 
upon  the  basis  of  their  population.  The  needs  of  a great 
city  with  half  a million  or  more  of  people  are  somewhat  dif- 
ferent in  many  respects  from  the  needs  of  a city  with  10,000. 
The  organization  of  their  local  government  and  the  man- 
agement of  their  municipal  affairs  will  be  quite  unlike.  Each 
of  these  classes  requires  legislation  peculiar  to  itself,  but  such 
legislation  must  be  applicable  to  all  the  members  of  the  class 
to  which  it  relates,  and  must  be  directed  to  the  existence 
and  regulation  of  municipal  powers  and  to  matters  of  local 
government.  The  supposed  classification  in  the  Act  of  1879 
is  of  a very  different  character. 

“The  Act  provides  for  the  incorporation  and  government 
of  street  railway  companies,  but  it  does  not  affect  all  such 
companies.  It  selects  such  companies  as  may  be  located  in 
cities  of  the  second  and  third  class,  and  makes  special  provis- 
ion for  them,  while  all  other  street  railway  companies  remain 
under  the  operation  of  the  general  law.  This  is  just  what 
the  Constitution  declares  shall  not  be  done.” 

The  Act  of  May  6th,  1887,  P.  L.  87,  entitled  “An  Act  re- 
lating to  the  opening  and  widening  and  assessment  and  pay- 
ment of  damages  and  benefits  for  the  opening,  widening,  and 
change  of  grade  of  streets  in  cities  of  the  first  class,  and  reg- 
ulating proceedings  therein,”  made  detailed  provisions  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  purposes  expressed  in  the  title.  The  Act 
comprised  seventeen  sections.  It  was  held  to  be  invalid,  ex- 
cept the  first  two  sections,  which  were  sustained  because  they 
repealed  an  existing  system  for  the  assessment  of  damages,  and 
in  effect  put  in  its  place  a system  prevailing  generally  through- 
out the  Commonwealth;  the  remaining  sections  were  held  to- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


175 


be  void  because  they  did  not  relate  to  municipal  purposes 
within  the  principle  justifying  the  classification  of  cities.3  In 
this  case  Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “In  order  that  a given 
Act  of  Assembly,  relating  to  a class  of  cities,  may  escape  the 
charge  of  being  a local  Act,  it  is  necessary,  as  was  said  in 
Weinman  v.  Railway  Company  (supra),  that  it  should  'be 
applicable  to  all  the  members  of  the  class  to  which  it  relates, 
and  must  be  directed  to  the  existence  and  regulation  of  mu- 
nicipal powers,  and  to  matters  of  local  government.’  A law 
that  will  bear  the  application  of  this  test  is  within  the  pur- 
poses for  which  classification  was  designed,  and  therefore 
constitutional.  A law  that  will  not  bear  its  application  is 
local,  and  offends  against  'the  Constitution.  Among  the 
many  subjects  of  legislation  which  classification  presents,  we 
may  call  attention  to  such  as  the  establishment,  maintenance, 
and  control  of  an  adequate  police  force  for  the  public  pro- 
tection; the  preservation  of  the  public  health;  protection 
against  fire;  the  provision  of  an  adequate  water  supply;  the 
paving,  grading,  curbing,  and  lighting  of  public  streets;  the 
regulation  of  markets  and  market-houses,  of  docks  and 
wharves;  the  erection  and  care  of  public  buildings,  and  other 
municipal  improvements.  These  are  mentioned,  not  because 
they  include  all  the  ‘subjects  for  the  exercise  of  municipal 
powers,  but  as  a suggestion  of  some  of  the  more  obvious  ones 
and  as  an  illustration  of  the  character  of  the  subjects  upon 
which  legislation  for  the  classified  cities  may  be  necessary. 
These  classes  are  thus  seen  to  embrace,  not  mere  geograph- 
ical subdivisions  of  the  territory  of  the  State,  but  organized 
municipalities,  which  are  divided  with  reference  to  their  own 
peculiar  characteristics  and  needs,  and  the  legislation  to 
which  they  are  entitled  by  virtue  of  such  division  is  simply 
that  which  relates  to  the  peculiarities  and  needs  which  in- 
duced the  division.  In  this  way  each  class  may  be  provided 
with  legislation  appropriate  to  it,  without  imposing  the  same 
provisions  on  other  classes  to  which  they  would  be  unsuitable 
and  burdensome. 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 76 

“We  come  now  to  inquire  what  legislation  remains  forbid- 
den to  cities,  notwithstanding  classification.  I reply  that  all 
legislation  not  relating  to  the  exercise  of  corporate  powers, 
or  to  corporate  officers  and  their  powers  and  duties,  is  un- 
authorized by  classification.  In  Article  III,  Section  7,  the 
Constitution  declares  that  the  Legislature  shall  not  pass  any 
local  or  special  law  'regulating  the  practice  or  jurisdiction  of, 
or  changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in,  any  judicial  proceeding 
or  inquiry  before  courts,  aldermen,  justices  of  the  peace, 
sheriffs,  commissioners,  arbitrators,  auditors,  masters  in 
chancery,  or  Other  tribunals/  The  same  section  forbids  the 
passage  of  any  local  or  special  law  fixing  the  rate  of  interest, 
exempting  property  from  taxation,  changing  the  laws  of  de- 
scent, affecting  the  estates  of  minors,  and  many  other  pur- 
poses, among  which  is  'authorizing  the  laying  out,  opening, 
altering,  or  maintaining  roads,  highways,  streets,  or  alleys/ 
It  is  very  clear  that  the  purpose  of  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision is  to  require  that  laws  relating  to  the  several  subjects 
enumerated  in  Section  7 shall  be  general,  affecting  the  whole 
State,  so  that  the  rule  upon  all  these  subjects  shall  be  uni- 
form throughout  every  part  of  the  territory  in  which  the  Con- 
stitution itself  is  operative.  For  example,  there  cannot  be 
one  rate  of  interest  in  cities  of  the  first  class,  another  in  those 
of  the  second  or  third,  and  still  another  for  the  rest  of  the 
State,  but  the  rate,  when  fixed  by  law,  must  apply  to  all  parts 
and  divisions  of  the  State  alike.  The  same  thing  is  true  of 
the  law  of  descent,  and  so  on,  through  the  entire  list  of  sub- 
jects upon  which  local  and  special  legislation  is  forbidden. 
If  classification  can  relieve  against  the  constitutional  pro- 
hibition as  to  one  of  these  subjects  it  can  relieve  as  to  all.  If 
it  can  justify  a change  in  the  practice  in  the  courts  of  law, 
or  the  proceedings  to  assess  damages  for  an  entry  by  virtue 
of  the  right  of  eminent  domain,  it  can,  by  the  same  reasoning, 
justify  a change  in  the  law  of  descents,  or  the  settlement  of 
estates,  or  the  rate  of  interest,  and  sweep  away  the  entire  sec- 
tion with  all  its  safeguards.”  Applying  this  reasoning  the  Act 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


1 77 


was  held  invalid  in  so  far  as  it  related  to  the  practice  and  pro- 
cedure prescribed  in  the  Act  for  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  in 
relation  to  its  subject-matter. 

The  Act  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  386,  was  entitled  as 
shown  in  the  note,  and  was  an  elaborate  statute  relating  to 
street  improvements  containing  thirty-four  sections.  Its  val- 
idity was  in  question  in  Wyoming  Street,4  and  the  cases  re- 
ported under  the  name  of  Wyoming  Street  were  subsequently 
epitomized  in  Scranton  v.  Whyte  by  the  same  learned 
justice  who  wrote  the  opinion  in  Wyoming  Street  as 
follows: 

“The  cases  involved  the  validity  of  municipal  liens,  entered 
upon  the  awards  of  a ‘board  of  viewers.’  This  board  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  Allegheny  County, 
but  only  on  the  nomination  of  the  city.  Its  members  were  re- 
movable by  the  same  court,  but  only  on  request  of  the  city. 
Their  salaries  were  fixed  by  the  city,  and  paid  out  of  the  city 
treasury.  All  claims  for  damages  done  by  the  entry  of  the 
city  on  private  property  were  required  to  be  submitted  to 
them  for  adjustment.  Their  report  was  made,  not  to  the 
court  that  appointed  them,  but  to  the  city,  which  sat  as  an 
appellate  court  to  review  and  revise  the  awards  against  itself 
for  the  injury  it  had  done  its  citizens  by  its  entry  on  their 
lands,  under  the  right  of  eminent  domain.  The  judgment 
thus  rendered  by  the  city,  in  its  own  case,  was  conclusive  on 
the  citizen,  unless  he  fled  to  a court  of  law  at  a rate  of  speed 
that  left  no  dust  on  his  feet.  Having  assessed  the  damages 
done  by  the  city,  the  board  of  viewers  added  all  costs  and  ex- 
penses to  that  total,  and  charged  the  entire  amount  on  ad- 
joining property  as  benefits,  without  regard  to  whether  the 
improvement  had  conferred  any  benefits  on  the  property 
charged  or  not.  The  measure  of  a lot-owner’s  liability  was, 
therefore,  not  the  benefit  he  had  received,  but  his  share  of 
the  loss  some  one  else  had  suffered.  The  statute  under  con- 
sideration in  that  case  fell,  because  the  board  of  viewers, 
with  its  powers  and  functions,  was  indispensable  to  the  sys~ 


t78 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


tem  provided  by  it,  and  the  provisions  relating  to  the  board 
were  unconstitutional.” 

In  the  opinion  in  Wyoming  Street,  Mr.  Justice  Williams 
said:  “Some  confusion  seems  to  exist,  however,  in  regard  to 
the  definition  of  a general  law,  and  a theory  has  been  advanced 
in  several  recent  cases,  and  has  been  contended  for  by  the  ap- 
pellee in  this  case  that  the  division  of  the  cities  of  the  State  into 
classes  by  the  Act  of  1874,  which  was  recognized  as  a nec- 
essary classification  in  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St. 
338,  required  us  to  hold  any  law  to  be  general  which  em- 
braces all  the  cities  of  a given  class,  without  regard  to  the 
subject  to  which  it  relates.  This  theory  overlooks  the  ob- 
jects and  purposes  of  classification,  which  are  very  clearly  set 
forth  in  the  first  section  of  the  Act  which  divides  the  cities  of 
the  State  into  three  classes.  These  are,  to  make  provision  for 
the  municipal  needs  of  cities  which  differ  greatly  in  popula- 
tion. Differences  in  population  make  it  necessary  to  pro- 
vide different  machinery  for  the  administration  of  ‘certain 
corporate  powers,’  and  to  make  a difference  in  ‘the  number, 
character,  powers,  and  duties  of  certain  corporate  officers,’ 
corresponding  with  the  needs  of  the  population  to  be  pro- 
vided for.  An  Act  of  Assembly  that  relates  to  a subject  with- 
in the  purposes  of  classification,  as  they  are  thus  declared  by 
law,  is  a general  law,  although  it  may  be  operative  in  a very 
small  portion  of  the  territory  of  the  State,  if  it  relates  to  all 
the  cities  of  a given  class.  For  example,  an  Act  relating  to 
the  lighting  of  streets  in  cities  of  the  third  class  would  be  a 
general  law  for  the  following  reasons:  (a)  It  relates  to  the 

exercise  of  ‘corporate  powers;’  (b)  It  affects  all  the  cities  of  a 
given  class  in  the  same  manner;  (c)  It  affects  the  inhabitants 
and  property-owners  in  such  cities,  because  of  their  residence 
and  ownership  'therein,  and  the  circumstances  and  needs  that 
are  peculiar  to  the  class  of  which  this  city  belongs.  But  a 
law  that  should  provide  that  all  applications  made  by  guar- 
dians, administrators,  and  executors  for  leave  to  sell  the  real 
estate  of  a decedent  for  the  payment  of  his  debts  in  cities 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


179 


of  the  third  class  should  be  made,  not  in  the  court  having 
jurisdiction  of  the  petitioner’s  accounts,  but  in  the  court  of 
quarter  sessions,  would  be  a local  law,  and  therefore  uncon- 
stitutional. It  would  be  applicable  to  the  same  class  of  sub- 
divisions of  territory  as  the  law  relating  to  the  lighting  of 
streets,  but  it  would  relate  to  the  exercise  of  no  corporate 
power  residing  in  a city,  nor  to  the  duties  of  any  municipal 
officer,  nor  to  the  needs  or  welfare  of  citizens  of  a city  of  the 
third  class,  as  distinguished  from  other  cities  of  the  Com- 
monwealth. On  the  other  hand,  it  would  affect  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  State  courts,  modify  the  duties  of  public  officers 
whose  functions  are  not  local  but  general,  and  touch  the  in- 
habitants of  cities  of  the  given  class  in  the  exercise  and  en- 
joyment of  their  rights  as  citizens  of  the  State,  not  as  dwell- 
ers in  the  municipality.  The  test,  therefore,  by  which  all  laws 
may  be  tried  is  their  effect.  If  they  operate  upon  the  exercise 
of  some  power  or  duty  of  a municipality  of  the  given  class,  or 
relate  to  some  subject  within  the  purposes  of  classification 
they  are  general,  otherwise  they  are  local.”  The  opinion  ex- 
amines the  various  provisions  of  the  bill,  and  concludes,  “If 
it  is  not  our  duty,  and  we  have  no  desire  to  speak  of  this  Act 
of  Assembly  except  as  the  case  may  require  it.  We  therefore 
content  ourselves  with  saying  that  so  much  of  it  as  relates 
to  the  creation,  functions,  powers,  and  compensation  of  the 
board  of  viewers  is  in  plain  violation  of  Article  III,  Section 
7,  of  the  Constitution  and  cannot  be  sustained.  These  pro- 
visions do  not  relate  to  any  municipal  function  or  officer,  but 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  and  practice  in  the  courts  of  law  of  Alle- 
gheny CQunty.  They  fasten  upon  such  of  the  citizens  of  the 
Commonwealth  as  are  owners  of  property  in  a city  of  the 
second  class,  a new,  inconvenient,  injurious,  and  despotic  sys- 
tem for  the  assessment  of  damages  done  by  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  to  which  citizens  in  other  parts 
of  the  State  are  not  subjected.  They  fasten  upon  lot-holders, 
who  are  assessed  with  benefits,  a new,  inconvenient,  and  des- 
potic system  for  the  assessment  of  benefits,  to  which  citizens 
in  other  portions  of  the  State  are  not  subjected.” 


i8o 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


In  Straub  v.  Pittsburg,5  which  involved  the  corporate  au- 
thority of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  to  convey  the  Pittsburg  City 
Poor  Farm,  the  title  to  which  was  originally  acquired  under 
special  legislation  relating  to  the  relief  and  employment  of 
the  poor  in  said  city,  and  the  charge  of  the  poor  having  de- 
volved upon  the  department  of  charities  by  virtue  of  the  Act 
of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  relating  to  cities  of  the  second 
class,  it  was  held  that  such  power  existed,  and  that  the  twelfth 
section  of  the  said  Act  of  1887,  which  provides  that  the  coun- 
cils of  such  said  cities  shall  have  full  power  and  authority  to 
provide  by  ordinance  for  the  relief  and  employment  of  the  poor 
of  said  cities,  and  for  that  purpose  shall  have  the  power  and 
authority  to  sell  and  purchase  real  estate  and  improvements 
and  erect  such  improvements  as  may  be  deemed  necessary 
for  the  proper  care  and  maintenance  of  said  poor,  was  valid, 
caring  for  the  poor  of  a city  being  a municipal  function. 

The  case  of  Pittsburg's  Petition,6  embraced  seven  appeals 
and  cross-appeals  which  were  argued  together.  In  the  court 
below  the  various  proceedings  were  disposed  of  in  one  opin- 
ion. They  were:  (1)  The  petition  of  the  city  to  the  court  of 
quarter  sessions  for  the  appointment  of  viewers  under  the 
Acts  of  May  13th,  1871,  P.  L.  840,  March  20th,  1873,  P.  L. 
325,  and  January  6th,  1864.  It  set  forth  that  the  Act  of  June 
14th,  1887,  P.  L.  386,  had  been  declared  invalid  in  Wyoming 
Street  (supra),  and  that  the  Act  of  May  16th,  1889,  P.  L.  228, 
being  open  to  the  same  objections  the  city  was  remitted  for 
remedy  to  the  first  named  Acts.  This  petition  was  denied 
on  the  ground  that,  assuming  these  Acts  to  be  in  force,  they 
prescribed  certain  conditions  precedent  which  had  not  been 
complied  with; — the  proceedings  involved  having  been  pursu- 
ant to  the  later  legislation  and  on  the  theory  of  its  validity, 
these  conditions  had  been  disregarded.  (2)  A bill  in  equity 
by  certain  property-owners  to  restrain  the  opening  and  im- 
proving of  a certain  street,  and  assessing  the  cost  of  the  same 
on  plaintiff’s  property,  in  which  a decree  of  invalidity  of  the 
Acts  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395,  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L. 
386,  and  May  16th,  1889,  P.  L.  228,  was  sought,  and  also  a 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  l8 1 

decree  that  the  city  was  without  power  or  authority  to  lay 
out,  open,  or  otherwise  improve  any  of  the  streets  or  high- 
ways within  its  limits.  It  was  also  averred  that  plaintiff’s 
property  was  rural,  and  not  subject  to  the  foot-front  rule  of 
assessment.  (3)  Another  bill  of  substantially  similar  nature  re- 
lated to  another  street.  (4)  A third  bill  of  substantially  similar 
nature  related  to  a certain  sewer.  The  hearing  was  upon 
bills  and  answers.  The  city  denied  that  the  foot-front  rule 
was  applied  and  alleged  the  assessments  were  according  to 
benefits  and  set  up  the  Acts  of  1887  and  1889  as  governing 
the  cases.  So  much  of  the  matters  involved  in  the  bills  in 
equity  as  challenged  the  validity  of  the  municipal  organiza- 
tion of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  need  not  be  treated  of  in  detail 
here.  The  result  reached  was  that  the  city  had  power  to 
prosecute  public  improvements,  and  injunctions  staying  the 
work  were  refused.  But  it  was  also  decided  that  no  valid 
statutory  authority  existed  to  charge  the  pending  improve- 
ments upon  the  property  benefited,  because  the  Acts  of  1887 
and  1889  known  as  the  Street  Laws  were  invalid,  upon  the 
ground  that  when  the  work  of  the  board  of  viewers  was  taken 
out  of  the  system  all  that  depended  upon  that  work  went 
with  it  and  the  system  was  literally  eviscerated.  That  the  few 
detailed  and  unrelated  provisions  that  might  remain  were 
without  significance  or  value  and  ought  not  to  survive  the 
system  to  which  they  belonged. 

In  the  case  of  Scranton  v.  Whyte,7  which  was  an  appeal 
from  the  discharge  of  a rule  for  judgment  for  want  of  a suffi- 
cient affidavit  of  defense  in  a scire  facias  sur  municipal  claim, 
certain  provisions  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  277, 
relating  to  municipal  liens  were  in  question.  It  was  objected 
that  these  provisions  related  to  liens  in  cities  of  the  third 
class  only,  and  that  the  practice  of  the  courts,  the  rules  of 
evidence,  and  the  effect  of  sheriff’s  sales  of  read  estate,  were 
affected  by  special  rules  embodied  in  these  provisions.  After 
pointing  out  the  general  propriety  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1889,  that  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  was  a sub- 


182 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ject  of  municipal  control,  that  the  right  to  collect  the  cost  by 
any  appropriate  form  of  taxation  was  a municipal  power,  and 
that  assessment  for  benefits  under  the  rules  governing  such 
assessments  was  proper,  Mr.  Justice  Williams  continued: 
“But  some  provision  must  be  made  for  the  collection  of 
the  assessment,  and  the  Act  authorizes  the  entry  of  a munici- 
pal lien  for  the  amount,  if  not  paid  when  due.  This  is  the 
method  for  collecting  similar  assessments  in  cities  of  the  first 
and  of  the  second  classes.  It  is  not  the  introduction  of  a new, 
but  an  adoption  of  an  old  and  well-understood  mode  of  pro- 
cedure to  secure  the  city,  and  give  notice  of  the  incumbrance. 
So  much  of  this  article  as  gives  a lien  for  ten  years,  without 
a revival,  may  be  open  to  criticism,  but  that  question  is  not 
raised  on  this  record.  For  the  usual  period  fixed  for  the  dura- 
tion of  liens,  appearing  by  the  records  of  the  court,  this 
lien  is  certainly  good,  if  there  was  authority  to  enter  it  in 
the  first  place.  The  amount  of  the  lien  may  be  collected,  ac- 
cording to  the  article  of  the  Act  of  1889  we  are  considering, 
in  either  of  two  ways,  viz.,  by  an  action  against  the  person 
of  the  owner,  or  by  a writ  of  scire  facias , and  a proceeding 
against  the  land  bound  by  the  lien.  These  are  usual  modes 
of  procedure,  in  which  the  practice  is  well  settled,  and  are 
to  be  pursued  in  the  ordinary  manner.  When  the  defendant 
is  served  with  the  writ  of  scire  facias  he  must  make  an  affi- 
davit of  defense,  as  in  a case  of  a scire  facias  on  a mechanic’s 
lien,  a judgment,  or  a mortgage,  or  as  in  the  case  of  any 
action  brought  to  recover  a sum  of  money  due.  If  he  does 
not  do  this  the  Statements  in  the  claim  filed  are  to  be  taken 
as  proof,  prima  facie,  of  the  facts  stated  therein,  and  judg- 
ment may  be  taken,  as  in  any  case  under  the  affidavit  of  de- 
fense laws.  Here,  again,  the  established  practice  in  the 
courts,  in  like  causes,  is  adopted  for  the  enforcement  of  the 
lien  in  favor  of  the  city.  But  it  is  thought  that  the  provision, 
which  declares  that  a sale  by  the  sheriff  of  the  land  bound  by 
the  lien  shall  be  deemed  a proceeding  in  rem,  and  shall  vest 
a good  title  in  the  purchaser,  is  an  interference  with  settled 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


183 


rules  of  law,  and  therefore  unconstitutional..  If  this  was  so, 
it  could  not  affect  the  case  now  before  us;  our  question  is  not 
with  the  title  of  purchaser  at  sheriff’s  sale,  but  with  the  right 
of  the  city  to  a judgment  upon  the  scire  facias.  But  if  the 
proceeding  by  scire  facias,  resulting  in  a sale  by  the  sheriff, 
is  a proceeding  in  rem,  the  fact  that  it  is  so  declared  in  the 
Act  is  of  no  consequence.  The  declaration  would  be,  in  that 
case,  mere  surplusage.  . . . 

“The  Act  of  1889  provides  for  the  ascertainment  of  dam- 
ages and  the  assessment  of  benefits,  by  a system  in  harmony 
with  that  in  use  in  cities  of  the  first  and  second  class.  Its 
provisions,  authorizing  the  filing  oj  a municipal  lien  for  un- 
paid assessments  and  the  collection  of  the  amount  so  secured, 
by  means  of  a personal  action  or  a writ  of  scire  facias,  are  not 
diverse  from  those  in  force  in  other  cities,  but  in  harmony 
with  them.  They  do  not  change  the  established  modes  of 
procedure  in  the  courts  »of  law,  or  the  rules  of  evidence.  They 
create  no  new  style  of  liens,  they  change  no  settled  rule  of 
property.  The  court  below  was,  'therefore,  in  error  in  holding 
the  Act  to  be  unconstitutional,  and  the  affidavit  of  defense  to 
be  sufficient.” 

The  Act  of  May  8th,  1876,  P.  L.  147,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  the  use  of  motive  power  upon  passenger  railways,” 
enacted  “that  passenger  railways  in  any  and  all  cities  of  the 
first  class  . . . may  use  other  than  animal  power  . . . when- 
ever authorized  so  to  do  by  the  councils  of  such  city,  and  the 
limitations  contained  in  any  of  the  charters  of  passenger  rail- 
way companies,  restricting  them  'to  the  use  of  horse  power,” 
were  repealed.  The  validity  of  this  statute  was  sustained  in 
Reeves  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Company.8  Said  Mr.  Justice 
Mitchell:  “If  this  statute  is  constitutional,  it  supplies  the 
necessary  authority.  It  is  claimed,  however,  that  it  trans- 
gresses the  prohibition  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Con- 
stitution, in  that  it  is  a local  or  special  law  amending  or  ex- 
tending the  charter  of  a corporation.  But  under  the  settled 
construction  of  this  section,  classification  of  subjects,  includ- 


184 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ing  cities,  is  permissible,  and  legislation  which  applies  alike  to 
all  the  members  of  a class  is  not  local  or  special  but  general. 
The  important  inquiry,  therefore,  is  whether  the  Act  of  1876 
is  upon  a subject  as  to  which  the  classification  of  cities  is 
proper.  Repeated  decisions  of  this  court  have  marked  out 
the  lines  upon  which  such  classification  may  proceed.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  cite  them  all,  but  in  one  of  the  latest,  Wyoming 
Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494  (503),  our  Brother  Williams  has  put 
the  test  into  the  compactest  phrase:  ‘The  test,  therefore,  by 
which  all  laws  may  be  tried  is  their  effect.  If  they  operate 
upon  the  exercise  of  some  power  or  duty  of  a municipality  of 
the  given  class  . . . they  are  general/  and  he  gives,  as  an 
example,  ‘an  act  relating  to  the  lighting  of  streets  in  cities 
of  the  third  class  would  be  a general  law.’  The  control  of  the 
vehicles  that  should  be  used  on  the  public  streets  for  the  gen- 
eral conveyance  of  passengers,  the  rate  of  speed,  and  the  mo- 
tive power  by  which  they  shall  be  propelled  is  equally  or  even 
more  peculiarly  the  subject  of  municipal  duty.  In  fact,  public 
conveyances,  whether  ferry  boats,  barges,  hackney  coaches, 
or  omnibuses,  have  been  subjects  of  police  regulation  and  li- 
censes as  long  as  they  have  been  known  or  used  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. The  Act  of  1876  is  therefore  upon  a subject  proper 
for  municipal  classification  and  is  a general  law.  It  takes  off 
restrictions  previously  existing  as  to  the  motive  power  of  cars 
upon  streets,  and  commits  the  whole  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  cities  themselves  acting  through  their  councils.  This  is 
its  effect,  and  that  is  the  test  of  its  constitutionality.  That 
incidentally  it  has  affected  and  enlarged  the  charters  of  certain 
railway  corporations  does  not  vitiate  it  as  an  exercise  of  un- 
questionable police  powers  over  subjects  within  their  proper 
province.  The  second  clause  of  the  Act  expressly  repealing 
the  charter  restrictions  to  horse  power  as  a motor,  is  not  an 
essential  part  of  its  substance,  and  might  have  been  omitted 
without  impairing  its  general  scope  and  effect.  It  was  mani- 
festly added  to  prevent  any  question  of  the  application  of  the 
Act  to  companies  already  chartered. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


185 


“The  learned  court  below  thought  itself  bound  by  the  decis- 
ion in  Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St. 
192,  but  there  is  a distinction  between  the  cases  that  is  capable 
of  a sharp  definition.  The  statute  involved  in  that  case  was 
one  relating  to  the  formation  of  corporations.  In  the  lan- 
guage of  the  opinion  ‘the  subject  of  this  statute  is  street  rail- 
way companies,  which  is  a subject  for  general  legislation, 
while  the  statute  professes  to  deal  only  with  a limited  number 
of  these  railways,  and  these  are  selected  by  reference  to  their 
location  in  certain  cities.  Under  the  guise  of  a general  law 
we  have  here  one  which  is  special,  because  it  relates  to  a few 
members  of  the  general  class  of  corporations  known  as  street 
railway  companies,  and  local  because  its  operations  are  con- 
fined to  particular  localities/  The  essence  of  that  decision 
is  that  the  formation  of  corporations,  their  corporate  powers, 
capital  stock,  dividends,  etc.,  have  no  relation  to  the  classi- 
fication of  cities,  and  cannot  be  made  in  any  way  to  depend 
thereon.  The  Act  of  1876  on  the  contrary,  as  we  have  seen, 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  formation,  stock,  or  dividends  of 
passenger  railway  companies,  but  refers  solely  to  the  manage- 
ment of  their  cars  on  the  public  streets,  a subject  having  close 
relation  to  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  municipal  authorities 
to  which  the  Act  commits  its  control.” 

Sections  11  and  12  of  the  Act  of  March  22d,  1877,  P.  L.  16, 
declaring  the  claims  for  taxes  for  city,  school,  or  poor  pur- 
poses, and  overdue  water  rents,  in  cities  of  the  second  class, 
filed  in  court,  shall  be  liens  on  the  real  estate  described  therein, 
without  regard  to  whether  the  owner  is  named  therein  or  not, 
and  that  a judicial  sale  of  such  real  estate  shall  vest  a good 
title  in  the  purchaser,  are  invalid,  for  the  reason  that  they  of- 
fend against  the  constitutional  provisions  that  the  General 
Assembly  shall  pass  no  local  or  special  law  authorizing  the 
creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of  liens,  or  prescribing  the 
effect  of  judicial  sales  of  real  estate.9  The  question  arose  upon 
specifications  of  error  to  the  rejection  of  the  record  of  a tax 
lien,  judgment  thereon,  execution,  and  sheriff’s  deed,  under 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 86 

which  the  defendant  who  offered  the  evidence,  claimed.  A 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff  was  directed  and  judgment  thereon 
was  affirmed.  The  taxes  in  question  were  not  assessed  against 
the  registered  owner,  nor  against  any  one  apparently  con- 
nected with  the  title.  The  Act  cited  was  again  before 
the  court  in  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,10  wherein  it 
was  said:  “It  is  also  contended  that  an  Act  relating  to  the 

collection  of  taxes  in  a given  class  of  cities  is  local,  and  vio- 
lates Article  IX,  Section  i,  of  the  Constitution,  which  de- 
clares that  all  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under  gen- 
eral laws,  and  we  are  asked  to  reverse  the  court  below  for  this 
reason.  We  regard  this  question  as  already  settled  against 
the  appellant.  We  have  repeatedly  held  that  the  power  to 
classify  being  conceded,  the  conclusion  that  an  Act  passed  for 
a class  was  not  a local  law  within  the  prohibition  of  the  Con- 
stitution was  irresistible.  It  may  not  be  a general  law  in  the 
same  sense  that  one  applicable  to  the  Commonwealth  at 
large  is  general,  but  it  is  general  in  another  and  strictly  legal 
sense,  since  it  embraces  all  the  members  of  a class  which  the 
Legislature  has  created,  without  any  violation  of  the  funda- 
mental law,  and  which  is,  therefore,  a proper  subject  for  leg- 
islation. Whether  all  the  provisions  of  the  Acts  of  1874  and 
1877  are  constitutional  is  not  our  question.  If  any  one  of 
them  is  open  to  objection  because  of  its  attempt  to  change 
the  law  of  liens,  the  rules  of  evidence,  or  the  effect  of  a sher- 
iff’s sale,  it  will  be  quite  time  to  consider  such  a question 
when  we  have  before  us  a case  that  fairly  raises  it.” 

In  McAskie’s  Appeal,11  the  court  declined  to  consider 
whether  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L. 
277,  providing  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities 
of  the  third  class,  was  valid  in  respect  to  Article  III,  page  280, 
relating  to  annexation  of  territory,  because  the  proceedings 
involved  in  that  case  were  not  authorized  by  the  provisions 
in  question.  The  same  provisions  were  in  question  in  Har- 
ris’s Appeal 12  and  were  sustained. 

The  Act  of  June  2d,  1881,  P.  L.  41,  entitled  “An  Act  to 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


187 


make  taxes  assessed  upon  real  estate  a first  lien,  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  collection  of  such  taxes,  and  a remedy  for  false  re- 
turn,” which  excepts  from  its  provisions  cities  of  the  first, 
second,  and  fourth  classes,  and  relates  to  taxes  whether 
county,  township,  poor,  school,  or  municipal,  is  invalid  be- 
cause it  violates  the  constitutional  provisions  providing  that 
no  local  or  special  law  shall  be  passed  “authorizing  the  crea- 
tion, extension,  or  impairing  of  liens,”  “creating  offices,  pre- 
scribing the  powers  and  duties  of  officers  in  counties,  cities, 
boroughs,  townships,  election,  or  school  districts.”  In  this 
case,13  Mr.  Justice  Williams,  after  referring  to  the  consti- 
tutional provisions  quoted,  said:  “Under  the  provisions  of 

the  Act  of  1881  unpaid  county,  school,  township,  and  poor 
taxes  are  collected  in  one  way  in  the  county  of  Philadelphia, 
and  in  a very  different  way  in  the  other  counties  of  the  State. 
In  the  county  of  Allegheny  the  collection  of  unpaid  county 
taxes  falls  under  the  Act  of  1881  so  far  as  the  townships,  bor- 
oughs, and  cities  of  the  third  class  are  concerned.  In  the 
cities  of  Pittsburg  and  Allegheny  they  do  not.  Thus  two  dif- 
ferent methods  are  in  force  within  the  limits  of  the  same 
county  for  dealing  with  county,  school,  poor,  and  municipal 
taxes. 

“This  is  so  clearly  in  the  face  of  the  constitutional  provis- 
ions referred  to,  and  so  destructive  to  that  uniformity  of  pro- 
cedure upon  subjects  of  general  interest,  which  it  is  the  object 
of  the  Constitution  to  bring  about  and  to  preserve,  that  a sin- 
gle statement  of  the  necessary  consequences  of  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Act  of  1881  renders  an  argument  upon  the  con- 
stitutional question  unnecessary.” 

Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291;  16 
W.  N.  C.  331;  42  L.  I.  287. 

2Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St.  192. 

3In  re  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257;  24  W.  N.  C.  460;  25 
W.  N.  C.  460. 

4Wyoming  Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494;  s.  c.,  27  W.  N.  C.  136. 

An  Act  authorizing  and  directing  councils  of  cities  of  the 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 88 

second  class  to  provide  for  the  improvement  of  streets,  lanes, 
alleys,  and  public  highways,  sewers,  and  sidewalks,  requiring 
plans  of  streets,  providing  for  the  appointment  of  a board  of 
viewers  of  street  improvements,  prescribing  their  duties, 
granting  appeals  to  councils  and  court,  providing  for  the  as- 
sessment and  collection  of  damages  and  benefits,  authorizing 
the  use  of  private  property,  and  providing  for  filing  liens  and 
regulating  proceedings  thereon,  and  prohibiting  the  use  of 
public  streets  without  authority  of  councils. 

5Straub  v.  Pittsburg,  138  Pa.  St.  356;  38  P.  L.  J.  89. 

6Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401. 

7Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

8Reeves  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Company,  152  Pa.  St. 
153;  and  see  Watkins  v.  West  Philadelphia  Passenger  Rail- 
way Company,  11  C.  C.  R.  648;  s.  c.,  1 P.  D.  R.  463. 

9Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St.  231. 
The  same  Act  was  before  the  court  in  McKay  v.  Trainor,  152 
Pa.  St.  242,  wherein  the  ruling  in  the  foregoing  case  was  ap- 
plied; and  see  Bruce  v.  Pittsburg,  166  Pa.  St.  152. 

10Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244. 

11McAskie’s  Appeal,  154  Pa.  St.  24. 

^Harris’s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494. 

13Van  Loon  v.  Engle,  171  Pa.  St.  157. 


In  re  Ruan  Street,  24  W.  N.  C.  460,  was  first  decided  Octo- 
ber 2 1st,  1889,  in  an  opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell  hold- 
ing that  the  Act  of  May  6th,  1887,  P.  L.  87,  was  valid  in  so  far 
as  it  related  to  the  opening  of  streets,  which  was  held  to  be  a 
municipal  function,  and  further  holding  the  Act  was  not  in 
violation  of  Article  V,  Section  26.  The  case  was  reargued 
January  6th,  1890,  and  the  opinions  on  reargument  are  re- 
ported 132  Pa.  St.  257,  and  25  W.  N.  C.  349. 

The  final  hearing  was  by  a full  bench.  Mr.  Justice  Clark 
and  Mr.  Justice  McCollum  concurred  in  the  judgment,  but 
dissented  from  so  much  of  the  opinion  as  sustained  the  validity 
of  Sections  1 and  2 of  the  Act.  Chief  Justice  Pax- 
son  filed  a dissenting  opinion,  with  which  Mr.  Justice 
Mitchell  concurred,  and  in  which,  among  other  things,  it 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


189 


was  said:  “If,  then,  legislation  for  classified  cities  is  neither 

local  nor  special,  it  does  not  come  within  the  prohibition  of 
Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution.  It  follows,  logi- 
cally, from  this,  as  I view  it,  that  it  is  for  the  Legislature  to 
say  what  legislation  is  needed  for  a classified  city,  and  that 
it  is  not  a judicial  question  at  all.  This  is  a plain  rule,  easily 
understood,  which  leaves  the  Legislature  free  to  enact  such 
laws  as  the  wants  of  classified  cities  require.  Concede  that 
it  must  be  limited  to  matters  affecting  their  government  what 
can  be  more  vital  to  the  good  government  and  welfare  of  a 
city,  and  to  the  material  interests  of  its  inhabitants,  than  the 
control  of  its  streets?  Why  may  not  a classified  city  have  the 
power  to  direct  the  opening  of  streets,  and  the  assessment  of 
the  damages  therefor?  Must  the  damages  for  widening  of 
Chestnut  Street,  which  may  amount  to  millions  of  dollars,  be 
assessed  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  for  the  opening  of  a 
road  in  the  hemlock  forests  of  the  Pocono  Mountain?  Why 
should  we  have  an  iron-clad,  inflexible  rule,  which  cannot 
be  enforced  without  injury  to  the  one  section  or  the  other, 
when  neither  section  demands  it,  or  would  be  benefited  by  it? 
In  my  opinion  all  that  relates  to  the  local  affairs  of  the  mu- 
nicipality, the  control  of  its  streets,  its  gas  and  water  supply, 
its  markets,  and  many  other  matters  which  might  be  men- 
tioned, are  proper  subjects  of  municipal  control,  and  may  be 
safely  left  to  such  municipalities.  As  to  all  such  matters, 
those  communities  can  best  govern  themselves,  and  I do  not 
think  the  Constitution  prohibits,  or  was  intended  to  prohibit, 
legislation  conferring  upon  them  such  powers.  If  one  class 
of  cities  desires  certain  regulations  regarding  its  streets,  or 
any  other  matter  affecting  the  welfare  of  its  inhabitants,  why 
should  it  not  have  them,  when  no  other  community  is  ob- 
jecting, or  is  injured  thereby?  And  why  should  such  regu- 
lations, if  conferred  upon  one  class  of  cities  which  desires 
them,  be  forced  upon  another  class,  or  upon  rural  districts, 
which  do  not  desire  them,  and  to  whose  wants  they  are  utterly 
unsuited?  The  answer,  and  the  only  answer  to  this  is,  we 
must  have  ‘uniformity.’  This  is  all  very  well,  so  far  as  the 
Constitution  enjoins  uniformity,  but  in  my  opinion  neither 
that  instrument,  nor  the  common  good  and  welfare  of  the 
people  requires  this  principle  to  be  carried  to  the  extent 
claimed  for  it  in  the  affairs  of  municipalities.  It  would  be  as 
reasonable  to  declare  that  all  men  should  wear  coats  of  the 
same  size,  whether  they  fit  them  or  not. 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


190 

“I  am  unable  to  see  that  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the 
court  furnishes  any  fixed  rule  by  which  such  legislation  can 
be  measured  in  the  future.  This  particular  case  is  decided, 
but  if  it  furnishes  a rule  by  which  a lawyer  can  safely  advise 
his  clients  in  reference  to  future  legislation,  unless  upon  pre- 
cisely similar  facts,  I fail  to  see  it.  If  the  legislation  in  regard 
to  streets  in  the  cities  must  be  uniform  with  the  rule  in  all 
other  parts  of  the  State,  upon  what  subjects,  and  to  what  ex- 
tent, may  legislation  be  applied  to  classified  cities?  Until 
this  question  is  answered  specificially,  I contend  we  have  no 
rule  at  all.  We  have  nothing  but  theories,  and  the  most  as- 
tute lawyer  cannot  safely  pronounce  an  Act  relating  to  classi- 
fied cities  constitutional,  until  after  such  Act  has  been  passed 
upon  by  this  court.  In  other  words,  the  General  Assembly 
may  legislate  for  classified  cities  subject  to  the  veto  of  this 
court.  In  my  opinion  it  would  be  better  to  leave  this  whole 
subject  to  the  wisdom  of  the  Legislature,  where,  under  the 
constitutional  division  of  the  powers  of  the  government,  it 
properly  belongs.” 

In  Shaaber  v.  Reading,  133  Pa.  St.  653,  the  decision  in 
Ruan  Street  {supra),  was  explained  as  follows: 

“There  is  no  constitutional  question  in  this  case,  nor  is 
there  the  slightest  resemblance  between  it  and  the  recent  case 
of  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257.  In  this  case  no  question  was 
raised  over  the  exercise  of  any  municipal  power.  The  right 
of  the  cities  of  either  class  to  discharge  the  functions  of  mu- 
nicipal government  was  freely  conceded.  Among  these  is 
the  laying  out  of  streets;  the  decision  of  the  question  when, 
for  municipal  purposes,  their  opening  should  take  place;  how 
they  shall  be  paved,  curbed,  sewered,  lighted.  What  was  de- 
nied was  the  right  of  the  Legislature  to  make  the  classifica- 
tion of  cities  the  basis  of  legislation  for  them  on  subjects  not 
relating  to  the  organization  or  administration  of  their  mu- 
nicipal governments,  but  to  questions  of  public  concern,  such 
as  the  forms  of  procedure  in  the  courts  of  the  State;  the  rate 
of  interest;  exemption  of  property  from  levy  and  sale  on  legal 
process;  the  mode  of  proceeding  to  secure  a citizen  compen- 
sation for  an  entry  on  his  property  for  public  use  by  virtue  of 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  and  the  like.  In  other  words, 
we  held  that  while  the  classification  of  cities  authorizes  all 
necessary  legislation  for  them  as  cities,  in  the  management 
of  their  municipal  affairs,  it  does  not  make  three  separate 
States  within  the  territorial  limits  of  Pennsylvania,  for  each 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  191 

of  which  there  may  be  different  laws,  on  subjects  of  a gen- 
eral character,  from  those  in  force  in  the  rest  of  the  Com- 
monwealth. On  the  other  hand,  while  cities  may  have  the 
legislation  needful  to  the  proper  regulation  and  discharge  of 
all  municipal  powers,  they  are,  under  the  Constitution,  and 
they  must  remain,  a part  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,  for  all 
purposes  not  municipal,  and  subject  to  the  laws  of  the  State 
upon  all  subjects  not  of  municipal  concern.  It  is  plain  that 
no  such  question  is  involved  in  this  case.  Here  the  city  of 
Reading  seized  and  appropriated  private  property  to  public 
use.  It  went  into  the  court  of  common  pleas  to  give  security 
and  obtain  an  assessment  of  damages.  This  was  exactly  in 
accordance  with  the  Act  of  1874,  and  with  the  decision  of  this 
court  in  Spring  Street  (. supra ).” 

The  Act  of  May  6th,  1887,  P.  L.  87,  in  question  in  Ruan 
Street  (supra),  was  entitled  an  Act  relating  to  the  opening 
and  widening  and  assessments  and  payment  of  damages  and 
benefits  for  the  opening,  widening,  and  changing  of  grade  of 
streets  in  cities  of  the  first  class,  and  regulating  the  proceed- 
ings therein.  The  first  and  second  sections  of  this  Act  were 
held  to  be  valid  as  above  stated.  The  first  section  made  it  the 
duty  of  viewers  and  reviewers  appointed  by  the  courts  of 
quarter  sessions  of  the  Commonwealth  in  cities  of  the  first 
class,  to  endeavor  to  procure  release  of  damages  in  cases 
where  they  decided  in  favor  of  opening  and  widening  of 
streets,  and  to  assess  the  damages  and  benefits  “where  now 
authorized  by  law”  and  make  report  thereof  to  the  court  of 
quarter  sessions  “subject  to  appeal,  review,  or  modification, 
as  may  be  provided  by  existing  laws.”  The  second  section 
provided  that  the  courts  of  quarter  sessions  of  the  several 
counties  of  the  Commonwealth  should  not  have  jurisdiction 
to  order  the  opening  or  widening  of  any  plotted  street  in  any 
city  of  the  first  class,  except  upon  the  report  of  a jury  of  view, 
having  performed  all  the  duties  prescribed  by  the  first  section 
of  the  Act,  any  local  or  special  law  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. The  third  and  subsequent  sections  provided  that 
whenever  the  courts  of  quarter  sessions,  having  jurisdiction  in 
cities  of  the  first  class,  should  appoint  viewers,  they  should 
also  appoint  a reputable  person,  learned  in  the  law  and  enti- 
tled to  practice  at  the  bar  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  this  Com- 
monwealth, who  should  preside  at  all  meetings  of  the  view- 
ers, be  known  as  a master,  and  have  power  to  determine  the 
admissibility  of  evidence,  to  issue  writs  of  subpoena  to  com- 


192 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


pel  the  attendance  of  witnesses,  and  the  production  of  papers, 
and  instruct  the  viewers  upon  matters  of  law,  to  which  actions 
of  said  master  exception  might  be  taken  for  purposes  of  re- 
view by  the  court  of  quarter  sessions  and  the  Supreme  Court. 
The  master  had  no  vote  upon  any  question  of  fact  or  value. 
His  compensation  was  to  be  fixed  by  the  court  and  paid  by 
the  county.  He  was  required  to  take  an  oath  and  to  draft 
the  report  of  the  viewers,  giving  a statement  of  all  facts  in 
evidence,  and  all  exceptions  to  the  rulings  or  instructions. 
The  appointment  of  a stenographer  to  make  a record  of  and 
report  the  proceedings  before  the  viewers  was  provided  for. 
The  court  of  quarter  sessions  having  jurisdiction  was  empow- 
ered to  regulate  the  details  of  procedure  by  general  rules  or 
special  order.  Property-owners  injured  were  given  the  right 
to  petition  for  the  appointment  of  viewers,  subject  to  appeal 
from  their  award  and  trial  by  jury.  Registered  owners  and 
tenants  were  required  to  be  notified  of  the  appointment  of 
viewers  and  time  and  place  of  meeting,  and  the  failure  of  such 
to  present  claim  for  damages  was  to  be  a waiver  of  right 
thereto,  proof  of  service  having  been  made.  Damages  were 
to  be  assessed  upon  property  benefited  with  right  of  appeal. 
The  court  was  authorized  to  order  streets  to  be  opened  not- 
withstanding the  pendency  of  an  appeal.  A limitation  of  six 
years  was  fixed  for  the  presentation  of  claims  for  damages. 
The -last  two  sections  of  the  Act  were  in  the  nature  of  saving 
clauses  and  clauses  of  repeal. 

In  the  opinion  below  in  Pittsburg’s  Petition  {supra),  his 
Honor,  Judge  Slagle,  said:  “It  cannot  be  contended  that 

each  clause  of  Section  7,  Article  III,  of  the  Constitution,  cre- 
ates a class  as  to  which  legislation  must  apply  to  all,  and  no 
legislation  as  to  particular  subjects  will  be  allowable.  For 
instance,  the  clause  relating  to  ferries  and  bridges  does  not 
require  that  all  legislation  as  to  one  must  include  the  other. 
They  are  entirely  different,  and  laws  relating  to  one  would 
be  inappropriate  to  the  other.  So  the  clause  relating  to  the 
practice  and  jurisdiction  of  courts  does  not  require  that  the 
practice  and  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  record,  aldermen,  and 
justices  of  the  peace  shall  be  identical.  They  must  be  uni- 
form in  each  class.  It  is  equally  clear  that  the  clause  relating 
to  the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships,  wards,  boroughs, 
and  school  districts,  recognizes  them  as  distinct  classes.  Laws 
applicable  to  one  would  be  absurdly  inappropriate  to  another. 
All  that  is  required  is  that  laws  shall  apply  to  all  of  such  class 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


193 


and  relate  to  affairs  of  that  class,  so  that  we  may  have  one 
set  of  laws  relating  to  counties,  another  to  cities,  etc.  The 
same  rule  would  therefore  apply  to  the  creation  of  offices  in 
these  several  classes  of  municipal  organizations  and  prescrib- 
ing their  duties. 

“The  same  principle  would  lead  to  a proper  construction  of 
the  provisions  as  to  laying  out,  opening,  altering,  or  main- 
taining roads,  highways,  streets,  or  alleys,  and  vacating  roads, 
town  plots,  streets,  or  alleys.  The  words  roads,  highways, 
streets,  and  alleys  do  not  refer  to  the  same  subject-matter, 
and  these  clauses  do  not  require  that  the  same  law  shall  be 
applicable  to  all.  It  is  true  that  these  terms  are  sometimes 
used  indiscriminately  one  for  the  other,  but  in  common  ac- 
ceptance they  have  clearly  defined  distinctions.  A road  is 
defined  to  be  ground  appropriated  for  traveling,  forming  a 
communication  between  one  city,  town,  or  place  and  another; 
a street,  a paved  way  or  road,  but  in  usage  any  way  or  road  in 
a city;  an  alley,  a narrow  passage  or  way  in  a city  as  distinct 
from  a public  street;  a highway  a public  road.  These  are  the 
definitions  given  in  Webster,  and  they  are  substantially  the 
same  as  given  by  other  authors.  A highway,  however,  has  a 
broader  signification,  including  all  public  ways  by  land  or  by 
water,  by  foot,  teams,  or  machinery.  Railroads,  canals,  rivers, 
and  bridges  are  highways  as  well  as  ordinary  roads.  In  speak- 
ing of  roads  one  might  be  understood  as  including  streets 
(Sharett’s  Road,  8 Pa.  St.  92);  but,  in  using  the  word  street 
or  alley,  it  would  not  ordinarily  be  understood  as  referring 
to  roads. 

“Roads  as  thus  understood  are  so  essentially  different  from 
streets  that  they  clearly  require  different  proceedings  in  open- 
ing and  maintaining  them.  The  proceedings  for  opening 
public  roads’  through  country  districts  by  petition  setting 
forth  the  termini  only,  and  leaving  to  viewers  the  determina- 
tion of  the  route  between  these  points,  and  the  fixing  the 
width  by  the  court,  would  be  clearly  insufficient  for  the  loca- 
tion and  width  of  public  streets  and  alleys.  And  the  provis- 
ions for  maintaining  country  roads  by  supervisors  who  should 
call  upon  the  citizens  to  work  out  their  road  taxes  would  be 
an  inadequate  means  of  maintaining  streets  in  a populous 
city.  Tire  Constitution  should  be  construed  in  recognition 
of  these  distinctions,  and  therefore  it  must  be  held  to  author- 
ize legislation  as  to  the  different  classes  of  municipal  bodies, 
and  to  authorize  legislation  as  to  roads  and  streets,  both  as 
13 


194 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


to  their  opening  and  maintenance.  It  will  be  found  that  the 
Supreme  Court  has  not  restricted  but  has  enlarged  this  view, 
by  recognizing  the  right  to  classify  cities  and  counties  for 
some  of  these  purposes.” 

After  reviewing  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338;  Kil- 
gore v.  Magee,  85  Pa.  St.  401;  Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St. 
266;  Reading  City  v.  Savage,  120  Pa.  St.  198;  s.  c.,  124  Pa.  St. 
328;  Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291; 
Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257;  Shaaber  v.  Reading  City,  133 
Pa.  St.  643,  and  Spring  Street,  112  Pa.  St.  258,  the  court 
continued: 

“From  these  cases  it  appears  that  the  power  to  lay  out  and 
open  streets  is  a municipal  function,  but  the  assessment  of 
damages  for  property  taken  must  be  by  general  law,  because, 
as  said  in  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257,  'The  compensation 
due  the  property  holder  for  an  invasion  of  his  close,  under 
the  right  of  eminent  domain,  is  a subject  as  exclusively  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  these  courts  as  an  indictment  for  a crime 
or  an  action  trespass  quare  clansam  fregit.  The  only  connec- 
tion the  city  has  or  can  have  with  such  a proceeding  is  as  a 
party  to  the  litigation  because  liable  to  pay  the  damages  as- 
sessed.’ ” 

After  stating  the  ruling  in  Wyoming  Street  (supra),  he  fur- 
ther said: 

“Of  course,  this  decision  having  been  made  in  reference  to 
the  board  of  viewers,  who  made  the  assessment  in  the  cases 
now  in  controversy,  must  be  accepted  as  conclusive,  and  the 
assessment  so  made  or  threatened,  and  the  filing  of  liens  upon 
such  assessment  must  be  restrained,  unless  some  other  mode 
of  assessment  is  authorized  by  law.  But  we  are  asked  to  go 
further,  to  declare  void  the  Acts  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L.  395, 
and  May  16th,  1889,  P.  L.  228,  and  restrain  further  prosecu- 
tion of  the  improvements.  It  will,  therefore,  be  necessary  to 
further  consider  the  effect  of  this  decision. 

“It  was  clearly  not  intended  to  question  or  modify  the  rul- 
ings previously  given  by  th,e  court  in  the  opinion  delivered 
by  the  same  justice  in  Ruan  Street,  and  Shaaber  v.  Reading 
City.  In  them  we  find,  as  one  of  the  recognized  municipal 
functions  and  a proper  subject  of  classified  legislation,  the 
paving  and  grading  of  public  streets;  and  sewers  would  cer- 
tainly come  within  the  same  ruling:  Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2 
Gr.  291.  This  being  the  case,  it  would  follow  that  the  cost 
and  expense  of  such  improvements  could  properly  be  pro- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


195 


vided  for  by  the  same  means.  They  have  always  been  treated 
as  proper  municipal  charges  and  the  proper  subject  for  local 
assessment  upon  properties  benefited,  either  by  foot-front  or 
actual  benefit,  and  this  both  before  and  since  the  new  Con- 
stitution. It  was  provided  for  boroughs  in  the  general  bor- 
ough Act  of  1851,  and  for  cities  of  the  third  class  by  the  Act 
of  1874;  and  such  assessments  have  been  sustained  in  numer- 
ous decisions  as  late  as  Harrisburg  v.  McCormick,  129  Pa.  St. 
213.  It  would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  the  proper  subject  for 
classified  legislation  as  an  incident  to  the  improvement  of 
municipal  streets.  These  assessments  have  usually  been  made 
by  corporate  officers,  as  in  case  of  street  grading  in  boroughs, 
or  by  viewers  appointed  by  councils,  as  in  the  case  of  cities 
of  the  third  class,  and  many  cities  acting  under  special  charters 
before  the  adoption  of  the  new  Constitution.  We  know  of  no 
case  in  which  it  has  been  held  that  such  assessments  must  be 
made  by  viewers  appointed  by  the  court.  Such  assessments 
differ  essentially  from  those  for  damages  by  taking  or  injuring 
of  property.  The  last  depend  upon  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, while  the  others  depend  upon  the  taxing  power:  Wolf 
v.  Philadelphia,  105  Pa.  St.  25;  Michener  v.  Philadelphia,  118 
Pa.  St.  535. 

“It  is,  therefore,  not  probable  that  it  was  intended  to  hold 
that  municipal  corporations  are  required  to  resort  to  “ the 
courts  for  assessment  of  benefits  to  pay  the  cost  of  municipal 
improvements.  It  is  not  so  expressed.  We  therefore  con- 
clude that  the  clause  of  Article  III,  to  which  Justice  Wil- 
liams refers,  is  that  relating  to  judicial  proceedings,  and  the 
clause  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  which  he  regards  as  violated,  Sec- 
tion 11,  which  provides  that  ‘All  courts  shall  be  open,  and 
every  man  for  an  injury  done  him  in  lands,  goods,  person,  or 
reputation  shall  have  remedy  by  due  course  of  law.’  The  first 
is  violated  by  the  special  proceedings  as  to  the  collection  of 
liens,  and  the  last  by  the  fact  that  appeals  are  restricted  to  one 
court,  and  the  other  provisions  which  are  regarded  as  unusual 
and  despotic. 

“Some  of  the  objectionable  features  of  the  Act  of  1887  have 
been  eliminated  by  the  Act  of  1889,  but  the  same  general  sys- 
tem is  retained  and  the  same  board  of  viewers  authorized  to 
make  assessments,  so  that  if  one  falls  the  other  will  fall  with 
it.  Without  making  any  special  reference  to  the  various  pro- 
visions of  the  Act,  an  examination  will  show  that  each  and 
every  power  is  so  dependent  upon  that  for  the  assessment  of 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


196 

benefits  that  no  consistent  result  can  be  worked  out  without 
it.  We  must,  therefore,  hold  that  the  entire  Acts  of  1887 
and  1889  are  unconstitutional  and  void.” 

This  subject  may  be  further  illustrated  by  an  extract  from 
an  opinion  of  his  Honor,  Judge  Archbald,  in  passing  upon  a 
claim  for  city  taxes  of  the  city  of  Scranton  to  a fund  for  distri- 
bution in  the  case  of  Smith  v.  Meadow  Brook  Brewing  Com- 
pany, 3 Lack.  Jur.  154,  where  he  said:  “The  final  question 

relates  to  the  city  taxes  proper,  and  we  turn  for  its  solution 
to  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  277,  entitled  ‘An  Act  pro- 
viding for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities  of  the 
third  class.’  Section  11,  of  Article  XV,  of  said  Act — already 
quoted — declares  that  ‘all  taxes  assessed  upon  real  estate 
shall  be  and  continue  to  be  liens  thereon  from  the  date  of  the 
levy  thereof  until  paid.’  The  prior  part  of  the  section  which  di- 
rects that  unpaid  city  taxes,  returned  to  the  treasurer,  shall  be 
certified  to  the  city  solicitor,  and  by  him  be  registered  in  the 
prothonotary’s  office,  does  not  affect  the  absolute  lien  which 
is  thus  given,  nor  make  it  dependent  upon  registry.  In  this 
respect  there  is  a marked  difference  from  the  provisions  with 
regard  to  school  taxes  in  the  Act  of  1874,  which  we  have  just 
been  considering.  The  twelfth  section  of  the  same  article 
goes  on  to  declare  that  ‘the  lien  of  said  taxes  shall  have  pri- 
ority to  and  shall  be  fully  paid  and  satisfied  before  any  recog- 
nizance, mortgage,  judgment,  or  obligation,  lien  or  respon- 
sibility, which  the  said  real  estate  may  become  charged  with 
or  liable  to,  and  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  judicial  sale,  ex- 
cept for  so  much  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  as  shall  be  act- 
ually applied  thereto.’  These  enactments  create  in  cities  of 
the  third  class  a lien  for  taxes  which  is  indefinite  in  extent,  of 
absolute  priority,  and  indivestible  until  actually  paid.  The 
question  naturally  arises  whether  this  or  any  part  of  it  is  legit- 
imate with  regard  to  cities  of  the  third  class,  to  which  the 
Act  wherein  it  is  found  is  confined.  It  is  said  by  Mr.  Justice 
Mitchell  in  Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30,  with  re- 
gard to  a similar  provision  in  the  Act  of  April  16th,  1879, 
Section  5,  P.  L.  26,  relating  to  the  lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the 
first  class:  ‘The  Act  of  1879  1S  extremely  harsh.  It  not  only 
gives  an  indefinite  lien  which  is  contrary  to  the  whole  spirit 
of  our  lien  laws,  but  if  its  terms  be  taken  literally  it  makes  the 
whole  discharge  depend  upon  the  fact  of  distribution  of  a 
fund,  for  the  ascertainment  of  which  there  is  no  adequate  pro- 
vision, and  which  after  a few  years  and  the  change  of  sheriffs 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


197 


and  tax  receivers  becomes  of  great  practical  difficulty.  There 
is  another  feature  of  it  still  more  serious  in  the  doubt  how  far 
a perpetual  lien  for  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class  might  be 
consistent  with  the  provisions  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the 
Constitution,  prohibiting  local  or  special  laws  authorizing  the 
creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of  liens.’  The  doubt  which 
is  thus  expressed  does  not,  however,  amount  to  a real  decis- 
ion, so  as  to  materially  aid  us  in  deciding  the  question  pro- 
pounded. In  Safe  Deposit  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St, 
231,  we  have  something  which  comes  much  closer  to  doing 
so.  The  point  there  under  consideration  was  presented  by 
the  Act  of  March  226.,  1877,  P.  L.  16,  relating  to  the  collec- 
tion of  taxes  and  water  rents  in  cities  of  the  second  class.  The 
eleventh  and  twelfth  sections  of  this  Act  are  as  follows:  ‘Sec- 
tion 11.  All  taxes  and  water  rents  levied  for  any  purpose  in 
cities  of  the  class  aforesaid  shall  remain  liens  until  fully 
paid  and  satisfied,  and  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  judicial 
sale  except  to  the  extent  to  which  distribution  shall  be  made 
out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale.  Section  12.  All  taxes  and 
waper  rents  filed  as  liens  in  default  of  payment  shall  be  liens 
on  the  real  estate  whether  the  real  owner  is  named  or  not,  and 
a sale  upon  the  same  as  against  the  party  assessed  shall  vest  a 
good  title  in  the  purchaser  thereof.’  With  regard  to  the  last 
of  these  two  sections,  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett,  in  the  decision 
quoted,  says:  ‘In  view  of  the  foregoing  authorities  and  the 

principles  clearly  established  by  them,  how  can  it  be  success- 
fully claimed  that  Section  12  of  the  Act  of  1877  is  within  the 
recognized  scope  of  valid  legislation  for  cities  of  the  second 
class?  It  certainly  does  not  relate  to  the  exercise  of  any  cor- 
porate power  of  such  cities  nor  to  the  number,  character, 
powers,  and  duties  of  any  municipal  officer  thereof,  nor  to 
any  subject  under  the  control  of  city  government.  On  the 
contrary,  it  relates  to  claims  for  overdue  taxes  and  water  rents 
filed  in  the  courts  of  Allegheny  County,  and  under  the  guise 
of  legislating  for  cities  of  the  second  class,  it  undertakes  to 
declare  that  such  claims  shall  be  liens  on  the  real  estate  de- 
scribed therein  without  regard  to  whether  the  owner  is  named 
therein  or  not;  and  further,  that  a judicial  sale  of  said  real 
estate  on  such  lien  shall  have  the  effect  of  vesting  a good  title 
thereto  in  the  purchaser.  It  thus  undertakes  to  prescribe  a 
rule  of  law  for  the  guidance  of  the  judges  of  said  courts.  If 
the  section  is  constitutional,  they  are  bound  to  declare  as  mat- 
ter of  law  that  such  claims  are  liens,  and  that  a sale  by  virtue 


198 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


of  their  process  thereon,  invests  the  purchaser  with  the  title 
of  the  real  owner  of  the  land  notwithstanding  he  may  have 
fully  complied  with  the  law  of  said  city,  requiring  registra- 
tion of  his  property.  . . . On  principle,  therefore,  as  well 
as  authority,  we  think  the  section  referred  to  is  uncon- 
stitutional and  void,  for  the  reason  that  it  offends  against 
those  clauses  in  Section  7,  of  Article  III  {supra),  which 
declare  the  General  Assembly  shall  pass  no  local  or  spe- 
cial law  “authorizing  the  creation,  extension,  or  impair- 
ing of  liens”  ...  or  “prescribing  the  effect  of  judicial  sales 
of  real  estate.”  ’ This  is  a clear  and  conclusive  opinion,  and  I 
have  quoted  from  it  at  length,  in  order  to  show  the  exact 
grounds  upon  which  the  legislation  in  question  was  declared 
unconstitutional.  It  may  be  claimed  that  it  is  not  wholly  in 
point  with  the  present  case  because  we  have  no  exactly  sim- 
ilar provisions  in  the  statute  before  us,  but  on  principle  it  is 
difficult  to  see  why  it  does  not  equally  condemn  not  only  the 
eleventh  section  of  the  same  Act,  and  the  fifth  section  of  the 
Act  of  1879,  upon  which  such  doubt  is  cast  by  Judge 
Mitchell  in  Philadelphia  v.  Kates  {supra),  but  with  them 
also  the  very  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1889,  which  we  have 
here  to  pass  upon.  In  each  of  these  Acts  we  have  special  and 
peculiar  legislation  creating  liens,  and  giving  them  such 
characteristics  in  each  class  of  cities  legislated  for  as  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  has  at  the  time  thought  best.  It  is  true  that 
city  taxes  are  a municipal  subject,  and  so,  as  it  would  seem, 
is  the  collection  and  enforcement  of  them  against  the  prop- 
erty assessed.  Moreover,  the  three  Acts  quoted  have  pro- 
visions sufficiently  similar  to  bring  the  lien  of  taxes  in  the  sev- 
eral classes  of  cities  into  a certain  line  of  uniformity.  Why, 
then,  it  may  be  asked,  can  not  such  legislation  be  sustained? 
The  matter  of  uniformity  would  seem  to  have  little  to  do  with 
the  question.  The  very  purpose  of  class  legislation  is  to  allow 
of  diversity.  It  is  permitted  not  on  the  ground  that  it  produces 
uniformity,  but  where,  in  the  very  face  of  that,  it  does  not. 
The  lien  of  city  taxes  therefore,  if  a legitimate  subject  of  such 
legislation,  may  be  dealt  with  in  one  way  in  cities  of  one  class, 
and  in  a distinct  and  entirely  different  way  in  each  of  the  other 
two  classes.  A uniformity  at  any  time  by  chance  existing 
may  at  any  subsequent  time  be  completely  overturned.  Cities 
of  the  first  class  are  not  to-day  in  line  with  the  others  on  this 
subject,  if,  as  was  held  in  Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St. 
30,  the  Act  of  1879  has  been  supplanted  by  the  later  Act  of 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


199 


April  19th,  1883,  P.  L.  9.  Moreover,  an  Act  which  is  other- 
wise local  and  special  is  not  relieved  from  this  vice  simply  be- 
cause it  happens  to  bring  about  a uniformity  of  the  law.  This 
was  expressly  decided  in  City  of  Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa. 
St.  191.  Apparently,  therefore,  we  are  in  this  dilemma:  if 
such  legislation  is,  permitted  we  may  have  one  character  of 
municipal  lien  created  in  one  class  of  cities,  and  another  in 
another,  and  thus  offend  against  the  Constitution,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  if  it  is  not  permitted,  we  reject  a legitimate  sub- 
ject of  municipal  legislation.  Let  us  see  how  far  a solution 
of  these  difficulties  is  afforded  by  the  case  of  the  City  of  Scran- 
ton v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419,  which  is  almost  as  recent  a 
deliverance  of  the  Supreme  Court  as  Safe  Deposit  Company  v. 
Fricke.  The  question  there  under  consideration  was  the 
constitutionality  of  those  provisions  of  the  Act  of  4889 — now 
under  discussion — which  relate  to  the  lien  and  collection  of 
municipal  assessments  for  paving,  etc.,  in  cities  of  the  third 
class:  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  Article  XV,  Sections  21  to  31, 
inclusive,  P.  L.  323-327.  Upon  this  subject  Mr.  Justice  Wil- 
liams, speaking  for  the  Supreme  Court,  says:  ‘Classifica- 

tion of  cities  for  purposes  of  municipal  government  was  rec- 
ognized as  valid  in  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St.  338. 
Laws  limited  in  their  operation  to  a single  class  of  cities  are 
not  therefore  within  the  Constitutional  prohibition  of  local 
legislation,  if  they  relate  to  matters  that  are  connected  with 
the  organization  or  the  administration  of  the  city  government 
or  the  regulation  of  municipal  affairs.  . . .If  such  laws 
relate  to  other  subjects  not  within  the  purposes  of  clas- 
sification they  fall  within  the  prohibition  and  are  void.  . . . 
This  is,  therefore,  the  test  by  which  to  determine  the  validity 
of  a law  relating  to  a given  class  of  cities.  If  it  relates  to  sub- 
jects of  municipal  concern  only,  it  is  constitutional,  because 
operating  upon  all  the  members  of  the  class  it  is  a general 
law.  . . . Tried  by  this  test  the  Act  of  1889  is  in  its 
character  and  effect  a general  law,  and  must  be  regarded  as 
constitutional,  except  as  to  such  particular  provisions,  if  any 
as  transcend  the  limits  imposed  by  its  title,  or  fail  to  bear  the 
test  to  which  we  have  referred.  The  subject  of  the  grading 
and  the  paving  of  streets  is  clearly  and  exclusively  one  for  mu- 
nicipal control.  The  power  to  collect  the  cost  of  the  work  so 
done  by  any  appropriate  form  of  taxation  is  a municipal 
power.  In  the  case  of  an  original  pavement  the  right  to  as- 
sess the  cost  of  the  work  on  property  along  the  street  paved 


200 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


was  possessed  by  the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth  under  their 
several  charters  before  the  Constitution  of  1873  was  adopted 
or  any  attempt  at  classification,  as  now  understood,  h^d  been 
made.  The  mere  fact  of  classification  did  not  strip  the  clas- 
sified cities  of  their  powers.  . . . The  Act  of  1889  regu- 
lates the  manner  in  which  the  power  to  pave  streets  and  col- 
lect the  cost  thereof,  shall  be  exercised,  and  authorizes  the 
assessment  of  the  cost  upon  property  fronting  on  the  street 
according  to  the  extent  of  the  frontage.  So  far  the  Act  is 
certainly  free  from  objection.  . . . But  some  provision 
must  be  made  for  the  collection  of  the  assessment,  and  the  Act 
authorizes  the  entry  of  a municipal  lien  for  the  amount  if  not 
paid  when  due.  This  is  the  method  provided  for  collecting 
similar  assessments  in  cities  of  the  first  and  of  the  second 
classes.  It  is  not  the  introduction  of  a new,  but  the  adoption 
of  an  old  and  well-understood  mode  of  procedure  to  secure 
the  city  and  give  notice  of  the  incumbrance.  So  much  of  the 
article  as  gives  a lien  for  ten  years  without  a revival  may  be 
open  to  criticism,  but  the  question  is  not  raised  on  this  record. 
For  the  usual  period  fixed  for  the  duration  of  liens  appear- 
ing by  the  records  of  the  courts  this  lien  is  certainly  good,  if 
there  was  authority  to  enter  it  in  the  first  place.’  The  con- 
clusion finally  reached  in  the  case  is  summed  up  (page  428) 
as  follows:  ‘The  Act  of  1889  provides  for  the  ascertainment 
of  damages  and  the  assessment  of  benefits  by  a system  in  har- 
mony with  that  in  cities  of  the  first  and  second  classes.  Its 
provisions  authorizing  the  filing  of  a municipal  lien  for  un- 
paid assessments  and  the  collection  of  the  amount  so  secured 
by  means  of  a personal  action  or  a writ  of  scire  facias  are  not 
diverse  from  those  in  force  in  other  cities  but  in  harmony 
with  them.  They  do  not  change  the  established  modes  of 
procedure  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  the  rules  of  evidence.  They 
create  no  new  style  of  liens,  they  change  no  settled  rule  of 
property.  The  court  below  was,  therefore,  in  error  in  holding* 
the  Act  to  be  unconstitutional.’ 

“I  must  confess  that  I cannot  fully  understand  all  the  posi- 
tions taken  in  this  opinion,  nor  altogether  reconcile  them  with 
one  another.  There  seems  to  be  some  confusion  in  asserting 
that  municipal  assesments  are  the  legitimate  subject  of  class 
legislation,  thus  recognizing  the  right  to  a diversity  therein, 
and  at  the  same  time  apparently  attempting  to  justify  the  leg- 
islation which  we  have  on  the  subject  in  cities  of  one  class 
on  the  ground  of  its  being  in  harmony  with  that  which  exists 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


201 


in  the  other  two.  Nor  is  it  altogether  easy  to  square  this  de- 
cision with  the  ruling  made  in  Safe  Deposit  Company  v. 
Fricke  {supra).  If  we  may  deal  with  the  subject  of  liens  for 
municipal  assessments  or  taxes  by  classification,  why  may  we 
not  deal  with  it  thoroughly  and  specially  for  each  class?  And 
yet  it  is  plainly  decided  in  the  latter  case  that  we  cannot.  But 
without  dwelling  upon  the  possible  conflict  in  these  cases  and 
taking  them  as  they  stand,  let  us  see  to  what  conclusions  they 
bring  us  in  the  case  in  hand.  If  it  is  legitimate,  in  any  Act 
relating  to  cities  of  a specified  class,  to  provide  for  the  en- 
forcement of  paving  assessments  by  making  them  liens  on  the 
properties  affected  thereby,  it  certainly  is  to  provide  for  the 
collection  of  taxes  in  the  same  manner.  The  levying  of  taxes 
for  city  purposes  is  one  of  the  most  essential  of  municipal 
functions,  and  in  dealing  with  the  matter  of  its  exercise  the 
Legislature  cannot  stop  short  of  providing  an  effective  sys- 
tem. If  this  involves  the  making  of  such  taxes  a lien  on  the 
properties  against  which  they  are  respectively  levied,  a pro- 
vision to  that  effect  becomes  an  entirely  proper  and  legiti- 
mate part  of  such  legislation.  So  far,  therefore,  as  the  Act 
of  1889,  relating  to  cities  of  the  third  class,  undertakes  to  de- 
clare that  city  taxes  shall  be  a lien  therein,  it  is  a valid  con- 
stitutional enactment.  But  this  does  not  deal  with  the  whole 
of  our  problem,  we  are  required  to  go  further  and  uphold  the 
priority  of  lien  which  is  given  by  the  statute.  Can  this  also  be 
done?  I do  not  see  why  on  principle  it  may  not.  If  the  Leg- 
islature deem  it  necessary  to  the  effective  collection  of  such 
taxes  to  declare  that  they  shall  be  first  liens  on  the  properties 
affected,  this  is  just  as  legitimate  as  to  say  that  they  shall  be 
liens  at  all.  This  does  not — if  we  may  use  this  double  line 
of  argument — create  any  new  style  of  lien,  but  on  the  con- 
trary it  merely  extends  to  cities  of  this  class,  what  has  long 
been  in  vogue  in  both  the  other  classes.  How  far  we  may 
go  beyond  this  and  sustain  the  perpetuity  of  lien  which  is 
given  by  the  statute  is  another  question.  We  are  warned  by 
what  is  decided  in  Safe  Deposit  Company  v.  Fricke  {supra), 
as  well  as  by  what  is  said  in  the  other  cases  on  this  subject, 
that  here,  perhaps,  we  cross  the  line.  It  may  seem  to  be 
standing  on  narrow  and  arbitrary  grounds  to  hold  that  the 
lien  of  taxes  as  thus  legislated  for  is  good  in  one  direction  and 
not  in  another,  but  this  it  would  hardly  be  useful  to  further 
discuss.  Taking  the  law  as  it  is  laid  down  in  City  of  Scranton 
v.  Whyte,  I cannot  do  otherwise  than  hold  that  the  provis- 


202 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ions  of  the  Act  of  1889  under  consideration  are  valid,  and  the 
taxes  in  question  are  first  liens,  and  must  therefore  be  paid 
with  their  penalties  out  of  the  fund.  The  remaining  excep- 
tions are  overruled  and  the  report  of  the  auditor  confirmed.” 

And  see  Jermyn  v.  Scranton,  3 Lack.  Leg.  News,  112,  and 
infra,  under  title  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

The  case  of  Scranton  v.  Whyte  illustrates  a point  of  diffi- 
culty, the  explanation  of  which  tends  to  show  the  unity  of  the 
subject  of  this  volume,  and  to  suggest  an  application  of  what 
has  been  said  heretofore  upon  the  subject  of  enactment  by 
reference.  The  draftsman  of  the  Act  of  1889,  in  question  in 
that  case,  was  dealing  with  the  subject  of  municipal  liens  for 
assessments  for  benefits  under  the  foot-front  rule;  a kind  of 
lien  distinctively  municipal,  hardly  to  be  conceived  of  as 
legally  capable  of  existing  outside  of  a municipality,  or  in  rela- 
tion to  anything  else  than  an  improved  municipal  highway. 
He  provided  for  the  creation  of  a statutory  lien,  for  there 
was  none  at  common  law.  The  lien  was  also  statutory  as 
distinguished  from  judicial,  if  the  expression  may  be  allowed, 
because  it  derived  its  force  from  the  terms  of  the  statute  and 
not  from  the  effect  of  a judgment.  The  lien  was  possibly  capa- 
ble of  enforcement  without  resort  to  judicial  process,  because 
in  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power  due  process  of  law  may 
be  applied  for  the  collection  of  a tax  independently  of  strictly 
judicial  procedure.  But  such  proceedings  are  not  favored 
in  law,  their  application  is  usually  inconvenient,  and  their 
regulation,  in  such  manner  as  to  be  free  from  constitutional 
objection,  difficult.  Hence  the  draftsman  of  the  Act  of  1889 
undertook  to  provide  a judicial  remedy,  and  here  the  diffi- 
culty referred  to  was  encountered.  The  situation  may  be  illus- 
trated by  legal  conditions  either  real  or  hypothetical.  He 
deemed  a provision  that  such  lien  should  be  enforced  in  like 
manner,  and  by  like  judicial  proceedings,  as  other  municipal 
liens  were  enforced  under  existing  laws,  to  be  unsafe,  in  view 
of  the  provision  of  Article  III,  Section  6.  He  could  not 
adopt,  amend,  and  re-enact  at  length  the  existing  provisions 
of  law,  if  such  there  were,  governing  the  general  subject  of 
municipal  liens,  because  his  bill  would  then  be  incongruous 
and  relate  to  more  than  one  subject.  He  could  take  up  such 
supposed  existing  statutory  provisions  governing  the  general 
subject,  and  prepare  a separate  bill  so  revised  and  amended 
as  to  cover  his  case,  and  thus  bring  the  whole  subject  before 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


203 


the  Legislature,  expose  it  to  other  revisions  and  amendments, 
with  the  risk  of  failure  on  final  passage  or  of  expiration  of  the 
legislative  session  before  enactment,  and  thus  institute  a prac- 
tice of  legislation  tending  to  the  unsettlement  of  the  law;  or 
he  could  take  up  the  different  laws  relating  to  the  subject,  one 
by  one,  and  deftly  graft  them  with  amendments  unobjection- 
able in  form,  and  sufficient  in  number  to  properly  modify  the 
existing  laws  without  unsettling  the  system,  and  start  his 
brood  of  little  bills  out  on  their  perilous  way.  As  a choice  of 
evils  he  made  independent  provisions,  which  were  not  inclu- 
sive of  the  class  of  liens  with  which  he  had  to  do,  but  which 
were  inclusive  of  the  class  of  cities  to  which  the  Act  related, 
and  thus  encountered  the  difficulties  pointed  out  in  the  prin- 
cipal case,  and  in  that  of  Smith  v.  Meadow  Brook  Brewing 
Company.  The  subject  of  enactment  by  reference,  and  the 
provision  as  to  titles  of  Acts  of  Assembly,  are  thus  shown 
to  have  an  intimate  relation  to  the  subject  of  local  and  special 
legislation,  and  to  the  rule  which  permits  legislation  for 
classes  of  subjects,  including  classes  of  cities. 


12.  What  are  Municipal  Matters  Proper  and  What 
are  Not. 

Three  clauses  of  Article  III,  Section  7,  specifically  relate  to 
cities.  They  declare  that  the  General  Assembly  shall  not 
pass  any  local  or  special  law  regulating  the  affairs  of  cities, 
incorporating  cities,  or  changing  their  charters,  creating 
offices,  or  prescribing  the  powers  and  duties  of  officers  in 
cities. 

These  provisions  have  been  so  construed  as  to  permit  a 
classification  of  cities  in  a division  of  three  classes,  and  to  per- 
mit legislation  relating  to  each  class,  that  is,  to  the  affairs 
of  cities  of  each  class,  to  their  incorporation  or  the  change  of 
their  charters,  and  to  the  creation  of  offices,  and  the  pre- 
scribing the  powers  and  duties  of  officers  in  each  of  the  three 
classes  of  cities. 

Certain  statutes  have  been  enacted,  based  in  form  upon 
this  recognized  classification  of  cities,  which  have  been  de- 
clared invalid  because  not  within  the  principle  which  permits 
and  sustains  legislation  for  cities  by  classes. 


204 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


The  cases  passing  upon  the  validity  of  this  kind  of  legisla- 
tion have  furnished  two  tests  of  its  validity,  the  one  positive 
and  the  other  negative,  as  follows:  Such  legislation  “must 

be  applicable  to  all  the  members  of  the  class  to  which  it  re- 
lates, and  must  be  directed  to  the  existence  and  regulation  of 
municipal  powers  and  to  matters  of  local  government,”  or, 
as  the  same  thought  is  otherwise  expressed,  “such  legislation 
must  make  provision  for  the  administration  of  corporate 
powers  and  relate  to  the  number,  character,  powers,  and  du- 
ties of  corporate  officers  in  cities.”  The  negative  test  is  thus 
stated:  “All  legislation  remains  forbidden  to  cities,  notwith- 
standing classification,  if  it  does  not  relate  to  the  exercise  of 
corporate  powers,  or  to  corporate  officers,  and  their  powers 
and  duties.  Laws  relating  to  the  several  subjects  in  Section 
7 must  be  general  affecting  the  whole  State,  so  that  the  rule 
upon  this  subject  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  territory 
upon  which  the  Constitution  is  operative.  For  example, 
there  cannot  be  one  rate  of  interest  in  cities  of  the  first  class, 
another  in  those  of  the  second  or  third,  and  still  another  for 
the  rest  of  the  State,  but  the  rate  when  fixed  by  law  must 
apply  to  all  parts  and  divisions  of  the  State  alike.  The  same  is 
true  of  the  law  of  descent,  and  so  on  through  the  entire  list 
of  subjects  upon  which  local  and  special  legislation  is  forbid- 
den. If  classification  can  relieve  against  the  constitutional 
provision  as  to  one  of  these  subjects  it  can  relieve  as  to  all.” 

The  present  inquiry  relates  to  the  application  of  these  tests 
with  a view  to  furnishing  suggestion  as  to  the  solution  of  the 
question  as  to  what  legislation  may,  and  what  does  not,  relate 
to  municipal  affairs. 

As  related  to  this  topic  the  provisions  of  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  may  be  divided  into  three  classes:  First,  those  in 

which  municipal  affairs  are  directly  referred  to  and  in  which 
special  or  local  laws  are  prohibited,  viz.,  laws  “regulating  the 
affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships,  wards,  or  school  dis- 
tricts,” “incorporating  cities,  towns,  or  villages,  or  changing 
their  charters,”  “creating  offices  or  prescribing  the  powers 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


205 


and  duties  of  officers  in  counties,  cities,  boroughs,  townships, 
election,  or  school  districts.”  The  provisions  in  this  class  are 
covered  by  what  has  been  already  said. 

The  second  class  of  subjects  enumerated  in  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  are  such  as  can  have  no  relation  to  municipal  affairs, 
either  because  of  their  subject-matter,  or  because  of  their  re- 
lation to  persons  or  bodies  corporate,  other  than  cities.  The 
clauses  referred  to  are  those  wherein  local  or  special  laws  are 
prohibited,  “regulating  the  affairs  of  counties,  townships, 
wards,  boroughs,  or  school  districts;  changing  the  names  of 
persons  or  places;  changing  the  venue  in  civil  or  criminal 
cases;  authorizing  the  adoption  or  legitimation  of  children; 
locating  or  changing  county  seats;  erecting  new  counties  or 
changing  county  lines;  granting  divorces;  erecting  new  town- 
ships or  boroughs;  changing  township  lines,  borough  lim- 
its, or  school  districts;  creating  offices,  or  prescribing  the 
powers  and  duties  of  officers  in  counties,  boroughs,  town- 
ship, election,  or  school  districts;  changing  the  law  of  descent 
or  succession;  regulating  the  practice  or  jurisdiction  of,  or 
changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in,  any  judicial  proceeding  or 
inquiry  before  courts,  aldermen,  justices  of  the  peace,  sher- 
iffs, commissioners,  arbitrators,  auditors,  masters  in  chancery, 
or  other  tribunals,  or  providing  or  changing  methods  for  the 
collection  of  debts,  or  the  enforcing  of  judgments,  or  prescrib- 
ing the  effect  of  judicial  sales  of  real  estate;  regulating  the  fees 
or  extending  the  powers  and  duties  of  aldermen,  justices  of 
the  peace,  magistrates,  or  constables;  regulating  the  manage- 
ment of  public  schools,  the  building  or  repairing  of  school 
houses,  and  the  raising  of  money  for  such  purposes;  affecting 
the  estates  of  minors  or  persons  under  disability,  except  after 
due  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest  to  be  recited  in  the  special 
enactment;  remitting  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures,  or  re- 
funding moneys  legally  paid  in  the  treasury;  regulating  labor, 
trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing;  creating  corporations, 
or  amending,  renewing,  or  extending  the  charters  thereof; 
granting  to  any  corporation,  association,  or  individual  any 


206 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


special  or  exclusive  privilege  or  immunity  or  to  any  corpora- 
tion, association,  or  individual  the  right  to  lay  down  a rail- 
road track.”  In  connection  with  these  provisions,  Article  V, 
Section  26,  relating  to  uniformity  of  laws  governing  courts 
may  he  referred  to. 

The  third  class  of  subjects  named  in  Article  III,  Section  7, 
are  such  as  may  have  relation  to  municipal  matters  or  not, 
according  to  circumstances.  They  are  embraced  in  those 
clauses  in  which  the  passage  of  local  or  special  laws  is  pro- 
hibited, “authorizing  the  creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of 
liens;  authorizing  the  laying  out,  altering,  or  maintaining 
roads,  highways,  streets,  or  alleys;  relating  to  ferries  or 
bridges,  or  incorporating  ferry  or  bridge  companies,  except 
for  the  erection  of  bridges  crossing  streams  which  form 
boundaries  between  this  and  any  other  State;  vacating  roads, 
town  plats,  streets,  or  alleys;  relating  to  cemeteries,  grave- 
yards, or  public  grounds  not  of  the  State;  for  the  opening  and 
conducting  of  elections,  or  fixing  or  changing  the  place  of 
voting;  fixing  the  rate  of  interest;  exempting  property  from 
taxation.”  The  provisions  of  Article  VIII,  Section  7,  requir- 
ing uniformity  of  election  laws,  and  those  of  Article  IX,  Sec- 
tion 1,  requiring  taxes  to  be  levied  and  collected  under  gen- 
eral laws  may  be  referred  to  in  this  connection. 

In  explanation  of  the  last  classification  it  may  be  said  that 
laws  authorizing  the  creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of  liens, 
and  more  particularly  those  relating  to  their  creation,  may 
have  reference  to  municipal  liens,  or  to  other  liens,  as,  for 
example,  mechanics’  liens  or  judgment  liens.  Legislation  as 
to  the  latter  would  have  reference  to  non-municipal  affairs, 
legislation  as  to  the  former  would  have  relation  to  municipal 
affairs.  Laws  authorizing  the  laying  out,  opening,  or  main- 
taining of  roads,  highways,  streets,  or  alleys  may  have  rela- 
tion to  municipal  highways  or  to  non-municipal  highways. 
Streets  and  alleys  are  peculiarly  municipal  highways,  and  laws 
authorizing  the  laying  out,  opening,  altering,  or  maintaining 
municipal  highways,  which  would  include  their  grading,. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


207 


curbing,  paving,  and  draining,  would  relate  to  municipal  af- 
fairs. A law  authorizing  municipalities  to  maintain  free  pub- 
lic ferries  or  bridges  would  relate  to  municipal  affairs,  but  one 
relating  to  the  incorporation  of  ferry  or  bridge  companies  or 
to  ferries  and  bridges,  non-municipal,  would  not  relate  to 
municipal  affairs.  A law  vacating  a specific  road,  town  plat, 
street,  or  alley,  would  be  local  and  special,  but  provisions  au- 
thorizing municipalities  to  institute  proceedings  to  vacate 
roads,  town  plats,  streets,  or  alleys  would  relate  to  municipal 
affairs.  A law  relating  to  a given  cemetery,  graveyard,  or 
other  public  ground  not  of  the  State,  would  be  local  and  spe- 
cial, but  laws  relating  to  parks,  public  squares,  cemeteries,  and 
graveyards  in  cities,  especially  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of 
police  powers  over  the  latter,  would  relate  to  municipal  af- 
fairs. Election  laws  must  be  general  and  uniform,  but  the 
regulation  of  municipal  elections  is  a municipal  affair.  Laws 
fixing  the  rate  of  interest,  in  the  sense  of  defining  the  liability 
of  the  party  in  default  by  reason  of  the  non-payment  of  money 
when  due,  must  be  uniform,  but  a provision  which,  for  ex- 
ample, might  limit  the  borrowing  powers  of  municipalities 
by  prescribing  a rate  of  interest  payable  by  them  less  than 
the  ordinary  rate,  would  be  a municipal  affair,  so  far  as  it  gov- 
erned the  rate  to  be  paid  before  the  municipality  was  in  de- 
fault. Taxes  are  required  to  be  levied  and  collected  under 
general  laws,  but  taxation  for  the  support  of  municipal  gov- 
ernments is  a municipal  affair.  Exemption  from  taxation  is 
not,  in  general,  a municipal  affair,  but  a law  which  exempted 
property  from  municipal  taxation  but  not  from  other,  the 
property  being  of  a kind  that  is  permitted  to  be  exempted, 
would  relate  to  a municipal  affair.  These  statements  as  to 
what  are  municipal  affairs  are  made  provisionally  and  as  prop- 
ositions of  fact. 

As  to  the  matters  in  the  second  class,  it  is  clear  that  county, 
township,  borough,  or  school  district  affairs  are  distinct  from 
city  affairs.  The  school  district  may  be  coterminous  with 
the  city,  but  the  law,  as  a rule,  separated  the  two  corpora- 


208 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


tions  before  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  con- 
stitutional enumeration  of  them  as  distinct  classes  separates 
them  now.  The  ward  may  be  a subdivision  of  a city  or  a 
borough,  but  city  wards  must  be  regulated  by  the  law  which 
relates  to  all  the  wards  of  all  the  cities  of  a given  class.  Town- 
ships and  boroughs  lie  outside  of  cities,  and  there  can  be  no 
confusion  as  to  the  affairs  of  these.  Cities  are  within  the 
body  of  a county.  County  affairs  relate  to  the  whole  county, 
including  all  of  its  subdivisions,  whether  city,  borough,  or 
township.  These  affairs  are  naturally  separate  from  city  af- 
fairs, although  there  may  be  instances  where  an  officer  of  one 
of  these  corporations  is  charged  with  duties  which  pertain  to 
another,  as  in  like  manner  some  county  officers  may  be 
charged  with  duties  which  pertain  to  State  affairs.  Changing 
the  names  of  persons  or  places,  venue,  adoption,  county  seats 
and  county  lines,  divorces,  descent  and  succession,  are  so 
clearly  unrelated  to  municipal  affairs  as  to  pass  without  com- 
ment, and  so  are  the  provisions  as  to  minors  or  persons  under 
disability,  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures,  if  treasury  means 
treasury  of  the  State  or  county,  and  as  to  special  privileges 
and  immunities.  Regulation  of  labor,  trade,  mining,  or  man- 
ufacturing, which  is  prohibited,  probably  was  not  intended 
to  exclude  such  local  and  municipal  police  regulations  by 
boroughs  and  cities  as  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  be  made 
by  them,  and  which  relate  to  the  safety,  health,  and  comfort 
of  thickly  settled  communities.  It  is  clear  that  the  creation 
of  corporations,  or  amending,  renewing,  or  extending  their 
charters,  is  a matter  having  no  more  relation  to  city  lines  or 
affairs  than  it  has  to  county  lines  or  affairs.  The  remaining 
provision  in  this  class  from  the  seventh  section  has  relation  to 
judicial  matters.  Here  again  it  is  clear  that  the  city,  whether 
as  creditor  or  debtor,  tort-feasor,  or  party  injured,  or  as  vested 
with  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  as  public  and  quasi  public 
corporations  are,  has,  and  can  have,  no  special  or  peculiar 
privileges  under  the  law  which  may  distinguish  a city  from 
any  other  party  or  litigant.  A city,  a mechanic,  a livery-stable 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


209 


keeper,  a borough,  a pawn-broker,  a mortgagee,  or  a pledgee 
may  have  liens  upon  property  real  or  personal,  but  when  the 
judicial  power  is  invoked,  the  enforcement  of  these  liens 
must  be  governed  by  the  constitutional  provisions  relating 
to  the  jurisdiction,  practice,  rules  of  evidence,  and  process 
of  the  courts.  Remedies  must  be  governed  by  uniform  rules 
relating  to  the  remedy  as  such,  and  not  to  the  person  of  the 
claimant.  Each  class  of  liens  may  have  its  usual  and  regular 
method  of  procedure  not  varied  except  by  those  peculiarities 
which  spring  from  the  nature  of  the  lien  itself,  as  .defined  by 
the  common  law,  or  by  the  statute  which  creates  or  regu- 
lates it. 

It  is  believed  that  the  foregoing  is  in  harmony  with  the  de- 
cided cases;  thus  the  cases  relating  to  subjects  within  the 
second  class  as  above  pointed  out,  are  Commonwealth  v.  Rey- 
nolds, and  Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  wherein  school  affairs  are 
distinguished  from  municipal  affairs:  Philadelphia  v.  Plad- 
dington  Church,  Ruan  Street,  Wyoming  Street,  Pittsburg’s 
Petition,  Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  and 
McKay  v.  Trainor,  wherein  it  is  shown  that  the  municipality 
cannot  be  granted  a peculiar  jurisdiction,  practice,  procedure, 
or  process  as  a party  litigant  in  a judicial  proceeding, 
whether  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  or 
otherwise,  or  as  plaintiff  in  a judgment  or  execution.  Wein- 
man v.  Passenger  Railway  Company  pointed  out  that  the 
creating  of  corporations,  including  the  amending,  renewing, 
or  extending  of  their  charters,  cannot  be  legislated  for  with 
reference  to  municipal  boundaries  or  classes  of  cities.  On  the 
other  hand,  and  with  reference  to  subjects  within  the  third 
class,  wherein  the  terms  of  prohibition  are  general,  and  large 
enough  to  include  municipal  affairs  in  common  with  others, 
it  appears  that  the  suggested  distinction  has  prevailed.  Thus, 
in  Scranton  v.  Whyte,  a municipal  lien  for  paving  a certain 
street  in  front  of  the  defendant’s  premises  in  the  city  of  Scran- 
ton was  held  to  be  valid  as  such,  while  certain  provisions 
in  regard  to  the  procedure  for  its  enforcement,  objected  to 
14 


210 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


as  falling  within  the  second  class  of  subjects  above  referred 
to,  were  not  passed  upon.  This  case  is  direct  authority  for 
the  proposition  that  the  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving 
of  streets  is  clearly  and  exclusively  one  for  municipal  control, 
and  that  the  power  to  collect  the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  in 
some  appropriate  iorm  of  taxation  is  a municipal  power,  and 
that  the  Act  of  1889,  relating  to  cities  of  the  third  class,  which 
regulates  the  manner  in  which  the  power  to  pave  streets  and 
collect  the  cost  thereof  shall  be  exercised,  and  authorizes  the 
assessment  of  the  cost  upon  property  fronting  on  the  street  ac- 
cording to  the  extent  of  the  frontage,  and  which  gives  a lien 
for  such  assessment,  is,  to  that  extent,  free  from  objection. 
Shaaber  v.  Reading,  which  explains  Ruan  Street,  shows  that 
the  laying  out  of  highways  and  the  decision  of  the  ques- 
tions when  their  opening  shall  take  place,  and  how  they  shall 
be  paved,  sewered,  and  lighted,  are  functions  of  municipal 
government. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  general  municipal  taxation 
was  held  to  be  a municipal  affair,  and  that  the  city  of  Alle- 
gheny, having  come  into  the  second  class  of  cities,  was  sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  22d,  1877,  P.  L. 
16,  notwithstanding  the  invalidity  of  some  of  its  provisions, 
as  decided  at  the  same  time  in  the  cases  of  Safe  Deposit  & 
Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  and  McKay  v.  Trainor.  It  was 
contended  in  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron  that  an  Act  re- 
lating to  the  collection  of  taxes  in  a given  class  of  cities  is 
local  and  violates  Article  IX,  Section  1,  of  the  Constitution, 
which  declares  that  all  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  collected 
under  general  laws.  That  question  was  regarded  as  already 
settled  against  the  appellant.  It  was  said  that  it  had  been  re- 
peatedly held  that  the  power  to  classify  being  conceded,  the 
conclusion  that  an  Act  passed  for  a class  was  not  a local  law 
was  irresistible,  that  it  might  not  be  a general  law  in  the 
same  sense  that  one  applicable  to  the  Commonwealth  at  large 
is  general,  but  that  it  was  general  in  another  and  strictly  legal 
sense,  since  it  embraced  all  the  members  of  a class  which  the 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


21  I 


Legislature  had  created  without  any  violation  of  the  funda- 
mental law.  Reeves  v.  Traction  Company  relates  to  a 
matter  not  within  the  subjects  enumerated  in  class  three.  It 
relates  to  the  exercise  of  police  power  in  the  regulation  of  the 
movement  of  vehicles  on  streets.  Harris’s  Appeal  in  like 
manner  relates  to  annexation  of  territory,  and  Straub  v.  Pitts- 
burg to  the  relief  and  support  of  the  poor  and  the  regulation 
of  the  holding  and  conveyance  of  property  in  connection  with 
that  function. 

The  foregoing  are  the  cases  of  direct  application  decided  in 
the  Supreme  Court.  An  examination  of  those  decided  in  the 
lower  courts  which  have  not  been  appealed  will  show  that 
they  also,  as  a rule,  are  in  harmony  with  the  foregoing. 

From  the  foregoing  review  of  the  authorities,  it  will  ap- 
pear that  certain  matters  stated  to  be  municipal  as  matters  of 
fact  have  been  so  determined  to  be  as  matters  of  law.  Mu- 
nicipal liens,  municipal  highways,  so  far  as  their  laying  out, 
the  institution  of  proceedings  for  their  opening,  and  their 
maintenance  by  grading  and  paving  is  involved,  and  munici- 
pal taxation,  are,  under  the  decided  cases,  as  matters  of  law, 
municipal  affairs  within  the  explanation  given  of  the  subjects 
of  constitutional  prohibition  classified  within  the  third  class 
above.  As  to  the  remaining  instances  within  that  class,  the 
authorities  thus  far  are  silent,  and  thus  are  indicated  the  ques- 
tions to  be  definitely  settled  hereafter,  but  these  questions  are 
near  solution  if  the  decided  instances  may  be  regarded  as  fur- 
nishing the  principle  upon  which  they  are  to  be  determined. 

As  to  the  broad  and  general  question  what  are  municipal 
affairs  and  what  not,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  difficult  to 
formulate  a comprehensive  definition,  the  answer  must  rather 
be  sought  from  enumeration,  and  this  must  be  determined 
practically  and  historically,  and  not  even  then  definitely,  be- 
cause municipal  corporations  must  keep  abreast  with  the  prog- 
ress and  improvements  of  the  age,  and  their  powers  must  be 
modified  or  enlarged  in  conformity  therewith:  Linn  v.  Cham- 
bersburg  Borough,  160  Pa.  St.  51 1.  It  may  be  well,  however, 


212 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


to  examine  in  this  connection  the  general  borough  law  of 
1851,  with  its  amendments  prior  to  1874,  for  the  purpose  of 
illustrating,  by  the  only  general  and  comprehensive  municipal 
law  then  existing,  what  were  regarded  as  municipal  affairs 
when  the  Constitution  was  adopted. 

The  general  borough  law  regulates  the  procedure  for  the 
incorporation  of  boroughs,  it  regulates  the  conduct  of  bor- 
ough elections  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  general  elec- 
tion laws,  it  names  the  officers  to  be  elected  as  corporate  offi- 
cers, including  the  election  officers,  the  borough  constable, 
and  the  overseers  of  the  poor,  it  defines  the  powers  and  du- 
ties of  the  borough  officers,  including  the  burgess,  council- 
men,  treasurer,  and  secretary,  tax  collector,  and  high  consta- 
ble. The  municipal  powers  are,  among  others,  to  have  suc- 
cession; to  sue  and  defend;  to  make  and  use  a common  seal; 
to  hold,  purchase,  and  convey  real  estate;  to  make  such  or- 
dinances, by-laws,  and  regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  law, 
as  may  be  deemed  necessary  for  the  good  order  and  govern- 
ment of  the  borough;  to  survey,  lay  out,  enact,  and  ordain 
such  roads,  streets,  lanes,  alleys,  courts,  and  common  sewers 
as  may  be  deemed  necessary,  and  provide  for,  enact,  and  or- 
dain the  widening  and  straightening  of  the  same;  to  regulate 
the  roads,  streets,  lanes,  alleys,  courts,  common  sewers,  pub- 
lic squares,  common  grounds,  foot-walks,  pavements,  gutters, 
culverts,  and  drains,  and  the  heights,  grades,  widths,  slopes, 
and  forms  thereof,  with  all  other  needful  jurisdiction  over  the 
same.  To  regulate  and  direct  the  grading,  curbing,  paving, 
and  guttering  of  the  said  foot-walks,  by  the  owner  or  owners 
of  the  lots  of  ground  respectively  fronting  thereon,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  general  regulations  prescribed,  or  cause  the 
same  to  be  done  on  failure  of  the  owners  thereof,  and  to  col- 
lect the  cost  of  the  work  and  materials  with  20  per  cent,  ad- 
vance thereon,  as  claims  are  by  law  recoverable  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  law  relative  to  mechanics’  liens;  to  make  all 
needful  regulations  respecting  the  foundations  and  party- 
walls  of  buildings,  and  respecting  vaults,  cess-pools,  sinks, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


213 


drains,  and  partition  fences;  to  enter  upon  lands  and  prem- 
ises for  the  purposes  authorized  by  the  Act;  to  prohibit  and 
otherwise  regulate  the  running  at  large  of  certain  animals; 
to  regulate  markets,  hawking  and  peddling,  and  the  inspec- 
tion and  measurement  and  weight  of  cord  wood,  hay,  coal, 
and  other  articles  sold  or  offered  for  sale  in  the  borough;  to 
regulate  annually  the  scales,  weights,  and  measures  within 
the  borough  according  to  the  standard  of  the  Common- 
wealth; to  prohibit  and  remove  nuisances;  and  the  carrying 
on  of  any  manufacture,  trade,  or  business  which  may  be  nox- 
ious or  offensive  to  the  inhabitants;  and  to  regulate  other 
matters  noxious  or  dangerous;  to  prohibit  interments  wholly 
or  within  partial  limits,  and  to  prescribe  and  regulate  the  depth 
of  graves;  to  make  such  other  regulations  as  may  be  necessary 
for  the  health  and  cleanliness  of  the  borough;  to  establish 
a fire  department;  to  regulate  or  prohibit  plays,  shows,  and 
other  exhibitions;  to  establisn  a nightly  watch;  to  light  the 
streets,  to  supply  water  for  the  use  of  the  inhabitants,  and  to 
regulate  the  same;  to  impose  fines  and  penalties;  to  appoint 
and  remove  such  officers,  prescribe  their  duties,  and  allow 
them  such  compensation  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  to  se- 
cure the  peace,  order,  and  well-being  of  the  inhabitants,  and 
to  enforce  the  ordinances  and  regulations  of  the  borough. 
To  prescribe  fees  for  official  service  in  the  adjustment  of  the 
grades,  curbs,  lines,  party-walls,  partition  fences,  and  the  like; 
to  levy  and  collect  annually,  for  borough  purposes,  a tax  not 
exceeding  one-half  per  cent,  on  the  dollar,  on  the  valuation 
assessed  for  county  purposes,  as  then  or  thereafter  prescribed, 
upon  all  property,  offices,  professions,  and  persons  made  tax- 
able by  the  laws  of  the  Commonwealth  for  county  rates  and 
levies;  to  tax  dogs,  and  to  borrow  money;  with  a limitation  of 
rate  of  interest  conforming  to  the  general  rate;  and  with  the 
power  of  eminent  domain  to  be  exercised  according  to  the 
laws  of  the  Commonwealth. 

From  the  foregoing  enumeration  it  appears,  that  when  the 
Constitution  was  adopted  the  following  subjects  included 


214 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


within  class  three  above  of  the  subjects  of  constitutional  pro- 
vision in  Article  III,  Section  7,  were  regarded  as  municipal 
affairs,  and  were  regulated  by  the  general  borough  law,  to 
wit,  the  creation  of  municipal  liens;  the  laying  out,  altering, 
or  maintaining  municipal  roads,  highways,  streets,  and  alleys; 
the  regulation  of  cemeteries,  graveyards,  and  public  grounds 
not  of  the  State  within  municipalities;  the  conducting  of  mu- 
nicipal elections;  fixing  the  rates  of  interest  to  be  paid  by  mu- 
nicipalities and  the  levy  and  collection  of  taxes  for  municipal 
purposes;  thus  covering  the  municipal  aspect  of  substantially 
all  of  the  subjects  enumerated  in  class  three.  It  has  never 
been  doubted  that  laws  relating  to  such  matters,  governing 
the  boroughs  of  the  Commonwealth,  were  general  laws.  If 
this  be  so,  then  laws  relating  to  such  matters,  governing  all 
the  cities  of  the  Commonwealth,  would  be  general  laws,  and 
if  so,  then  any  matter  regulated  by  a law  applicable  to  bor- 
oughs or  cities,  may  be  regulated  by  a law  applicable  to  a 
class  of  cities. 

13.  Acts  of  Assembly  Void  in  Part. 

It  is  a rule  of  general  application  that  an  Act  of  Assembly 
containing  provisions  contrary  to  the  Constitution  may  be 
sustained  as  valid  in  part,  the  invalid  provisions  being  re- 
jected. Many  of  the  cases,  as  has  been  incidentally  shown, 
have  declared  various  statutes  to  be  utterly  void.  In  other 
cases  statutes  have  been  sustained  in  so  far  as  they  were  in- 
volved in  the  question  in  controversy,  when  afterwards,  other 
provisions  being  in  question,  these  provisions  have  been  held 
to  be  invalid;  in  other  cases  statutes  have  been  held  to  be 
valid  in  part  and  void  in  part.  For  example,  in  Ayars’  Ap- 
peal,1 the  Acts  of  1876  and  1887  were  held  to  be  entirely  void, 
and  so  in  Frost  v.  Cherry,2  as  to  the  Act  of  1885.  In  the  case 
of  Ruan  Street,3  a majority  of  the  court  held  the  first  and 
second  sections  to  be  valid  because  they  repealed  an  existing 
local  system,  and  so  far  made  the  general  system  operative; 
two  of  the  justices  concurring  in  the  judgment  dissented  from 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


215 


so  much  of  the  opinion  as  sustained  the  validity  of  the  first 
and  second  sections  of  the  Act.  In  Kilgore  v.  Magee,4  the 
validity  of  the  Act  of  March  22d,  1877,  P.  L.  16,  was  sustained 
in  so  far  as  questioned  in  the  points  made  in  the  argument,  but 
in  the  subsequent  cases  of  Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v. 
Fricke,5  and  Pittsburg  v.  Hughes,6  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 
sections  of  the  Act  were  held  invalid.  In  Wyoming  Street,7 
the  decision  was  adverse  to  the  validity  of  the  sections  of  the 
Act  of  1887  relating  to  boards  of  viewers  in  cities  of  the 
second  class.  In  the  subsequent  case  of  Pittsburg’s  Petition,8 
an  attempt  was  unsuccessfully  made  to  sustain  the  Acts  of 
1887  and  1889  in  part,  the  latter  partaking  in  the  vice  of  the 
former,  but  the  attempt  failed  because  the  objectionable  fea- 
tures were  so  interwoven  with  the  whole  texture  of  the  Acts 
in  question  as  to  be  indispensable  to  their  operation.  In  Si- 
mon’s Case,9  and  Betz  v.  Philadelphia,10  different  parts  of  the 
Act  of  1885,  known  as  the  “Bullitt  Bill,”  were  held  invalid, 
and  in  Gaston  v.  Graham,11  the  forty-first  section  of  the  oft- 
litigated  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  dividing  cities  into  three 
classes  was  declared  void.  In  Meadville  v.  Dickson,12  it  was 
said,  referring  to  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  204,  con- 
taining legislation  for  cities  of  the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth 
classes,  that  as  there  were  no  cities  of  the  fourth  and  fifth 
classes,  it  could  not  be  said  that  the  Legislature  would  have 
passed  the  Act  with  cities  of  the  fourth  and  fifth  classes  elim- 
inated, save  on  the  supposition  that  such  classification  ought 
not  to  have  been  made.  In  Pittsburg’s  Petition  the  court  be- 
low referred  to  the  rule  that  where  a part  of  an  Act  is  void  the 
remainder  may  be  enforced  unless  the  parts  are  so  essential 
to  each  other  that  it  cannot  be  presumed  that  one  would  have 
been  adopted  without  the  other.  Elsewhere  the  rule  is  laid 
down  that  if  a statute  attempts  to  accomplish  a single  ob- 
ject only,  and  some  of  its  provisions  are  void,  the  whole  must 
fail  unless  sufficient  remains  to  effect  the  object  without  the 
aid  of  the  invalid  portions,  but  if  its  purpose  is  to  accomplish 
two  or  more  objects  and  it  is  void  as  to  one,  it  may  still,  in 


2l6 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


every  respect,  be  complete  and  valid  as  to  the  other.13  It 
must  be  evident  from  the  nature  of  the  subject  that  no  certain 
rules  can  be  laid  down.  Each  statute  must  be  considered 
upon  a view  of  its  various  provisions  and  its  relation  to  stat- 
utes in  pari  materia.  The  decided  cases  must  be  regarded 
with  reference  to  the  mode  in  which  they  arise  and  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  statute  is  drawn  in  question.  As  illus- 
trating this  suggestion  Kilgore  v.  Magee  may  be  compared 
with  subsequent  cases  relating  to  the  same  statute,  and  Scran- 
ton v.  Whyte,14  may  be  referred  to.  The  courts  may  be  as- 
tute to  save  as  much  as  possible  of  a statute  of  considerable 
age  and  frequent  use,  under  which  many  rights  have  come  into 
existence,  when  a new  statute  would  not  be  regarded  with  the 
same  concern.  In  view  of  the  foregoing,  and  because  the  sub- 
ject is  more  general  than  the  scope  of  the  particular  subject 
under  consideration,  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  treat  this- 
topic  in  detail. 

4Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

2Frost  v.  Cherry,  122  Pa.  St.  417. 

3Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257. 

4Kilgore  v.  Magee,  85  Pa.  St.  401. 

5Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St.  231. 

6Pittsburg  v.  Hughes,  13  C.  C.  R.  535. 

7 Wyoming  Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494. 

8Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401. 

9Simon’s  Case,  4 D.  R.  189. 

10Betz  v.  Philadelphia,  4 C.  C.  R.  481. 

11  Gaston  v.  Graham,  18  C.  C.  R.  265. 

12Meadville  v.  Dickson,  129  Pa.  St.  1. 

13Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds,  8 C.  C.  R.  568. 

14Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

Validity  of  Things  Executed  Under  Invalid 
Acts  of  Assembly. 

In  Dunn  v.  Mellon,1  Mr.  Justice  Green  said:  “In  the  case 
of  Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401,  we  decided  not  only 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


217 


that  certain  portions  of  the  Acts  of  1887  and  1889,  relating  to 
streets  and  sewers  in  cities  of  the  second  class,  were  uncon- 
stitutional and  void,  but  also  that  the  city  must  pay  for  all 
work  done  under  the  proceedings,  and  for  all  damages  in- 
flicted upon  property-owners  thereby.  All  the  proceedings 
of  the  city  for  the  opening  of  streets  and  assessment  of  dam- 
ages and  benefits,  under  the  Acts  of  1887  and  1889,  had  at 
least  color  of  authority  under  the  language  of  those  Acts.  If 
the  real  legal  authority  did  not  exist,  because  those  Acts  were 
unconstitutional,  the  city  would  be  responsible  for  the  dam- 
ages sustained  by  their  proceedings.  But  it  does  not  at  all 
follow  that  the  officers  or  agents  who  executed  the  authority 
of  the  city  in  the  premises  would  be  subject  to  any  such  re- 
sponsibility. 

“The  commissioner  of  highways  was  the  proper  officer,  both 
de  facto  and  de  jure,  for  the  execution  of  the  orders  of  the  city 
for  the  opening  of  streets,  and  could  proceed  with  such  exe- 
cution without  subjecting  himself  to  a personal  liability  for 
his  acts  as  such.  He  could  not  question  the  validity  of  his 
orders,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  obey  them.  In  the  case  of  Clark 
v.  Commonwealth,  29  Pa.  St.  129,  we  held  that  even  the  acts 
of  a president  judge,  whose  right  to  his  office  was  questioned, 
could  not  be  impugned  in  any  collateral  proceeding.  We 
said:  ‘He  is  a judge  de  facto,  and  as  against  all  parties  but  the 
Commonwealth  he  is  a judge  de  jure  also.’  In  the  case  of 
Campbell  v.  Commonwealth,  96  Pa.  St.  344,  we  enforced  the 
same  doctrine,  saying,  in  relation  to  the  challenged  title  of 
two  associate  judges:  ‘Under  due  form  of  law  they  hold  their 
offices  by  title  regular  on  its  face.  They  are  performing  the 
duties  thereby  imposed  on  them,  and  enjoying  the  profits  and 
emoluments  thereof.  Thus  they  are  judges  de  facto,  and  as 
against  all  parties  but  the  Commonwealth  they  are  judges 
de  jure.  Having  at  least  a colorable  title  to  these  offices,  their 
right  thereto  cannot  be  questioned  in  any  other  form  than  by 
quo  warranto  at  the  suit  of  the  Commonwealth.’  In  both  of 
the  foregoing  cases  we  refused  to  permit  the  validity  of  the 


2l8 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


acts  done  by  the  judges  to  be  called  in  question  in  any  col- 
lateral proceeding. 

“It  is  no  doubt  true  that  unconstitutional  laws  cannot  con- 
fer either  contract  rights  or  property  rights  upon  any  persons, 
natural  or  artificial,  and  the  validity  of  such  laws  may  be  di- 
rectly questioned  by  any  persons  adversely  interested.  But 
that  doctrine  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  question  which  arises 
in  this  case.  Here,  the  question  is  as  to  the  immunity  from 
personal  liability  of  a citizen  who  acts  as  the  mere  representa- 
tive of  a municipal  officer,  in  the  performance  of  a duty  which, 
apparently  and  by  color  of  law,  rested  upon  him  as  a citizen, 
and  which  would  necessarily  be  performed  by  the  municipal 
officer  without  any  personal  liability,  if  the  citizen  refused  to 
obey  the  law  and  the  mandate  of  the  officer.  If,  in  such  cir- 
cumstances, the  municipal  officer  would  be  exempt  from  in- 
dividual liability  for  executing  the  orders  of  the  city,  we  know 
of  no  reason  why  the  citizen  should  be  subject  to  such  liabil- 
ity, he  being  a person  interested,  and  apparently  subject  to 
the  duty  of  obeying  the  mandatory  order  of  the  authorities. 
No  hardship  results  to  the  persons  injured,  as  they  have  their 
recourse  to  the  city,  and  it  would  be  a severe  hardship  to  hold 
the  citizen  liable  for  merely  obeying  the  law  as  it  is  written.” 

In  this  case  the  defendants  removed  a portion  of  a house  in 
obedience  to  an  order  of  the  commissioners  of  highways  in 
Pittsburg,  given  under  color  of  statutes,  afterwards  declared 
invalid,  under  an  ordinance  for  the  opening  of  a certain  street 
for  which  regular  proceedings  had  been  had  under  the  said 
statutes.  The  landlord  in  compliance  with  the  order  removed 
the  building,  and  thereby  evicted  plaintiffs,  tenants,  who  were 
held  not  to  be  entitled  to  recover. 

In  King  v.  Philadelphia  Company,2  it  appeared  that  a nat- 
ural gas  company  had  laid  pipes  in  a street  by  permission  of 
the  city.  The  street  had  been  laid  out  under  the  Act  of  June 
14th,  1887,  P.  L.  386,  the  proceedings  under  which  had  been 
regular  and  uncontested;  afterwards,  a property-owner  abut- 
ting upon  and  claiming  fee  in  the  street,  sought  to  enjoin  the 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


219 


gas  company  from  keeping  and  maintaining  the  pipes.  In 
this  case  Mr.  Justice  Green  said:  “It  is  now  objected  against 
the  legality  of  the  action  of  the  defendant  in  laying  its  pipes, 
that  the  city  government  had  no  power  to  proceed  in  the 
opening  of  this  street,  because  the  Act  of  1887  was  unconsti- 
tutional in  certain  respects.  However  this  contention  might 
suffice  to  prevent  the  city  from  laying  out  and  opening  streets 
in  the  future,  it  does  not  follow  by  any  means  that  it  will  suf- 
fice to  overthrow  such  work  previously  done  under  color  of 
the  authority  conferred  by  the  Act.  If  no  question  of  the  con- 
stitutional power  of  a city  to  do  municipal  work,  such  as  the 
opening  or  grading  and  paving  of  streets,  the  construction 
of  drains  and  sewers,  the  erection  of  municipal  buildings,  the 
introduction  of  gas  and  water-works,  arises  until  years  have 
elapsed  after  such  work  is  done,  it  could  not  be  tolerated  that 
because  the  power  is  ultimately  held  to  have  been  in  excess  of 
the  lawful  authority  of  the  city,  that  such  streets  must  be 
closed  and  abandoned,  or  the  sewers  and  drains  destroyed,  or 
the  gas  and  water-works  closed,  or  the  municipal  buildings 
torn  down.  Such  municipal  works  having  been  done  under 
color  of  lawful  authority,  when  no  question  as  to  the  validity 
of  the  authority  was  raised,  must  be  regarded  as  lawfully 
done.  The  opening  of  a street  ordinarily  is  followed  by  the 
erection  of  buildings  on  both  sides,  by  the  laying  of  gas  and 
water  pipes,  and  the  construction  of  sewers.  If  after  all  this 
has  taken  place  it  is  discovered  and  judicially  decided  that 
the  law  under  which  the  municipal  authorities  have  acted  in 
the  premises  is  unconstitutional,  surely  it  cannot  be  that  all 
the  improvements,  works,  and  buildings,  carried  on  and  con- 
structed under  apparent  legal  authority  must  be  abandoned 
or  destroyed. 

“There  is  a very  well-established  principle  applicable  to  such 
cases,  which  holds  valid  the  acts  done  by  persons  exercising 
official  functions,  by  virtue  of  legislative  authority,  which  is 
subsequently  declared  void.  Thus,  in  Clark  v.  The  Common- 
wealth, 29  Pa.  St.  129,  where  a person  had  been  convicted  of 


220 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


murder  in  the  first  degree,  and  had  pleaded  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  that  tried  and  sentenced  him,  that  the  presiding 
judge  had  not  been  lawfully  elected  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Constitution,  we  held  that  the  title  of  the  judge  to  his 
office  could  not  be  called  in  question  by  a private  suitor,  but 
only  by  the  Commonwealth,  that  he  was  a judge  de  facto,  and 
as  against  all  parties  but  the  Commonwealth  a judge  de  jure 
also.  It  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Woodward,  in  delivering 
the  opinion,  that  ‘the  notion  that  the  functions  of  a public 
officer,  or  of  a corporation  existing  by  authority  of  law,  can 
be  drawn  in  question  (I  do  not  mean  as  to  the  mode  of  their 
exercise,  but  as  to  their  right  of  existence),  except  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  sovereign  is  a mistake  that  springs  from  the 
too  prevalent  misconception  that  it  is  the  duty  of  everybody 
to  attend  to  public  affairs.’ 

“In  Campbell  v.  The  Commonwealth,  96  Pa.  St.  344,  in  an 
indictment  for  arson,  a question  was  raised  in  this  court  as 
to  the  title  of  the  two  associate  judges  to  their  office  under 
the  Constitution  of  1874.  The  defendants  were  convicted  and 
sentenced,  and  in  this  court  they  claimed  that  the  oyer  and 
terminer  which  sentenced  them  was  not  a legally  constituted 
court,  but  we  declined  to  entertain  the  question  on  the  ground 
that  the  associates  were  judges  de  facto . Mr.  Justice  Mercur 
said:  ‘Under  due  forms  of  law  they  hold  their  offices  by  title 
regular  on  its  face.  They  are  performing  the  duties  thereby 
imposed  on  them  and  enjoying  the  profits  and  emoluments 
thereof.  Thus  they  are  judges  de  facto,  and  as  against  all 
parties  but  the  Commonwealth  are  judges  de  jure.  Having 
at  least  a colorable  title  to  these  offices  their  right  thereto 
cannot  be  questioned  in  any  other  form  than  by  a quo  war- 
ranto at  the  suit  of  the  Commonwealth.’ 

“In  Keyser  v.  McKissan,  2 Rawle,  139,  the  action  was 
brought  by  the  commissioners  of  a county  against  the  county 
treasurer  and  his  sureties  on  the  treasurer’s  bond,  and  it  was 
alleged  in  defense  that  the  plaintiffs  had  never  taken  the  oath 
of  office  required  by  law,  and  were  therefore  disqualified  to 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


221 


act  in  their  official  capacity,  or  to  maintain  the  action. 
Rogers,  J.,  conceding  that  the  oaths  were  never  taken,  said: 
‘The  rule  which  governs  the  case  is  that  the  commissioners 
who  appointed  the  treasurer  were  officers  de  facto,  since  they 
came  into  their  office  by  color  of  title.  It  is  a well-settled 
principle  of  law  that  the  acts  of  such  persons  are  valid  when 
they  concern  the  public,  or  the  rights  of  third  persons  who 
have  an  interest  in  the  act  done:  The  People  v.  Collins,  7 
Johns.  Rep.  554;  King  v.  Lisle,  Andrews’  Rep.  163.  And  this 
rule  has  been  adopted  to  prevent  a failure  of  justice.  . . . The 
reason  given  for  the  rule  is  most  satisfactory.  That  the  act  of 
an  officer  de  facto  where  it  is  for  his  own  benefit  is  void,  be- 
cause he  shall  not  take  advantage  of  his  want  of  title,  which 
he  must  be  cognizant  of,  but  where  it  is  for  the  benefit  of 
strangers  or  the  public  who  are  presumed  to  be  ignorant  of 
such  defect  of  title,  it  is  good:  Cro.  Eliz.  699;  King  v.  Lisle, 
Andrews’  Rep.  163;  Hippsly  v.  Tucke,  2 Lev.  184.’ 

“In  Riddle  v.  The  County  of  Bedford,  7 S.  & R.  386,  this 
court  said,  Duncan,  J.:  ‘There  are  many  acts  done  by  an 

officer  de  facto  which  are  valid.  They  are  good  as  to  stran- 
gers, and  all  those  persons  who  are  not  bound  to  look  further 
than  that  the  person  is  in  the  actual  exercise  of  the  office, 
without  investigating  his  title.’ 

“To  the  same  effect  are  Kingsbury  v.  Ledyard,  2 W.  & S. 
41,  and  Gregg  Township  v.  Jamison,  55  Pa.  St.  468. 

“Applying  these  principles  to  the  present  case  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  proceedings  for  the  extension  and  opening  of  Negley 
Avenue  were  conducted  in  a regular  and  orderly  manner  by 
the  select  and  common  councils  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg,  who 
were  officials  in  the  actual  exercise  of  their  functions.  One  of 
the  instrumentalities  employed  was  the  board  of  viewers,  who 
were  also  the  properly  constituted  officers  for  that  purpose, 
according  to  the  law  supposed  to  be  applicable  to  the  case. 
These  several  officials  acting  in  their  official  capacity  carried 
through  to  completion  all  the  proceedings  necessary  to  the 
extension  and  opening  of  the  avenue  for  public  use.  The 


222 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


councils  in  their  official  capacity  gave  consent  to  the  occu- 
pancy of  the  avenue  by  the  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  lay- 
ing their  pipes.  The  chief  of  the  department  of  public  works, 
the  proper  officer  for  that  purpose,  not  only  gave  consent, 
but  gave  directions  to  the  defendant,  to  occupy  Negley 
Avenue  in  laying  its  pipes.  All  of  these  officials  held  their 
offices  and  exercised  their  functions  so  far  as  the  proceedings 
in  regard  to  the  extension  and  opening  of  Negley  Avenue 
were  concerned,  in  strict  conformity  with  the  law  as  it  was 
written.  With  those  proceedings  the  defendant  had  nothing 
to  do,  but,  acting  in  perfectly  good  faith,  so  far  as  appears 
upon  this  record,  did  the  acts  complained  of  in  the  plaintiffs’ 
bill  in  the  matter  of  laying  their  pipes.  In  our  opinion  it  is 
not  practicable  to  hold  that  their  acts  in  the  premises  were 
entirely  illegal  and  void.  They  were  not  responsible  for  the 
law  as  it  stood,  nor  were  they  responsible  for  errors  or  defects, 
if  there  were  any,  in  the  exercise  of  the  official  functions  of  the 
several  city  officials.  They  had  a right  to  assume  that  the 
officials  whose  action  was  involved  were  legally  constituted 
officials,  with  full  power  to  do  just  what  they  did  do  with  re- 
gard to  the  subject  of  the  present  contention. 

“Nor,  even  if  there  were  some  defects  in  the  manner  in 
which  the  pipes  were  laid,  would  those  defects  suffice  to  in- 
validate the  entire  action  of  the  defendant  in  laying  their 
pipes.  The  defendant  can  easily  be  compelled  to  relay  any 
portion  of  its  pipes  which  are  defectively  laid.  We  do  not 
consider  that  any  question  of  estoppel  arises  against  the  plain- 
tiff by  reason  of  the  payment  by  him  of  the  assessed  benefits. 
We  decide  the  case  upon  the  ground  that  there  was  a com- 
pliance with  the  existing  law  in  the  laying  of  the  pipes,  and 
that  the  defendant  is  not  responsible  for  the  law  of  1887,  or 
for  its  want  of  conformity  to  the  Constitution.  Acting  within 
the  limits  of  that  law  and  by  the  sanction  of  the  properly  con- 
stituted officials,  who  were  officers  de  facto  in  the  exercise  of 
their  official  functions,  they  are  protected  from  an  allegation 
of  illegality  in  their  action.” 


. LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  223 

1Dunn  v.  Mellon,  147  Pa.  St.  11. 

2King  v.  Philadelphia  Company,  154  Pa.  St.  160. 

A borough  which  became  a de  facto  city  under  the  invalid 
classification  Acts  did  not  revert  to  its  former  condition  as  a 
borough  when  these  were  declared  invalid.  It  became  a city 
of  the  third  class:  Hoffman  v.  Matthes,  3 Delaware  County, 

579- 

-0 

15.  Curative  Statutes. 

In  Reading  v.  Savage,1  in  which  it  was  decided  that  Section 
57  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  269,  making  acceptance 
of  its  provisions  optional  was  void,  and  that  the  provis- 
ions of  the  said  Act,  so  far  as  they  depended  upon  such 
acceptance  were  also  void,  and  which  ruling  was  after- 
wards reversed,2  it  was  held  that  the  invalidity  of  liens  depend- 
ing upon  the  provisipns  so  held  to  be  void  was  not  helped 
by  the  provisions  of  Section  2,  Article  XXII,  of  the  Act  of 
May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  261,  which  enacted  that  “all  taxes  or 
assessments  made  in  any  of  the  cities  of  the  fourth,  fifth,  sixth, 
or  seventh  classes  within  five  years  next  preceding  the  date 
of  the  approval  of  this  Act  are  hereby  made  valid,  and  the  said 
cities  are  hereby  authorized  and  empowered  to  collect  the 
same  in  the  manner  provided  by  this  Act,  for  the  collection 
of  taxes  and  assessments.”  Under  the  classification  at- 
tempted by  the  Act  of  1887  Reading  was  a city  of  the  fifth 
class.  This  Act  at  the  date  of  the  decision  had  not  been  de- 
clared invalid  as  was  afterwards  done  in  Ayars’  Appeal.3  In 
passing  upon  Section  2 of  the  Act  of  1887,  the  court  below, 
Ermentrout,  J.,  said:  “But  it  is  contended  that  the  lien, 

assessment,  and  scire  facias  are  made  valid  by  Section  2,  Arti- 
cle XXIII,  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  261,  dividing  cities 
into  seven  classes.  This  section  reads:  ‘All  taxes  levied  or 

assessments  made  in  any  of  said  cities  of  the  fourth,  fifth, 
sixth,  or  seventh  classes  within  five  years  next  preceding  the 
date  of  the  approval  of  this  Act  are  hereby  made  valid,  and 
said  cities  are  hereby  authorized  and  empowered  to  collect 


224 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


the  same  in  the  manner  provided  by  this  Act  for  the  collec- 
tion of  taxes  and  assessments.’  Whilst  true  it  is  that  as  early 
as  Hepburn  v.  Curts,  7 W.  300,  and  Schenley  v.  Allegheny, 
36  Pa.  St.  57,  it  has  been  held  'the  Legislature  may  pass  re- 
trospective laws  such  as  in  their  operation  may  affect  suits 
pending  and  give  a party  a remedy  he  did  not  possess,  modify 
an  existing  remedy,  or  remove  an  impediment  in  the  way  of 
legal  proceedings,’  the  important  qualification  was,  neverthe- 
less, attached  that  such  laws  must  not  violate  any  constitu- 
tional prohibition.  The  General  Assembly  cannot  by  an  en- 
abling Act  indirectly  make  that  constitutional  which  directly 
is  prohibited  as  unconstitutional.  Such  legislation  is  just  as 
obnoxious  as  the  original  Act.  This  very  point  has  also  been 
decided  in  other  States.  In  Iowa  it  was  held  that  the  Legis- 
lature cannot  validate  void  special  legislation:  Strange  v.  Du- 
buque, 62  Iowa,  303;  and  in  Wisconsin  it  was  held  that  a Leg- 
islature cannot  give  validity,  by  ratification  or  curative  law, 
to  past  defective  proceedings  by  officers  or  municipalities.  If 
it  has  not  the  power  to  authorize  such  proceedings  directly  its 
power  to  ratify  is  subject  to  whatever  limits  describe  its  power 
to  grant  authority,  and,  therefore,  after  a constitutional 
amendment  has  forbidden  it  to  pass  a special  law  for  the  col- 
lection of  taxes,  it  cannot  cure  defective  proceedings  under 
a previous  special  law:  Kimball  v.  Rosendale,  42  Wis.  407. 
To  the  same  effect  is  Cain  v.  Goda,  84  Ind.  209.”  The  judg- 
ment was  affirmed  upon  this  opinion. 

The  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  272,  entitled  "An  Act  au- 
thorizing assessments  and  reassessments  for  the  cost  of  local 
improvements  already  made,  or  in  process  of  completion,  and 
providing  for  and  regulating  the  collection  of  the  same,”  re- 
cited that  local  improvements  of  different  kinds  had  hereto- 
fore been  made  in  the  cities  of  the  State  and  the  cost  thereof 
assessed  upon  the  abutting  property,  or  upon  property  bene- 
fited; that  it  was  doubtful  whether  the*  assessments  made 
and  levied  to  pay  for  said  local  improvements  could  be  col- 
lected under  existing  laws,  and  that  said  cities  were  threatened 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


225 


with  great  loss,  unless  said  assessments  could  be  collected. 
It  made  provision  for  assessment  or  reassessment  by  ordinance 
for  the  cost  of  local  improvements  made  or  in  process  of  con- 
struction, or  which  had  already  been  completed,  upon  prop- 
erty benefited.  Provision  was  made  for  credit  upon  such  as- 
sessments for  any  amounts  previously  paid  on  any  former  as- 
sessment on  account  of  any  property.  The  Act  contained  a 
proviso  that  it  should  not  apply  to  cities  of  the  first  and 
second  classes,  and  was  intended  as  a curative  Act  to  validate 
proceedings  undertaken  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  which  had  been  held  invalid  in  Ayars’ 
Appeal,4  decided  in  January,  1889.  In  Chester  City  v.  Black,5 
the  validity  of  this  Act  of  1889  was  sustained  by  the  court  in  a 
per  curiam  opinion,  in  which  it  was  said:  “The  paving  in 

question  was  done  under  authority  of  the  Act  of  May  24th, 
1887,  P.  L.  204,  entitled  'An  Act  dividing  cities  of  this  State 
into  seven  classes/  etc.  This  Act  was  declared  unconstitu- 
tional in  Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266.  The  Act  of  May 
23d,  1889,  P.  L.  272,  authorizing  assessments  and  reassess- 
ments for  the  cost  of  local  improvements  already  made  or  in 
process  of  completion,  and  providing  for  and  regulating  the 
collection  of  the  same,  was  passed  to  meet  this  difficulty.  Sub- 
sequent to  its  passage,  viewers  were  appointed  by  the  coun- 
cils of  the  city  of  Chester,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
said  Act,  who  proceeded  to  reassess  the  cost  of  these  improve- 
ments upon  the  property  fronting  upon  the  said  street,  by 
what  is  commonly  known  as  the  foot-front  rule.  We  need  not 
discuss  the  rule  itself,  as  there  is  nothing  in  the  case-stated  to 
indicate  that  it  was  not  applicable  to  this  street  and  to  the 
property  assessed.  The  only  question  remaining  is  the  power 
of  the  Legislature  to  authorize  this  reassessment.  Upon  this 
point  we  are  not  in  any  doubt.  Judge  Dillon,  in  referring 
to  it  in  Section  814  of  the  third  edition  of  his  excellent  work 
on  municipal  corporations,  says:  'The  original  assessment 

for  a local  improvement  proving  insufficient,  the  Legislature 
may  constitutionally  authorize  a reassessment,  and  make  it 
U 


226 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


operate  upon  the  property  benefited;’  and  cites  a number  of 
cases  which  sustain  his  text,  among  which  are  the  following: 
Mills  v.  Charleton,  29  Wis/400;  Butler  v.  Toledo,  5 Ohio, 
225;  Dean  v.  Borchsenius,  30  Wis.  236;  State  v.  Newark,  34 
N.  J.  L.  236;  People  v.  Brooklyn,  71  N.  Y.  495. 

“It  cannot  be  denied  successfully  that  the  Legislature  had 
the  power  to  authorize  this  assessment  originally,  and  that 
nothing  but  the  unconstitutionality  of  the  Act  of  1887  ren- 
dered the  proceeding  abortive.  The  principle  has  been  re- 
peatedly recognized  in  this  State  that  where  the  Legislature 
has  antecedent  power  to  authorize  a tax  it  can  cure  by  a re- 
troactive law  an  irregularity  or  want  of  authority  in  levying  it, 
though  thereby  a right  of  action  which  had  been  vested  in 
an  individual  should  be  divested:  Grim  v.  School  District, 
57  Pa.  St.  433.  In  the  same  line  are  Commonwealth  v.  Mar- 
shall, 69  Pa.  St.  328;  Schenley  v.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  St. 
57;  Magee  v.  Commonwealth,  46  Pa.  St.  358;  Kelly  v.  Pitts- 
burg, 85  Pa.  St.  170;  Hewitt’s  Appeal,  88  Pa.  St.  55;  Erie 
City  v.  Reed,  113  Pa.  St.  468.  The  constitutionality  of  this 
kind  of  legislation  is  not  open  to  objection.  Of  the  numerous 
cases  upon  this  subject  it  is  sufficient  to  refer  to  Huidekoper 
v.  City  of  Meadville,  83  Pa.  St.  156,  where  it  was  held  that 
the  Act  of  1870,  which  confers  upon  the  city  of  Meadville  the 
power  of  paving  its  streets  and  collecting  the  cost  from  the 
owners  of  adjoining  property  by  filing  liens  for  paving,  is  not 
in  violation  of  Section  1,  Article  IX,  of  the  Constitution,  pro- 
viding for  a uniformity  of  taxation.” 

In  Meadville  v.  Dickson,6  the  second  section  of  the  Act 
of  May  17th,  1887,  P.  L.  117,  entitled  “An  Act  authorizing 
cities  of  the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  classes  to  levy  and  collect 
taxes  and  validate  taxes  levied  and  assessments  made  there- 
in,” was  held  ineffective  as  a curative  Act,  because  its  provis- 
ions were  based  upon  an  invalid  classification  of  cities. 

In  Donley  v.  Pittsburg,7  the  validity  of  the  Act  of  May 
1 6th,  1891,  P.  L.  71,  entitled  “An  Act  authorizing  the  ascer- 
tainment, levy,  assessment,  and  collection  of  the  costs,  dam- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


227 


ages,  and  expenses  of  municipal  improvements,  including  the 
grading,  paving,  macadamizing  or  otherwise  improving  of 
any  street,  lane,  or  alley  or  parts  thereof  completed  or  now  in 
process  of  completion,  and  also  the  costs,  damages,  and  ex- 
penses of  the  construction  of  any  sewer  completed  or  now  in 
process  of  completion,  and  authorizing  the  completion  of  any 
such  improvement,”  was  sustained.  This  Act,  as  Its  title  indi- 
cates, was  a general  statute  and  in  terms  related  to  any  city, 
borough,  township,  or  other  municipal  division  of  the  State. 
It  was  passed  to  provide  for  improvements  made  or  in  pro- 
cess of  completion  under  the  Acts  of  June  14th,  1887,  P.  L. 
386,  and  May  16th,  1889,  P.  L.  228.  In  this  case  the  court  in 
a per  curiam  opinion  said:  “It  was  urged  that  this  Act  does 
not  apply  because  the  improvements  in  question  were  made 
under  void  Acts  of  Assembly,  and  without  any  authority 
whatever.  If  they  had  been  made  under  competent  au- 
thority, or  a valid  Act  of  Assembly,  there  would  have  been 
no  need  of  this  curative  legislation.  The  work  having  been 
done  under  void  authority,  and  the  property-owners  having 
received  the  benefits  of  the  street  improvements,  the  Legisla- 
ture had  the  clear  right  to  legalize  what  it  might  previously 
have  ordered.  That  the  Legislature  had  the  power  to  pass  such 
remedial  legislation  is  settled  by  abundant  authority:  Satterlee 
v.  Matthewson,  16  S.  & R.  169;  Schenley  v.  The  City  of  Alle- 
gheny, 36  Pa.  St.  29;  Commonwealth  v.  Marshall,  69  Pa.  St. 
328;  Hewitt’s  Appeal,  88  Pa.  St.  55;  Harrisburg  v.  McCor- 
mick, 129  Pa.  St.  213;  Chester  City  v.  Black,  132  Pa.  St. 
568.”8 

York  was  a city  of  the  fifth  class  under  the  Act  of  May 
24th,  1887,  Article  XIX,  Section  1,  P.  L.  204.  March  30th, 

1888,  an  ordinance  was  passed  fixing  the  compensation  of  the 
city  assessor  at  $3  per  day;  January  7th,  1889,  the  Act  was 
declared  invalid  in  Ayars’  Appeal.  The  Act  of  May  8th, 

1889,  P.  L.  133,  reclassified  the  cities  of  the  State,  and 
York  fell  into  the  third  class.  The  Act  of  May  13th, 
1889,  P.  L.  196,  declared  the  de  facto  of  councils  of  cities 


228 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


to  be  and  to  have  been  legally  constituted,  and  validated 
and  declared  to  be  in  full  force  all  ordinances  duly  passed  by 
them.  May  23d,  1889,  the  general  Act  for  the  government 
of  cities  of  the  third  class  was  passed,  P.  L.  277,  and  Article 
XV,  Section  1,  provided  for  the  election  of  city  assessors. 
Article  XIX,  Section  2,  provided  that  “All  ordinances  of  any 
of  said  cities  heretofore  legally  passed,  not  inconsistent  with 
such  provisions  as  are  hereby  made  valid  shall  be  and  remain 
in  full  force  and  virtue  until  altered  or  repealed.”  The  plaintiff 
was  elected  city  assessor  in  February,  1890,  and  in  October  of 
that  year  an  ordinance  was  passed  fixing  the  salary  of  city 
assessors  at  $2.50  per  day,  not  to  exceed  $225  in  any  year. 
The  plaintiff  claimed  for  201  days  at  $3  per  day,  but  defend- 
ant refused  to  pay  more  than  $225.  The  plaintiff  claimed 
that  the  ordinance  of  March  30th,  1888,  governed,  as  it  was 
not  repealed  at  the  time  of  his  election.  The  court  below 
held  otherwise,  but  the  judgment  was  reversed.9 

Said  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell  in  the  opinion:  “When  the  or- 
dinance of  March  30th,  1888,  was  passed  it  had  apparently  all 
the  requisites  of  validity,  passage  in  due  form,  by  the  regularly 
elected  councils  of  a city  of  the  fifth  class  under  the  Act  of 
May  24th,  1887,  P.  L.  204.  All  of  these  elements  existed 
de  facto,  and  were  supposed  to  exist  de  jure.  Under  this  sup- 
position the  city  organization  had  been  made,  officers  elected, 
their  compensation  fixed,  and  the  general  business  of  a city 
put  in  operation.  When  the  Act  of  1887  was  declared  to  be 
unconstitutional,  in  Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266,  the  result 
was  intolerable  confusion.  Public  measures  had  been  under- 
taken, and  rights  which  had  been  acquired  in  the  utmost  good 
faith  were  set  aside  and  ended  on  the  instant.  This  condition 
of  affairs  existed  all  over  the  State,  and  called  imperatively 
for  relief.  The  Legislature  met  the  crisis  promptly  and  effect- 
ually by  the  Act  of  May  13th,  1889,  P.  L.  196,  by  which  the 
existing  councils  were  declared  to  be  and  to  have  been 
legally  constituted  councils,  and  their  ordinances  were  validated 
and  declared  to  be  in  full  force.  The  intent  of  this  Act  is  per- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


229 


fectly  clear.  It  was  to  make  all  the  de  facto  municipal  bodies 
de  jure,  and  to  render  all  their  acts,  done  in  their  de  facto 
capacity,  valid  and  effective  in  law.  It  was  a universal  statute, 
making  no  exceptions,  as  there  was  no  room  for  any.  No 
foresight,  legislative  or  other,  could  have  discriminated 
among  the  vast  mass  of  ordinances  in  all  the  cities  similarly 
situated,  which  would  be  required  to  bring  order  out  of  this 
chaos.  The  Legislature  did  not  attempt  it.  It  validated 
them  all. 

“We  have  then  an  ordinance  applicable  to  an  existing 
office,  both  supposed  to  be  legal  and  operative.  Both  fail  to- 
gether by  the  failure  of  the  foundation  on  which  they  rested 
alike.  The  Legislature  at  once  restores  the  ordinance  and 
says  it  shall  be  ‘valid  and  in  full  force,’  and  immediately  after 
restores  the  office  and  makes  it  also  de  jure.  When  the  office 
was  thus  reinstated  it  found  an  ordinance  applicable  to  it 
already  existing.  The  order  of  dates  of  the  two  statutes  is 
entirely  immaterial.  They  are  parts  of  the  same  legislative 
effort,  to  repair  the  mischief  which  the  invalidity  of  the  pre- 
vious Act  had  brought  about,  and  to  ratify  everything  that 
had  been  done  under  it,  as  broadly  and  as  conclusively  as  if 
it  had  been  legally  authorized  in  the  first  instance. 

“Even, if  there  was  a doubt  on  this  point,  the  same  result 
would  be  reached  by  the  force  of  Article  XIX,  Section  2,  of  the 
Act  of  May  23d,  1889.  The  same  statute  which  restores  the 
office  also  makes  valid  all  the  ordinances  theretofore  legally 
passed  and  declares  that  they  shall  be  in  full  force  until  re- 
pealed or  altered.  The  office  and  the  ordinance  were  parts  of 
the  old  system,  and  it  was  intended  to  restore  them  together 
as  alike  parts  of  the  new.” 

1 Reading  v.  Savage,  120  Pa.  St.  198. 

2Reading  v.  Savage,  124  Pa.  St.  328. 

3Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

4Ayars’  Appeal,  122  Pa.  St.  266. 

5Chester  City  v.  Black,  132  Pa.  St.  568. 

6Meadville  v.  Dickson,  129  Pa.  St.  1. 


230 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


7Donley  v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St.  348. 

8And  see  Whitney  v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St.  351;  Bingaman 
v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St.  353;  Gray  v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St. 
354;  Rubright  v.  Pittsburg,  147  Pa.  St.  355. 

9Devers  v.  York,  150  Pa.  St.  208;  and  see  Devers  v.  York, 
156  Pa.  St.  359;  Melick  v.  Williamsport,  162  Pa.  St.  408. 

16.  Questions  of  Repeal. 

As  shown  below,  the  application  of  class  legislation  has 
given  rise  to  interesting  questions  as  to  the  effect  of  it  in  re- 
pealing prior  local  legislation,  and  as  to  how  far  it  may  be 
modified  by  subsequent  general  laws. 

The  Act  of  March  31st,  1876,  P.  L.  13,  fixing  the  salaries 
of  county  officers  in  counties  having  over  150,000  inhabitants, 
pursuant  to  the  constitutional  provision,  is  neither  a local  nor 
a special  law,  as  it  applies  to  all  counties  of  a special  class 
created  by  the  Constitution  itself,  but  it  comes  within  the 
reason  of  the  rule  that  a prior  statute  which  is  particular  is  not 
repealed  by  a general  statute  without  negative  words,  though 
the  provisions  of  the  latter  differ  from  those  of  the  former. 
Hence,  in  the  county  of  Luzerne,  in  which  the  Act  of  1876  is 
in  effect,  the  provisions  of  that  Act  will  prevail  over  the  sub- 
sequent general  law  of  May  12th,  1887,  P.  L.  95,  which  pro- 
vides that  the  auditors  of  each  county  shall  be  allowed  the 
sum  of  $3  each  for  each  and  every  day  necessarily  employed.1 

The  Act  of  March  22d,  1877,  P.  L.  16,  entitled  “An  Act  in 
relation  to  cities  of  the  second  class,  providing  for  the  levy, 
collection,  and  disbursement  of  taxes  and  water  rents,”  was 
enacted  when  the  city  of  Pittsburg  was  the  sole  city  of  that 
class.  It  was  held  that  this  Act  did  not  repeal  the  previous 
Act  of  February  14th,  1871,  P.  L.  126,  entitled  “An  Act  pro- 
viding for  the  registration  of  lots  in  the  city  of  Pittsburg,” 
nor  the  Act  of  May  5th,  1876,  P.  L.  124,  providing  for  the  clas- 
sification of  real  estate  for  purposes  of  taxation,  and  for  the 
payment  of  assessors  in  cities  of  the  second  class.  It  was  held 
that  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act  of  1871,  which  provided 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


23T 


that  no  property  returned  and  registered  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  should  be  subject  to  sales  for  taxes 
or  other  municipal  claims,  except  in  the  name  of  the  owners 
as  returned,  might  be  construed  in  pari  materia  with  the 
twelfth  section  of  the  Act  of  1877.  That  the  former  Act  ap- 
plied to  real  estate  returned  and  registered,  while  the  lat- 
ter might  with  entire  propriety  be  restricted  to  real  es- 
tate which  had  not  been  returned  and  registered  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1871. 3 In  this 

case  it  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Sterrett:  “ Assuming, 

for  argument  sake,  that  this  and  other  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1877  are  within  the  proper  limits  of  legislation 
for  cities  of  either  class,  it  follows  that  said  Act  is  a general 
law,  as  much  so  as  any  general  statute  applicable  to  the  whole 
State.  If  it  is  not  a general  law  it  must  be  special  or  local,  and 
therefore  unconstitutional,  in  so  far,  at  least,  as  it  embraces 
matters  in  which  local  legislation  is  prohibited.  Viewing  it 
then  as  a general  law  what  is  its  effect,  or  rather  the  effect  of 
the  section  referred  to,  including  its  cognate  provisions,  on 
the  registry  Act  of  1871 — a purely  special,  local  Act,  relating 
to  a particular  subject?  As  was  recently  said  by  our  Brother 
Heydrick,  in  Bell  v.  Allegheny  County,  1 Adv.  Rep.  763, 
and  30  W.  N.  C.  193  [149  Pa.  St.  381] : Tt  is  a rule  of  inter- 
pretation, as  old  as  the  common  law,  and  followed  in  an  un- 
broken line  of  decisions  in  this  State,  that  a general  affirma- 
tive statute  will  not  repeal  a previous  particular  statute  upon 
the  same  subject,  though  the  provisions  of  the  former  be  dif- 
ferent from  those  of  the  latter/  To  the  same  effect  are  Sei- 
fried  v.  Commonwealth,  101  Pa.  St.  200;  Malloy  v.  Reinard, 
1 15  Pa.  St.  25,  and  many  other  cases  that  might  be  cited. 
It  will  not  do  to  assume  that  the  Legislature — well  knowing 
Pittsburg  was  the  only  city  of  the  second  class  when  the  Act 
of  1877  was  passed — intended  to  interfere  with  special  local 
Acts  of  that  city,  and  especially  to  repeal  all  provisions  of  the 
registry  Act  that  are  in  conflict  with  said  Act  of  1877.  As  was 
said  in  Bell  v.  Allegheny  "County  {supra),  this  proves  too 


232 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


much.  Whenever  the  intent  is  to  legislate  for  a particular 
city  the  resultant  legislation  contravenes  Section  7,  Article  III, 
of  the  Constitution.”  Pointing  out  that  the  Acts  of  1871  and 
1877  might  be  construed  in  pari  materia,  the  learned  justice 
continued:  “As  thus  construed  there  is  no  necessary  repug- 
nancy between  the  fourth  section  of  the  latter  Act  and  the 
twelfth  section  of  the  Act  of  1877.  The  leaning  of  courts  is 
strongly  against  repealing  the  positive  provisions  of  a former 
statute  by  construction.  The  more  natural,  if  not  necessary, 
inference,  in  all  such  cases,  is  that  the  Legislature  intended  the 
new  law  to  be  auxiliary  to  and  in  aid  of  the  purposes  of  the  old 
law.  There  should,  therefore,  be  such  a manifest  and  total  re- 
pugnancy in  the  provisions  of  the  new  law  as  to  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  latter  abrogated  and  were  designed  to 
abrogate  the  former:  Henrix’s  Account,  146  Pa.  St.  285. 
When  two  statutes  are  so  flatly  repugnant  that  both  cannot 
be  executed,  and  we  are  obliged  to  choose  between  them,  the 
latter  is  deemed  a repeal  of  the  former;  but,  whenever  they 
can  be  made  to  stand  together  effect,  as  far  as  possible,  should 
be  given  to  both:  Brown  v.  Commissioners,  21  Pa.  St.  42.” 
As  shown  elsewhere  the  twelfth  section  of  the  Act  of  1877 
was  held  to  be  invalid  because  it  was  in  effect  a local  law  au-' 
thorizing  the  creation  of  liens  and  prescribing  the  effect  of 
judicial  sales  of  real  estate  in  the  case  cited,  and  in  the  sub- 
sequent case  of  McKay  v.  Trainor,4  the  same  declaration  was 
made.  In  Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,5  it  was  decided  that 
while  a previous  local  statute  is  not  repealed  by  a subsequent 
general  statute  inconsistent  with  it  unless  words  of  repeal  are 
employed,  yet  such  rule  is  not  applicable  to  classification 
Acts:  (1)  Because  the  legislative  intent  to  repeal  local  laws  is 
fully  expressed  in  those  Acts.  (2)  Because  those  Acts  are  of 
a character  to  exclude  the  operation  of  the  rule,  being  in- 
tended to  revise  the  laws  relating  to  municipal  affairs  so  as 
to  reduce  all  former  types  and  forms  of  municipal  govern- 
ment to  three,  one  for  each  class.  (3)  Because  the  very  nature 
of  class  legislation  renders  the  rule  inapplicable.  Whenever 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  233, 

any  law  regulating  the  municipal  affairs  of  cities  of  the  given 
class  shall  be  found  to  conflict  with  a previous  local  statute 
applicable  to  any  member  of  the  class  relating  to  the  same 
subject,  the  latter  must  give  way  by  reason  of  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  class  legislation.  Hence  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  March  22d,  1877,  prescribing  a system  of  taxation  for  cities 
of  the  second  class  is  not  a local  law  in  violation  of  Article  IX, 
Section  1,  of  the  Constitution,  declaring  that  all  taxes  shall  be 
levied  under  general  laws — the  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes 
being  one  of  the  corporate  powers  which  the  classification 
Acts  have  undertaken  to  regulate. 

Whether  all  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  22d,  1877, 
relating  to  liens,  law  of  evidence  or  the  effect  of  sheriff’s 
sales,  are  constitutional,  was  not  decided,  but  only  that  the 
city  of  Allegheny,  having  passed  out  of  the  third  into  the 
second  class  of  cities,  must  levy  and  collect  its  taxes  under  the 
system  provided  for  that  class. 

The  result  of  these  cases  is,  that  a special  law  governing 
a city  of  a given  class  is  not  repealed  by  a general  law  passed 
for  the  class  of  cities  to  which  that  city  belongs,  at  a time 
when  such  special  law  was  in  force  therein ; but  that  the  same 
general  law  will  replace  a special  law  on  the  same  subject 
which  was  in  force  up  to  the  time  when  the  city  subject  to  it 
passed  into  the  class  in  which  the  general  law  was  operative. 

Referring  to  the  Act  of  April  20th,  1874,  P.  L.  65,  entitled 
“An  Act  to  regulate  the  manner  of  increasing  the  indebted- 
ness of  municipalities,  to  provide  for  the  redemption  of  the 
same,  and  to  impose  penalties  for  the  illegal  increase  thereof,” 
Mr.  Justice  Williams  said,  in  Chalfant  v.  Edwards:6  “The 
Act  of  1874  passed  immediately  after  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitution, and  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  this  and  other  pro- 
visions of  that  instrument  into  operation,  introduces  a new 
and  uniform  system.  It  follows  the  constitutional  provision 
in  the  limitation  it  imposes  on  the  power  of  all  the  bodies  to 
which  it  relates  to  borrow  money,  and  prescribes  the  manner 
in  which  they  shall  proceed  to  contract  or  to  increase  their 


234 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


indebtedness  within  the  limits  fixed.  This  Act  supersedes 
the  methods  and  the  limits  theretofore  existing  in  different 
portions  of  the  State,  and  substitutes  its  own  provisions  for 
them.  This  was  the  legislative  intent,  and  this  we  think  was 
the  legal  effect  of  the  constitutional  provision  and  the  legis- 
lation under  it. 

“We  do  not  disturb  the  general  rule.  Ordinarily  it  is  true 
that  a general  law  will  not  operate  to  repeal  a previous  local 
Act  without  some  words  indicative  of  such  an  intention.  But 
when  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Legislature  to  change  an  existing 
system  because  of  some  constitutional  provision  on  the  sub- 
ject and  a law  is  passed  for  this  purpose  introducing  a new 
system  which  is  general  in  its  terms  and  evidently  intended  to 
provide  a uniform  system  for  all  subjects  to  which  it  relates, 
no  repealing  words  are  necessary.  This  doctrine  has  been 
recognized  in  many  cases.  Among  them  we  may  mention 
Best  v.  Baumgardner,  122  Pa.  St.  17;  Quinn’s  Appeal,  162 
Pa.  St.  56;  Howard’s  Appeal,  162  Pa.  St.  374;  and  Bruce  v. 
Pittsburg,  166  Pa.  St.  152.  Hutchinson’s  Appeal,  4 Penny- 
packer,  84,  relied  on  by  the  appellant,  has  not  been  followed, 
and  to  avoid  all  doubt  about  the  subject  it  is  now  distinctly 
overruled,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  this  question.”  Giving  effect 
to  this  declaration,  it  was  held  in  that  case  that  the  Act  of  1874 
in  effect  repealed  the  sixty-ninth  section  of  the  Act  of  Febru- 
ary 12th,  1869,  P.  L.  150,  entitled  “An  Act  consolidating  the 
wards  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  for  educational  purposes,” 
which  limited  the  indebtedness  of  the  said  school  districts  of 
Pittsburg  to  an  amount  less  than  that  permitted  by  the  Act  of 
1874. 

In  Bruce  v.  Pittsburg,6  it  was  held  that  the  Act  of  April 
20th,  1874,  P.  L.  65,  regulating  the  increase  of  indebtedness 
of  municipalities  repealed  the  Act  of  April  6th,  1850,  P.  L. 
408,  limiting  the  debt  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg  to  $1,500,000. 

The  power  of  a borough  of  its  own  motion  to  open  or  widen 
a street  under  the  Act  of  April  3d,  1851,  P.  L.  320,  is  not  im- 
paired by  the  Act  of  May  16th,  1891,  P.  L.  75,  providing  for 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


235 


the  passage  of  ordinances  for  such  purposes  on  the  petition  of 
a majority  of  the  property-owners.  There  is  nothing  repug- 
nant in  the  existence  of  two  methods  of  initiating  improve- 
ments. A borough  council  may  exercise  its  own  judgment  as 
to  a street  in  a built-up  portion  of  a borough  while  as  to  a re- 
moter highway  it  may  wait  to  be  moved  by  the  petition  of 
the  property-owner.7 

In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell  said:  “The  main 

ground  on  which  the  proceedings  were  set  aside  by  the 
learned  judge  below  has  since  been  taken  away  by  the  de- 
cision of  this  court  in  Hand  v.  Fellows,  30  W.  N.  C.  72,  and 
McCall  v.  Coates,  23  Atl.  Rep.  1126,  1127.  It  was  there  held 
that  the  Act  of  May  16th,  1891,  P.  L.  75,  in  relation  to  laying 
out,  opening,  etc.,  streets,  etc.,  in  the  several  municipalities 
of  the  Commonwealth,  is  an  affirmative  Act,  conferring  ad- 
ditional and  cumulative  powers,  on  municipalities  of  all 
grades,  but  repealing  no  prior  statute  expressly,  nor  any  por- 
tion thereof  by  implication  ‘unless  the  system  provided  by 
it  is  so  inconsistent  with  that  previously  existing  as  to  make 
it  impracticable  for  them  to  stand  together.’  In  the  task  of 
steering  through  constitutional  restrictions,  well  meant,  but 
destructive  of  necessary  governmental  powers,  the  Legisla- 
ture had  found  it  difficult  to  construct  statutes  conferring 
powers  and  modes  of  procedure  suitable  to  all  the  diverse 
needs,  situations,  and  wishes  of  the  multitude  of  municipal  or- 
ganizations in  the  State.  In  the  effort  some  well  intended 
Acts  had  come  to  naught,  and  others  had  been  shorn  of  sec- 
tions that  left  inconvenient  gaps  here  and  there  in  the  whole 
system.  It  was  to  fill  these  gaps,  to  supply  the  casus  omissi , 
and  to  supplement  powers  doubtful  or  defective,  that  the 
Act  of  1891  was  passed.  It  took  away  no  power  in  any  mu- 
nicipality that  existed  before,  nor  interfered  with  any  mode 
of  its  existence,  except  as  already  said,  where  there  is  an  ir- 
reconcilable repugnancy.” 

7Rymer  v.  Luzerne  County,  142  Pa.  St.  108;  and  see  Bell  v. 
Allegheny  County,  149  Pa.  St.  381. 


236 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


2Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St.  231. 
3 McKay  v.  Trainor,  152  Pa.  St.  242. 

^Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  242. 

5Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  173  Pa.  St.  246. 

6Bruce  v.  Pittsburg,  166  Pa.  St.  152. 

7 Hanover  Borough’s  Appeal,  150  Pa.  St.  202;  and  see  gen- 
erally Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257;  Commonwealth  v.  Grier,. 
152  Pa.  St.  176;  McCleary  v.  Allegheny  County,  163  Pa.  St. 
578;  Von  Bonnhorst  v.  Allegheny  County,  163  Pa.  St.  588; 
McGunnegle  v.  Allegheny  County,  163  Pa.  St.  589;  Common- 
wealth v.  Grier,  179  Pa.  St.  640;  Quinn  v.  Cumberland 
County,  162  Pa.  St.  55;  Commonwealth  v.  Weir,  165  Pa.  St. 
284;  Commonwealth  v.  Schneipp,  166  Pa.  St.  401. 


The  division  of  a county  governed  by  a special  law  does 
not  operate  to  repeal  the  law  in  whole  or  in  part.  It  remains 
in  effect  in  all  of  the  territory  for  which  it  was  originally  en- 
acted: Lackawanna  County  v.  Stevens,  105  Pa.  St.  465,  fol- 
lowed in  Gibbons  v.  Scranton  School  District,  3 Lack.  Jur. 
241. 

In  Bear  v.  Eshleman,  14  Lane.  Law  Review,  273,  it  was 
held  that  the  general  Act  of  June  8th,  1893,  P.  L.  333,  au- 
thorizing the  election  of  tax  collectors  in  boroughs  and  town- 
ships for  a term  of  three  years  repeals  local  laws  on  the  same 
subject,  upon  the  principle  that  since  the  adoption  of  the 
present  Constitution  the  policy  of  the  law  is  uniformity  in 
the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  counties  and  townships, 
as  well  as  cities  and  boroughs,  and  therefore  such  an  inter- 
pretation of  statutes  should  be  made  as  would  promote  that 
end.  See  Leitzel  v.  Center  County,  14  Lane.  L.  R.  191 ; Price 
v.  Blair  County,  14  Lane.  L.  R.  134. 

The  Act  of  April  26th,  1855,  P.  L.  321,  which  was  local 
to  the  county  of  Allegheny,  provided  certain  remedies  in 
cases  of  conviction  under  the  general  law  of  February  26th, 
1855,  P.  L.  73,  relating  to  the  sale  of  liquors.  The  Act  of 
April  3d,  1872,  P.  L.  843,  to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating 
liquors  in  the  county  of  Allegheny  repealed  all  laws  and  parts 
of  laws  in  force  relative  to  the  sale  of  liquors  in  said  county, 
or  any  part  thereof,  and  made  full  and  general  regulations 
governing  the  sale  of  liquor  in  said  county.  This  Act  was 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


2 37 


in  turn  repealed  by  the  general  license  law  of  May  13th, 
1887,  P.  L.  108.  In  a case  arising  in  the  county  of  Allegheny 
it  was  claimed  that  under  the  rule  that  the  repeal  of  a repeal- 
ing Act  (in  this  case  the  Act  of  1872)  revived  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  repealed,  the  Act  of  April  26th,  1855,  was  revived 
and  in  force  in  the  county  of  Allegheny.  It  was  held  that  this 
rule  was  inapplicable  where  the  Act  was  special  because  the 
operation  of  the  rule  in  such  a case  would  be  in  contravention 
of  Article  III,  Section  7,  as  an  indirect  enactment  of  a special 
law:  Durr  v.  Commonwealth,  3 C.  C.  R.  525. 

The  Act  of  April  9th,  1870,  P.  L.  1116,  applied  to  Wilkins 
Township;  Sterrett  Township  was  erected  out  of  Wilkins  in 
1879.  Held  that  the  Act  continued  in  force  in  both  unaf- 
fected by  the  division:  Irwin  v.  McCallin,  28  P.  L.  J.  322. 

The  Liquor  License  Law  of  April  3d,  1872,  P.  L.  843,  en- 
titled “An  Act  to  regulate  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  in 
the  county  of  Allegheny,”  was  repealed  by  the  Act  of  May 
13th,  1887,  P.  L.  108,  commonly  known  as  the  “Brooks  Li- 
cense Law,”  which  provided,  Section  19,  that  “all  local  law 
fixing  a license  rate  or  fee  less  than  is  provided  for  in  this  Act 
be  and  the  same  are  hereby  repealed:”  Commonwealth  v. 
McCandless,  4 C.  C.  R.  119,  affirmed  10  Central  Reporter, 
758;  s.  c.,  21  W.  N.  C.  162. 


CHAPTER  III. 


SUMMARY  OF  APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  FOREGOING  PRINCIPLES. 

1.  Local  affairs  of  political  subdivisions  of  the  State. 

Preliminary. 

1.  Counties. 

2.  Cities. 

3.  Boroughs. 

4.  Townships. 

5.  School  districts. 

2.  Highways. 

3.  Judicial  matters. 

4.  Liens. 

5.  Taxation. 

6.  Elections. 

7.  Private  corporations. 

8.  Cemeteries,  etc. 

9.  Labor,  trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing. 

10.  Special  privileges  and  immunities. 

1 1 . Partial  repeal  of  a general  law. 

12.  Cases  within  general  law  or  judicial  jurisdiction. 

13.  Notice. 

1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

Preliminary. 

No  reported  cases  have  been  found  in  which  a statute  has 
been  challenged  as  violative  of  any  one  of  the  following  pro- 
hibitions of  local  and  special  legislation:  changing  names  of 
persons  or  places;  changing  the  venue  in  civil  or  criminal 
cases;  authorizing  the  adoption  or  legitimation  of  children; 
locating  or  changing  county  seats;  erecting  new  counties,  or 
238 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


239 


changing  county  lines;  granting  divorces;  erecting  new  town- 
ships or  boroughs;  changing  township  lines,  borough  limits, 
or  school  districts;  changing  the  law  of  descent  or  succession; 
fixing  the  rate  of  interest;  affecting  the  estates  of  minors  or 
persons  under  disability;  remitting  fines,  penalties,  or  forfeit- 
ures, or  refunding  moneys  legally  paid  into  the  treasury.  The 
cases  related  to  the  present  subject  classified  according  to  the 
various  provisions  which  have  been  invoked  or  enforced,  are 
arranged,  together  with  such  provisions,  as  relating  to: 

1,  Local  affairs  of  political  subdivisions  of  the  State;  2, 
highways;  3,  judicial  matters;  4,  liens;  5,  taxation;  6,  elec- 
tions; 7,  private  corporations;  8,  cemeteries,  etc.;  9,  labor, 
trade,  mining  or  manufacturing;  10,  special  privileges  and  im- 
munities; 11,  partial  repeal  of  general  laws;  12,  cases  within 
general  laws  or  judicial  jurisdiction;  13,  notice. 

In  the  following  paragraphs,  wherein  the  cases  are  grouped 
and  points  decided  briefly  stated,  there  is  some  repetition;  this 
is  intentional  and  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  subject-mat- 
ter. The  constitutional  provisions  having  been  construed  as 
remedial,  there  has  been  no  disposition  apparent  in  the  de- 
cisions applying  them,  unless**  there  be  one  exception, 
to  impair  their  force  by  distinguishing  between  the  end 
or  purpose  of  a law  and  the  incidental  means  or  ma- 
chinery necessary  to  render  it  effective.  Thus,  for  ex- 

ample, a law  may  have  for  its  end  or  purpose  the  regu- 
lation of  the  paving  of  the  streets  or  the  construction  of 
sewers  in  municipalities  of  a certain  class;  such  a law  is  not 
local  or  special,  for  it  is  within  the  principle  of  classification 
and  relates  to  municipal  functions,  but  it  may  nevertheless  fail 
because  the  incidental  means  of  making  it  operative  are  ob- 
jectionable. It  may  contain  invalid  provisions  as  to  the  man- 
ner of  assessing  benefits,  or  as  to  the  creation  of  liens,  or  as  to 
the  procedure  to  reduce  them  to  judgment,  or  as  to  the  effect 
of  judicial  sales  upon  the  execution  of  such  judgments.  Thus, 
incidentally,  the  same  law  may  infringe  at  once  upon  the  con- 
stitutional provisions  relating  to  taxation,  to  liens,  to  the  jur- 


240 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


isdiction  of  courts,  and  to  the  effect  of  judicial  sales,  while  its 
purpose  has  no  direct  reference  to  either  of  these  matters,  and 
hence,  where  the  objections  upon  constitutional  grounds  are 
numerous,  as  has  frequently  happened,  the  same  case  appears 
undei*  different  heads.  The  repetition,  not  carried  to  the  ex- 
tent it  might  be,  serves  to  emphasize  a point  upon  which  too 
much  stress  cannot  be  laid.  Of  the  statutes  declared  invalid 
comparatively  few  have  failed  because  their  main  purpose  or 
end  was  constitutionally  objectionable.  The  large  majority 
have  failed  in  whole  or  in  part  because  they  have  incidentally 
violated  one  or  more  of  the  constitutional  provisions.  And 
it  may  be  remarked  in  this  connection  that  the  constitutional 
provisions,  general  and  specific,  affirmative  and  negative, 
sometimes  themselves  involving  repetition,  are  so  marshalled 
and  so  reinforce  each  other,  that  almost  any  offending  statute 
must  necessarily  encounter  more  than  one  of  them. 

i.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

Provisions  as  to  local  affairs  of  political  subdivisions  of  the 
State  which  have  been  construed. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  2.  Regulating  the  affairs 
of  counties,  cities,  townships,  wards,  boroughs,  and  school 
districts. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  11.  Incorporating  cities, 
towns,  or  villages,  or  changing  their  charters. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  19.  Regulating  the  man- 
agement of  public  schools,  the  building  or  repairing  of  school- 
houses  and  the  raising  of  money  for  such  purposes. 

Article  III,  Section  21,  Clause  2.  No  Act  shall  pre- 
scribe any  limitation  of  time  within  which  suits  shall  be 
brought  against  corporations  for  injuries  to  persons  or  prop- 
erty or  for  other  causes  different  from  those  fixed  by  general 
laws  regulating  actions  against  natural  persons  and  such  Acts 
now  existing  are  avoided. 

Article  XIV,  Section  5.  In  counties  containing  over 
150,000  inhabitants  all  county  officers  shall  be  paid  by  salary. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


241 


Article  XV,  Section  1.  Cities  may  be  chartered  whenever 
a majority  of  the  electors  of  any  town  or  borough  having  a 
population  of  at  least  10,000  shall  vote  at  any  general  elec- 
tion in  favor  of  the  same. 

1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

1.  Counties. 

Under  the  definition  of  what  may  be  a prohibited  regula- 
tion of  affairs  of  counties  the  following  instances  may  be 
given:  Providing  for  the  holding  of  courts.1  Fixing  salaries 
of  county  officers.2  Authorizing  appeals  by  owners  of  real 
estate  from  tax  assessments  in  counties  of  less  than  500,000 
population.3  Regulation  of  fences.4  An  Act  which  pro- 
vides a system  for  taxing  the  fees  of  officers  in  counties  having 
less  than  150,000  inhabitants  is  valid.5 

In  the  case  of  Jenks  Township  v.  Sheffield  Township,6  it 
appeared  that  the  poor  district  of  Jenks  Township  recovered 
a charge  against  the  poor  district  of  Sheffield  Township  for 
relief  furnished  to  persons  legally  settled  in  Sheffield.  The 
District  of  Sheffield  defended  on  the  ground  that  the  Act  of 
June  4th,  1879,  P-  L.  78,  created  a single  poor  district  of  For- 
est County  and  abolished  the  poor  district  of  Jenks  Town- 
ship in  that  county,  and  that  Warren  County  having  erected 
a county  poor-house  and  removed  all  its  poor  thereto  prior 
to  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1879,  the  said  Act  created  a single 
poor  district  of  Warren  County  and  abolished  the  poor  dis- 
trict of  Sheffield  Township  situated  therein.  With  reference 
to  the  defense  of  Sheffield  so  raised,  Mr.  Justice  Clark  said: 

“The  Act  of  June  4th,  1879,  was  intended  to  establish  a 
general  system  for  the  relief  and  employment  of  the  destitute 
poor  throughout  the  State.  The  general  plan  or  purpose  of 
the  Act  is  that  each  county  shall  be  or  become  a single  poor 
district  ; that  real  estate  shall  be  purchased,  and  suitable  build- 
ings erected  thereon,  and  that  as  soon  as  the  buildings  are 
completed  and  the  county  commissioners  are  prepared  to  ac- 
16 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


242 

commodate  the  poor  of  the  district,  upon  notice  given,  the 
poor  shall  be  transferred  to  their  custody  and  care,  and  there- 
upon the  duties  of  the  overseers  of  the  poor  shall  be  per- 
formed by  th^  county  commissioners.  But  the  practical 
provisions  of  this  Act,  it  will  be  observed,  do  not  come  into 
effect,  so  as  to  abrogate  the  office  or  to  dispense  with  the  au- 
thorities of  the  overseers,  until  the  county  commissioners, 
under  the  conditons  of  the  Act,  have  provided  a place  and 
are  prepared  to  accommodate  the  poor  thus  transferred. 

“It  does  not  appear  that  the  county  commissioners  of  the 
county  of  Forest  have  as  yet  taken  any  steps  toward  the 
erection  of  a poor-house,  or  that  they  have  made  any  other 
suitable  provision  or  preparation  for  the  relief  or  employment 
of  the  poor  of  the  county;  and  it  follows  that  the  overseers 
throughout  the  county  are  still  charged  with  the  perform- 
ance of  all  the  duties  appertaining  to  that  office,  since  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Act  of  1879,  as  before.  The  eighteenth  section 
of  that  Act  provides  that  ‘after  delivery  of  the  poor  to  the 
commissioners  as  before  provided,  the  overseers  of  the  poor 
in  the  townships  and  boroughs  embraced  in  said  districts  shall 
cease  to  act  as  overseers  of  the  poor,  except  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  to  levy  and  collect  tax,  settle  the  accounts,  and  pay 
debts  already  incurred.’ 

“.But  it  is  said  that,  if  it  be  held  that  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  1879  are  only  t°  come  into  practical  operation  in  the 
respective  counties  upon  a vote  of  the  people  therein  to  that 
effect,  it  may  produce  local  results  merely;  and  that  such  a 
construction  would  condemn  the  Act,  or  a part  of  it  at  least, 
as  a local  or  special  law  and  therefore  unconstitutional.  If 
upon  any  ground  the  Act  is  wholly  unconstitutional,  it  is  plain 
that  it  cannot  have  the  effect  the  appellant  claims  for  it;  if 
constitutional,  it  saves  the  office  of  overseer  until  its  provis- 
ions are  brought  into  full  effect;  if  unconstitutionl,  it  is  void, 
and  can  have  no  effect  to  abrogate  that  office.  The  conten- 
tion of  counsel  is,  however,  that  it  may  be  held  to  be  consti- 
tutional in  part,  and  in  part  unconstitutional.  But,  from  the 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


243 


very  nature  of  the  several  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1879,  it 
is  obvious  that  they  were  intended  to  operate  as  a 
whole;  and,  especially  in  view  of  the  limitations  imposed 
by  the  Constitution  upon  the  creation  of  municipal  in- 
debtedness, it  would  seem  to  be  impossible  to  sustain 
the  first  and  some  of  the  succeeding  sections  as  con- 
stitutional, and  set  aside  the  third  and  fourth  as  unconstitu- 
tional. The  effect  of  this,  in  some  of  the  counties,  might  and 
probably  would  be  to  abrogate  the  present  system  for  the 
support  of  the  poor,  and  to  render  it  wholly  impracticable  to 
provide  any  other.  Moreover,  it  would  appear  that  the  limi- 
tations upon  the  powers  of  the  Legislature  as  to  local  or  spe- 
cial legislation  do  not  extend  to  the  regulation  of  the  affairs 
of  poor  districts.  The  affairs  of  townships  do  not  of  necessity 
include  the  affairs  of  either  the  school  or  poor  districts  em- 
braced within  the  same  boundaries.  The  provision  of  the 
Constitution,  Article  III,  Section  7,  is  that  ‘the  General  As- 
sembly shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  law/  etc.,  ‘regulat- 
ing the  affairs  of  counties,  cities,  townships,  wards,  boroughs, 
or  school  districts.’  It  is  a very  significant  fact  that  whilst 
school  districts  are  expressly  included  within  the  restriction, 
poor  districts  are  plainly  omitted.  The  overseers  of  Jenks 
Township,  under  the  sixteenth  section  of  the  Act  of  March 
9th,  1771,  constitute  a quasi  corporation,  by  that  name,  dis- 
tinct from  the  township  of  Jenks,  with  the  right  to  sue  and  be 
sued;  process  in  this  form  being  properly  served  upon  the 
overseers,  whilst  process  against  the  school  district  is  served 
upon  the  school  directors,  and  that  against  the  township  upon 
the  supervisors.  The  convention,  being  conversant  with  the 
manifold  forms  in  which  the  public  charity  was  dispensed,  in 
county  poor-houses  and  in  district  poor-houses  organized 
under  both  general  and  special  laws,  in  hospitals  and  homes 
supported  by  contributions  both  public  and  private,  and 
through  the  ordinary  agency  of  the  overseers  or  directors  of 
the  poor,  may  have  deemed  it  unwise  to  interrupt  the  course 
of  legislation  on  this  subject,  or  to  restrict  the  relief  and  em- 


244 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


ployment  of  the  poor  to  any  one  uniform  or  general  system 
for  the  whole  State,  preferring  rather  that  the  hand  of  charity 
might  be  freely  extended  in  any  form  which  the  Legislature 
from  time  to  time  might  provide.  However  this  may  be,  the 
overseers  of  the  poor  in  Jenks  Township  would  appear  to  be 
the  proper  parties  complainant  in  this  case.” 

In  Straub  v.  Pittsburg7  it  was  held  that  the  relief  and  care  of 
the  poor  was  a municipal  purpose  and  that  a statute  authoriz- 
ing cities  of  the  second  class  to  purchase  and  sell  real  estate 
for  that  purpose  was  valid.  The  judgment  below  was  affirmed 
in  a per  curiam  opinion.  Plis  Honor,  Judge  Ewing,  in  the 
court  below  said:  “Counsel  for  defendants  have  argued  very 
forcibly  and  ingeniously  that  special  and  local  legislation 
in  regard  to  poor  districts  is  not  forbidden  in  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  in  this  they  are  supported  by  a suggestion  or  dic- 
tum in  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  recent  case  of 
Jenks  Township  v.  Sheffield  Township,  135  Pa.  St.  400. 

“With  great  respect  for  the  learned  judge  making  the  sug- 
gestion (who  was  a distinguished  member  of  the  constitu- 
tional convention),  we  cannot  agree  with  this  view,  until  it 
shall  be  so  decided  by  him  or  by  the  Supreme  Court.  It  is 
true  that  the  seventh  section  of  the  third  article  of  the  Con- 
stitution does  not  in  the  precise  words  prohibit  local  legisla- 
tion for  poor  districts,  as  it  does  for  school  districts,  and  for 
this  very  good  reason:  the  care  of  the  poor  had  always  been 
considered  a municipal  function  and  ‘affairs  of  counties,  cities, 
townships,  wards,  and  boroughs,’  for  which  local  laws  are 
prohibited  in  the  second  paragraph  of  Section  7,  while  the 
uniform  rule  had  been  to  treat  schools  and  school  districts  as 
something  separate  and  independent  of  the  ordinary  mu- 
nicipal governments.  The  same  reason  will  apply  to  other  ar- 
ticles in  the  Constitution  where  school  districts  are  mentioned 
and  poor  districts  are  not  named.  In  Article  IX,  Sections 
8 and  10,  on  taxation  and  finance,  school  districts  are  named, 
but  poor  districts  are  not.  Certainly  these  sections  were  in- 
tended to  include  all  officers,  bodies  or  departments,  that 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


245 


could  involve  a community  in  debt  or  who  managed  the  af- 
fairs of  such  community.  It  was  no  more  necessary  to  specify 
poor  districts  than  to  specify  police  districts  or  road  districts, 
or  to  specify  township  auditors.” 

Commonwealth  v.  Patton,  88  Pa.  St.  258;  Scowden’s  Ap- 
peal, 96  Pa.  St.  422. 

2McCarty  v.  Commonwealth,  no  Pa.  St.  243;  Morrison  v. 
Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322. 

City  of  Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St  .191. 

4Frost  v.  Cherry,  122  Pa.  St.  417. 

Commonwealth  v.  Anderson,  178  Pa.  St.  171. 

6Jenks  v.  Sheffield,  135  Pa.  St.  400. 

7 Straub  v.  Pittsburg,  138  Pa.  St.  356. 


In  connection  with  the  foregoing  question  as  to  poor  dis- 
tricts, reference  may  be  made  to  the  remarks  of  his  Honor, 
Judge  Smith  (supra),  page  134,  as  to  the  exercise  of  the 
police  power,  and  to  the  cases  cited  under  the  paragraph  relat- 
ing to  the  construction  of  the  provisions  in  question  and  prin- 
cipally to  what  is  said  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  “affairs.” 
It  appears  that  this  word  is  not  confined  to  governmental  mat- 
ters or  public  affairs.  Thus,  in  Frost  v.  Cherry,  122  Pa.  St. 
417,  the  Act  in  question  related  to  fences;  in  Commonwealth 
v.  McCandless,  21  W.  N.  C.  162,  it  related  to  liquors;  in  Com- 
monwealth v.  Hough,  1 D.  R.  51,  it  related  to  milk;  in  Com- 
monwealth v.  Carey,  2 C.  C.  R.  293,  it  related  to  the  opera- 
tion of  insolvent  laws  upon  criminals;  in  Commonwealth  v. 
Farley,  6 C.  C.  R.  433,  it  related  to  mineral  water  bottles;  in 
Bowen  v.  Tioga  County,  6 C.  C.  R.  613,  it  related  to  dogs. 
No  question  appears  to  have  been  raised  in  these  cases 
as  to  the  unconfined  nature  of  the  police  power,  the  ex- 
ercise of  which  was  involved  in  some  or  all  of  them. 
They  assume  or  declare  that  the  matters  mentioned  relate  to 
local  affairs.  And  see  Philadelphia  v.  Cemetery  Company, 
162  Pa.  St.  105. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Mercer,  9 C.  C.  R.  461,  the  Act  of 
May  2 1st,  1879,  P-  L.  72,  was  held  to  be  invalid.  The  first 
section  of  this  Act  repealed  Section  7 of  the  salary  Act  of 
March  31st,  1876;  the  second  section  provided  that  it  should 


246 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


be  the  duty  of  the  councils  of  cities  of  the  first  class  to  fix  the 
salaries  of  certain  officers  and  the  number  of  clerks  and  em- 
ployes of  certain  other  officers.  The  Act  of  July  5th,  1883, 
P.  L.  182,  repealed  certain  provisions  of  the  salary  Acts,  ex- 
cept so  far  as  the  same  applied  to  cities  of  the  first  class,  and 
in  Section  2 made  provisions  for  counties  containing  less  than 
500,000  and  more  than  300,000  inhabitants.  This  Act  was 
held  invalid  in  the  same  case;  both  Acts  were  held  to  be  local 
and  special. 

The  Acts  of  April  20th,  1876,  P.  L.  44,  and  May 
24th,  1878,  P.  L.  133,  providing  for  and  regulating  appeals 
from  assessments  for  taxation,  regulate  the  affairs  of  counties 
and  are  therefore  invalid:  Appeal  of  Lake  Shore  & Michi- 
gan Southern  Railroad  Company,  1 C.  C.  R.  327,  and  see 
Scranton  v.  Silkman,  1 C.  C.  R.  329,  113  Pa.  St.  191;  also 
Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company’s  Appeal,  3 C.  C.  R.  162. 

The  Act  of  June  13th,  1883,  P.  L.  99,  relating  to  the  dis- 
charge of  prisoners  from  jail  without  proceeding  under  the  in- 
solvent laws  is  invalid  by  reason  of  its  excepting  counties  con- 
taining a city  co-extensive  with  the  county:  Commonwealth 
v.  Carey,  2 C.  C.  R.  293;  s.  c.,  Carey’s  Petition,  43  Leg.  Int. 
384.  In  this  case  his  Honor,  Judge  Yerkes,  said:  “Why 

there  should  be  one  procedure  prescribed  for  convicts  who 
seek  discharge  from  a Philadelphia  prison  and  another  from 
those  in  the  other  prisons  of  the  State,  affecting  differently 
their  liability  to  confinement,  may  be  left  to  surmise.  Crime 
is  the  same  in  whatever  county  of  the  State  committed  or 
punished,  and  the  duties  of  those  upon  whom  rests  the  admin- 
istration of  the  laws  affecting  the  detention  of  prisoners  ought 
to  be  the  same,  and  the  liability  of  convicts  to  imprisonment 
should  be  uniform  throughout  the  Commonwealth.  That  the 
Constitution  of  1874  does  not  intend  that  such  an  anomaly 
in  our  laws  shall  exist  is  clear.  It  declares,  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  that  ‘the  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or 
special  law  creating  offices  or  prescribing  the  powers  and  du- 
ties of  officers  in  counties,  cities,  boroughs,  townships,  elec- 
tion, or  school  districts.’  ‘Regulating  the  practice  or  jurisdic- 
tion of,  or  changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in  any  judicial  pro- 
ceeding or  inquiry  before  courts,  aldermen,  justices  of  the 
peace,  sheriffs,  commissioners,  arbitrators,  auditors,  masters 
in  chancery,  or  other  tribunals,  or  providing  or  changing 
methods  for  the  collection  of  debts,  or  the  enforcing  of  judg- 
ments, etc.’  This  Act  is  unquestionably  within  the  prohibited 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


247 


class.  Is  it  a local  or  special  Act?  It  does  not  contain  a clas- 
sification of  cities  or  counties,  according  to  population,  but, 
by  proviso,  the  one  county  of  the  State  which  answers  the 
description  of  it  is  excluded  from  the  operation  of  the  law. 
This  is  what  it  was  said  in  Davis  v.  Clark,  15  W.  N.  C.  209, 
could  not  be  done.  The  proviso  does  not  classify,  or  attempt 
to  classify,  the  county  of  Philadelphia.  It  does  not  refer  to  it 
by  name,  but  contains  words  of  description  which  apply  to  it 
alone  and  exclude  it  from  the  operation  of  the  Act.  This 
makes  the  Act  local,  just  as  clearly  as  would  words  limiting 
an  Act  to  the  counties  bordering  on  the  river  Delaware,  or 
to  the  county  containing  the  State  capitol.  In  my  opinion 
the  proviso  renders  the  Act  unconstitutional.” 

The  Act  of  May  3d,  1878,  P.  L.  43,  authorizing  the  courts 
of  common  pleas  to  change,  alter,  and  direct  the  mode  of 
preparing  and  keeping  indexes  in  the  several  courts  of  record, 
and  for  preparing,  making,  and  substituting  new  indexes  for 
old  indexes  or  parts  thereof  is  invalid  because  by  Section  6 
of  the  said  Act  it  is  declared  that  the  provisions  thereof  shall 
not  apply  to  counties  having  a population  of  over  400,000. 
The  Act  is  a local  law  regulating  the  affairs  of  counties  and 
prescribing  the  powers  and  duties  of  county  officers.  It  also 
violates  Article  V,  Section  26,  of  the  Constitution,  which  pro- 
vides that  the  jurisdiction  and  powers  of  all  courts  of  the  same 
class  or  grade  shall  be  uniform:  Beaver  County  Indexes,  6 C. 
C.  R.  525. 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1891,  P.  L.  214,  a re-enactment  with 
amendments  of  the  Act  of  May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  123,  authoriz- 
ing an  action  of  assumpsit  against  counties,  boroughs,  and 
townships  for  bounty,  by  veterans,  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  who  were  accredited  to  such  borough, 
township,  or  county,  providing  that  the  statute  of  limitations 
should  not  be  a bar  to  such  action  if  commenced  within  a 
certain  time  was  held  invalid  in  Cole  v.  Economy  Township, 
3 D.  R.  699,  because  it  prescribed  a limitation  for  suits  against 
corporations  different  from  those  against  natural  persons. 
The  constitutional  provision  in  question  was  held  to  be  broad 
enough  to  include  not  only  private  but  municipal  and  quasi 
municipal  corporations  as  well.  The  original  Act  was  held  in- 
valid for  other  reasons  in  Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township,  9 
C.  C.  R.  342;  s.  c.,  21  W.  N.  C.  21 1. 

The  Act  of  June  2d,  1881,  P.  L.  41,  making  all  taxes, 
whether  county,  township,  poor,  school,  or  municipal,  as- 


248 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


sessed  upon  real  estate  a first  lien,  providing  for  the  collec- 
tion of  such  taxes  and  a remedy  for  false  returns,  is  invalid 
because  cities  of  the  first,  second,  and  fourth  classes  are  ex- 
cepted from  its  provisions.  It  thus  violates  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  of  the  Constitution,  forbidding  special  laws  regulating 
the  affairs  of  counties  and  municipalities,  and  Article  IX, 
Section  1,  requiring  the  assessment  and  collection  of  taxes  to 
be  by  general  laws:  Townsend  v.  Wilson,  7 C.  C.  R.  101 ; Mil- 
ler v.  Cunningham,  7 C.  C.  R.  500;  Bryn  Mawr  v.  Anderson, 
10  C.  C.  R.  442;  Ancona  v.  Becker,  3 P.  D.  R.  86;  Van  Loon 
v.  Engle,  1 71  Pa.  St.  157. 

The  Act  of  June  1st,  1883,  P.  L.  58,  '‘empowering  and  di- 
recting county  commissioners  of  any  county  to  purchase 
ground  at  the  county  seat  for  the  erection  thereon  of  such 
building  or  buildings  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  the  courts,  and  of  the  several  officers  of  the  county, 
and  for  the  reception  and  safekeeping  of  the  records  and  other 
papers  in  charge  of  such  officers;  and  also  such  other  building 
or  buildings  as  may  be  necessary  and  proper  for  the  purposes 
of  a county  jail  or  workhouse,  when  occasion  shall  require  the 
erection  of  such  building  or  buildings,  and  in  case  the  said 
ground  cannot  be  obtained  by  agreement  with  the  owner 
or  owners  at  a reasonable  price  in  the  estimation  of  said  com- 
missioners then  to  resort  to  condemnation,”  is  invalid  by  rea- 
son of  the  proviso  to  the  last  section  that  the  Act  shall  not 
apply  to  counties  containing  cities  co-extensive  with  the 
county:  Chester  County  Court  House,  7 C.  C.  R.  212.  See 
Act  April  26th,  1889,  P.  L.  55,  by  which  the  proviso  was  re- 
pealed. 

The  Act  of  April  25th,  1889,  P.  L.  52,  authorizing  the 
county  commissioners  of  the  several  counties  to  furnish  office 
furniture,  etc.,  to  county  officers  "located  in  the  county  build- 
ings at  the  county  seat,”  is  valid:  Young  v.  Bradford  County, 
7 C.  C.  R.  428. 

The  Act  of  June  6th,  1893,  P.  L.  328,  entitled  "An  Act  pro- 
viding for  the  relief  of  needy,  sick,  injured,  and  in  case  of 
death,  burial  of  indigent  persons  whose  legal  place  of  settle- 
ment is  unknown,”  is  invalid.  In  the  opinion  in  this  case  his 
Honor,  Judge  Craig,  said:  "We  are  further  asked  to  say 

that  the  Act  under  consideration  is  unconstitutional,  because 
it  is  a local  or  special  law,  and  therefore  falls  within  the  in- 
hibition of  the  seventh  section  of  Article  III,  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. Is  the  Act  local  or  special?  It  provides  'that  in  each 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


249 


and  every  county  of  this  Commonwealth  in  which  a poor  or 
almshouse  for  the  support,  care,  and  shelter  of  the  needy  and 
indigent  is  not  maintained  by  and  at  the  county  expense,  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  the  poor  directors  or  overseers  of  the  poor 
of  the  several  poor  districts  in  such  counties  to  provide,’  etc. 
It  is  operative,  therefore,  only  in  such  counties  where  the  indi- 
gent poor  are  not  cared  for  ‘by  and  at  county  expense7 — 
where  they  are  cared  for  ‘by  and  at  county  expense’  the  Act 
is  inoperative.  It  is  a fact,  of  which  we  are  bound  to  take  ju- 
dicial notice,  that  there  is  a large  number  of  counties  in  this 
Commonwealth  in  which  poor  or  almshouses  are  maintained 
‘by  and  at  county  expense.’  Hence  the  Act  must  produce 
local  or  special  results.  This  is  manifest  from  its  face. 
Such  results  the  Constitution  will  not  allow:  City  of  Scranton 
v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191;  Davis  v.  Clark,  106  Pa.  St.  377; 
Morrison  v.  Bachert,  112  Pa.  St.  322;  McCarthy  v.  Common- 
wealth, no  Pa.  St.  243;  Commonwealth  v.  Patton,  88  Pa.  St. 
258.  In  our  judgment  this  Act  is  local  or  special  legislation 
under  the  attempted  disguise  of  a general  law.  Of  all  forms 
of  special  legislation  this  is  the  most  vicious:  Scowden’s  Ap- 
peal, 96  Pa.  St.  422;  Morrison  v.  Bachert  {supra),  330.  More- 
over, it  is  said  that  a statute  which  relates  to  particular  per- 
sons or  things  of  a class  is  special,  and  comes  within  the  con- 
stitutional prohibition:  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Pa.  St. 
338;  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Company’s  Appeal,  164  Pa.  St.  44. 
We  are  of  opinion  that  this  statute  relates  to  particular  things 
of  a class,  and  is  therefore  special:”  Conyngham  Township 
Poor  District  v.  County  of  Luzerne,  17  C.  C.  R.  83. 


1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 

State. 

2.  Cities. 

It  is  not  properly  within  the  purposes  of  class  legislation 
relating  to  cities  to  give  to  a scire  facias  sur  municipal  claim 
the  added  effect  of  a scire  facias  to  revive  and  continue  the 
lien  for  five  years,1  nor  is  an  Act  providing  for  the  incorpora- 
tion of  street  railways,2  nor  one  relating  to  the  opening  and 
widening  and  assessment  and  payment  of  damages  and  bene- 
fits for  the  opening,  widening,  and  change  of  grade  of  streets 
and  regulating  proceedings  therein,  which  attempts  to  intro- 


250 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


duce  a new  method  of  procedure  and  create  a special  mode  of 
exercising  judicial  powers.3 

School  affairs  are  not  municipal  subjects.4  The  laying  out 
of  highways,  the  decision  of  the  question  when  their  opening 
shall  take  place,  the  institution  of  proceedings  therefor,  and 
their  grading,  paving,  sewering,  and  lighting,  are  municipal 
matters,  but  the  judicial  proceedings  incident  to  the  exercise 
of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  must  be  conducted  under 
general' laws.  Such  jurisdiction  is  not  within  the  principle 
of  classification.5 

The  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  is  clearly 
and  exclusively  one  for  municipal  control.  The  power  to  col- 
lect the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  by  any  appropriate  form 
of  taxation  is  a municipal  power,  therefore  an  Act  upon  this 
subject  relating  to  the  one  of  the  classes  of  cities  is  valid,  in  so 
far  as  it  applies  in  such  cases  the  regular  and  settled  course  of 
procedure,  as,  for  example,  the  filing  of  liens  for  assessments 
with  the  usual  procedure  thereunder.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  any  provision  varying  the  usual  course  of  procedure 
in  such  matters,  as  by  providing  a special  period  of  limita- 
tion, duration  of  lien,  or  as  to  the  effect  of  a sheriff’s  sale, 
would  be  valid.6 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a statutory  provision  for  a perpetual 
lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  valid.7 

The  regulation  of  street  railway  motive  power  in  cities  is 
a proper  subject  of  class  legislation  for  cities.8 

The  provision  of  a system  of  taxation  for  cities  of  a certain 
class  is  valid  because  the  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes  is 
one  properly  pertaining  to  the  regulation  of  the  corporate 
powers  of  classes  of  cities.9 

The  annexation  of  adjacent  territory  is  a matter  proper 
for  legislation  for  classes  of  cities.10  An  Act  regulating  the 
collection  of  taxes  in  the  boroughs  and  townships  of  the  Coip- 
monwealth  is  general.11 

An  Act  to  make  taxes,  whether  county,  township,  poor, 
school,  or  municipal,  assessed  upon  real  estate,  a first  lien, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


251 


and  to  provide  for  the  collection  of  such  taxes  and  a remedy 
for  false  returns,  excepting  certain  classes  of  cities,  is  invalid.12 

A provision  in  an  Act  by  which  claims  for  overdue  taxes, 
levied  for  city,  school,  or  poor  purposes,  and  water  rents,  in 
cities  of  the  second  class,  filed  in  court,  shall  be  liens  on  the 
real  estate  described  therein  without  regard  to  whether  the 
owner  is  named  therein  or  not,  and  that  a judicial  sale  of  such 
real  estate  shall  vest  a good  title  thereto  in  the  purchaser  is 
invalid.13 

I Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291. 

2 Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St. 
192. 

3In  re  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257. 

Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds,  137  Pa.  St.  389;  Chalfant  v. 
Edwards,  173  Pa.  St.  246. 

5Wyoming  Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494;  Pittsburg’s  Petition, 
138  Pa.  St.  401. 

6Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30. 

Peeves  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Company,  152  Pa.  St. 

PS- 

Common  wealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244. 

10Harris’s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494;  and  see  McAskie’s  Ap- 
peal, 154  Pa.  St.  24;  see  also  Millvale  Borough,  43  P.  L.  J. 
41 1,  as  to  Act  of  May  8th,  1895,  P.  L.  56. 

II  Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50. 

12Van  Loon  v.  Engle,  171  Pa.  St.  157. 

13Safe  Deposit  and  Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St. 
231;  McKay  v.  Trainor,  152  Pa.  St.  242;  and  see  Common- 
wealth v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244.  And  see  further  in 
note  below. 

The  Act  of  March  22d,  1877,  P.  L.  16,  is  entitled  “An 
Act  in  relation  to  cities  of  the  second  class,  providing  for  the 
levy,  collection,  and  disbursement  of  taxes  and  water  rents.” 
It  provides  for  the  levy  and  collection  of  water  rents  in  such 


252 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


cities  and  for  the  levy  and  collection  of  all  taxes  required  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  all  the  departments  of  such  cities 
whether  legislative,  executive,  or  administrative,  “including 
schools  or  boards  of  education  or  poor  boards.”  It  expressly 
declares  in  Section  3 that  “the  educational  school  and  poor 
departments  shall  be  departments  of  the  city  government/' 
and  all  the  provisions  of  the  Act  relate  to  the  water  rents  and 
taxes  to  be  levied  and  collected  for  the  purposes  above  ex- 
pressed. It  provides  for  separate  estimates  for  the  different 
purposes  to  be  submitted  to  the  Finance  Committee  of  Coun- 
cils and  empowers  the  Councils  to  levy  the  taxes.  The  funds 
raised  for  the  different  purposes  are  required  to  be  kept  sep- 
arate. The  levy  is  required  to  be  made  in  January  and  the 
taxes  are  required  to  be  paid  one-half  in  March  and  the 
other  half  in  September.  The  business  tax  and  water  rents 
are  due  in  Tune.  The  taxes  are  levied  upon  the  “estates,  real 
and  personal,  subject  to  taxation  within  such  cities.”  Un- 
paid taxes  and  water  rents  are  delinquent  at  the  end  of  the 
month  in  which  they  are  due,  and  lists  of  such  delinquent 
taxes  and  water  rents  are  given  to  the  delinquent  tax  col- 
lector, whose  appointment  is  provided  for,  by  the  city  treas- 
urer on  or  before  the  15th  of  the  following  month.  The  col- 
lector is  given  power  to  collect  the  same  out  of  the  real  or 
personal  estate  of  the  owner,  to  levy  and  sell  personal  estate 
after  thirty  days,  and  to  direct  sale  of  real  estate  after  six 
months.  It  is  made  his  duty  to  procure  accurate  descriptions 
of  the  real  estate  on  which  delinquent  taxes  have  been  as- 
sessed and  to  file  liens  therefor  in  the  office  of  the  prothono- 
tary.  “Provided,  however,  that  in  cases  where  the  amount 
of  taxes  or  water  rents  due  shall  not  exceed  $20  the  real  es- 
tate shall  not  be  exposed  to  sale,  but  the  judgment  against 
the  same  shall  be  kept  revived.”  The  Act  subsequently  refers 
to  the  costs  of  the  sheriff  and  prothonotary,  but  there  is  in 
the  Act  no  express  provision  for,  or  express  reference  to, 
a proceeding  by  scire  facias  on  the  lien.  So  much  precedes 
Sections  11  and  12,  which  are  as  follows: 

“Section  11.  All  taxes  and  water  rents  levied  for  any  pur- 
pose in  cities  of  the  class  aforesaid  shall  remain  liens  until 
fully  paid  and  satisfied,  and  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  ju- 
dicial sale  except  to  the  extent  to  which  distribution  shall 
be  made  out  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale. 

“Section  12.  All  taxes  and  water  rents  filed  as  liens  in  de- 
fault of  payment  shall  be  liens  on  the  real  estate  whether  the 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


253 


real  owner  is  named  or  not,  and  a sale  upon  the  same  as 
against  the  party  assessed  shall  vest  a good  title  in  the  pur- 
chaser thereof.  Provided , that  the  real  owner  of  any  property 
so  sold  may  redeem  the  property  within  one  year  upon  peti- 
tion to  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  the  county  and  order 
of  said  court,  by  payment  to  the  purchaser  of  the  amount  of 
the  bid  and  ten  per  centum  additional,  the  cost  of  advertising 
and  all  expenses  incident  to  the  sale.” 

The  remaining  provisions  of  the  Act  are  not  material  to 
the  purpose. 

In  Pittsburg  v.  Plughes,  13  C.  C.  R.  535,  decided  in  Sep- 
tember, 1893,  it  appeared  by  a case-stated  that  the  taxes  in 
question,  levied  pursuant  to  the  foregoing  Act  for  the  year 
1890  against  John  Hughes,  were  filed  of  record  in  the  office 
of  the  prothonotary  in  November,  1891,  and  a scire  facias 
was  thereupon  issued.  The  case-stated  was  upon  this  scire 
facias.  It  further  appeared  that  John  Hughes  died  in  1889, 
and  that  his  administrator  had  sold  his  real  estate  at  orphans’ 
court  sale  in  December,  1890,  and  that  distribution  of  the 
fund  had  been  made  by  that  court  in  July,  1891.  The  fund 
exceeded  the  amount  of  taxes  due,  but  this  claim  thereon 
was  not  presented.  His  Honor,  Judge  Stowe,  was  of  opinion 
that  the  terms  of  the  Act  of  1877,  if  valid,  were  sufficient  to 
preserve  the  lien  notwithstanding,  and  thus  the  main  ques- 
tion was  presented,  and  as  to  this  he  said:  “It  is  now  well 
settled  that  laws  limited  to  a single  class  of  cities  fall  within 
the  constitutional  prohibition  if  they  relate  to  subjects  not 
within  the  purposes  of  classification. 

“Undoubtedly  all  the  matters  relating  to  the  assessment 
of  taxes  for  municipal  purposes,  the  filing  of  liens  therefor 
and  the  proceeding  by  which  they  may  be  collected  are  proper 
municipal  purposes,  but  the  eleventh  section  which  under- 
takes to  establish  a rule  different  from  the  general  law,  is 
attempting  to  do  that  which  is  local  in  its  character  and  not 
within  nor  connected  with  the  organization  or  administration 
of  the  city  government  or  the  regulation  of  municipal  affairs. 
And  it  also  seems  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  section  of  the 
Constitution  prohibiting  the  prescribing  the  effect  of  judicial 
sales  of  real  estate  by  special  or  local  laws.”  Judgment  was 
therefore  entered  for  the  defendants. 

In  McKay  v.  Trainor,  152  Pa.  St.  242,  a judgment  upon  a 
special  verdict  was  entered  for  the  plaintiff,  who  claimed  under 
the  purchaser  at  a sheriff’s  sale  upon  a judgment  against  the 


254 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


party  assessed,  under  the  foregoing  Act,  as  owner  of  the  real 
estate  in  question,  a lien  for  the  taxes  having  been  entered 
against  him  and  having  been  prosecuted  by  scire  facias  to 
judgment  and  sale.  The  judgment  in  this  case  was  reversed 
for  the  reasons  given  in  the  case  of  Safe  Deposit  & Trust 
Company  v.  Fricke  decided  at  the  same  time  (152  Pa.  St 
231)  in  which  case  it  appeared  that  the  taxes  there  in  ques- 
tion were  not  assessed  against  the  registered  owner  but 
against  one  apparently  not  connected  with  the  title,  and  that 
the  real  estate  had  been  sold  upon  a judgment  against  such 
party  upon  a scire  facias  upon  the  tax  lien. 

The  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  277,  entitled  “An  Act 
providing  for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities  of 
the  third  class,”  provides  in  Section  1 1 of  Article  XV  of  the 
Act  that  “all  taxes  assessed  upon  real  estate  shall  be  and  con- 
tinue to  be  liens  thereon  from  the  date  of  the  levy  thereof 
until  paid.”  Provision  is  made  for  the  registry  of  the  lien 
in  the  office  of  the  prothonotary,  but  its  validity  is  not  made 
dependent  upon  such  registry.  The  twelfth  section  of  the 
same  article  declares  that  “the  lien  of  said  taxes  shall  have 
priority  to  and  shall  be  fully  paid  and  satisfied  before  any 
recognizance,  mortgage,  judgment,  or  obligation,  lien  or  re- 
sponsibility, which  the  said  real  estate  may  become  charged 
with  or  liable  to,  and  shall  not  be  divested  by  any  judicial 
sale,  except  for  so  much  of  the  proceeds  of  such  sale  as  shall 
be  actually  applied  thereto.”  In  Smith  v.  Meadow  Brook 
Brewing  Company,  3 Lack.  Jur.  154,  his  Honor,  Judge  Arch- 
bald, sustained  the  validity  of  these  provisions  in  a case  where 
the  tax  lien  was  presented  for  allowance  out  of  a fund  for 
distribution.  His  opinion  is  quoted  from  at  large  in  Chapter 
II,  Section  11,  page  196. 

The  validity  of  the  Act  of  July  7th,  1885,  P.  L.  260,  entitled 
an  Act  to  prevent  the  adulteration  of,  and  the  traffic  in,  im- 
pure and  unwholesome  milk  in  cities  of  the  first  and  second 
class  was  doubted:  Commonwealth  v.  Hough,  1 P.  D.  R.  51. 

The  Act  of  March  17th,  1875,  P.  L.  62,  authorizing  Court 
of  Common  Pleas,  No.  2,  of  Allegheny  County,  to  appoint 
assessors  in  cities  of  the  second  class  is  invalid.  It  imposes  an 
extra-judicial  duty  and  is  local  and  special,  relating  in  effect 
to  but  one  city  and  to  one  court:  Pittsburg’s  Assessors,  7 
Leg.  Gaz.  117. 

The  Act  of  June  30th,  1885,  P.  L.  250,  authorizing  boards 
of  health  in  cities  of  the  first  class  to  regulate  house  drainage, 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


255 


the  registration  and  licensing  of  plumbers  and  the  construc- 
tion of  cess-pools,  is  valid.  The  objection  to  the  Act  was 
directed  to  those  provisions  of  it  which  authorized  the  adop- 
tion by  the  board  of  suitable  rules  and  regulations,  which  was 
alleged  to  be  a delegation  of  the  law-making  power:  Com- 
monwealth v.  Lambrecht,  3 C.  C.  R.  323;  s.  c.,  44  Leg.  Int. 
196. 

In  Carbondale  Township’s  Appeal,  5 C.  C.  R.  339,  it  was 
held  that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  May  24th,  1887,  P.  L. 
204,  for  the  annexation  of  territory  to  cities  was  valid.  The 
objection  made  in  this  case  was  that  the  annexation  and  in- 
corporation of  adjacent  territory  into  a city  is  indirectly  a 
chartering  of  such  territory,  and  that  in  view  of  the  provision 
of  Article  XV,  Section  1,  of  the  Constitution,  “that  cities  may 
be  chartered  whenever  a majority  of  the  electors  of  any  town 
or  borough  having  a population  of  at  least  10,000  shall  vote 
at  any  general  election  in  favor  of  the  same,”  the  Legislature 
has  no  power  by  such  annexation  to  impose  a city  govern- 
ment against  the  will  of  a majority  of  the  electors,  nor  except 
where  the  population  has  reached  the  limit  of  10,000.  This 
objection  was  held  to  be  unsound.  It  does  not  appear 
from  the  opinion  that  special  objection  was  made  upon  any 
other  constitutional  ground. 

The  Act  of  May  4th,  1889.  P.  L.  83,  to  authorize  the  elec- 
tion of  constables  for  three  years  in  cities  of  the  second  and 
third  classes  is  valid.  The  constable  is  not  strictly  a township 
or  ward  officer,  and  his  election  is  consequently  not  neces- 
sarily a township  or  ward  affair,  but  is  a matter  belonging  to 
the  administration  of  the  municipal  government,  and  is  there- 
fore within  the  principle  of  classification:  Reading’s  Consta- 
bles, 8 C.  C.  R.  101. 

The  Act  of  April  28th,  1887,  P.  L.  263,  entitled  “An  Act 
relating  to  the  acquisition,  purchase,  and  sale  of  real  estate  by 
the  boards  of  guardians  for  the  relief  and  employment  of  the 
poor  in  cities  of  the  second  class,”  is  valid:  Straub  v.  Pitts- 
burg, 38  P.  L.  J.  89;  affirmed,  Straub  v.  Pittsburg,  138  Pa. 
St.  356. 

Prescribing  the  effect  of  writs  of  scire  facias  upon  munici- 
pal liens  in  cities  of  the  first  class  as  was  done  by  the  Act  of 
June  27th,  1883,  P.  L.  161,  it  is  not  valid  class  legislation 
for  cities:  Philadelphia  v.  Pepper,  2 C.  C.  R.  287:  16  W.  N. 
L.  33L  Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291; 
nor  is  a provision  giving  a particular  effect  to  the  recovery  of 


256 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


a judgment  against  the  city  as  provided  in  Article  VIII,  Sec- 
tion 3,  of  the  Act  of  June  1st,  1885,  P.  L.  37,  known  as  the 
“Bullitt  Law:”  Betz  v.  City  of  Philadelphia,  4 C.  C.  R.  481; 
18  W.  N.  C.  12 1.  In  this  case  referring  to  laws  relating  to 
classes  of  cities  which  might  be  properly  enacted,  his  Honor, 
Judge  Thayer,  said:  “Such  are  laws  relating  to  the  public 
health,  the  public  safety,  to  trade  and  commerce,  police  regu- 
lations, and  the  government  and  political  affairs  of  the  cities, 
but  there  must  be  some  bounds  to  the  powers  to  enact  special 
or  local  legislation  for  the  different  classes  of  cities,  if  the  Con- 
stitution is  not  to  become  a dead  letter  upon  that  subject.” 
The  provision  in  question  was  held  to  be  in  violation  of  that 
provision  of  the  article  of  the  Constitution  which  relates  to 
the  collection  of  debts. 

1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

3.  Boroughs. 

The  annexation  of  adjacent  territory  is  a matter  proper 
for  legislation  for  cities  by  classes.1  An  Act  regulating  the 
collection  of  taxes  in  the  boroughs  and  townships  of  the  Com- 
monwealth is  general.2 

1LIarris,s  Appeal,  160  Pa.  St.  494. 

Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50;  and  see  Evans  v. 
Phillipi,  1 17  Pa.  St.  226,  and  Bennett  v.  Hunt,  142  Pa.  St. 
257- 

The  Act  of  April  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  44,  “authorizing  the 
councils  of  incorporated  boroughs  to  require  the  paving, 
curbing,  and  macadamizing  of  streets  or  thoroughfares,  or 
parts  thereof,  and  assess  a portion  of  the  cost  of  the  same  on 
the  owners  of  property  abutting  thereon,  and  providing  for 
the  collection  of  the  same,”  is  valid;  it  applies  to  all  boroughs, 
although  special  charters  may  not  call  municipal  authorities 
“councils:”  Greensburg  v.  Laird,  8 C.  C.  R.  608. 

The  Act  of  June  nth,  1879,  P.  L.  150,  supplementary  to 
the  general  borough  law  of  1851,  and  the  Act  of  May  17th, 
1883,  P.  L.  35,  amendatory  thereof  are  valid:  Pottstown  Bor- 
ough, 1 Montgomery  County,  189,  affirmed  4 Montgomery 
County,  29. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


257 


1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

4.  Townships. 

An  Act  requiring  the  school  directors  of  a certain  township 
to  levy  a tax  to  reimburse  certain  persons  for  moneys  ex- 
pended to  fill  the  township  quota  for  drafted  men  is  a local 
and  special  Act  regulating  the  affairs  of  a township.1 

An  Act  regulating  the  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 
townships  of  the  Commonwealth  is  general.2 

An  Act  enabling  taxpayers  of  townships  and  road  districts 
to  contract  for  making  the  roads  at  their  own  expense  and 
paying  salaries  of  township  or  road  district  officers  and  there- 
by preventing  the  levy  and  collection  of  road  taxes  therein  is 
valid.3 

1 Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa.  St.  125. 

2Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50;  and  see  Evans  v. 
Phillipi,  1 17  Pa.  St.  226,  and  Bennett  v.  Hunt,  142  Pa.  St. 
257- 

3Lehigh  Valley  Railroad  Company’s  Appeal,  164  Pa.  St. 
44;  Philadelphia  & Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Company’s  Peti- 
tion, 164  Pa.  St.  248. 

1.  Local  Affairs  of  Political  Subdivisions  of  the 
State. 

5.  School  Districts. 

The  Act  of  July  3d,  1895,  P.  L.  588,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
establish  and  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  school  districts  and  sub- 
school districts  in  cities  of  the  second  class,  and  to  repeal  all 
local  and  special  laws  inconsistent  therewith,”  enacted  in  its 
first  section  that  hereafter  each  city  of  the  second  class  should 
constitute  an  independent  public  school  district,  known  as 

the  school  district  of  the  city  of , and  should  be 

constituted,  governed,  controlled,  and  regulated  in  the  man- 
ner prescribed  by  the  Act,  which  contained  an  elaborate  sys- 
17 


258 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


tem  of  legislation  for  such  school  districts.  On  the  same  day 
a separate  Act  was  passed  repealing  certain  local  and  special 
laws  recited  by  their  titles  relating  to  the  city  of  Pittsburg, 
P.  L.  603.  These  Acts  were  held  to  be  invalid.1  In  this  case 
Mr.  Justice  Williams  said,  after  referring  to  a number  of 
cases  cited:  “In  every  instance  we  have  asserted  the  same 

rule,  saying  that  the  effect  of  classification  must  not  be  car- 
ried beyond  its  purpose  as  declared  in  the  original  classifica- 
tion law,  and  that  a law  relating  to  any  other  subject,  though 
embracing  all  the  cities  of  any  given  class,  or  of  all  the  classes 
into  which  cities  are  divided,  is  local  and  unconstitutional  if 
the  subject  be  one  upon  which  local  and  special  legislation  is 
forbidden.  The  regulation  of  the  affairs  of  school  districts 
is  such  a subject.  It  is  distinctly  named  in  the  list  of  subjects 
enumerated  in  the  fifty-second  section  of  Article  III,  upon 
which  ‘The  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  spe- 
cial law.’ 

“The  precise  point  was  under  consideration  in  the  Appeal  of 
the  City  of  Scranton  School  District,  113  Pa.  St.  176,  and  we 
there  held  that  ‘if  an  Act  regulating  the  affairs  ...  of  school 
districts  either  produces  or  may  produce  local  results  it  of- 
fends against  Article  III,  of  the  Constitution,  and  is  therefore 
void.’ 

“The  Act  now  before  us  was  passed  to  establish  a local  sys- 
tem. Its  results  were  intended  to  be  local,  and  only  local. 
They  can  by  no  possibility  be  anything  but  local.  It  is  there- 
fore squarely  within  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  Appeal  of  the 
Scranton  School  District,  as  well  as  squarely  within  the  words 
of  the  constitutional  prohibition.  It  is  beyond  the  power 
of  the  Legislature  to  enact,  and  absolutely  void.”  The  repeal- 
ing Act  was  held  to  be  void  for  want  of  publication  of  notice. 

1Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  173  Pa.  St.  246. 

In  Engle  v.  Reichard,  4 C.  C.  R.  48,  4 Kulp,  361,  decided 
prior  to  the  case  of  Avars’  Appeal,  it  was  held  that 
the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  classify,  and  to  pass  laws 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


2 59 


relating  to  given  classes,  included  the  power  to  classify 
school  districts,  that  the  Act  of  May  28th,  1887,  P.  L.  274, 
was  valid,  and  that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  May  28th, 
1887,  P.  L.  274,  constituting  each  city  of  the  fourth,  fifth, 
sixth,  and  seventh  classes  one  school  district  were  valid.  In 
this  case  his  Honor,  Judge  Rice,  remarked:  “ Assuming,  as 

the  counsel  do  in  their  argument,  that  the  affairs  of  the  school 
district  or  districts  within  the  territorial  limits  of  a city  are 
entirely  distinct  from  the  municipal  affairs,  and  then  carrying 
out  the  proposition  as  thus  understood  to  its  logical  conclu- 
sion would  lead  to  results  which,  we  believe,  the  learned  coun- 
sel would  themselves  declare  never  were  contemplated  by  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution.  Such  an  interpretation  would  not 
only  prevent  all  legislation  applying  exclusively  to  school  dis- 
tricts in  cities  of  certain  specified  class  or  classes,  but  also  leg- 
islation applying  to  school  districts  in  cities  as  distinguished 
from  boroughs  and  townships.  That  the  subject-matter  of 
such  legislation  might  be  of  a character  which  would  make 
the  law  unconstitutional  because  it  did  not  apply  uniformly  to 
all  school  districts  of  the  Commonwealth,  we  do  not  deny. 
But  we  are  not  convinced  that  a law  relating  exclusively  to 
the  formation  of  school  districts  in  cities  or  boroughs,  or  vest- 
ing the  control  of  the  affairs  of  such  districts,  or  specifying 
the  number  or  mode  of  electing  members  of  the  board  of  di- 
rectors in  such  districts,  would  be  local  or  special  because  it 
did  not  apply  uniformly  throughout  the  Commonwealth  so  as 
to  include  school  districts  in  townships.  Under  such  an  inter- 
pretation of  the  constitutional  provision  against  special  legis- 
lation, the  machinery  of  the  State  government  would  indeed 
‘be  so  bolted  and  riveted  down  by  the  fundamental  law  as  to 
be  unable  to  perform  its  necessary  functions.’  It  is  true  that 
a school  district  is  a quasi  corporation,  and,  as  such,  to  a cer- 
tain extent,  at  least,  may  be  entirely  distinct  from  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  municipal  division  of  the  State  within  which  it 
may  be  located.  Indeed,  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  Legislature, 
in  the  creation  of  school  districts  under  a general  law,  to  en- 
tirely ignore  the  lines  of  such  municipal  divisions:  Colvin  v. 
Beaver,  94  Pa.  St.  388.  But  does  it  follow  because  a school 
district  is,  in  a sense,  independent  of  and  distinct  from  the 
city  or  borough,  that  a law,  to  be  general,  for  the  creation, 
division,  or  change  of  school  districts,  or  for  the  election  of  di- 
rectors must  ignore  city,  borough,  and  ward  lines  and  be 
framed  according  to  a plan  or  classification,  if  you  please,  that 


26o 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


would  apply  equally  well  in  all  particulars  in  townships?  We 
think  not.” 

The  second  section  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  274, 
constituting  each  city  of  the  third  class  a single  school  dis- 
trict, providing  for  the  election  for  its  school  controllers,  the 
levy  and  collection  of  taxes  and  the  management  of  its  affairs 
is  invalid  because  cities  of  the  first  and  second  classes  are  ex- 
cluded from  its  operation.  After  reviewing  previous  cases, 
his  Honor,  Judge  Rice,  concluded  the  opinion  as  follows: 
“We  return,  now,  to  an  application  of  the  principle  enunciated 
in  the  above  cases.  The  management  of  public  schools  is  not 
one  of  the  corporate  powers  of  cities  of  the  third  class  and 
school  directors  are  not  corporate  officers  thereof.  Further- 
more, we  are  not  convinced  that  there  is  any  necessity  springing 
from  manifest  peculiarities  other  than  such  as  are  due  to  ex- 
isting special  and  local  legislation,  distinguishing  school  dis- 
tricts in  cities  of  one  class  from  those  in  other  classes,  which 
imperatively  demand  legislation  for  the  management  of  the 
affairs  of  that  class  of  districts  which  would  be  useless  and 
detrimental  to  other  city  school  districts.  It  follows  that  the 
section  under  consideration  cannot  be  sustained  upon  the 
ground  that  cities  are  now  classified  for  the  purposes  to  which 
it  relates,  or  upon  the  ground  that  classification  is  necessary 
and  allowable  for  those  purposes:”  Commonwealth  v.  Reich- 
ard,  8 C.  C.  R.  563;  s.  c.,  5 Kulp,  540.. 

In  another  case  decided  by  the  same  learned  judge  at  the 
same  time  (Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds,  8 C.  C.  R.  568,  re- 
versed Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds,  137  Pa.  St.  389;  and  see 
Chapter  II,  Section  6,  option  under  classification  Acts),  the 
validity  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  274,  Sections  1 and 
9,  were  sustained;  Section  1 provided  that  each  city  of  the 
third  class  hereafter  incorporated  shall  constitute  a school 

district  to  be  termed  a school  district  of  the  city  of ; 

the  ninth  section  provided  that  any  city  of  the  third  class  now 
incorporated  may  accept  and  become  subject  to  the  provis- 
ions of  the  Act  by  resolution  of  the  school  boards  of  such 
city,  duly  passed  by  a majority  of  the  members  elected  to 
each  of  the  separate  districts  thereof:  the  section  fur- 
ther provided  that  upon  the  exercise  of  the  option  such  city 
shall  constitute  a school  district  within  the  meaning  of  this 
Act,  and  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  same,  any  pro- 
vision of  any  local  or  special  law  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing. After  sustaining  the  option  principle  of  the  Act  by 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


26l 


showing  that  other  cities  were  by  existing  laws  single  school 
districts,  and  that  therefore  it  was  not  necessary  to  extend  the 
option  beyond  those  cities  not  in  harmony  with  the  general 
law,  that  the  exercise  of  the  option  would  result  in  every  city 
of  the  Commonwealth  being  a single  school  district,  and  that 
the  tendency  of  the  exercise  of  the  option  was  to  uniformity, 
the  learned  judge  concluded  that  Sections  1 and  9 standing 
alone  would  be  valid  and  proceeded  to  consider  the  question 
whether  those  sections  could  be  sustained  notwithstanding 
Section  2 and  possibly  others  were  invalid.  His  conclusion  is 
thus  expressed:  “Two  objects  were  intended  to  be  accom- 

plished by  the  Act  of  1889;  first,  consolidation  of  school  dis- 
tricts of  cities  of  the  third  class;  second,  government  of  all 
school  districts  in  cities  of  the  third  class.  The  intention  as  to 
the  second  object  has  failed  of  effect,  but  not  as  to  the  first  as 
a necessary  consequence.  It  is  a question  of  intention,  and, 
upon  a fair  view  of  the  whole  Act,  and  having  regard  to  the 
weight  of  authority,  we  conclude  that  the  provisions  for  the 
accomplishment  of  the  first  object  should  be  sustained.” 

The  Act  of  June  4th,  1885,  P.  L.  108,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
prohibit  members  of  boards  of  school  control,  in  cities  of  the 
third  class,  from  holding  any  office  of  emolument  under,  or 
being  employed  by  said  board,”  is  invalid,  and  so  is  the  forty- 
first  section  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  P.  L.  230-254,  which 
provides  that  each  city  of  the  third  class  shall  constitute  one 
school  district  and  regulates  the  school  affairs  of  school  dis- 
tricts in  such  cities.  The  opinion  in  this  case  follows  Van 
Loon  v.  Engle,  171  Pa.  St.  157,  and  Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  173 
Pa.  St.  246:  Gaston  v.  Graham,  18  C.  C.  R.  265;  s.  p.,  Baker 
v.  McKee,  6 P.  D.  R.  599. 

2.  Highways. 

Provisions  as  to  highways. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  5.  Authorizing  the  laying 
out,  altering,  or  maintaining  roads,  highways,  streets,  or 
alleys. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  7.  Vacating  roads,  town- 
plats,  streets,  or  alleys. 

An  Act  relating  to  the  opening  and  widening  and  assess- 
ment and  payment  of  damages  and  benefits  for  the  opening, 


262 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


widening,  and  change  of  grade  of  streets  in  cities  of  the  first 
class  and  regulating  proceedings  therein,  is  rendered  local  by 
provisions  essential  to  its  execution  relating  to  procedure  and 
jurisdiction  of  courts  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.1 

The  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  is  clearly 
and  exclusively  one  for  municipal  control.  The  power  to 
collect  the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  by  any  appropriate  form 
of  taxation  is  a municipal  power,  therefore  an  Act  upon  this 
subject  relating  to  one  of  the  classes  of  cities  is  valid,  in  so  far 
as  it  applies  in  such  cases  the  regular  and  settled  course  of 
procedure,  as,  for  example,  the  filing  of  liens  for  assessments 
with  the  usual  procedure  thereunder.  It  is  doubtful,  how- 
ever, whether  any  provision  varying  the  usual  course  of  pro- 
cedure in  such  matters  as  by  providing  a special  period  of 
limitation,  duration  of  lien,  or  as  to  the  effect  of  a sheriff’s 
sale,  would  be  valid.2 

1In  re  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257;  and  see  Wyoming 
Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494;  Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138  Pa.  St.  401. 

2Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 


3.  Judicial  Matters. 

Provisions  as  to  judicial  matters. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  17.  Regulating  the  practice 
or  jurisdiction  of  or  changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in  any  ju- 
dicial proceeding  or  inquiry  before  courts,  aldermen,  justices 
of  the  peace,  sheriffs,  commissioners,  arbitrators,  auditors, 
masters  in  chancery,  or  other  tribunals.  Providing  or  chang- 
ing the  method  for  the  collection  of  debts  or  the  enforcing  of 
judgments  or  prescribing  the  effect  of  judicial  sales  of  real 
estate. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  18.  Regulating  the 
fees  or  extending  the  powers  and  duties  of  aldermen,  justices 
of  the  peace,  magistrates,  or  constables. 

Article  V,  Section  26.  All  laws  relating  to  courts  shall  be 
general  and  of  uniform  operation,  and  the  organization,  jur- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


263 


isdiction,  and  powers  of  all  courts  of  the  same  class  or  grade 
so  far  as  regulated  by  law  and  the  force  and  effect  of  the  pro- 
cess and  judgments  of  such  courts  shall  be  uniform. 

An  Act  authorizing  appeals  to  courts  of  common  pleas 
from  tax  assessments  in  counties  of  less  than  500,000  popu- 
lation is  local  and  special.1 

An  Act  empowering  the  sheriffs  and  prothonotaries  of  the 
several  counties  to  sue  for  their  fees,  providing  special  reme- 
dies in  such  cases,  is  special.2 

The  Act  of  1879  enlarging  civil  jurisdiction  of  justices  of 
the  peace  to  $300  is  not  rendered  local  or  special  by  the  ex- 
clusion of  cities  of  the  first  class  from  its  operation,  because 
the  city  of  Philadelphia  is  intended  by  this  statute  and  this 
city  is  governed  by  a special  constitutional  provision  limiting 
the  jurisdiction  to  $ioo.3 

An  Act  giving  scire  facias  sur  municipal  claim  the  added 
effect  of  a scire  facias  to  revive  and  continue  the  lien  for  five 
years  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  a local  Act.4 

The  special  regulation  of  the  jurisdiction  and  procedure  of 
courts  of  quarter  sessions  in  relation  to  the  opening  and 
widening  and  assessment  and  payment  of  damages  and  bene- 
fits for  the  opening,  widening,  and  change  of  grade  of  streets 
in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  local.5 

An  Act  confined  to  cities  of  a certain  class  regulating  the 
procedure  for  the  collection  of  damages  and  benefits  and  pro- 
viding for  the  filing  of  liens  and  regulating  the  proceedings 
thereon  is  local.6 

The  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  is  clearly 
and  exclusively  one  for  municipal  control.  The  power  to  col- 
lect the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  by  any  appropriate  form  of 
taxation  is  a municipal  power,  therefore  an  Act  upon  this  sub- 
ject relating  to  the  one  of  classes  of  cities  is  valid  in  so  far 
as  it  supplies  in  such  cases  the  regular  and  settled  course  of 
procedure,  as,  for  example,  the  filing  of  liens  for  assessments 
with  the  usual  procedure  thereunder.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  any  provision  varying  the  usual  course  of  procedure 


264 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


in  such  matters  as  by  providing  a special  period  of  limitation, 
duration  of  lien,  or  as  to  the  effect  of  a sheriff’s  sale  would  be 
valid.7 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a statutory  provision  for  a perpetual 
lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  valid.8 

A provision  in  an  Act  that  claims  for  overdue  city,  poor, 
and  school  taxes  and  water  rents,  in  cities  of  the  second  class 
filed  in  court,  shall  be  liens  on  the  real  estate  described  therein, 
without  regard  to  whether  the  owner  is  named  therein  or  not, 
and  that  a judicial  sale  of  such  real  estate  shall  vest  a good 
title  thereto  in  the  purchaser,  is  invalid.9 

1Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191. 

2Strine  v.  Foltz,  113  Pa.  St.  349. 

3Wilkes-Barre  v.  Myers,  113  Pa.  St.  395. 

Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  1 1 5 Pa.  St.  291. 

5In  re  Ruan  Street,  132  Pa.  St.  257. 

6Wyoming  Street,  137  Pa.  St.  474;  Pittsburg’s  Petition,  138 
Pa.  St.  401. 

7 Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30. 

9Safe  Deposit  & Trust  Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St.  231; 
McKay  v.  Trainor,  152  Pa.  St.  242;  and  see  Commonwealth 
v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244.  And  see  supra,  under  2 Cijies 
and  note  thereunder. 

The  Act  of  June  8th,  1891,  P.  L.  214,  a re-enactment  with 
amendments  of  the  Act  of  May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  123,  authoriz- 
ing an  action  of  assumpsit  against  counties,  boroughs,  and 
township  for  bounty,  by  veterans,  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  who  were  accredited  to  such  borough, 
township,  or  county,  providing  that  the  statute  of  limitations 
should  not  be  a bar  to  such  action  if  commenced  within  a cer- 
tain time  was  held  invalid,  in  Cole  v.  Economy  Township, 
3 D.  R.  699,  because  it  prescribed  a limitation  for  suits 
against  corporations,  different  from  those  against  natural  per- 
sons. The  constitutional  provision  in  question  was  held  to  be 
broad  enough  to  include  not  only  private  but  municipal  and 
quasi  municipal  corporations  as  well.  The  original  Act  was 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  265 

held  invalid  for  other  reasons  in  Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township, 
9 C.  C.  R.  342;  s.  c.,  21  W.  N.  C.  21 1. 

Prior  to  1874  certain  Acts  of  Assembly  regulated  the 
traffic  in  mineral  water  bottles  and  other  bottles.  This  legis- 
lation was  restricted. to  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  The  Act  of 
May  5th,  1876,  P.  L.  109,  was  passed  to  correct  certain  errors 
in  transcription  of  one  of  these  Acts,  and  provided  in  Section 
2 that  the  certificate  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth 
should  be  conclusive  evidence  of  the  publication,  marking,  and 
registering  of  mineral  water  and  other  bottles,  required  by 
the  laws  of  the  Commonwealth.  This  provision  was  held  in- 
valid because  a special  law  changing  the  rules  of  evidence  in 
judicial  proceedings:  Commonwealth  v.  Farley,  6 C.  C.  R. 
433- 

In  Betz  v.  Philadelphia,  4 C.  C.  R.  481;  s.  c.,  18  W.  N. 
C.  121,  it  was  held  that  the  provisions  of  Article  VIII,  Sec- 
tion 3,  of  the  Act  of  June  1st,  1885,  P.  L.  37,  commonly 
known  as  “the  Bullitt  Law/’  relating  to  the  recovery  of  judg- 
ments against  the  city  of  Philadelphia  were  invalid. 

So  much  of  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1889,  P.  L.  277,  providing 
for  the  incorporation  and  government  of  cities  of  the  third 
class  as  refers  to  the  assessment  of  damages  for  the  opening  of 
streets  is  invalid  in  that  it  attempts  to  provide  a special  rule 
for  the  assessment  of  the  same,  which  does  not  apply  to  the 
entire  State.  The  question  of  damages  for  the  land  taken  by 
the  right  of  eminent  domain  is  one  common  to  the  whole 
State,  and  in  no  way  peculiar  to  city  government:  Gardner 
v.  Chester,  2 P.  D.  R.  162. 

The  Acts  of  February  14th,  1889,  P-  L.  6,  and  June  26th, 
1895,  P.  L.  375,  are  valid.  The  first  is  entitled  an  Act  to  au- 
thorize the  election  of  constables  for  three  years,  and  provides 
for  such  election  by  the  voters  of  every  borough  and  town- 
ship, and  when  the  borough  is  divided  into  wards,  of  every 
ward.  The  latter  Act  is  entitled  an  Act  to  amend  the  fore- 
going by  providing  for  the  election  of  a high  constable  in 
each  of  the  boroughs  of  the  Commonwealth  for  three  years, 
and  by  correcting  the  ambiguity  as  to  the  beginning  of  the 
terms  of  office  under  the  first  mentioned  Act:  Allegheny 
County  Constables,  17  C.  C.  R.  622. 

The  Act  of  May  4th,  1889,  P.  L.  83,  to  authorize  the  elec- 
tion of  constables  for  three  years  in  cities  of  the  second  and 
third  class  is  valid.  The  constable  is  not  strictly  a township 
or  ward  officer,  and  his  election  is  consequently  not  neces- 


266 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


sarily  a township  or  ward  affair,  but  is  a matter  pertaining  to 
the  administration  of  the  municipal  government,  and  is  there- 
fore within  the  principle  of  classification:  Reading’s  Consta- 
bles, 8 C.  C.  R.  ioi. 

The  two  foregoing  cases  are  here  placed  because  of  the 
relation  of  the  constable  to  the  justice  of  the  peace,  and  be- 
cause of  the  relation  to  these  officers  to  the  general  judicial 
system  of  the  State. 

The  Act  of  March  17th,  1875,  P.  L.  62,  authorizing  Court 
of  Common  Pleas,  No.  2,  of  Allegheny  County,  to  appoint 
assessors  in  cities  of  the  second  class  is  invalid.  It  imposes 
an  extra-judicial  duty  and  is  local  and  special,  relating  in  effect 
to  but  one  city  and  to  one  court:  Pittsburg’s  Assessors,  7 
Leg.  Gaz.  117. 

The  Constitution  in  Article  VIII,  Section  17,  provides  that 
the  General  Assembly  shall  by  general  law  designate  the 
courts  and  judges  by  whom  the  several  classes  of  election  con- 
tests shall  be  tried,  and  regulates  the  manner  of  trial  and  all 
matters  incident  thereto.  Construed  with  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  and  Article  V,  Section  26,  this  provision  seems  to 
create  an  exception;  it  recognizes  the  necessity  and  propriety 
of  the  classification  of  cases  of  contested  elections,  and  pro- 
vides for  general  laws  governing  the  several  classes,  while,  at 
the  same  time,  it  provides  that  the  General  Assembly  shall 
designate  the  courts  and  judges  by  whom  the  several  classes 
of  election  contests  shall  be  tried.  The  Act  of  May  19th, 
1874,  P.  L.  208,  enacted  to  carry  into  effect  Article  VIII,  Sec- 
tion 17,  classifies  cases  of  contested  elections  and  puts  in  one 
class  electors  of  presidents  and  vice-presidents  of  the  United 
States,  and  all  officers  of  the  Commonwealth,  except  Gover- 
nor and  Lieutenant-Governor,  who  are  required  to  be  elected 
by  the  State  at  large.  Jurisdiction  of  this  class  of  cases  is 
vested  in  the  court  of  common  pleas  6f  Dauphin  County,  by 
name,  and  the  two  president  judges,  learned  in  the  law,  resid- 
ing nearest  to  the  court-house  of  the  said  judicial  district. 

The  Act  of  June  10th,  1893,  P.  L.  419,  known  as  “The  Ba- 
ker Ballot  Law,”  provides  in  Section  6 for  the  hearing  of  ob- 
jections to  certificates  of  nomination,  and  vests  the  jurisdic- 
tion in  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  the  county  in  which  the 
certificate  or  paper  objected  to  has  been  filed.  Such  certifi- 
cates or  papers  as  to  certain  officers  are  filed  with  the  Secretary 
of  the  Commonwealth,  and  consequently  jurisdiction  of  ob- 
jections to  them  vests  in  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  Dau- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


267 


phin  County.  This  exceptional  jurisdiction  has  never  been 
questioned,  and  undoubtedly  finds  its  safe  basis  in  the  con- 
stitutional recognition  of  the  necessity  for  legislation  by 
classes  in  relation  to  election  contests,  a species  of  which, 
created  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  includes  the 
nomination  of  public  officers. 

Referring  to  the  provision  of  Clause  17,  of  Article  III,  Sec- 
tion 7,  which  prohibits  the  prescribing  the  effect  of  judicial 
sales  of  real  estate  by  local  or  special  law,  Mr.  Buckalew 
(Buckalew  on  the  Constitution,  page  99)  says:  “It  is  believed 
that  the  true  construction  of  the  last  clause  of  this  (seven- 
teenth) division  of  the  section  does  not  forbid  the  exercise  by 
the  Legislature  of  a remedial  power  known  from  the  earliest 
times  in  the  history  of  Pennsylvania,  never  the  subject  of  pop- 
ular complaint,  and  which  the  constitutional  convention  very 
certainly  did  not  intend  to  destroy.” 

He  then  gives  the  parliamentary  history  of  the  clause  in  the 
convention,  and  concludes:  “But  upon  the  whole  language  of 
this  clause  in  the  seventh  section,  independent  of  its  history 
and  of  the  general  argument  above,  it  is  plain  that  it  can  have 
no  application  to  retroactive,  curative  laws.  The  effect  of  ju- 
dicial sales  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  clause,  whereas  a pro- 
ceeding of  sale  is  the  subject-matter  of  a curative,  confirming 
Act.  An  Act  may  confirm  or  validate  a sale — may  cure  a de- 
fect in  the  proceedings  of  sale,  and  cause  the  sale  to  take  effect 
— while  it  does  not  determine  what  the  effects  or  consequences 
of  a sale  shall  be.  In  such  case  the  operation  and  results  of 
the  confirmed  sale  will  be  left  to  the  general  law  of  the  State, 
and  remain  untouched.  The  fallacy  of  an  objection  to  such  an 
Act,  founded  upon  this  clause,  consists  in  confounding  a 
question  of  sale  or  no  sale,  as  affected  by  the  Act,  with  a per- 
fectly distinct  and  subsequent  question,  with  which  the  Act 
will  have  nothing  to  do.  The  Legislature  may  confirm  a sale 
in  a proper  case,  but  cannot  prescribe  an  effect  for  the  con- 
firmed sale  different  from  that  prescribed  by  the  general  law 
of  the  State.” 


4.  Liens. 

Provision  as  to  liens. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  1.  Authorizing  the  crea- 
tion, extension,  or  impairing  of  liens. 


268 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


An  Act  authorizing  the  filing  of  mechanic’s  liens  in  certain 
cases,  containing  a proviso  that  it  shall  not  apply  to  counties 
having  over  200,000  inhabitants  is  local.1 

An  Act  giving  scire  facias  sur  municipal  claim  the  added 
effect  of  a scire  facias  to  revive  and  continue  the  lien  for  five 
years  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  a local  Act.2 

An  Act  providing  special  provisions  relating  to  liens  for 
municipal  improvements  in  cities  of  the  second  class  is  local.3 

The  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  is  clearly 
and  exclusively  one  for  municipal  control.  The  power  to  col- 
lect the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  by  any  appropriate  form  of 
taxation  is  a municipal  power,  therefore  an  Act  upon  this  sub- 
ject relating  to  the  one  of  classes  of  cities  is  valid,  in  so  far 
as  it  applies  in  such  cases  the  regular  and  settled  course  of 
procedure,  as,  for  example,  the  filing  of  liens  for  assessments 
with  the  usual  procedure  thereunder.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  any  provision  varying  the  usual  course  of  procedure 
in  such  matters  as  by  providing  a special  period  of  limitation, 
duration  of  lien,  or  as  to  the  effect  of  a sheriff’s  sale,  would 
be  valid.4 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a statutory  provision  for  a perpetual 
lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  valid.5 

A provision  in  an  Act  that  claims  for  overdue  city,  school, 
and  poor  taxes  and  water  rents,  in  cites  of  the  second  class, 
filed  in  court,  shall  be  liens  on  the  real  estate  described  therein 
without  regard  to  whether  the  owner  is  named  therein  or  not, 
and  that  a judicial  sale  of  such  real  estate  shall  vest  a good 
title  thereto  in  the  purchaser,  is  invalid.6 

An  Act  to  make  taxes  assessed  upon  real  estate,  whether 
county,  township,  poor,  school,  or  municipal,  a first  lien,  and 
to  provide  for  the  collection  of  such  taxes  and  a remedy  for 
false  returns,  excepting  certain  classes  of  cities,  is  invalid.7 

1 Davis  v.  Clark,  106  Pa.  St.  377. 

Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291. 

3 Wyoming  Street,  137  Pa.  St.  494;  Pittsburg’s  Petition, 
138  Pa.  St.  401. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  269 

4Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30. 

6McKay  v.  Trainor,  152  Pa.  St.  242;  Safe  Deposit  & Trust 
Company  v.  Fricke,  152  Pa.  St.  231;  and  see  Commonwealth 
v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244.  And  see  supra  2 Cities  and 
note  thereunder. 

7 Van  Loon  v.  Engle,  171  Pa.  St.  157. 

The  Act  of  June  27th,  1883,  P.  L.  161,  providing  that 
writs  of  scire  facias  for  the  collection  of  municipal  claims  shall 
have  the  effect  of  writs  to  revive  the  lien  of  such  claims,  being 
confined  to  cities  of  the  first  class,  is  invalid,  because  it  is  a 
local  Act  infringing  those  provisions  of  the  Constitution  re- 
lating to  the  creation,  extension,  or  impairing  of  liens,  to  pro- 
viding or  changing  the  methods  for  the  collection  of  debts, 
and  to  the  operation  of  laws  relative  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
courts:  Philadelphia  v.  Pepper,  2 C.  C.  R.  287;  16  W.  N.  C. 
13 1 ; Philadelphia  v.  Haddington  Church,  115  Pa.  St.  291. 


5.  Taxation. 

Provisions  as  to  taxation. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  23.  Exempting  property 
from  taxation. 

Article  IX,  Section  1.  All  taxes  shall  be  uniform  upon  the 
same  class  of  subjects  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  au- 
thority levying  the  tax,  and  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under 
general  laws;  but  the  General  Assembly  may  by  general  laws 
exempt  from  taxation  public  property  used  for  public  pur- 
poses, actual  places  of  religious  worship,  places  of  burial  not 
used  or  held  for  private  or  corporate  profit,  and  institutions 
of  purely  public  charity. 

Article  IX,  Section  8.  But  any  city  the  debt  of  which  now 
exceeds  seven  per  centum  of  such  assessed  valuation  may  be 
authorized  by  law  to  increase  the  same  three  per  centum  in 
the  aggregate  at  any  one  time  upon  such  valuation. 


A special  law  requiring  the  levy  of  a tax  for  a specific  pur- 
pose in  a certain  township  is  invalid.1 


270 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


An  Act  authorizing  appeals  to  courts  of  common  pleas  by 
owners  of  real  estate  from  tax  assessments  in  counties  of  less 
than  500,000  inhabitants  is  local  and  special.2 

A law  regulating  the  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 
townships  is  general.3 

The  subject  of  the  grading  and  paving  of  streets  is  clearly 
an  exclusive  one  for  municipal  control.  The  power  to  collect 
the  cost  of  the  work  so  done  by  any  appropriate  form  of  taxa- 
tion is  a municipal  power,  therefore  an  Act  upon  this  subject 
relating  to  the  one  of  the  classes  of  cities  is  valid  in  so  far 
as  it  applies  in  such  cases  the  regular  and  settled  course  of 
procedure.  As,  for  example,  the  filing  of  liens  for  assess- 
ments with  the  usual  procedure  thereunder.  It  is  doubtful, 
however,  whether  any  provision  varying  the  usual  course  of 
procedure  in  such  matters  as  by  providing  a special  period  of 
limitation,  duration  of  lien,  or  as  to  the  effect  of  a sheriff’s  sale 
would  be  valid.4 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a statutory  provision  for  a perpetual 
lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  the  first  class  is  valid.5 

The  provision  of  a system  of  taxation  for  cities  of  a cer- 
tain class  is  valid  because  the  power  to  levy  and  collect  taxes 
is  one  properly  pertaining  to  the  regulation  of  the  corporate 
powers  of  classes  of  cities.6 

An  Act  enabling  taxpayers  of  townships  and  road  districts 
to  contract  for  making  the  roads  at  their  own  expense  and 
paying  salaries  of  township  or  road  district  officers  and  there- 
by preventing  the  levy  and  collection  of  road  taxes  therein 
is  valid.7 

An  Act  which  provides  a system  for  taxing  the  fees  of  offi- 
cers in  counties  having  less  than  150,000  inhabitants  is  valid.8 

An  Act  to  make  taxes  assessed  upon  real  estate,  whether 
county,  township,  poor,  school,  or  municipal,  a first  lien,  and 
to  provide  for  the  collection  of  such  taxes  and  a remedy  for 
false  returns,  excepting  certain  classes  of  cities  is  invalid.9 

Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Pa.  St.  125. 

2City  of  Scranton  v.  Silkman,  113  Pa.  St.  191. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


271 


3Evans  v.  Phillipi,  117  Pa.  St.  226;  s.  p.,  Bitting  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 20  W.  N.  C.  178;  Swatara  Township  School  Dis- 
trict’s Appeal,  1 Super  Ct.  502;  Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162 
Pa.  St.  50. 

4Scranton  v.  Whyte,  148  Pa.  St.  419. 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates,  150  Pa.  St.  30. 

Commonwealth  v.  Macferron,  152  Pa.  St.  244. 

7 Lehigh  Valley  Railroad  Company’s  Appeal,  164  Pa.  St. 
44;  Philadelphia  & Reading  Coal  and  Iron  Company’s  Peti- 
tion, 164  Pa.  St.  248. 

Commonwealth  v.  Anderson,  178  Pa.  St.  171. 

9Van  Loon  v.  Engle,  171  Pa.  St.  157.  And  see  note  Chap- 
ter I,  Section  1,  page  98,  supra. 


The  validity  of  the  Act  of  May  12th,  1897,  P.  L.  56,  known 
as  the  Direct  Inheritance  Tax  Law,  has  not  been  finally  de- 
termined. The  lower  courts  are  not  agreed  as  to  its  validity: 
Portuondo’s  Estate,  19  C.  C.  R.  419,  6 P.  D.  R.  462;  Blight’s 
Estate,  19  C.  C.  R.  426,  6 P.  D.  R.  4^9;  Lacy’s  Estate,  19  C. 
C.  R.  431,6  P.  D.  R.  499. 

The  provisions  of  the  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  P.  L.  7, 
supplementary  to  the  Act  of  May  23d,  1874,  relating  to  the 
classification  of  property  for  purposes  of  taxation  are  not  in 
violation  of  Article.  IX  of  the  Constitution.  By  Section  4 of 
the  supplement,  real  estate  is  classified  as  built-up  property, 
rural  or  suburban  property,  and  property  used  for  agriculture 
or  farming  purposes,  including  untillable  land;  the  latter  is 
subjected  to  one-half  of  the  tax  rate,  the  rural  or  suburban  to 
not  exceeding  two-thirds,  and  built-up  property  to  the  full 
rate:  Commonwealth  v.  Halstead,  1 C.  C.  R.  335;  s.  c.,  2 C. 
P.  Rep.  247.  The  judgment  below  was  reversed  in  Common- 
wealth v.  Halstead,  18  W.  N.  C.  385,  and  Sections  1,  2,  3,  4, 
and  5,  of  the  Act  of  March  18th,  1875,  were  held  to  be  invalid 
on  the  authority  of  Scranton  School  District’s  Appeal,  113 
Pa.  St.  176,  by  reason  of  the  option  feature  of  the  said  Act. 
As  to  the  validity  of  the  classification  see  Kitty  Roup’s  Case, 
81*  Pa.  St.  21 1. 

The  Act  of  June  2d,  1881,  P.  L.  41,  making  taxes  assessed 
upon  real  estate,  whether  county,  township,  poor,  school,  or 
municipal,  a first  lien,  providing  for  the  collection  of  such 


2J2 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


taxes,  and  a remedy  for  false  returns,  is  invalid,  because  cities 
of  the  first,  second,  and  fourth  classes  are  excepted  from  its 
provisions.  It  thus  violates  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Con- 
stitution, forbidding  special  laws  regulating  the  affairs  of 
counties  and  municipalities,  and  Article  IX,  Section  1,  re- 
quiring the  assessment  and  collection  of  taxes  to  be  by  gen- 
eral laws:  Townsend  v.  Wilson,  7 C.  C.  R.  101 ; Miller  v.  Cun- 
ningham, 7 C.  C.  R.  500;  Bryn  Mawr  v.  Anderson,  10  C.  C.  R. 
442;  Ancona  v;  Becker,  3 P.  D.  R.  86;  and  see  Van  Loon  v. 
Engle,  1 71  Pa.  St.  157. 

The  Act  of  February  14th,  1889,  P.  L.  7,  providing  for  the 
election  of  assessors  for  three  years  in  the  several  boroughs 
and  townships  of  the  Commonwealth  is  valid:  Commonwealth 
v.  Coleman,  9 C.  C.  R.  90.  In  this  case  his  Honor,  Judge 
Wickham,  said:  “The  obvious  meaning  of  the  language, 

above  quoted  from  the  Constitution,  is,  that  legislation,  af- 
fecting the  affairs  of  any  one  of  the  several  classes  disjunc- 
tively named,  shall  apply  to  every  member  of  that  particular 
class.  If  this  be  done,  the  legislation  is  not  local  or  special: 
Evans  v.  Phillipi,  117  Pa.  St.  226.  The  statute  under  con- 
sideration includes  all  townships  and  all  boroughs  in  the 
State.  So  far,  therefore,  as  it  affects  townships,  and  boroughs 
not  divided  into  wards,  it  does  not  offend  against  the  Consti- 
tution. 

“A  more  difficult  question  would  be  presented  if  the  con- 
troversy related  to  the  office  of  ward  assessor  in  a borough. 
The  second  section  of  the  Act  provides  'that,  when  any  bor- 
ough has  been  or  shall  be  divided  into  wards,  or  any  township 
has  been  or  shall  be  divided  into  election  districts,’ the  Act  shall 
apply  to  such  districts  and  wards.  This  section,  if  held  con- 
stitutional, in  whole  or  in  part,  by  reason  of  its  non-applica- 
tion to  wards  in  cities,  would  not  invalidate  the  enactment,  so 
far  as  it  operates  on  ordinary  boroughs  and  townships.  Indeed, 
it  might  be  dropped  from  the  statute  altogether  and  still  leave 
the  provisions  as  to  the  two  clauses  last  mentioned,  complete 
and  intelligible.  It  is  not  necessary,  therefore,  to  decide, 
whether  fixing  the  terms  of  office  of  ward  assessors  is  a regu- 
lation of  the  ‘affairs’  of  wards,  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution,  nor  whether  the  Legislature  is  prohibited  from 
recognizing  the  intrinsic  and  important  differences  that  often 
exist  between  the  affairs  of  wards  in  boroughs  and  wards  in 
cities.”  s.  p.,  Commonwealth  v.  Green,  7 Kulp,  15 1.  The  lat- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


273 


ter  case  affirmed  the  validity  also  of  the  amendatory  Act  of 
May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  133. 

The  Act  of  June  25th,  1885,  P.  L.  187,  provided  for  the 
election  of  borough  and  township  tax  collectors  in  each  bor- 
ough and  township  of  the  Commonwealth  at  the  February 
election;  for  the  filling  of  vacancies  by  the  court  of  quarter  ses- 
sions; required  an  official  oath  and  bond;  provided  that  the 
several  county,  borough,  township,  school,  and  other  authori- 
ties now  or  hereafter  empowered  to  levy  taxes  within  the  sev- 
eral boroughs  and  townships,  should  issue  their  respective  du- 
plicates to  such  collector  on  or  about  the  first  of  August  in 
each  year,  with  their  warrants  directing  the  collection  of  such 
taxes,  excepting  road  taxes,  which  might  be  worked  out;  de- 
fined the  powers  and  liabilities  of  such  collectors;  required 
books  to  be  kept  in  a certain  manner  by  the  collector,  subject 
to  the  inspection  of  each  taxpayer;  for  public  notices  to  be 
given  of  the  receipt  of  the  duplicate;  provided  for  a reduction 
for  prompt  payment  of  the  taxes,  and  a charge  in  case  of  de- 
linquency; provided  for  the  collector’s  compensation,  exoner- 
ation and  accounting;  excepted  unseated  lands,  taxes  charged 
upon  which  were  to  be  collected  as  formerly;  repealed  incon- 
sistent general  Acts,  but  saved  from  repeal  taxes  collection  of 
which  was  regulated  by  a local  law.  The  validity  of  this  Act 
was  affirmed  in  Evans  v.  Phillipi,  1 17  Pa.  St.  226;  the  principal 
objection  in  that  case  being  directed  to  the  clause  saving  spe- 
cial laws.  The  validity  of  the  Act  was  affirmed  in  Bitting  v. 
Commonwealth,  20  W.  N.C.  178,  and  again  in  Bennett  v.  Hunt, 
148  Pa.  St.  257,  upon  an  appeal  from  the  decree  of  the  court 
below  dissolving  a preliminary  injunction  and  without  an  opin- 
ion. The  Act  seems  to  have  been  objected  to  in  the  court  be- 
low on  the  ground  of  alleged  defect  in  title,  the  latter  not  be- 
ing thought  comprehensive  enough  to  include  a provision  as 
to  counties,  and  because  the  rebate  for  prompt  payment  was 
supposed  to  result  in  a want  of  uniformity. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Lyter,  162  Pa.  St.  50,  the  validity  of 
the  Act  was  again  affirmed.  In  this  case  the  opinion  of  his 
Honor,  Judge  McPherson,  in  the  court  below,  summarizes 
the  history  of  the  litigation  of  this  Act  as  follows:  “Coming, 
then,  to  the  principal  question  in  the  case,  namely,  the  consti- 
tutionality of  the  Act  of  1885,  so  far  as  concerns  the  collec- 
tion of  county  and  State  taxes,  we  may  briefly  observe,  with- 
out discussing  the  cases,  that  various  opinions  have  been  ex- 
pressed by  the  lower  courts  upon  various  aspects  of  the 
18 


274 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


statute.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Scheckler,  i C.  C.  R.  505; 
Commonwealth  v.  Bitting,  2 Id.  298;  Keim  v.  Devitt,  3 Id. 
250;  Hannick’s  Bonds,  3 Id.  254;  Commonwealth  v.  Lacka- 
wanna County  Commissioners,  7 Id.  173;  Commonwealth  v. 
Swab,  8 Id.  111;  and  Evans  v.  Witmer,  4 Lane.  L.  R.  105. 
The  decision  in  Evans  v.  Phillipi,  117  Pa.  St.  226,  has  not 
been  regarded  as  settling  anything  beyond  the  precise  point 
there  raised,  although  the  language  used  by  Mr.  Justice 
Clark,  on  page  237,  is  so  wide  that  it  may  be  easily  construed 
to  declare  deliberately  the  constitutionality  of  the  statute  as 
to  the  collection  of  all  taxes  in  boroughs  and  townships,  and 
not  merely  as  to  the  collection  of  the  school  tax  which  alone 
was  then  in  question.  Plis  words  are  these:  ‘We  are  of  opin- 
ion, for  the  reasons  expressed,  that  the  Act  of  June  25th, 
1885,  must  be  regarded  as  a general  law  applying  to  the 
whole  State,  excepting  in  so  far  as  its  operation  is  obstructed 
by  existing  local  statutes  passed  prior  to  the  new  Constitu- 
tion, upon  the  repeal  of  which  it  will  take  effect  throughout 
the  State.  Nor  is  the  Act  of  1885  obnoxious  to  Clause  27,  Sec- 
tion 7,  Article  III,  or  to  Section  1,  Article  IX,  of  the  Consti- 
tution. What  we  have  already  said  is  sufficient  to  show  why 
no  such  conflict  exists.  We  hold  the  Act  of  1885  to  be  a gen- 
eral law.  It  is  a general  law  relating  to  the  collection  of  taxes 
in  boroughs  and  townships  of  the  State;  boroughs  and  town- 
ships are  created  by  general  laws,  and  the  proper  subjects  of 
appropriate,  independent,  general  legislation  as  such;  and 
the  Act  establishes  a general  system  peculiarly  adapted  to  the 
convenience  and  necessities  of  the  municipal  divisions 
named.’ 

“Nevertheless,  if  there  had  been  no  later  action  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  than  this,  we  would  simply  follow  the  decision  of 
our  own  court  in  Commonwealth  v.  Swab  {supra),  and  would 
hold  the  Act  to  be  unconstitutional  so  far  as  the  collection 
of  county  and  State  taxes  is  concerned.  Since  the  case  of 
Commonwealth  v.  Swab,  however,  Bennett  v.  Hunt,  148  Pa. 
St.  257,  has  been  decided  and  reported,  and  we  regard  that 
decision  as  implying  strongly  that  the  collection  of  county 
taxes  is  constitutionally  embraced  by  the  Act.  It  is  true  that 
the  appeal  was  from  a decree  dissolving  a preliminary  injunc- 
tion, and  therefore  that  no  opinion  was  given  upon  the  merits; 
but,  as  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act  was  distinctly  ques- 
tioned and  distinctly  affirmed  in  the  court  below,  and  as  this 
question  could  not  be  affected  by  any  facts  which  might  ap- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


275 


pear  in  the  further  conduct  of  the  case,  it  seems  to  us  that  the 
Supreme  Court  would  not  have  permitted  the  tax  to  be  col- 
lected if  they  had  been  satisfied  that  in  this  respect  the  Act 
was  void.” 

In  Evans  v.  Witmer,  2 C.  C.  R.  612;  4 Lane.  L.  R.  105, 
the  Act  was  held  invalid  as  being  a local  law,  and  the  provis- 
ion that  taxes  shall  be  levied  and  collected  under  general  laws 
was  emphasized.  Among  other  things,  it  was  pointed  out 
that  school  districts  had  not  yet  been  classified,  and  until  they 
were  any  Act  affecting  them  must  affect  all  alike. 

In  Hannick’s  Bond,  3 C.  C.  R.  254,  the  Act  was  thought 
to  be  special  because  it  did  not  apply  to  cities,  because  it  re- 
sulted in  a want  of  uniformity  in  taxation  by  reason  of  the 
provision  for  discount  for  prompt  payment,  and  charge  for 
dilatory  payment,  no  similar  provisions  existing  in  cities,  and 
because  of  the  creation  of  a new  and  peculiar  office  of  collector 
of  county  taxes,  to  be  exercised  only  in  boroughs  and  town- 
ships, being  therein  elective,  while  in  the  remainder  of  the 
county  the  official  function  was  discharged  by  an  appointive 
officer. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Commissioners,  7 C.  C.  R.  173,  the 
Act  was  held  invalid  because  of  insufficiency  of  title,  because 
special  by  reason  of  the  difference  in  the  manner  of  the  collec- 
tion of  county  taxes  in  boroughs  and  townships,  and  in  cities, 
and  because  the  charge  and  rebate  result  in  a want  of  uniform- 
ity in  taxation.  As  shown  in  the  opinion  above,  a distinc- 
tion was  made  in  Commonwealth  v.  Swab,  8 C.  C.  R. 
hi,  in  which  case,  upon  a return  to  a mandamus,  his  Honor, 
Judge  Simonton  pointed  out  the  difference  between  State 
and  county  taxes,  and  such  as  were  local  to  the  borough  or 
township.  The  validity  of  the  Act  was  again  affirmed  in  Swa- 
tara  Township  School  District’s  Appeal,  1 Super.  Ct.  502. 

The  cases  collected  under  this  head  are  principally  those 
wherein  Acts  of  Assembly  have  been  challenged  as  being 
local.  Those  objected  to  as  special,  that  is,  as  involving  im- 
proper classification,  have  already  been  sufficiently  referred  to, 
as  the  question  is  really  broader  than  the  scope  of  this  subject. 

6.  Elections. 

Provisions  as  to  elections. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  12.  For  the  opening  and  con- 
ducting of  elections,  or  fixing  or  changingthe  places  of  voting. 


276 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


Article  I,  Section  5.  Elections  shall  be  free  and  equal. 

Article  VIII,  Section  7.  All  laws  regulating  the  holding 
of  elections  by  the  citizens  or  for  the  registration  of  electors 
shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  State. 

Article  VIII,  Section  17,  Clause  2.  The  General  Assem- 
bly shall,  by  general  law,  designate  the  courts  and  judges  by 
whom  the  several  classes  of  election  contests  shall  be  tried  and 
regulate  the  manner  of  trial  and  all  matters  incident  thereto. 

Article  VIII,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution,  is  not  self- 
efficient and  hence  the  local  system  of  voting  in  Luzerne 
County  under  the  special  Act  of  April  6th,  1868,  P.  L.  729, 
remained  in  force  after  its  adoption.1 

The  Act  of  June  19th,  1891,  P.  L.  349,  known  as  the  Ballot 
Reform  Act,  is  valid.  It  does  not  infringe  Article  VIII,  Sec- 
tion 7,  nor  Article  III,  Section  7,  of  the  Constitution.2 

The  provision  of  the  Act  of  June  24th,  1895,  P.  L.  212, 
establishing  the  Superior  Court  that  “no  elector  may  vote 
either  then  or  at  any  subsequent  election  for  more  than  six 
candidates  upon  one  ballot  for  said  office,”  is  valid.3 

1Wright  v.  Barber  (S.  C.),  5 W.  N.  C.  444. 

2Dewalt  v.  Commissioners,  1 P.  D.  R.  199;  Ripple  v.  Com- 
missioners, 1 P.  D.  R.  201;  Meredith  v.  Lebanon  County,  1 
P.  D.  R.  220;  affirmed  sub  nom  Dewalt  v.  Bartley,  146  Pa.  St. 
529- 

Commonwealth  v.  Reeder,  17 1 Pa.  St.  505. 

7.  Private  Corporations,  Etc. 

Provisions  as  to  private  corporations. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  6.  Relating  to  ferries  or 
bridges  or  incorporating  ferry  or  bridge  companies,  except 
for  the  erection  of  bridges  crossing  streams  which  form  boun- 
daries between  this  and  any  other  State. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  25.  Creating  corporations 
or  amending,  renewing,  or  extending  the  charters  thereof. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  26.  Granting  to  any  cor- 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


277 


poration,  association,  or  individual  any  special  or  exclusive 
privilege  or  immunity  or  to  any  corporation,  association,  or 
individual  the  right  to  lay  down  a railroad  track. 

Article  III,  Section  21,  Clause  2.  No  Act  shall  prescribe 
any  limitation  of  time  within  which  suits  shall  be  brought 
against  corporations  for  injuries  to  persons  or  property,  or 
for  other  causes  different  from  those  fixed  by  general  laws 
regulating  actions  against  natural  persons,  and  such  Acts  now 
existing  are  avoided. 

The  Act  of  March  19th,  1879,  P.  L.  9,  providing  for  the 
incorporation  of  street  railways  in  cities  of  the  second  and 
third  classes  is  invalid,  because  local  and  not  general.1 

The  Act  of  May  8th,  1876,  P.  L.  147,  provided,  “Passenger 
railways  in  any  and  all  cities  of  the  first  class  . . . may  use 
other  than  animal  power  . . . whenever  authorized  so  to  do 
by  the  councils  of  such  city,  and  the  limitations  contained  in 
any  of  the  charters  of  passenger  railway  companies,  restrict- 
ing them  to  the  use  of  horse  power,  be  and  the  same  are 
hereby  repealed,  provided,”  etc. 

After  showing  that  the  regulation  of  public  conveyances  was 
a proper  subject  for  municipal  classification,  and  that  the  Act 
was  not  objectionable  upon  this  ground,  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell 
said,  referring  to  the  Act:  “It  takes  off  restrictions 

previously  existing  as  to  the  motive  power  of  cars  upon  streets 
and  commits  the  whole  subject  to  the  control  of  the  cities 
themselves  acting  through  their  councils.  This  is  its  effect, 
and  that  is  the  test  of  its  constitutionality.  That  incidentally 
it  has  affected  and  enlarged  the  charters  of  certain  railway 
corporations,  does  not  vitiate  it  as  an  exercise  of  unquestion- 
able police  powers  over  subjects  within  their  proper  province. 
The  second  clause  of  the  Act  expressly  repealing  the  charter 
restrictions  to  horse  power  as  a motor,  is  not  an  essential 
part  of  its  substance,  and  might  have  been  omitted  without 
impairing  its  general  scope  and  effect.  It  was  manifestly 
added  to  prevent  any  question  of  the  application  of  the  Act  to 
companies  already  chartered.”2 


278 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


1 Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company,  118  Pa.  St.  192. 
2Reeves  v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Company,  152  Pa.  St. 
153- 


The  case  of  Weinman  v.  Passenger  Railway  Company 
{supra),  was  followed  by  Berks  & Dauphin  Turnpike  v.  Leb- 
anon Electric  Railway  Company,  5 C.  C.  R.  467,  and  Seitz 
v.  Lafayette  Traction  Company,  Id.  469,  holding  the  Act 
of  May  23d,  1878,  P.  L.  111,  providing  for  the  incorpora- 
tion of  such  companies  in  cities  of  the  third,  fourth,  and  fifth 
classes  and  in  the  boroughs  and  townships  of  the  Common- 
wealth to  be  invalid. 

In  the  Boston  Bridge  Company’s  Case,  13  C.  C.  R.  190, 
the  Act  of  May  6th,  1887,  P.  L.  92,  amending  the  Act  of 
April  29th,  1874,  by  providing  for  increased  rates  of  tolls  upon 
bridges,  in  certain  cases,  was  held  valid.  The  first  mentioned 
Act  provided  for  tolls  on  bridges  generally,  and  further  pro- 
vided that  any  bridge,  not  wholly  nor  in  part  within  the  limits 
of  any  city  of  the  first  or  second  class  within  this  Common- 
wealth, that  shall  hereafter  be  constructed  or  reconstructed, 
and  the  cost  thereof  shall  be  increased  beyond  the  minimum 
by  reason  of  the  demands  and  requirement  of  navigation,  the 
corporation  owning  the  same  may  demand  and  receive  tolls, 
not  exceeding  50  per  centum  in  excess  of  the  rate  provided,  in 
any  case  where  such  increased  rates  do  not  produce  a yearly 
revenue  in  excess  of  6 per  centum  per  annum  upon  the  capital 
stock  of  such  corporation.  The  question  arose  upon  an  appli- 
cation made  to  the  court  of  quarter  sessions,  for  authority  to 
charge  such  increased  tolls,  by  a bridge  within  the  description 
of  the  provision,  and  the  provision  was  sustained  on  the 
ground  that  a class  was  thus  created  and  particularly  de- 
scribed, and  the  reason  therefore  was  expressly  declared. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  25,  above,  forbids  the  passing 
of  any  local  or  special  law  creating  corporations,  or  amending, 
renewing,  or  extending  the  charters  thereof. 

Article  XVI,  Section  10,  Clause  2,  declares  that  no  law 
hereafter  enacted  shall  create,  renew,  or  extend  the  charter  of 
more  than  one  corporation.  The  latter  clause  appeared  in 
the  former  Constitution  in  such  relation  to  the  context  that 
it  was  doubted  whether  it  related  to  any  other  private  cor- 
porations than  banks,  and  it  was  held  not  to  relate  to  public 
political  corporations:  Moers  v.  Reading,  9 Harris,  188.  As 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  279 

to  this  clause,  Mr.  Buckalew  (Buckalew  on  the  Constitution, 
page  255)  says:  “Probably  by  inadvertence  the  last  clause  of 
the  section  was  copied  from  the  end  of  Section  25,  Article  I, 
of  the  old  Constitution  in  copying  Section  26  of  same  article 
for  insertion  in  the  new  Constitution.  By  reference  to  the 
convention  debates,  it  will  be  seen  that  when  General  White 
first  proposed  our  present  Section  10  as  an  amendment,  it  did 
not  contain  the  clause  in  question.  Apparently  the  clause 
slipped  into  the  new  text  without  consideration.  It  is  an  in- 
truder (although  a harmless  one),  because  it  has,  in  its  new 
situation,  no  appropriate  or  proper  office  to  perform.”  And 
see  Cleveland,  etc.,  Railroad  Company  v.  Erie,  27  Pa.  St.  380. 

8.  Cemeteries,  Etc. 

Provision  as  to  cemeteries , etc. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  8.  Relating  to  cemeteries, 
graveyards,  or  public  grounds  not  of  the  State. 

Cases  within  the  provision  against  special  laws  relating  to 
cemeteries,  graveyards,  or  public  grounds  not  of  the  State 
have  been  previously  considered:  Perkins  v.  Philadelphia, 
156  Pa.  St.  554;  Philadelphia  v.  Cemetery  Company,  162  Pa. 
St.  105;  s.  c.  below,  3 P.  D.  R.  15 1;  York  School  District’s 
Appeal,  169  Pa.  St.  70;  s.  c.  below,  Pottersfield,  8 York,  145. 

9.  Labor,  Trade,  Mining,  or  Manufacturing. 

Provision  as  to  labor,  trade,  mining,  or  manufacturing. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  24.  Regulating  labor,  trade, 
mining,  or  manufacturing. 

The  Act  of  June  4th,  1883,  P.  L.  72,  to  enforce  the  pro- 
visions of  the  seventeenth  article  of  the  Constitution  relative 
to  railroads  and  canals,  prohibiting  undue  discrimination  in 
charges  or  facilities  for  the  transportation  of  freight,  is  not  a 
special  law  within  the  foregoing  provision.1  Nor  is  the  Act 
of  June  2d,  1891,  P.  I..  176,  entitled  “An  Act  to  provide  for 
the  health  and  safety  of  persons  employed  in  and  about  the 
anthracite  coal  mines  of  Pennsylvania,  and  for  the  protection 


28o 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


and  preservation  of  property  connected  therewith.”  It  re- 
lates to  all  anthracite  coal  mines,  and  properly  and  legally  de- 
fines what  shall  be  regarded  as  such.  It  was  objected  that 
the  Act  was  local  and  special  because  it  applied  to  anthracite 
mines  only,  to  only  such  of  them  as  employed  over  ten  men, 
because  it  was  a regulation  of  labor  applicable  only  to  miners 
and  laborers  employed  in  certain  anthracite  mines,  because  it 
was  a regulation  applying  only  to  certain  anthracite  mines 
and  because  only  certain  employers,  to  wit,  of  labor  in  certain 
anthracite  mines,  were  subjected  to  liability  not  imposed  on 
other  employers,  to  wit,  for  negligence  of  fellow-servants  of 
employes.  The  case  was  for  death  by  negligence  and  the 
claim  was  made  that  the  negligence,  if  any,  was  that  of  a fel- 
low-servant. The  judgment  was  reversed  because  the  recov- 
ery was  for  an  alleged  liability  to  answer  for  the  act  of  one 
over  whom  the  defendant  had  no  control,  tc  wit,  for  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  mine  foreman,  whom  the  statute  required  to 
be  employed  to  perform  duties  imposed  on  him  by  the  stat- 
ute.2 

In  this  case  Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “We  are  not  pre- 
pared to  hold  the  Act  of  1891  to  be  unconstitutional  as  a 
whole.  It  relates  to  all  anthracite  coal  mines  and  defines  what 
shall  be  regarded  as  such  mines.  Coal  may  be  taken  out  of 
the  ground  by  farm  owners  for  their  own  use,  or  it  may  be 
taken  in  such  small  quantities  and  for  such  local  purposes  as 
to  make  the  application  of  the  mining  laws  to  the  operations 
so  conducted  not  only  unnecessary  but  burdensome  to  the 
extent  of  absolute  prohibition.  Such  limited  or  incipient  op- 
erations are  not  within  the  mischief,  to  remedy  which  the  min- 
ing laws  were  devised.  They  are  ordinarily  conducted  for 
purposes  of  exploration  or  for  family  supply,  and  ought  not 
to  be  classed  with  operations  conducted  for  the  supply  of  the 
public.  The  business  of  coal  mining,  like  that  of  insurance,  or 
banking,  may  be  defined  by  the  Legislature.  The  definition 
found  in  the  Act  of  1891  seems  to  us  reasonable,  to  be  within 
the  fair  limits  of  a legislative  definition,  and  to  exclude 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  28 1 

only  such  operations  as  are  too  small  to  make  the  gen- 
eral regulations  provided  by  the  Act  applicable  to  them.  The 
ground  on  which  we  place  our  judgment  is  not,  therefore, 
that  the  Act  is  local,  but  that  the  provisions  of  it  which  we 
have  considered  are  in  violation  of  the  Bill  of  Rights.” 

The  Act  of  May  7th,  1891,  P.  L.  44,  amending  the  Act  of 
June  1 2th,  1879,  and  extending  the  benefits  of  the  same  to 
persons  employed  in  hewing,  making,  and  hauling  square 
timber,  and  in  peeling,  skidding,  and  hauling  bark,  is  valid.3 

1 Hoover  v.  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company,  156  Pa.  St. 
221. 

2Durkin  v.  Kingston  Coal  Company,  171  Pa.  St.  193. 

3Hoffa’s  Appeal,  1 Super.  Ct.  357. 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Isenberg,  4 P.  D.  R.  519,  the  Act  of 
May  20th,  1891,  P.  L.  96,  known  as  the  semi-monthly  pay  law, 
was  questioned  under  this  provision,  but  the  case  was  de- 
cided upon  other  grounds.  In  Commonwealth  v.  Jones,  4 
Super.  Ct.  362,  the  Act  of  May  15th,  1893,  P.  L.  52,  entitled 
“An  Act  relating  to  bituminous  coal  mines,  and  providing  for 
the- lives,  health,  safety,  and  welfare  of  persons  employed 
therein,”  was  held  valid  on  the  authority  of  Durkin  v.  Kings- 
ton Coal  Company  {supra). 


10.  Special  Privileges  and  Immunities. 

Provision  as  to  special  privileges  and  immunities. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  26.  Granting  to  any  cor- 
poration, association,  or  individual  any  special  or  exclusive 
privilege  or  immunity,  or  to  any  corporation,  association,  or 
individual  the  right  to  lay  down  a railroad  track. 

The  Act  of  March  23d,  1877,  P.  L.  25,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
empower  the  sheriff  and  prothonotaries  of  the  several  counties 
. . . to  sue  for  their  fees,”  infringes  among  others,  the  fore- 
going provision.1 


^trine  v.  Foltz,  113  Pa.  St.  349;  s.  c.,  below,  1 C.  C.  R.  490. 


282 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


In  Foster  v.  Stray er,  19  C.  C.  R.  417,  the  validity  of  the 
Act  of  April  20th,  1876,  P.  L.  43,  relating  to  actions  for  wages 
of  manual  labor,  was  doubted,  in  so  far  as  it  provided  for  the 
giving  of  bail  absolute  on  appeal.  Said  his  Honor,  Judge 
White:  “This  kind  of  legislation  is  of  a most  pernicious 

character.  It  is  class  legislation.  If  the  Legislature  can  pass 
such  an  Act  in  reference  to  claims  for  ‘wages  of  manual  labor/ 
it  can  pass  similar  Acts  in  reference  to  any  other  class  of 
claims,  or  it  may  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  magistrates  in 
labor  claims  to  $1,000,  and  require  bail  for  the  debt  in  case 
of  appeal.  Is  not  such  legislation  in  violation  of  Article  III, 
Section  7,  of  the  Constitution  of  1874?  That  section  says: 
‘The  General  Assembly  shall  not  pass  any  local  or  special  law’ 
on  the  various  subjects  mentioned,  among  which  is  this: 
‘Granting  to  any  corporation,  association,  or  individual  any 
special  or  exclusive  privilege  or  immunity.’  Does  not  this 
Act  of  1876  give  a ‘special  privilege’  to  persons  suing  before 
a magistrate  for  ‘wages  of  manual  labor’?  I am  strongly 
inclined  to  this  opinion.” 

The  Act  of  May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  123,  authorizing  an  action 
of  assumpsit  against  counties,  boroughs  and  townships,  for 
bounty,  by  veterans,  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  who  were  accredited  to  such  county,  borough,  or 
township,  and  providing  that  the  statute  of  limitations  should 
not  be  a bar  to  such  actions  if  the  same  were  commenced 
within  two  years  from  the  date  of  the  approval  of  the  Act,  was 
held  invalid  because  local  (not  applying  to  cities),  special  (ap- 
plying to  particular  persons,  and  granting  them  special  privi- 
leges), and  as  a partial  repeal  of  a general  law,  to  wit,  the 
statute  of  limitations:  Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township,  9 C.  C. 
R.  342;  s.  c.,  21  W.  N.  C.  21 1. 

The  Act  of  July  2d,  1895,  P.  L.  434,  entitled  “An  Act  to 
amend  Section  1,  of  the  Act  of  April  18th,  1893,  P.  L.  23, 
entitled  an  Act  relative  to  the  admission  and  instruction  of 
children  of  soldiers  of  the  late  War  of  the  Rebellion  in  the 
common  schools  of  districts  outside  of  those  in  which  their 
parents  or  guardians  or  others  entitled  to  their  custody  may 
reside,”  is  invalid.  It  attempts  to  create  a special  privilege: 
Sewickley  v.  Osburn,  19  C.  C.  R.  257;  s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R. 
211. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


283 


11.  Partial  Repeal  of  a General  Law. 

Provision  as  to  partial  repeal  of  general  laws. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  27.  Nor  shall  the  General 
Assembly  indirectly  enact  such  special  law  by  the  partial  re- 
peal of  a general  law,  but  laws  repealing  local  or  special  Acts, 
may  be  passed. 

The  Act  of  May  8th,  1889,  P.  L.  123,  authorized  an  action 
of  assumpsit  against  counties,  boroughs  and  townships,  for 
bounty,  by  veterans,  and  provided  that  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions should  not  be  a bar  to  such  action  if  commenced  within 
two  years  from  the  passage  of  the  Act.  This  in  effect  is  a par- 
tial repeal  of  a general  law,  to  wit,  the  statute  of  limitations.1’ 

1Bearce  v.  Fairview  Township,  9 C.  C.  R.  342;  s.  c.,  21  W. 
N.  C.  21 1 ; and  see  Cole  v.  Economy  Township,  3 P.  D.  R. 
699. 


12.  Cases  Within  General  Law  or  Judicial  Juris- 
diction. 

Provision  as  to  cases  within  general  laws  or  judicial  jurisdic- 
tion. 

Article  III,  Section  7,  Clause  28.  Nor  shall  any  law  be 
passed  granting  powers  or  privileges  in  any  case  where  the 
granting  of  such  powers  and  privileges  shall  have  been  pro- 
vided for  by  general  law,  nor  where  the  courts  have  jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  the  same  or  give  the  relief  asked  for. 

In  Land  Company  v.  Weidner,1  the  validity  of  the  Act  of 
March  12th,  1891,  P.  L.  53,  to  validate  conveyances  and  other 
instruments  which  have  been  defectively  acknowledged,  was 
questioned.  Said  Mr.  Justice  Mitchell:  “But  it  is  said  as  ap- 
plied to  this  case,  the  Act  of  1891  would  violate  Section  54  of 
Article  III,  of  the  Constitution,  that  no  law  'shall  be  passed 
granting  powers  or  privileges  in  any  case  where  the  granting 
of  such  powers  and  privileges  shall  have  been  provided  for 


284 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


by  general  law,  nor  where  the  courts  have  jurisdiction  to  grant 
the  same,  or  give  the  relief  asked  for.’  The  application  of  this 
argument  is  not  quite  clear.  The  section  of  the  Constitution 
quoted  is  a prohibition  against  local  and  special  laws,  while 
the  Act  of  May  12th,  1891,  P.  L.  53,  is  a general  law  applica- 
ble to  all  cases  except  those  pending  at  the  time  of  its  pas- 
sage. The  exclusion  of  all  retroactive  force  does  not  detract 
from  its  general  character.  If  it  be  meant  that  the  Act  of  May 
25th,  1878,  P.  L.  149,  already  supplied  a remedy,  neverthe- 
less the  Legislature  might  provide  a new  and  different  one.” 

JLand  Company  v.  Weidner,  169  Pa.  St.  359. 

13.  Notice. 

Provision  as  to  notice. 

Article  III,  Section  8.  No  local  or  special  bill  shall  be 
passed  unless  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  therefor  shall 
have  been  published  in  the  locality  where  the  matter  or  thing 
to  be  affected  may  be  situated,  which  notice  shall  be  at  least 
thirty  days  prior  to  the  introduction  into  the  General  Assem- 
bly of  such  bill,  and  in  the  manner  to  be  provided  by  law,  the 
evidence  of  such  notice  having  been  published  shall  be  exhib- 
ited in  the  General  Assembly  before  such  Act  shall  be  passed. 

In  Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,1  it  was  alleged  that  the  Act  in 
question  was  invalid  because  notice  of  the  proposed  legislative 
action  was  not  published  in  Philadelphia  at  least  thirty  days 
before  the  introduction  of  the  bill.  As  to  this,  Mr.  Justice 
Dean  said:  “It  is  not  our  duty  to  go  behind  the  law  to  in- 
quire whether  all  the  precedent  formalities  have  in  fact  been 
complied  with.  The  evidence  that  notice  has  been  published 
is  to  be  exhibited  to  the  General  Assembly;  it  is  not  directed 
to  be  entered  on  the  journals.  The  law  before  us  is  certified 
by  both  houses  and  approved  by  the  Governor.  We  must 
presume  the  requirement  as  to  notice  was  complied  with;  to 
this  effect  are  all  the  authorities  of  numerous  adjudicated 
cases  on  the  same  question.” 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION.  285 

In  Chalfant  v.  Edwards,2  wherein  was  in  question  the  val- 
idity of  the  Act  of  July  3d,  1895,  P.  L.  603,  entitled  “An  Act 
repealing  an  Act  entitled  ‘An  Act  consolidating  the  wards  of 
the  city  of  Pittsburg  for  educational  purposes,  approved  Feb- 
ruary 19th,  1855/  ” Mr.  Justice  Williams  said:  “This  is  a 
local  law  passed  to  effect  the  repeal  of  the  local  Acts  of  1855 
and  1869.  Such  a law  is  not  necessarily  within  the  constitu- 
tional prohibition.  To  hold  that  it  was  would  make  the  road 
to  uniformity  much  more  difficult  than  was  intended.  The 
repeal  of  the  local  laws  is  ordinarily  made  to  open  the  way  for 
the  operation  of  general  laws  within  the  territory  from  which 
the  local  law  had  previously  excluded  them.  Still,  it  is  true 
that  such  a law  is  local  within  the  meaning  of  Section  55,  of 
Article  III.  Particularly  is  this  true  when  the  object  of  the 
repealing  Act  is  not  to  make  way  for  a general  law  but  for 
another  local  one.  In  such  case  it  is  such  a local  law  as  the 
Constitution  declares  shall  not  be  passed  unless  notice  of  the 
intention  to  apply  therefor  shall  have  been  published  in  the 
locality  where  the  matter  or  thing  to  be  affected  shall  be  sit- 
uated. It  is  conceded  that  no  notice  of  an  intention  to  ap- 
ply for  the  passage  of  a law  repealing  the  local  Acts  of  1855 
and  1869  was  ever  published  in  the  city  of  Pittsburg.  If  this 
fact  was  not  admitted  our  question  might  not  be  as  free  from 
difficulty  as  it  now  is.  It  is  admitted.  It  was  so  treated  in 
the  court  below.  We  have  then  a local  law  passed  to  repeal 
one  local  law  in  order  to  make  way  for  another. 

“It  affects  the  people  of  the  city  of  Pittsburg.  They  have  a 
right  to  notice  of  the  intention  to  apply  for  it.  It  now  appears 
that  without  notice  the  parties  interested  procured  the  pas- 
sage of  this  local  law  in  plain  violation  of  the  Constitution. 
If  it  appeared  that  this  question  had  been  considered  by  the 
Legislature  and  that  body  had  decided  that  sufficient  notice 
had  been  given,  or  if  the  committee  to  which  the  bill  was  re- 
ferred had  reported  that  the  constitutional  requirement  as  to 
notice  had  been  complied  with,  we  might  feel  ourselves  con- 
cluded by  such  action.  But  there  is  not  the  faintest  sugges- 


286 


VALIDITY  OF  STATUTES. 


tion  to  be  found  anywhere  that  the  subject  of  notice  was  ever 
before  the  mind  of  the  Legislature  or  attracted  the  attention 
of  the  promoters  of  the  bill.  If  we  should  hold  that  as  a gen- 
eral rule,  in  the  absence  of  any  recital  or  proof  upon  the  sub- 
ject, notice  should  be  presumed,  yet  the  presumption  cannot 
prevail  when  it  is  a conceded  fact  in  the  case  that  no  notice 
was  given.  The  only  question  then  presented  is  over  the  va- 
lidity of  an  Act  passed  in  the  face  of  a clear  and  positive  con- 
stitutional prohibition.  The  learned  judge  of  the  court  below 
was  of  opinion  that  as  the  form  and  manner  of  publishing  no- 
tice was  prescribed  by  the  Act  of  1874,  the  Legislature  of 
1895,  having  equal  power  in  the  premises,  was  not  bound  by 
the  directions  of  its  predecessor  but  might  disregard  them  at 
its  pleasure.  The  power  of  the  Legislature  to  repeal  the  Act  of 
1874  cannot  be  doubted,  but  it  had  not  been  exercised.  When 
this  Act  was  introduced  into  the  Legislature  and  when  it 
came  up  on  its  final  passage,  the  Act  of  1874  was  in  full  force, 
and  the  citizens  of  Pittsburg  had  a right  to  rely  upon  the  ob- 
servance of  its  provisions.  The  point  made,  however,  does 
not  relate  to  a compliance  with  the  forms  of  the  Act  of  1874, 
but  with  the  substance  of  the  constitutional  provision  that 
makes  notice  in  the  locality,  and  by  publication,  an  indispen- 
sable prerequisite  to  the  passage  of  a local  law.  The  Legis- 
lature of  1895,  though  not  bound  by  the  directions  of  its  prede- 
cessor was  bound  by  the  fundamental  law,  and  its  power 
to  pass  the  repealing  Act  depended  on  compliance  with  its 
mandates. 

“We  cannot  agree,  therefore,  with  the  learned  judge  in  re- 
gard to  the  validity  of  the  repealing  Act.  It  is  invalid.  The 
Acts  of  1855  and  1869  are  in  full  force,  and  the  system  of 
schools,  school  districts,  and  school  directors  built  upon  them 
in  the  city  of  Pittsburg  has  undergone  no  change  what- 
ever.” 

Perkins  v.  Philadelphia,  156  Pa.  St.  554. 

2Chalfant  v.  Edwards,  173  Pa.  St.  246. 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


287 


Article  III,  Section  7,  contains  two  provisions  as  to  notice. 
In  Clause  21  it  is  prescribed  that  no  special  law  shall  be  passed 
affecting  the  estates  of  minors  or  persons  under  disability, 
“except  after  due  notice  to  all  parties  in  interest,  to  be  recited 
in  the  special  enactment.”  Section  8 prescribes  that  the 
evidence  of  the  publication  of  notice  required  by  it  “shall  be 
exhibited  in  the  General  Assembly  before  such  Act  shall  be 
passed.”  The  former  provision  is  probably  so  made  in  order 
that  the  courts  may  determine  whether  the  notice  recited  in 
the  special  enactment  is  sufficient  in  law;  that  is  to  say, 
whether  as  matter  of  law  the  parties  notified,  as  recited,  are  all 
the  parties  in  interest.  As  to  the  latter  provision,  the  rule  as 
stated  in  Perkins  v.  Philadelphia  {supra) ; Chalfant  v.  Edwards 
{supra),  may  be  regarded  as  an  exceptional  case.  If  the  pre- 
sumption of  notice  is  not  absolute,  then  the  strange  re- 
sult might  follow  that  an  Act  might  be  sustained  in  a real  liti- 
gation, but  fail  in  a case  where  both  parties  to  it  might  wish  to 
destroy  the  Act  by  an  admission  that  no  notice  had  been 
given. 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Ahl  v.  Rhoads, 

84  Pa.  St.  319. 

PAGE 

US 

Allegheny  County  Constables, 

17  C.  C.  R.  622. 

265 

Allegheny  County  v.  Gibson, 

90  Pa.  St.  397. 

115 

Allegheny  County  Home’s  Case, 

77  Pa.  St.  77.  12, 

13,  14,  i5> 

19,  26,  42 

Allegheny  v.  Moorehead, 

80  Pa.  St.  1 18. 

15 

Am.  Banking  & Trust  Co.’s  Pet., 

37  W.  N.  C.  297. 

52 

Ancona  v.  Becker, 

3 D.  R.  86. 

248,  272 

Arrott  Street, 

18  W.  N.  C.  121. 

32 

Attorney-General  v.  Rice, 

64  Mich.  385 

9 

Ayars’  Appeal, 

122  Pa.  St.  256. 

33. 65, 99. 

101,  103,  105,  129,  137, 

145,  147,  194,  214,  216, 

223,  225,  228,  229,  258 

Baker  v.  McKee, 

6 P.  D.  R.  599. 

33>  261 

Baldwin  v.  Philadelphia, 

99  Pa.  St.  164. 

62,  108 

Banger’s  Appeal, 

109  Pa.  St.  79. 

139 

Barrett’s  Appeal, 

1 16  Pa.  St.  486. 

61,  64 

Barton  v.  Pittsburg, 

4 Brewster,  373. 

5,  38 

Bear  v.  Eshleman, 

14  Lane.  L.  R.  273 

236 

Bearce  v.  Fairview, 

9 C.  C.  R.  342. 

24 7,  265, 

27  W.  N.  C.  21 1. 

282,  283 

Beaumont  v.  Wilkes-Barre, 

142  Pa.  St.  198. 

115 

Affg.  s.  c.,  6 Kulp, 

163. 

Beaver  County  Indexes, 

6 C.  C.  R.  525. 

247 

Beckert  v.  Allegheny, 

85  Pa.  St.  191.  14 

19,  26,  46 

Bell  v.  Allegheny  County, 

149  Pa.  St.  381. 

23L  235 

30  W.  N.  C.  193. 

Bell’s  Gap  R.  R.  v.  Penna., 

134  U.  S.  232. 

124,  125 

Bennett  v.  Hunt, 

148  Pa.  St.  257. 

26,  27,  1 1 5, 

256, 257, 273, 274 

Bennett  v.  Maloney, 

4 Kulp,  537. 

21,  84 

Berghaus  v.  Harrisburg, 

122  Pa.  St.  289. 

33>  147 

19 

289 

290 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Berks  v.  Lebanon  County  R.  R., 
Best  v.  Baumgardner, 

Betz  v.  Philadelphia, 

Bidwell  v.  Pittsburg, 

Bing  v.  Weber, 

Bingaman  v.  Pittsburg, 

Bitting  v.  Commonwealth, 
Bittinger’s  Estate, 

Blight’s  Estate, 

Blood  v.  Mercelliott, 

Boston  Bridge  Co.’s  Case, 

Bowen  v.  Tioga  County, 

Bradley  v.  Pittsburg, 

Brown  v.  Commissioners, 

Bruce  v.  Pittsburg, 

Bryn  Mawr  College  v.  Anderson, 
Burdick  v.  Burdick, 

Butler  v.  Toledo, 

Cahill’s  Petition, 

Cain  v.  Goda, 

Campbell  v.  Commonwealth, 
Carey’s  Petition, 

Carbondale  Twp’s  Appeal, 
Carbondale,  etc.,  Turnpike, 

Carother’s  Appeal, 

Cassel’s  Appeal, 

Chalfant  v.  Edwards, 


Cheltenham  Township  Road, 


5 C.  C.  R.  467. 

PAGE 

278 

122  Pa.  St.  17. 

234 

4 C.  C.  R.  481. 

215,216, 

21  W.  N.  C.  155. 

256,  265 

85  Pa.  St.  491. 

15 

81  111.  290. 

10 

147  Pa.  St.  353. 

230 

20  W.  N.  C.  178. 

271, 273 

129  Pa.  St.  338. 

51 

19  C.  C.  R.  426. 

271 

6 P.  D.  R.  459. 

53  Pa.  St.  391. 

10, 19,  32, 
36,  37 

13  C.  C.  R.  190. 

278 

6 C.  C.  R.  613. 

245 

130  Pa.  St.  475. 

37 

21  Pa.  St.  42. 

232 

166  Pa.  St.  152. 

37,  188, 
234,  236 

10  C.  C.  R.  442. 

248,  272 

2 P.  D.  R.  622. 

66 

5 Ohio,  225. 

226 

no  Pa.  St.  167. 

115 

84  Ind.  209. 

224 

96  Pa.  St.  344. 

217,  220 

43  L.  I.  384 

246 

18  Phila.  668. 

5 C.  C.  R.  339. 

255 

22  W.  N.  C.  105. 

27 

4 Lane.  L.  R.  361. 
17  W.  N.  C.  310. 

1 18  Pa.  St.  468. 

19,  20 

8 Lane.  L.  R.  260. 

26 

173  Pa.  St.  246. 

33,  209. 

43  P.  L.  J.  121.  233,236,251, 

43  P.  L.  J.  237.  258,261,285, 
286,  287 

140  Pa.  St.  136. 

ns 

7 Montg.  Co.  42. 

TABLE  OF  CASES. 


29I 


PAGE 


Chester  City  v.  Black, 

132  Pa.  St.  568. 

225,  227, 
229 

Chester  County  Court  House, 

7 C.  C.  R.  212. 

248 

Church  Street, 

54  Pa.  St.  353. 

19,  32,  36,  45 

City  Sewage  Co.  v.  Davis, 

8 Phila.  625. 

37.  45 

Clark  v.  Commonwealth, 

29  Pa.  St.  129. 

217,  219 

Clearfield  Co.  v.  Cam.  Poor  Dist., 

135  Pa.  St.  86. 

32 

Cleveland,  etc.,  Railroad  Co.  v.  Erie,  27  Pa.  St.  380. 

279 

Cochran  v.  Library  Co., 

25  Leg.  Int.  20. 

7 

Cochran  v.  McKelvey, 

25  P.  L.  J.  120 

33 

Cole  v.  Economy  Township, 

3 D.  R.  699. 

247,  264,  283 

Collector’s  Bond, 

4 Lane.  166. 

115 

Columbia  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wright, 

151  U.  S.  470. 

124 

Colvin  v.  Beaver, 

94  Pa.  St.  388. 

259 

Commonwealth  v.  Anderson, 

178  Pa.  St.  171. 

129,  132, 
245.  271 

Commonwealth  v.  Bender, 

7 C.  C.  R.  620. 

8 W.  N.  C.  73. 

48 

Commonwealth  v.  Bitting, 

2 C.  C.  R.  298. 

274 

Commonwealth  v.  Carey, 

2 C.  C.  R.  293. 

245,  246 

Commonwealth  v.  Clark, 

3 Super.  Ct.  141. 

39.  104 

Commonwealth  v.  Clovis, 

1 W.  N.  C.  185. 
9 Phila.  561. 

33 

Commonwealth  v.  Coleman, 

9 C.  C.  R.  90. 

272 

Commonwealth  v.  Commissioners, 

7 C.  C.  R.  173. 
133  Pa.  St.  180. 

27.  1 1 5.  275 

Commonwealth  v.  Comrey, 

149  Pa.  St.  216. 

156 

Commonwealth  v.  Curry, 

18  C.  C.  R.  513. 
P.  D.  R.  143. 

16,  18 

4 Super  Ct.  356. 

Commonwealth  v.  Deibert, 

2 P.  D.  R.  53. 
12  C.  C.  R.  504. 
2 P.  D.  R.  446. 

37. 46 

Commonwealth  v.  Del.  Div.  C.  Co., 

123  Pa.  St.  594. 

129,  136, 
i37 

Commonwealth  v.  Denworth, 

145  Pa.  St.  172. 

160,  165 

Commonwealth  v.  Depuy, 

148  Pa.  St.  201. 

37 

Commonwealth  v.  Dickinson, 

9 Phila.  561. 

1 W.  N.  C.  185. 
30  Leg.  Int.  53. 

33 

292 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Commonwealth  v.  Dillon, 

17  C.  C.  R.  227. 

PAGE 

21 

Commonwealth  v.  Doll, 

6 C.  C.  R.  49. 

37 

Commonwealth  v.  Dolphin, 

2 C.  P.  Rep.  85. 

5i 

Commonwealth  v.  Evans, 

6 Kulp,  145. 

67,  68 

Commonwealth  v.  Edgerton  C.  Co., 

, 164  Pa.  St.  284. 

37,  46 

Affg.  14  C.  C.  R. 

449- 

Commonwealth  v.  Farley, 

6 C.  C.  R.  433- 

22,  53,  245, 

46  L.  I.  108. 

265 

Commonwealth  v.  Flecker, 

17  C.  C.  R.  671. 
8 Kulp,  225. 

63 

Commonwealth  v.  Fowler, 

18  Phila.  513. 

37 

Commonwealth  v.  Franz, 

135  Pa.  St.  389. 

4 

Commonwealth  v.  Frutchey, 

I P.  D.  R.  153. 

II  C.  C.  R.  1 12. 

ii5 

Commonwealth  v.  Geesey, 

1 Super.  Ct.  502. 

27 

Commonwealth  v.  Gregg, 

161  Pa.  St.  582. 

56 

Commonwealth  v.  Green, 

58  Pa.  St.  226. 

5,  13,  i5,  19, 

7 Kulp,  151. 
s.  c.,  5 Del.  342. 

36,  272 

Commonwealth  v.  Grier, 

179  Pa.  St.  640. 

236 

Commonwealth  v.  Grier, 

9 C.  C.  R.  444. 

28 

Commonwealth  v.  Grier, 

152  Pa.  St.  176. 

236 

Commonwealth  v.  Haag, 

6 C.  C.  R.  1 18. 

115 

Commonwealth  v.  Halstead, 

1 C.  C.  R.  335.  1 

66,  165,  271 

Commonwealth  v.  Halstead, 

s.  c.,  2 C.  P.  Rep.  247.  271 

Commonwealth  v.  Halstead, 

18  W.  N.  C.  385. 

271 

Commonwealth  v.  Handley, 

106  Pa.  St.  245. 

115 

Commonwealth  v.  Harding, 

87  Pa.  St.  351. 

150 

Commonwealth  v.  Hartman, 

6 P.  D.  R.  136. 

16,  18 

Commonwealth  v.  Hartzell, 

17  C.  C.  R.  91. 
5 P.  D.  R.  148. 

23 

Commonwealth  v.  Havens, 

6 C.  C.  R.  545. 

19 

Commonwealth  v.  Henderson, 

172  Pa.  St.  135. 
37  W.  N.  C.  344. 
43  P-  L.  J.  207. 

39 

Commonwealth  v.  Hough, 

1 D.  R.  51. 

245,  254 

Commonwealth  v.  Hufnal, 

4 Super,  Ct.  301. 

18 

Commonwealth  v.  Isenberg, 

4 P.  D.  R.  579. 
4 P.  D.  R.  51. 

281 

TABLE  OF  CASES. 


293 


PAGE 

Commonwealth  v.  Jones,  4 Super.  Ct.  362.  134,  28  c 

Commonwealth  v.  Kelly,  5 Kulp,  533.  68 

Commonwealth  v.  Key.  Ben.  Asso.,  171  Pa.  St.  465.  37 

3 7 W.  N.  C.  173. 

Commonwealth  v.  Lack.  Co.  Comrs.,7  C.  C.  R.  173.  274 


Commonwealth  v.  Lambrecht, 

Commonwealth  v.  Lehr, 
Commonwealth  v.  Lloyd, 

Commonwealth  v.  Lyter, 
Commonwealth  v.  Macferron, 


Commonwealth  v.  Marshall, 
Commonwealth  v.  Martin, 
Commonwealth  v.  Mercer, 
Commonwealth  v.  Moore, 


Commonwealth  v.  Moorehead, 

» Commonwealth  v.  Morgan, 
Commonwealth  v.  Morningstar, 
Commonwealth  v.  Morrow, 
Commonwealth  v.  Muir, 

Commonwealth  v.  McCandless, 

Commonwealth  v.  McCandless, 

Commonwealth  v.  McCandless, 
Commonwealth  v.  Nihil, 
Commonwealth  v.  Patton, 


s.  c.,  133  Pa.  St.  180. 

3 C.  C.  R.  323,  255 

s.  c.,  44  L.  I.  196. 

16  C.  C.  R.  532.  32 

2 Super.  Ct.  6.  7,  21 

Affd.  178  Pa.  St.  308. 

162  Pa.  St.  50.  26,  27,  1 1 5, 
34  W.  N.  C.  393.  251,256, 

257,  271,273 


152  Pa.  St.  244.  100,  148, 

153,  156,  186,  188,  210, 
232,  236,  251,  264,  269, 
271 

69  Pa.  St.  328.  226,  227 

107  Pa.  St.  185.  7,  14 

9 C.  C.  R.  461.  41,  51,  245 

16  C.  C.  R.  481.  32 

1 Lack.  L.  N.  267. 

4 P.  D.  R.  649. 

2 Super.  Ct.  162. 

7 C.  C.  R.  513.  7,  23 

178  Pa.  St.  198.  51 

144  Pa.  St.  103.  37 

40  P.  L.  J.  327.  67 

1 Super.  Ct.  578.  53 

180  Pa.  St.  47. 


4 C.  C.  R.  1 19.  36,  50,  1 1 5, 

237 

Affd.  21  W.  N.  C.  162.  50, 

237,  245 

10  Cent.  R.  758  50,237 

4 P.  D.  R.  582.  37 

88  Pa.  St.  258.  139,  141, 

144,  147,  166,  167,  245, 
249 


294 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Commonwealth  v.  Reeder, 
Commonwealth  v.  Reichard, 

Commonwealth  v.  Reynolds, 


Commonwealth  v.  Rynkiewicz, 
Commonwealth  v.  Samuels, 

Commonwealth  v.  Scheckler, 
Commonwealth  v.  Schneipp, 
Commonwealth  v.  Sellers, 
Commonwealth  v.  Severn, 

Commonwealth  v.  Shoemaker, 
Commonwealth  v.  Silverman, 
Commonwealth  v.  Slifer, 
Commonwealth  v.  Swab, 

Commonwealth  v.  Swatara  Twp., 

Commonwealth  v.  Swift, 
Commonwealth  v.  Taylor, 

Commonwealth  v.  Toomey, 
Commonwealth  v.  Van  Loon, 
Commonwealth  v.  Weir, 
Commonwealth  v.  Weir, 
Commonwealth  v.  Wickert, 

Commonwealth  v.  Wilkes-Barre 
Scranton  Ry., 

Commonwealth  v.  Williams, 
Commonwealth  v.  Wyman, 

Commonwealth  v.  Zacharias, 


171  Pa.  St.  505. 

PAGE 

276 

8 C.  C.  R.  563. 
s.  c.,  5 Kulp,  540. 

260 

137  Pa.  St.  389. 

159. 165, 

s.  c.,  27  W.  N.  C. 

139.  209, 

5 Kulp,  547. 

216,  251. 

8 C.  C.  R.  568. 

260 

178  Pa.  St.  213. 

51 

163  Pa.  St.  282. 
14  C.  C.  R.  423. 

11,  18,  26 

1 C.  C.  R.  505. 

274 

166  Pa.  St.  401. 

236 

130  Pa.  St.  32. 

36, 115 

164  Pa.  St.  462. 
15  C.  C.  R.  249. 

18, 26 

178  Pa.  St.  214. 

51 

138  Pa.  St.  642. 

20 

53  Pa.  St.  71. 

6 

8 C.  C.  R.  hi. 

115.  274- 
275 

i Super.  Ct.  502. 

27. 115. 
271-  27s 

17  C.  C.  R.  95. 

38 

159  Pa.  St.  451. 

14, 46,  50, 
89 

178  Pa.  St.  215. 

5i 

4 Kulp,  338. 

5i 

18  C.  C.  R.  425. 

37 

165  Pa.  St.  284. 

236 

19  C.  C.  R.  251. 

15.  18 

s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  136. 

162  Pa.  St.  614. 

37 

178  Pa.  St.  21 1. 

5i 

137  Pa.  St.  508. 

32,  37,  148, 

151, 154, 156 

3 Super.  Ct.  364. 
181  Pa.  St.  126. 

122 

TABLE  OF 

Conyngham  Twp.  v.  Luzerne 

Craig  v.  Presbyterian  Church 
Darby  & Collingdale, 

Davey  v.  Ruffell, 

Davis  v.  Clark, 

Dean  v.  Borchsenius, 

Del  Busto’s  Estate, 

Devers  v.  York, 

Dewalt  v.  Bartley, 

Dewalt  v.  Commissioners, 
Dewhurst  v.  Allegheny, 

Dibrell  v.  Morris’  Heirs,  S.  C. 
Doberneck’s  License, 

Donley  v.  Pittsburg, 

Donohugh  v.  Roberts, 

Dorrance  v.  Dorranceton, 
Dorsey’s  Appeal, 

Doucl  v.  Insurance  Co., 

Dunn  v.  Mellon, 

Durkin  v.  Kingston  Coal  Co., 
Durr  v.  Commonwealth, 

East  Grant  Street, 

Eby’s  Appeal, 

Engle  v.  Reichard, 

Erie  City  v.  Reed, 

Erie  Co.  v.  Erie  City  Comrs., 
Esling’s  Appeal, 

Evan’s  Appeal, 

Evans  v.  Phillipi, 

Evans  v.  Willistown  Twp., 


CASES. 

295 

17  C.  C.  R.  83. 

PAGE 

249 

5 P.  D.  R.  183. 
88  Pa.  St.  42. 

46 

19  C.  C.  R.  315. 

47 

162  Pa.  St.  443. 

22,  47 

106  Pa.  St.  377. 

101,  109, 

14 1,  148,  247,  249,  268 

30  Wis.  236. 

226 

23  W.  N.  C.  hi. 

5* 

156  Pa.  St.  359. 

230 

150  Pa.  St.  208. 
146  Pa.  St.  529. 

276 

1 P.  D.  R.  199. 

276 

95  Pa.  St.  437. 

i4>  15.73 

.,15  S.  W.  Rep.  87. 

125 

35  P.  L.  J.  476. 

37 

45  Leg.  Int.  256. 
5 C.  C.  R.  454. 
147  Pa.  St.  348. 

20,  226,  230 

11  W.  N.  C.  186. 

72,  74 

181  Pa.  St.  164. 

32 

72  Pa.  St.  192. 

5.  i4.  15.  1 7. 

18,  19,  26,  30,  32 

6 C.  C.  R.  329. 

74 

147  Pa.  St.  11. 

216,  223 

171  Pa.  St.  193. 

134,  281 

3 C.  C.  R.  525. 

68,  237 

121  Pa.  St.  596. 

63.  67,  84 

70  Pa.  St.  31 1. 

7.  37 

4 C.  C.  R.  48. 

258 

s.  c.,  4 Kulp,  361 

1 13  Pa.  St.  468. 

226 

1 13  Pa.  St.  368. 

22 

89  Pa.  St.  205. 

19 

152  Pa.  St.  401. 

47.  5o.  67 

1 17  Pa.  St.  226. 

114,  115. 

129,  256,  257,  271,  272, 

168  Pa.  St.  578. 

273.  274 
14.  37 

296 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Evans  v.  Witmer, 

2 C.  C.  R.  612. 

PAGE 

115>  274> 

4 Lane.  L.  R.  105 

275 

Fisher  v.  Harrisburg, 

2 Gr.  291. 

194 

Foster  v.  Stray er, 

19  C.  C.  R.  417. 

282 

s.  c.,  13  Lane.  L. 

R.  285. 

s.  c.,  6.  P.  D.  R. 

333- 

Fox’s  Appeal, 

1 12  Pa.  St.  353. 

138 

Frampton’s  Estate, 

18  C.  C.  R.  462. 

18 

Fraser  v.  McConway, 

6 P.  D.  R.  555. 

129 

Frederick  v.  Penna.  Canal  Co., 

109  Pa.  St.  50. 

32 

Frost  v.  Cherry, 

122  Pa.  St.  417. 

l66,  171, 

Affg.  4 C.  C.  R.  , 

579-  2i4.- 

Fryer  v.  Metz, 

12  Montg.  108. 

216, 245 
18 

Gackenbach  v.  Lehigh  County, 

166  Pa.  St.  448. 

27 

Gardner  v.  Chester, 

2 D.  R.  162. 

265 

Gardner  v.  Gibson, 

21  W.  N.  C.  121. 

84 

Gaston  v.  Graham, 

18  C.  C.  R.  265. 

33.21s. 

Gaston  v.  Meadville, 

5 P.  D.  R.  549. 

216, 261 

33 

Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 85  Pa.  St.  513. 

135. 138 

Gettysburg  Battlefield  Association, 

2 P.  D.  R.  649. 

38 

Gibbons  v.  Scranton  Poor  District, 

3 Lack.  Jur.  241. 

236 

Giozza  v.  Tiernan, 

148  U.  S.  657. 

124 

Grant  Street, 

121  Pa.  St.  596. 

33. 63, 67, 

Gray  v.  Pittsburg, 

147  Pa.  St.  354. 

84, 147 
230 

Greensburg  v.  Laird, 

8 C.  C.  R.  608. 

256 

Gregg  Twp.  v.  Jamison, 

55  Pa.  St.  468. 

221 

Grim  v.  School  District, 

57  Pa.  St.  433. 

226 

Grubb’s  Appeal, 

174  Pa.  St.  187. 

37 

Guildin  v.  Schuylkill  Co., 

149  Pa.  St.  210. 

148,  156 

Reversing  s.  c., 

10  C.  C.  R. 

Gulf,  etc.,  Railway  v.  Ellis, 

601  • 

165  U.  S.  150. 

122, 123 

Haines  v.  Pass.  Ry.  Co., 

152  Pa.  St.  153. 

183, 1 88, 

Halderman’s  Appeal, 

104  Pa.  St.  251. 

211,251,278 

7 

TABLE  OF  CASES. 


297 


Hancock  Street, 

Hand  v.  Fellows, 

Hannick’s  Bond, 

Hanover  Borough’s  Appeal, 

Harris’  Appeal, 

Harrisburg  v.  McCormick, 

Hatfield  v.  Commonwealth, 

Hawes  Mfg.  Co.’s  Appeal, 

Hays  v.  Commonwealth, 

Hayes  v.  Missouri, 

Henrix’s  Account, 

Henry  Street, 

Hepburn  v.  Curts, 

Hewitt’s  Appeal, 

Hippsly  v.  Tucke, 

Hoffa’s  Appeal, 

Hoffman  v.  Matthes, 

Hoopes  v.  Scranton, 

Hoover  v.  Penna.  R.  R.  Co., 
Hortsman  v.  Kaufman, 

Howard’s  Appeal, 

Huidekoper  v.  City  of  Meadville, 
Hunter’s  Appeal, 

Hutchinson’s  Appeal, 

Indiana  Co.  v.  Agricultural  Society, 
Irwin  v.  McCallin, 

Jenks  v.  Sheffield, 

Jermyn  v.  Scranton, 

Johnson  v.  Beacham, 

Kaufman  v.  Jacobs, 

Keim  v.  Devitt, 

Kelly  v.  City  of  Pittsburg, 

Kelly  v.  Mayberry, 

Kennedy  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co., 
Kenner  v.  Kelly, 

Keyser  v.  McKissan, 


1 W.  N.  C.  1 12. 

PAGE 

4i 

30  W.  N.  C.  72. 

235 

3 C.  C.  R.  254. 

274, 

150  Pa.  St.  202. 

275 

236 

160  Pa.  St.  494. 

27,  37,  162, 

165,  186,  188,  21 1,  251,  256 

129  Pa.  St.  213. 

195,  227 

120  Pa.  St.  395. 

40 

1 Monaghan,  353. 

53 

82  Pa.  St.  518. 

115 

120  U.  S.  68. 

124 

146  Pa.  St.  285. 

232 

123  Pa.  St.  346. 

152, 165 

7 W.  300. 

224 

88  Pa.  St.  55. 

226,  227 

2 Lev.  184. 

221 

1 Super.  Ct.  357. 

46,  53>  281 

3 Del.  Co.  579. 

223 

1 Wilcox,  189. 

165 

156  Pa.  St.  220. 

281 

97  Pa.  St.  147. 

45 

162  Pa.  St.  374. 

234 

83  Pa.  St.  156. 

226 

18  W.  N.  C.  411. 

138 

4 Pennypacker,  84.  234 

85  Pa.  St.  357. 

115 

28  P.  L.  J.  322. 

237 

135  Pa.  St.  400. 

241,  244, 

s.  c.,  26  W.  N.  C.  275.  245 

3 Lack.  L.  N.  112.  202 

2 C.  C.  R.  108. 

no 

4 C.  C.  R.  462. 

74 

3 C.  C.  R.  250. 

115.274 

85  Pa.  St.  170. 

137,  226 

1 54  Pa.  St.  440. 

37 

165  Pa.  St.  179. 

129.  135 

19  C.  C.  R.  348. 

18 

2 Rawle,  139. 

220 

298 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Kilgore  v.  Magee, 

85  Pa.  St.  401. 

PAGE 

129,  I94, 
215,  2l6 

Kimball  v.  Rosendale, 

42  Wis.  407. 

224 

King  v.  Lisle, 

Andrews’  Rep.  163. 

221 

King  v.  Philadelphia  Co., 

154  Pa.  St.  160. 

2l8,  223 

King  v.  Williams, 

1 W.  Bl.  93. 

*7 

/ 

Kingsbury  v.  Ledyard, 

2 W.  & S.  41. 

221 

Kittanning  Coal  Co.  v.  Com., 

79  Pa.  St.  100. 

129,  I30, 
137 

Kitty  Roup’s  Case, 

81*  Pa.  St.  21 1. 

I29,  I30, 

137. 138, 271 

Klingler  v.  Bickel, 

1 17  Pa.  St.  326. 

62,  107 
108 

Klugh  v.  Llarrisburg, 

122  Pa.  St.  289. 

33>  147 

Krause  v.  Penna.  R.  R.  Co., 

4 C.  C.  R.  60. 

74 

Lacey’s  Estate, 

19  C.  C.  R.  431. 
6 P.  D.  R.  499. 

271 

Lackawanna  Twp., 

160  Pa.  St.  494.  27,  37,  162, 

165,  186,  188, 

211,  251 

Lackawanna  Co.  v.  Stevens, 

Lake  Shore  & Mich.  So.  Ry.  Co.’s 

105  Pa.  St.  465. 

236 

Appeal, 

1 C.  C.  R.  327. 

246 

s.  c.,  16  P.  L.  J.  161. 

Land  v.  Wack, 

5 P.  D.  R.  606. 

18 

Land  Co.  v.  Weidner, 

169  Pa.  St.  359. 

1 16,  283, 
284 

Lansdale  Borough, 

1 Montg.  192. 

65,  66 

La  Plume  Bor.  v.  Gardner, 

148  Pa.  St.  192. 

26 

Affg.  2 Lack.  Jur.  28. 

Larrison  v.  Peoria,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co., 

77  111-  l7- 

10 

Lea  v.  Bumm, 

3 W.  N.  C.  335- 

15. 36 

Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Lower  Macungie 

Township, 

81  Pa.  St.  482. 

in,  1 15 

Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.’s  Appeal, 

164  Pa.  St.  44. 

I7L  249, 
257,  271 

Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.’s  Case, 

39  Leg.  Int.  210. 

8 

Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.’s  Petition, 

14  C.  C.  R.  621. 
3 P.  D.  R.  610. 

171 

14  Lane.  L.  R.  191. 


Leitzel  v.  Center  Co., 


236 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


299 


PAGE 

Linn  v.  Chambersburg  Borough,  160  Pa.  St.  51 1.  21 1 

Little  Equinunk,  etc.,  Turnpike  Co.,  2 C.  C.  R.  632.  27 

Loewi  v.  Haedich,  8 W.  N.  C.  7°-  45 

Loftus  v.  Farmers’  & Mechanics’ 


Bank, 


Loughlin’s  Appeal, 

Lucas  v.  Ruff, 

Luzerne  Co.  v.  Glennon, 

Luzerne  Co.  v.  Griffith, 

Luzerne  Water  Co.  v.  Toby  Creek 
Water  Co., 

Lyon  v.  State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R. 
Company, 

Magee  v.  Commonwealth, 

Malloy  v.  Reinard, 

Marchant  v.  Pe'nna.  R.  R.  Co., 
Mauch  Chunk  v.  Betzler, 


Mauch  Chunk  v.  McGee, 


Meadville  v.  Dickson, 

Melick  v.  Williamsport, 
Meredith  v.  Lebanon, 

Michener  v.  Philadelphia, 
Miller  v.  Cunningham, 

Mills  v.  Charleton, 

Millvale  Borough, 

Millvale  v.  Evergreen  Ry.  Co., 
Mink  v.  Mink, 

Missouri  Pacific  Ry.  v.  Humes, 
Moers  v.  Reading, 


133  Pa-  St.  97-  63,  64,  67, 

s.  c.,  25  W.  N.  C.  459.  1 17 

Affg.  46  L.  I.  46. 

19  W.  N.  C.  517. 

138 

45  L.  I.  454. 

39 

109  Pa.  St.  564. 

148,  156 

1 Kulp,  297. 

i5o> 156 

148  Pa.  St.  568. 
Affg.  6 Kulp,  237. 

46 

77  Pa.  St.  429. 

1 W.  N.  C.  225. 

45 

46  Pa.  St.  358. 

226 

1 15  Pa.  St.  25. 

231 

153  U.  S.  380. 

124 

19  C.  C.  R.  27. 
s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  330. 
s.  c.,  10  York,  151. 

33 

81  Pa.  St.  433. 

33  Leg.  Int.  272. 
3 W.  N.  C.  33. 

19. 36 

129  Pa.  St.  1.  33, 

165, 215, 

216, 

226,  229 

162  Pa.  St.  408. 

230 

1 D.  R.  220. 

276 

1 18  Pa.  St.  535. 

195 

7 C.  C.  R.  500. 

248,  272 

29  Wis.  400. 

226 

43  P.  L.  J.  41 1. 
26  P.  L.  J.  21 1. 

251 

131  Pa.  St.  1. 

18,  46 

16  C.  C.  R.  189. 

38 

115U.  S.  512. 

126 

21  Pa.  St.  188. 

278 

300 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Monroe  v.  Luzerne  Co., 
Montgomery  v.  Commonwealth, 
Morrison  v.  Bachert, 

Mount  Joy  v.  Lancaster  Tpk., 

Myers  v.  Commonwealth, 
McAskie’s  Appeal, 

McCall  v.  Coates, 

McCarty  v.  Commonwealth, 

McCleary  v.  Allegheny  Co., 
McCormick  v.  Fayette  Co., 
McGee’s  Appeal, 

McGunnegle  v.  Allegheny  Co., 
McKay  v.  Trainor, 

McKeesport  v.  Owens, 

McKeever  v.  Victor  Oil  Company, 
Nason  v.  Poor  Directors, 

Norristown  v.  Citizens’  Pass.  Ry. 
Company, 

Norristown  v.  Citizens’  Pass.  Ry. 

Company, 

Nutt’s  Avenue, 

Oakley  v.  Oakley, 

Otto  Township  Road, 

Oxford  Borough  Street, 

Packer  v.  Railroad  Company, 
Pacific  Exp.  Co.  v.  Seibert, 


page. 


103  Pa.  St.  278. 

148, 149, 

156 

91  Pa.  St.  125.  101, 

104, 105, 

37  L.  I.  94. 

257, 270 

1 12  Pa.  St.  322. 

102,  103, 

1 C.  C.  R.  153. 

105,  I29, 

133. 141. 148,  166,245,249 

13  Lane.  L.  R.  180 

47 

Reversed  182  Pa.  St.  581. 

no  Pa.  St.  217. 

36 

154  Pa.  St.  24.  186,  188,  251 

23  Atl.  Rep.  1126. 

235 

no  Pa.  St.  243. 

129, 131. 

i36.  !37. 141. 148,  245,  249 

163  Pa.  St.  578. 

236 

150  Pa.  St.  190. 

62,  108 

114  Pa.  St.  470. 

15 

163  Pa.  St.  589. 

236 

152  Pa.  St.  242. 

188,  209, 

210,232, 236, 251,253, 

264,  269 

6 W.  N.  C.  492. 

36,  46 

9 C.  C.  R.  284. 

22,  74 

126  Pa.  St.  445. 

18 

s.  c.,  22  W.  N.  C.  60. 

9 C.  C.  R.  102. 

61,  108 

148  Pa.  St.  87. 

61, 108 

2 Chester  Co.  49. 

29>  5 r 

1 P.  D.  R.  781. 

66 

n C.  C.  R.  572. 

2 Super.  Ct.  20. 

52 

1 81  Pa.  St.  390. 

38  W.  N.  C.  328. 

2 D.  R.  327. 

26 

19  Pa.  St.  21 1. 

73 

142  U.  S.  339. 

124 

TABLE  OF 

CASES. 

301 

PAGE 

Parkinson  v.  State, 

14  Md.  185. 

io>  37 

Payne  v.  School  District, 

168  Pa.  St.  386. 

27 

Penna.  R.  R.  Co.’s  Appeal, 

3 C.  C.  R.  162. 

246 

Penna.  R.  R.  v.  Montgomery  Co. 

Pass.  R.  R., 

3 P.  D.  R.  S8. 

38 

Penna.  R.  R.  v.  Riblet, 

66  Pa.  St.  164. 

7.31.32 

People  v.  Brooklyn, 

71  N.  Y.  495. 

226 

People  v.  Collins, 

7 Johns  Rep.  554.  22T 

People  v.  Mahaney, 

13  Mich.  197. 

61 

Pepper  v.  Philadelphia, 

6 P.  D.  R.  317. 

98 

Perkins  v.  Philadelphia, 

156  Pa.  St.  554. 

6,  22,  50,  74, 

156  Pa.  St.  539. 

i47.  279. 

284,  286,  287 

Perot’s  Appeal, 

86  Pa.  St.  335. 

115 

Philadelphia  v.  Donahew, 

5 Leg.  Gaz.  22. 

29 

1 Leg.  Chron.  45. 

Phila.  v.  Haddington  M.  E.  Ch., 

1 15  Pa.  St.  291 

172,  187, 

194, 209, 251, 255, 264, 

268,  269 

Philadelphia  v.  Kates, 

150  Pa.  St.  30. 

I96,  I98,  251, 

264,  269,  271 

Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 

2 C.  C.  R.  287. 

47,  255,  269 

Philadelphia  v.  Pepper, 

181  Pa.  St.  566 

98 

s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  ; 

317- 

Phila.  v.  Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co., 

142  Pa.  St.  484. 

19,  20,  26, 

6 C.  C.  R.  283. 

46,  50 

Philadelphia  v.  Spring  Garden  Co., 

161  Pa.  St.  522. 

14,  26,  47,  51 

Phila.  v.  Westminster  Cem.  Co., 

162  Pa.  St.  105. 

144.  147. 

34  W.  N.  C.  17. 

245>  279 

3 D.  R.  151. 

Philadelphia  v.  Wright, 

100  Pa.  St.  235. 

1 15 

Phila.  v.  Reading  Coal  Co.’s  Pet., 

164  Pa.  St.  248. 

171,257, 271 

Phillip’s  Estate, 

6 C.  C.  R.  499. 

84 

Phoenixville  Road, 

109  Pa.  St.  44. 

5,  11,  19,  26, 

3°>  32 

Pierce  v.  Commonwealth, 

104  Pa.  St.  150. 

1 15 

Pierie  v.  Philadelphia, 

139  Pa.  St.  573. 

27 

27  W.  N.  C.  285. 

Affg.  47  L.  I.  154. 

302 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Pittsburg’s  Assessors, 
Pittsburg’s  Petition, 


Pittsburg  v.  Hughes, 

Poor  Dist.  v.  Clearfield  Co., 

Poor  Dist.  v.  Luzerne  Co., 

Portuondo’s  Estate, 
Portuondo’s  Estate, 

Potter’s  Field, 

Pottstown  Borough, 

Pottstown  Borough  Ext., 

Price  v.  Blair  Co., 

Provident  Asso.  v.  Flanagan, 
Purvis  v.  Ross, 

Quinn’s  Appeal, 

Quinn  v.  Cumberland  Co., 

Railway  Co.  v.  Mackey, 
Reading’s  Constables, 
Reading  v.  Savage, 


Reid  v.  Smoulter, 

Reeves  v.  Edsall, 

Reeves  v.  Phila.  Trac.  Co., 

Reynolds  Lumber  Co.  v.  Reynolds, 


PAGE 

7 Leg.  Gaz.  117.  254,266 

138  Pa.  St.  401.  70,  74,  1 18, 


151,  156,  180,  188,  192, 
209,  215,  216,  251,  262, 
264,  266,  268 


I3C.CR.535.  215,216,253 

16  C.  C.  R.  554. 

28 

4 P.  D.  R.  584. 

17  C.  C.  R.  83. 

28 

5 P.  D.  R.  183. 

19  C.  C.  R.  419. 

18,  271 

6 P.  D.  R.  462. 

271 

8 York,  145. 

147,  279 

11 7 Pa-  St.  538. 

43.  46,  65, 

I Montg.  161. 

66.  256 

1 Montg.  189. 

4 Montg.  29. 

256 

Affg.  s.  c.,  1 Montg.  189. 

14  Lane.  L.  R.  134, 

236 

19  C.  C.  R.  529. 

18 

12  C.  C.  R.  193. 

46,  61,  90 

158  Pa.  St.  20. 

162  Pa.  St.  56. 

234 

162  Pa.  St.  55. 

26,  236 

Reversing  13  C.  C.  R.  602. 

127  U.  S.  205. 

124 

8 C.  C.  R.  101. 

255,  266 

120  Pa.  St.  198. 

157.  165, 

124  Pa.  St.  328. 

194= 

23  W.  N.  C.  332. 

223: 

5 Lane.  L.  R.  135. 

229 

128  Pa.  St.  324. 

129 

Reversing  5 Kulp,  145. 

1 Lane.  J.  96. 

74 

152  Pa.  St.  153. 

183,  188, 

211, 

251, 278 

4 P.  D.  R.  573. 

74 

12  Lane.  L.  R.  383. 
6 Del.  Co.  255. 

TABLE  OF  CASES. 


303 


PAGE 


Riddle  v.  County  of  Bedford, 

7 S.  & R.  386. 

221 

Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Phila., 

124  Pa.  St.  219.  20, 

26,  46,  50 

23  W.  N.  C.  324. 

Ripple  y.  Commissioners, 

1 P.  D.  R.  201. 

276 

142  Pa.  St.  484. 

Rogers  v.  Glendower  Iron  Works, 

1 7 W.  N.  C.  444.  . 

47. 50. 89 

Rogers  v.  Mfg.  Improvement  Co., 

109  Pa.  St.  109. 

20,  26 

Roth  v.  Hobson, 

5 C.  C.  R.  1 7. 

84 

21  W.  N.  C.  64. 

Royersford  Street, 

2 Montg.  Co.  153. 

28 

Ruan  Street, 

132  Pa.  St.  257. 

170,  187, 

24  W.  N.  C.  460. 

188,  190. 

25  W.  N.  C.  349. 

191,  194. 

209,  210, 

214,  236, 

251 

, 262,  264 

Rubright  v.  Pittsburg, 

147  Pa.  St.  355. 

230 

Ruth’s  Appeal, 

8 Lane.  L.  R.  264. 

26,  46,  50 

1 Lack.  L.  R.  31 1. 

10  W.  N.  C.  498. 

Rutt  v.  Burkey, 

14  Lane.  L.  R.  11. 

18 

Rymer  v.  Luzerne  Co., 

142  Pa.  St.  108. 

129,  132, 

148, 

156, 235 

Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Fricke, 

152  Pa.  St.  231. 

188, 197, 

199,  201,  209, 

210,215, 

216, 236,251,254 

, 264, 269 

Sanders  v.  Cambria  County, 

16  C.  C.  R.  94. 

48 

4 P.  D.  R.  241. 

Sanderson  v.  Commissioners, 

1 C.  C.  R.  342.  27, 

53.  66,  67 

Satterlee  v.  Matthewson, 

16  S.  & R.  169. 

227 

Sayre  Borough  v.  Phillips, 

148  Pa.  St.  488. 

123 

Schall  v.  Norristown, 

3 Luz.  L.  R.  77. 

38 

Schenley  v.  Commonwealth, 

36  Pa.  St.  29.  224, 

, 226,  227 

Scowden’s  Appeal, 

96  Pa.  St.  422.  141, 

146,  147. 

166, 

, 245,  249 

Scranton  School  Dist.’s  Appeal, 

1 13  Pa.  St.  176. 

103, 105, 

s.  c.,  1 Atl.  560. 

156, 157. 

159,  162,  165,  167. 

, 258,  271 

Scranton  v.  Silkman, 

113  Pa.  St.  191. 

105,  no, 

1 17,  I48,  199,  245,  246, 


304 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Scranton  v.  Whyte, 


Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Caldwell, 

/ 

Seifried  v.  Commonwealth, 

Seitz  v.  Lafayette  Traction  Co., 
Sener  v.  Ephrata, 

Sewer  Street, 

Sewickley  Bor.  v.  Sholes, 

Sewickley  Sch.  Dist.  v.  Osborn  Sch. 
District, 

Shaaber  v.  Reading, 

Sharett’s  Road, 

Shoemaker  v.  Harrisburg, 

Shurley  v.  Railroad  Co., 

Simon’s  Case, 

Sixteenth  Street, 

Smith  v.  Baker, 


Smith  v.  Reading  City  Pass.  Ry. 
Co., 


Smyers  v.  Beam, 

Snyder  v.  Mogart, 

South  Bethlehem  v.  Hemingway, 
Spring  Street, 

St.  L.  & San  Fran.  Ry.  v.  Mathew 
State  Street, 

State  v.  Loomis, 

State  v.  Newark, 

State  Line  & Juniata  R.  R.  Co 
Appeal, 


148  Pa.  St.  419. 

177, 181, 

188,  199,  201,  202,  209, 

216,  251,  262,  264,  269,  271 

39  Leg.  Int.  414. 

38.63 

13  Fed.  Rep.  429. 

101  Pa.  St.  200. 

231 

5 C.  C.  R.  469. 

278 

176  Pa.  St.  80. 

47 

8 C.  C.  R.  226. 

ii5 

1 18  Pa.  St.  165. 

1 

19,  22,  52 

L. 

19  C.  C.  R.  257. 

282 

s.  c.,  6 P.  D.  R.  21 1. 

133  Pa.  St.  643.  190,  194,  210 

8 Pa.  St.  92. 

193 

122  Pa.  St.  285. 

33>  65,  147 

4 C.  C.  R.  86. 

121  Pa.  St.  51 1. 

118 

4 D.  R.  189. 

215,  216 

4 C.  C.  R.  124. 

165 

3 P.  D.  R.  626. 

37 

, 3 Lack.  Jur.  154. 

196,  203, 

254 

156  Pa.  St.  5. 

25,  27 

Affg.  13  C.  C.  R. 

49. 

2 P.  D.  R.  490. 

158  Pa.  St.  57. 

46, 90 

1 7 C.  C.  R.  1. 

18 

16  C.  C.  R.  103. 

28,  51 

1 12  Pa.  St.  258. 

19L  i94 

165  U.  S.  1. 

124 

2 Leg.  Chron.  i. 

21,29,  42 

1 15  Missouri,  307. 

124 

34  N.  J.  L.  236. 

226 

77  Pa.  St.  429.  12,13,19,43 

i W.  N.  C.  225. 

62  Iowa,  303. 

224 

Strange  v.  Dubuque, 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


305 


Straub  v.  Pittsburg, 

38  P.  L.  J.  89. 

PAGE 

180, 188, 

Affd.  138  Pa.  St.  356.  21 1, 

Strine  v.  Foltz, 

244,  245,  255 
1 13  Pa.  St.  349.  264,281 

Strohl  v.  Ephrata, 

1 C.  C.  R.  490. 
13  Lane.  L.  R.  1. 

40 

Stuart’s  Appeal, 

163  Pa.  St.  210. 

61,  68,  89 

Swaney  v.  Wash.  Oil  Co., 

7 C.  C.  R.  351. 

22,  74 

Swatara  School  Dist.’s  Appeal, 

1 Super.  Ct.  502. 

115.  271, 

Taggart  v.  Commonwealth, 

102  Pa.  St.  354. 

275 
32>  36 

Taxpayer’s  Petition, 

26  P.  L.  J.  146. 

172 

Taylor  v.  Bowling, 

5 P.  D.  R.  605.  • 

18 

Telephone  Co.  v.  Keesey, 

5 P.  D.  R.  366. 

39 

Titus  v.  Elyria  Oil  Co., 

1 P.  D.  R.  204. 

22,  74 

Titusville  Iron  W.  v.  Key.  Oil  Co., 

122  Pa.  St.  627. 

39.61,72, 

Townsend  v.  Wilson, 

7 C.  C.  R.  101. 

83,  84 
248,  272 

Union  Pass.  Ry.  Co.’s  Appeal, 

81*  Pa.  St.  91.  13,  18,  47,  51 

Van  Loon  v.  Engle, 

4 Leg.  Gaz.  381. 
29  Leg.  Int.  380. 
9 Phila.  495. 

171  Pa.  St.  157. 

188,  248, 

Van  Storch  v.  Scranton, 

2 51,  26l,  260,  271,  272 
3 C.  C.  R.  567.  165 

Van  Storch  v.  Scranton  Sch.  Dist., 

3 C.  C.  R.  571. 

165 

Vanzandt  v.  Waddell, 

4 C.  P.  99. 

2 Yerger,  260. 

125 

Von  Bonnhorst  v.  Allegheny  Co., 

163  Pa.  St.  588. 

236 

Walston  v.  Nevin, 

128  U.  S.  232. 

124 

Washington  Avenue, 

69  Pa.  St.  352. 

138 

Washington  Bor.  v.  McGeorge, 

146  Pa.  St.  248. 

15.37.  74 

Watkin  v.  West  Phila.  Ry.  Co., 

152  Pa.  St.  153. 

188 

Weinman  v.  Pass.  Ry.  Co., 

ii  C.  C.  R.  648.  183, 1 88, 

1 D.  R.  463.  211,251,278 

1 18  Pa.  St.  192.  100,  1 18, 

144,  173,  175,  185,  187, 
209,  251,  278 


20 


3°6 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Wetzel  v.  Goodyear, 
Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia, 


Wheeler  v.  Rice, 

Whitney  v.  Pittsburg, 
Williams  v.  People, 
Wilkes-Barre  v.  Myers, 
Wilson  v.  Downing, 
Wishart  v.  Leslie, 

Wissler  v.  Becker, 

Wolf  v.  Philadelphia, 
Wright  v.  Barber  (S.  C.), 
Wynkoop  v.  Cooch, 
Wyoming  Street,  Pittsburg, 


Yeager  v.  Weaver, 

Yick  Wo.  v.  Hopkins, 

York  School  Dist’s  Appeal, 
York  Telephone  Co.  v.  Keesey, 

Young  v.  Bradford  County, 


PAGE 

5 P.  D.  R.  605.  18 

77  Pa.  St.  338.  33, 98,  107, 

129,  156,  170,  178,  194, 


199,  249 

83  Pa.  St.  232.  36 

147  Pa.  St.  351.  230 

24  N.  Y.  405.  11 7 

1 13  Pa.  St.  395.  110,264 

4 Super.  Ct.  487.  39,  63 

36  P.  L.  J.  223.  68 

2 C.  C.  R.  103.  no 

105  Pa.  St.  25.  195 

5 W.  N.  C.  444.  276 

89  Pa.  St.  450.  15 

137  Pa.  St.  494.  101 , 177, 

s.  c.,  27  W.  N.  C.  136.  180, 

184,  187,  194,  209, 
215,  216,  251,  262,  264,  268 
64  Pa.  St.  425.  7,  36 

118U.  S.  356.  128 

169  Pa.  St.  70.  147,  279 

9 York,  153.  39 

s.  c.,  5 P.  D.  R.  366. 

7 C.  C.  R.  428. 


248 


INDEX 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 

see  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements 
and  Amendments. 

see  Original  Acts  and  Specific  Supplements 
and  Amendments. 
see  Curative  Statutes. 

challenged  pursuant  to  constitutional  provisions 
herein  treated  and  sustained  or  held  invalid  in 
whole  or  in  part: — 
see  Table  of  Acts  with  Citations. 

ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY  VOID  IN  PART. 

only  that  portion  of  Act  fails  which  is  not  cov- 
ered by  the  title 
general  rule 

manner  in  which  questions  arise 

rule  of  essential  parts 

rule  of  single  object 

rule  as  to  two  or  more  objects 

time  and  use 

ADOPTION. 

see  Germane. 

AFFAIRS. 

see  Construction. 

ALIEN  TAX  LAW. 
invalid 

AMBIGUITY. 

in  title  not  permissible, 
see  Clearness  of  Title. 

307 


PAGE 


15 

214 

215 

215 

215 

215 

216 


129 


l6 


3°8 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

AMENDMENTS. 

see  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements 
and  Amendments. 

see  Original  Acts  and  Specific  Supplements 
and  Amendments. 

express  amendments  intended  by  Article  III, 
Section  6 

by  addition  must  recite  former  statute 
overlooking  intervening  amendments 

ANNEXATION. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 
see  Boroughs. 
see  Cities. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 

ANTHRACITE  COAL  MINES, 
see  Classification. 

see  Labor,  Trade,  Mining,  and  Manufacturing. 

APPEALS. 

see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 
see  Taxation. 
see  Counties. 

APPROPRIATION  BILL. 

constitutional  provisions  relating  to  I 

may  incidentally  create  an  office  53 

ARBITRARY. 

see  Classification. 

ARGUMENT. 

of  provisions  herein  treated  differs  from  that  of 

general  constitutional  questions  5 


6i 

64 

84 


INDEX. 


309 


PAGE 

ASSESSMENTS, 
see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 
see  Curative  Acts. 
see  Taxation. 

ASSESSORS. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 
see  Cities. 

AUDITORS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

BILL  OF  RIGHTS. 

see  Classification. 

BITUMINOUS  COAL  MINES. 

see  Labor,  Trade,  Mining,  and  Manufacturing. 


BOROUGHS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 

annexation  of  territory  proper  256 

regulation  of  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs 

proper  256 

authorizing  improvements  of  streets  in  bor- 
oughs valid  256 

authorizing  assessment  for  benefits  in  such 

cases  valid  256 


BOROUGH  LEGISLATION. 

not  within  provisions  as  to  local  and  special 

legislation  107 

these  provisions  apply  only  to  the  General  As- 
sembly 107 

BOROUGH  ORDINANCES. 

whether  within  Article  III,  Section  6 61 

BORROWING. 

see  Germane. 


3IQ 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

BRIDGES. 

see  Germane. 

see  Private  Corporations. 

CASES  WITHIN  GENERAL  LAW  OR  JUDICIAL 
JURISDICTION. 

exclusion  of  retroactive  effect  valid  283 

cumulative  remedy  valid  284 

CEMETERIES. 

cases  as  to  142,  279 

see  Classification. 

CENSUS. 

only  test  of  population  149 

CITIES. 

transition  of  cities  from  class  to  class  1 51-2-3-4-5 
prescribing  effect  of  scire  facias  in  certain  class 

of  cities  invalid  249 

or  for  incorporation  of  street  railways  249 

or  providing  special  judicial  procedure  for  as- 
sessment of  damages  248 

or  regulating  school  affairs  250 

laying  out  of  highways  a municipal  subject  250 

and  deciding  when  their  opening  shall  take 

place  250 

and  institution  of  proceedings  therefor  250 

and  grading,  paving,  sewering,  and  lighting  250 

judicial  proceedings  not  within  the  principle 

of  classification  250 

taxation  a municipal  power  250 

provision  for  liens  for  assessment  proper  250 

unusual  provisions  of  doubtful  validity  25a 

validity  of  perpetual  lien  of  taxes  doubtful  250 

- regulation  of  street  railway  motive  power  proper  250 

provision  for  annexation  of  territory  proper  250 

provision  as  to  tax  liens  excepting  certain 

classes  of  cities  invalid  251 


INDEX. 


311 


PAGE 

CITIES — Continued. 

provision  that  taxes  shall  be  liens  without  re- 
gard to  whether  the  true  owner  is  named  in- 
valid 251 

provision  that  judicial  sale  of  real  estate  shall 
vest  title  whether  owner  named  or  not  in- 
valid 251-3-4 

perpetual  lien  enforced  on  distribution  254 

priority  of  lien  enforced  on  distribution  254 

regulation  of  milk  traffic  doubtful  254 

requiring  a certain  court  to  appoint  assessors 

invalid  254 

regulation  of  plumbers  valid  255 

annexation  of  territory  valid  255 

election  of  constables  in  cities  of  certain  classes 

valid  255 

poor  affairs  in  cities  of  certain  classes  valid  255 

prescribing  effect  of  judgment  in  city  of  cer- 
tain class  invalid  255 


see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

see  Germane. 

see  Transition. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 

see  Option. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

see  Liens. 

see  Highways. 

see  School  Districts. 

see  Private  Corporations. 

see  Taxation. 

CLASSIFICATION. 


the  test  of  generality 

98 

necessary  in  some  cases 

106 

e.  g.,  cities 

106 

when  not  admissible 

no 

classification  generally 

121 

principle  of  not  capable  of  definition 

121 

312 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

CLASSIFICATION— Continued. 

the  test  of  special  legislation  12 1 

arbitrary  122 

e.  g.}  widows  of  druggists  122 

e.  g.,  railroad  companies  as  to  certain  liabilities  123 
equality  before  the  law  123 

equal  protection  of  the  laws  123 

must  be  reasonable  124 

must  not  be  invidious  125 

hostile  125 

unusual  125 

must  have  adequate  basis  126 

within  the  principle  of  Article  I,  Section  1,  Bill 

of  Rights  128 

alien  tax  law,  instance  of  improper  classification  129 
legislative  power  of  classification  not  abridged 

by  Constitution  129,  130 

Constitution  has  made  certain  classes  129 

recognizes  power  to  classify  129 

laws  based  on  constitutional  classification  are 

general  129 

power  to  classify  not  abridged  129,  130 

e.  g.,  cities  130 

e.  g.,  subjects  of  classification  130 

instances  of  constitutional  classification  131 

legislature  cannot  modify  13 1 

sub-classification  of  constitutional  classes  132 

classification  of  coal  mines  134 

of  foreign  insurance  companies  135 

proper  classification  a judicial  question  135 

grounds  of  classification  136 

custom  136 

nature  136 

laws  of  trade  136 

necessity  136 

presumption  favors  legislative  classification  137 

infringement  of  Constitution  the  test  137 

the  subject  further  illustrated  137 


INDEX.  313 

PAGE 

. CLASSIFICATION— Continued. 

population  the  only  basis  as  to  cities  or  counties  139 
classification  of  political  sub-divisions  must  be 

complete  140 

classification  must  not  be  false,  pretended, 

evasive  nor  excessive  141 

instance  of  false  classification — courts  141 

instance  of  evasive  classification — courts  142 

instance  of  pretended  classification — cemeteries  142 
instance  of  pretended  classification  with  indi- 
vidualizing definition — cemeteries  143 

instance  of  false  classification — public  buildings  144 
instance  of  excessive  classification — cities  144 

distinction  between  general  and  particular  clas- 
sification 145 

three  classes  of  cities  final  146 

multiplication  of  classes  of  cities  leads  to 
special  legislation  146 

classification  must  be  operative  from  time  to 
time  so  as  to  permit  transition  147 

instance  of  violation  of  this  rule — counties  148 

transition  from  class  to  class  148,  155 

see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 

CLEARNESS  OF  TITLE. 

required.  II 

what  is  clearness  16 

not  ambiguity  16 

not  uncertainty  17 

nor  words  used  in  misleading  sense  17 

see  Ambiguity. 

COAL  MINES. 

see  Classification. 

see  Labor,  Trade,  Mining,  and  Manufacturing. 


CONSTABLES, 

see  Cities. 


3H 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

CONSTITUTION. 

does  not  abridge  power  of  classification  129 

save  when  it  makes  certain  classes  129,  13 1 

CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS. 

relating  to  titles  of  Acts  of  Assembly  1 

relating  to  general  appropriation  bill  1 

reforms  intended  by  those  herein  treated  6 

relating  to  enactments  by  reference  57 

relating  to  local  and  special  legislation  91 

relating  to  local  affairs  of  political  divisions  of 

the  State  240 

relating  to  highways  261 

relating  to  judicial  matters  263 

relating  to  liens  267 

relating  to  taxation  269 

relating  to  elections  275 

relating  to  private  corporations  276 

relating  to  cemeteries,  etc.  279 

relating  to  labor,  trade,  mining  and  manufac- 
turing 279 

relating  to  special  privileges  and  immunities  281 

relating  to  partial  repeal  of  general  law  283 

relating  to  cases  within  general  law  or  judicial 

jurisdiction  283 

relating  to  notice  284 

summary  of  provisions  not  infringed  239 

affirmative  and  negative  95 

general  and  specific  96 

provisions  in  the  singular  97,  98 

provisions  for  special  legislation  97,  98 

provisions  operate  prospectively  in 

not  retroactively  ill 

provisions  classified  204 

as  relating  directly  to  municipal  affairs  204 

as  having  no  relation  to  municipal  affairs  205 

. as  relating  to  municipal  affairs  or  not  accord- 
„ ing  to  circumstances 


206 


INDEX. 


315 


CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS— Continued. 

classified  as  relating  to  political,  executive,  or 
administrative  matters 
as  relating  to  legislative  matters 
as  relating  to  judicial  matters 
primary  prohibitions  of  special  legislation 
these  relate  to  things  formerly  permitted 
secondary  prohibitions  of  special  legislation 
they  can  only  be  applied  cumulatively 
because  they  depend  on  whether  the  rule  of 
classification  has  been  violated 

CONSTRUCTION. 

of  provisions  relating  to  titles 
legislative  usage  recognized 
construction  generally 
quotation  marks  in  title 

of  provisions  as  to  local  and  special  legislation 
construction  as  remedial  101, 

historical  occasion  of  their  adoption  101, 

intent  to  substitute  general  for  local  and  special 
legislation  102, 

construction  prevents  indirect  as  well  as  direct 
violation 

prevents  incidental  as  well  as  direct  violation 
“affairs”  construed  broadly 
construction  generally 
construction  must  be  uniform 
provisions  construed  as  prospective 

CONTROLLERS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 

CORPORATIONS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 

see  Private  Corporations. 
see  Cities. 


PAGE 


97 

97 

97 

121 

121 

121 

I2T 

121 

12 

12 

13 

13 

101 

239 

102 

103 

103 

239 

103 

106 

110 

111 


316 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

COUNTIES. 

county  affairs  103-4-5 

can  only  be  classified  by  population  139 

constitutional  classification  final  for  some  pur- 
poses 131 

law  excluding  certain  counties  invalid  148 

transition  of  counties  from  class  to  class,  148,  149, 

150.  I51 

option  invalid  165  to  172 

local  provision  for  courts  invalid  241 

officers’  salaries  241 

authorizing  appeals  241- 

regulating  fences  241 

taxing  fees  of  officers  valid  24I 

doubt  as  to  whether  poor  districts  are  included 

within  the  provisions  241 

police  power  245 

salaries  245 

appeals  246 

prisoners  246 

indexes  in  courts  247 

actions  by  veterans  against  counties,  etc.  247 

lien  of  taxes  excepting  certain  classes  of  cities 

invalid  248 

provision  for  county  buildings  excepting  a 

county  invalid  248 

furnishing  offices  at  county  seat  valid  248 

relief  of  poor  where  not  cared  for  at  county 
expense  invalid  249 


see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

see  Subject. 

see  Germane. 

see  Transition. 

see  Option. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

see  Classification. 

COUNTY  AUDITORS  OR  CONTROLLERS. 

title  relating  to  17 


INDEX. 


317 

PAGE 

COUNTY  TREASURER. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

COURTS. 

see  Germane. 

see  Classification. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

CURATIVE  STATUTES. 


legislature  may  ratify  what  it  may  authorize  223 

legislature  may  not  ratify  what  it  could  not 

authorize  224 

may  ratify  assessments  for  local  improvements  224 

or  paving  223 

taxation  226 

ordinances  of  de  facto  city  247 

legalized  de  facto  officers  229 

relating  to  judicial  sales  267 


CUSTOM. 

see  Classification. 

DEBT,  INCREASE  OF 
see  Germane. 
see  Questions  of  Repeal. 

DE  FACTO. 

de  facto  officers  217,  220,  221,  229 

de  facto  streets  and  highways  219 

effect  of  regular  proceedings  under  color  of 

statute  222 

de  facto  city  223-227 

borough  becoming  a city  within  invalid  classi- 
fication act  remains  a city  of  the  third  class  223 

DEPUTY  CORONERS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

DIVISION. 

of  county  or  township  does  not  affect  special 
law  236, 237 


INDEX. 


318 

PAGE 


ELECTIONS. 

contested  elections  266 

special  election  law  prior  to  Constitution  in  ef- 
fect after  its  adoption  276 

Baker  Ballot  Law  valid  276 

Superior  Court  Act  valid  276 


see  Germane. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN. 

general  title  to  incorporate  may  probably  carry 

power  of  20 

see  Cities. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Judicial  Matters. 

ENABLING  AND  DISABLING  CLAUSE, 
see  Germane. 

ENACTMENT  AND  REPEAL, 
see  Two  Subjects. 

ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE. 


constitutional  provisions  as  to  57 

express  amendments  the  object  of  61 

mischief  to  be  remedied,  want  of  notice  and 

surprise  61 

enactment  must  be  self  sustaining  61 

whether  borough  ordinances  are  governed  by 

the  provision  61 

provision  is  mandatory  62 

former  statute  need  not  be  recited  at  length  62,  63 
expository  statute  violates  the  provision  62,  82 

amendments  by  addition  must  recite  provision 

amended  64 

independent  enactments  not  within  the  provision  64 
supplements  not  usually  within  the  provision  65 

supplements  by  way  of  extension  are  66 

implied  repeals  not  within  the  provision  67 

nor  are  express  repeals  by  title  67 


INDEX. 


319 


PAGE. 

ENACTMENT  BY  REFERENCE— Continued. 

revival  by  repeals  not  within  the  provision  67 

local  act  not  revived  68 

reference  by  way  of  illustration  not  within  the 

provision  68 

pre-existing  system  cannot  be  transferred  to 

new  officials  69,  73 

provision  for  enforcement  under  pre-existing 

law  may  be  sustained  in  a supplement  72 

but  not  in  an  original  enactment  74 

legislative  practice  illustrated  74 

enactments  by  amendment  disregarding  inter- 
vening legislation  84 

provision  not  evaded  by  expository  statute  83 

extending  a local  statute  enacted  prior  to  1874 

which  extended  another  act  by  title  89 

difficulty  in  drafting  bills  illustrated  202 

EQUAL  PROTECTION  OF  THE  LAW. 
see  Classification. 

EQUALITY. 

see  Classification. 

ERROR  IN  RECITAL. 


of  original  acts  44,  46,  47 

EVIDENCE. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

EXCEPTION. 

of  locality  governed  by  special  constitutional 

provision  proper  109 

special  laws  may  be  saved  by  ill,  114,  115 

EXEMPTION. 

see  Germane. 

see  Provisos,  Exceptions,  and  Amendments. 

EXPOSITORY  STATUTE. 

violates  Article  III,  Section  6 


62, 83 


320 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

EXPRESS  AMENDMENTS. 

are  the  object  of  Article  III,  Section  6 61 

EXPRESSIO  UNIUS  EST  EXCLUSIO  ULTERIUS. 

maxim  applied  to  titles  13,  46 

FEES. 

see  Classification. 
see  Counties. 

FENCES. 

see  Counties. 
see  Option. 

FISH. 

not  included  in  title  specifying  game  47 

FOREIGN  INSURANCE  COMPANIES, 
see  Classification. 

FORMER  STATUTE. 

need  not  be  recited  in  amendment  62,  63 

unless  amended  by  addition  to  a section  64 

FREEHOLDS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

GAME. 

see  Fish. 

GENERAL  APPROPRIATION  BILL. 

constitutional  provisions  relating  to  1 

may  incidentally  create  an  office  53 

GENERAL  LAW. 

defined  and  illustrated  99,  100,  101 

see  Classification. 

GENERALITY  OF  TITLE. 

act  entitled  to  incorporate  a company  will  not 


affect  status  of  navigable  stream  19 

but  may  pass  power  of  eminent  domain  20 

cannot  relieve  from  liability  to  repair  streets  20 

nor  reduce  rate  of  taxation  20 


INDEX.  321 

PAGE 

GERMANE. 

what  germane  means  34 

county  seat  and  county  boundary  34 

assessments  and  streets  34 

court  and  clerk  and  grand  jury  34 

persons  and  parties  34 

sewers  and  drains  and  charges  for  use  34 

public  buildings  and  public  square  34 

borrowing  money  and  constructing  bridges  34 

borough  and  town  plans  and  surveys  34 

city  controller  designated  county  officer  in 

salary  act  34 

Brooks  law  34 

costs  and  taxes  and  water  rents  34 

city  officers  and  change  of  class  of  cities  34 

taxing  dogs  and  declaring  them  property  35 

release  of  husband’s  claim  action  by  husband 

and  wife  35 

annexation  and  incorporation  35 

elections  of  public  officers  and  to  increase  debt  36 
wholesalers  and  brewers  and  distillers  37 

enabling  act  containing  a disabling  clause  3 7 

summary  convictions  and  penalties  38 

street  railways  on  rural  roads  38 

borough  improvement  and  sewers  and  pavements  38 
elective  tax  in  general  tax  law  38 

taxation  and  appropriation  38 

fruits  et  cetera  may  include  trees  39 

executions  39 

adoption  and  collateral  inheritance  tax  ex- 
emption 39 

telegraph  companies  and  telephone  companies  39 
what  is  germane  in  license  laws  46 

highways  and  drains  40 

HIGHWAYS. 

are  a municipal  subject  261 

except  in  relation  to  judicial  procedure  involved  262 


21 


322 


INDEX 


PAGE 

HIGHWAYS— Continued. 

assessment  for  benefits  a municipal  power  262 

liens  valid  262 

unusual  provisions  of  doubtful  validity  262 

see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, 
see  Germane. 


IDENTIFICATION. 

of  original  acts  in  supplements  and  amendments  44 


IMPLIED  REPEALS. 

not  within  Article  III,  Section  6 67 

4 

INCONSISTENCY  BETWEEN  TITLE  AND  ACT. 

not  permissible  21 

inconsistent  proviso  void  21 

acknowledgments  not  regulated  where  title 

relates  to  records  21 

title  relating  to  leaseholds  act  to  property  upon 

them  22 

lottery  gifts  does  not  cover  gifts  22 

protection  of  miners  suggests  safety  not  crim- 
inal liability  23 

inconsistency  in  proviso  52,  54 

INDEPENDENT  ENACTMENTS. 

as  affected  by  Article  III,  Section  6 64 

referring  to  pre-existing  lawr  68,  82,  202 

INDEX. 

title  is  not  an  index  to  act  17,  19 

INDEXES. 

see  Counties. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

JUDGMENTS. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 


INDEX. 


323 

PAGK 

JUDICIAL  MATTERS. 

authorizing  appeals  except  in  certain  counties 

invalid  263 

giving  special  remedies  to  certain  officers  invalid  263 
enlarging  civil  jurisdiction  of  justices  of  the 

peace  263 

excepting  Philadelphia  263 

giving  special  effect  to  scire  facias  in  city  invalid  263 
providing  special  procedure  in  the  exercise  of 

the  power  of  eminent  domain  invalid  263 

perpetual  lien  of  taxes  in  cities  doubtful  264 

prescribing  effect  of  judicial  sales  in  cities  in- 
valid 264 

providing  special  remedy  and  limitation  in 

favor  of  veterans  invalid  264 

special  rule  of  evidence  in  city  of  certain  class 

invalid  265 

special  effect  of  judgment  in  city  of  certain 

class  invalid  265 

special  procedure  invalid  265 

provision  for  election  of  constables  in  bor- 
oughs and  townships  valid  265 

in  classes  of  cities  valid  265 

authorizing  judicial  appointment  of  assessors 

in  city  of  certain  class  invalid  266 

classification  of  election  contests  266 

special  jurisdiction  thereunder  266 

prescribing  effect  of  judicial  sales  266 

curative  laws  as  to  267 

JUDICIAL  QUESTION. 

validity  of  classification  a judicial  question  136,  137 

JUDICIAL  SALES. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

see  Cities. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 


324 


INDEX. 


LABOR,  TRADE,  MINING,  OR  MANUFACTURING, 
prohibiting  railway  discrimination 
regulation  of  anthracite  mines  valid 
classification  of  anthracite  mines  valid 
similar  provisions  as  to  bituminous  mines  valid 
provision  for  lien  in  favor  of  employees  in 
working  timber  and  bark  valid 
semi-monthly  pay  law  doubted 
see  Classification. 

LAWS  OF  TRADE. 

see  Classification. 

LEASEHOLDS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

, in  title  will  not  cover  freehold  s 17 

LEGISLATIVE  PRACTICE. 

illustrating  Article  III,  Section  6 74 

see  Construction. 
see  Appropriation  Bill. 

see  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements 
and  Amendments. 

LICENSES. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 

see  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements 


and  Amendments. 

LIENS. 

special  effect  of  scire  facias  in  cities  invalid  172 

municipal  liens  proper  subject  of  city  class 

legislation  181 

tax  lien  whether  owner  named  or  not  invalid  185 

municipal  liens  are  municipal  subjects  195,  196 

priority  of  196 

perpetuity  of  196 

indivestible  196 

uniformity  of  regulation  of  198,  199 


PAGE 

279 

279 

279 

281 

281 

281 


INDEX. 


325 


PAGE 

LIEN  S — Continued. 

provision  for  mechanics’ liens  excluding  certain 

counties  invalid  268 

provision  for  special  effect  of  scire  facias  in  cer- 
tain cities  invalid  268,  269 

liens  for  benefits  in  cities  of  certain  class  valid  268 

unusual  provisions  as  to  doubtful  268 

perpetuity  lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  certain 

class  doubtful  268 

lien  without  regard  to  whether  owner  named 

or  not  invalid  268 

lien  for  all  local  taxes  certain  classes  of  cities 

excepted  invalid  268 

see  Judicial  Matters. 
see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Cities. 

LIVERY-STABLE  KEEPERS, 
see  Subject. 

LOCAL  ACT. 


not  revived  by  repeal  of  repealing  act  68 

extended  by  title  prior  to  1874  may  be  ex- 
tended by  recital  89 

see  Local  and  Special  Legislation. 

LOCAL  LAW. 

defined  and  illustrated  99 

definition  of  not  changed  by  Constitution  129 


see  Local  and  Special  Legislation. 
LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION. 


the  constitutional  provision  relating  to  91 

The  Constitutional  Provisions  Generally  95 

affirmative  and  negative  95 

general  and  specific  96 

uniformity  of  law  96 

political,  executive,  or  administrative  matters  97 

legislative  matters  97 


326 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

judicial  matters  97 

provisions  in  the  singular  97,  98 

provisions  for  special  legislation  97,  98 

special  law  defined  98 

local  law  defined  98 

illustrations  of  definition  special  law  98 

illustrations  of  definition  local  law  99 

classification  the  test  98 

general  law  governs  a class  99 

if  limited  to  part  it  is  special  99 

if  it  embraces  all  it  is  general  though  not 

operative  in  the  Commonwealth  at  large  100 

distinction  between  a special  and  a general  law 

relating  to  a class  of  cities  100 

on  a general  subject  a law  is  special  if  a single 

county  be  excluded  101 

Construction  of  the  Provisions  as  Remedial  ioi 

the  historical  occasion  of  their  adoption  101,  102 
intent  to  eradicate  local  and  special  legislation 

and  require  general  wherever  practicable  102,  103 
indirect  as  well  as  direct  violation  to  be  pre- 
vented 103 

broad  construction  of  word  “affairs”  103 

what  are  local  affairs  103,  104,  105 

taxation  though  an  affair  of  sovereignty  is  also 

a local  affair  105 

construction  of  provisions — Mr.  Buckalew’s 

suggestion  106 

classification  absolutely  necessary  in  some  cases  106 
municipal  affairs,  instances  of  106 

necessity  for  classification  as  to  106,  107 

Limitations  Govern  only  the  General  As- 
sembly 107 

borough  ordinance  not  a law  within  the  pro- 
visions 107 

municipal  legislation  must  necessarily  include 

particular  local  ordinances  108 


INDEX. 


327 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

but  not  in  matters  of  taxation  108 

Exception  Pursuant  to  Constitution  does 
not  Render  Law  Special  109 

exception  of  locality  governed  by  another 

statute  renders  law  special  109 

construction  must  be  uniform  in  like  cases  no 

classification  not  admissible  when  no 

taxation  is  a local  affair  no 

law  governing  locality  local  though  benefits  of 
it  may  be  available  to  all  inhabitants  of  the 
Commonwealth  no 

Special  Laws  may  be  Saved  by  Exception  iii 

in  a general  statute  hi 

Constitution  as  a rule  prospective  in  effect  hi 

Constitution  as  a rule  did  not  affect  pre-exist- 
ing legislation  in 

for  example,  special  tax  laws  in 

general  statute  may  save  special  laws  in 

for  example,  special  tax  laws  114 

special  liquor  laws  114 

special  road  laws  114 

distinction  between  saving  special  laws  and  ex- 
cepting territory  in  which  they  are  operative  115 
act  is  general  though  not  retroactive  116 

Act  General  as  to  Persons  Local  as  to  Sub- 
ject-Matter 116 

act  general  as  to  married  women  and  special 

as  to  Philadelphia  loans  116 

act  general  as  to  parties  entitled  to  act,  but 

local  as  to  territory  invalid  117 

General  Law  may  Contain  Special  Provisions 
Necessary  to  Render  It  Effective  117 

special  provisions  to  make  a general  law  opera- 
tive in  a certain  city  of  a class  will  not  in- 
validate law  117 

Classification  121 

general  topic  beyond  scope  of  this  work  121 


328 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

principle  of  classification  not  capable  of  defini- 
tion 121 

primary  prohibitions  of  special  legislation  121 

these  relate  to  things  formerly  permitted  121 

secondary  prohibitions  of  special  legislation  121 

they  can  only  be  applied  cumulatively  12 1 

because  they  depend  on  whether  the  rule  of 

classification  has  been  violated  121 

arbitrary  classification  122 

widows  of  druggists  122 

railroad  companies  as  to  certain  liabilities  123 

equality  before  the  law  123 

equal  protection  of  the  laws  123 

classification  as  affected  by  Federal  Constitution  124 
must  be  reasonable  124 

cannot  be  invidious  125 

hostile  125 

unusual  125 

must  have  adequate  basis  126 

governed  by  principle  of  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence as  to  equality  128 

by  Article  I,  Section  1,  Bill  of  Rights  128 

alien  tax  law  an  instance  of  improper  classifi- 
cation 129 

Power  to  Classify  not  Abridged  by  Constitu- 
tion 129 

Constitution  has  made  certain  classes  129 

recognizes  power  to  classify  129 

laws  based  on  constitutional  classification  not 

local  or  special  129 

definition  of  local  or  special  laws  not  changed 

by  Constitution  129 

power  to  classify  not  abridged  130 

for  example,  cities  130 

for  example,  subjects  of  taxation  130 

instances  of  constitutional  classification  131 

legislature  cannot  modify  13 1 


INDEX.  329 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

sub-classification  of  constitutional  class  132 

distinction  between  local  and  general  statute 

as  to  class  of  officers  132 

classification  of  coal  mines  134 

police  power  as  affected  by  prohibitions  of 

local  and  special  legislation  134,  245 

foreign  insurance  companies  a class  135 

Proper  Classification  a Judicial  Question  135 

grounds  of  classification  136 

custom  136 

nature  136 

laws  of  trade  136 

necessity  136 

presumption  probably  favors  legislative  classi- 
fication 137 

infringement  of  Constitution  the  test  137 

the  subject  further  illustrated  137 

Population  the  only  Basis  of  City  or  County 

Classification  139 

Classification  of  Political  Sub-Divisions 
Must  be  Complete  140 

Classification  Must  Not  be  False,  Pretended, 
Evasive  nor  Excessive  141 

instance  of  false  classification — courts  141 

instance  of  evasive  classification — courts  142 

instance  of  pretended  classification — cemeteries  142 
instance  of  pretended  classification  with  indi- 
vidualizing definition — cemeteries  143 

instance  of  false  classification — public  buildings  144 
instance  of  excessive  classification — cities  144 

distinction  between  general  and  particular  clas- 
sification 145 

three  classes  of  cities  final  146 

more  than  three  unnecessary  146 

multiplication  of  classes  leads  to  special  legis- 
lation 146 


330 


INDEX. 


PAGE 


LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 
Classification  Must  be  Operative  from  Time 
to  Time  so  as  to  Permit  Transition  147 

instance  of  violation — counties  148 

Transition  148 

Luzerne  Co.  subject  to  Act  of  1876  148 

fee  system  restored  on  division  of  county  148 

census  the  test  of  population  149 

salary  system  restored  in  Luzerne  county  in 

1890  150 

Schuylkill  became  subject  to  in  1890  150 

special  statutory  provisions  for  transition  151 

transition  of  city  151 

effect  of  151 

works  only  necessary  changes  to  adjust  to  class  151 
office  and  officers  remain  as  before  save  as  ef- 
fected by  new  provisions  152 

general  laws  relating  to  the  class  prevail  over 

special  formerly  applicable  1 53 

for  example,  general  system  of  taxation  super- 
sedes former  special  system  155 

Option  Under  Classification  Acts  156 

not  at  first  regarded  as  admissible  156 

special  option  for  a class  invalid  157 

general  option  for  a class  valid  157 

provided  the  purpose  is  to  substitute  a general 

for  special  systems  157 

option  tending  to  uniformity  valid  158 

partial  option  invalid  159 

option  tending  to  diversity  invalid  159 

option  must  include  whole  system,  not  part  160 

option  for  special  classes  invalid  160 

working  of  valid  option  law  illustrated  162 

for  purposes  of  classification  all  cities  not  be- 
longing to  the  first  or  second  class  belong  to 
the  third  163 

for  purposes  of  municipal  government  only 
those  belonging  to  the  third  class  which  are 
governed  by  the  general  system  163 


INDEX.  331 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

class  legislation  not  operative  in  non-accepting 

cities  163 

Option  as  Related  to  Local  and  Special  Leg- 
islation 165 

local  option  invalid  165 

because  it  produces,  or  may  produce,  local  re- 
sults 166 

for  example,  option  in  relation  to  fences  166 

the  test  is  possible  results  167 

local  option  invalid  as  an  evasion  of  the  Con- 
stitution 168 

such  option  distinguished  from  choice  of 

methods  applicable  to  all  of  a class  168 

for  example,  in  the  maintenance  of  roads  168 

summary  of  conclusions  as  to  option  170 

constitutional  provisions  as  to  option  171 

option  as  to  support  of  poor  invalid  172 

Legislation  for  Cities  by  Classes  Must  be 
Confined  to  Municipal  Matters  Proper  172 

prescribing  effect  of  scire  facias  in  cities  invalid  172 
incorporating  street  railways  in  given  classes 

of  cities  invalid  173 

general  rights  of  persons  and  property  must  be 

secured  by  general  laws  173 

class  legislation  for  cities  must  be  confined  to 

municipal  purposes  173 

incorporation  and  government  of  street  rail- 
ways is  not  such  a purpose  174 

regulating  exercise  of  power  of  eminent  do- 
main is  not  174 

judicial  procedure  as  to  such  exercise  is  not  174 

instances  of  proper  and  improper  legislation  175 

procedure  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  emi- 
nent domain  in  street  laws  invalid  177 

distinction  between  municipal  and  non-muni- 
cipal purposes  again  pointed  out  178 

test  is  the  effect  of  the  law  179 


332 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

it  must  be  confined  to  municipal  powers  or 
duties  or  municipal  officers  or  duties  179 

caring  for  the  poor  of  the  city  a municipal 

function  180 

rules  as  to  exercise  of  power  of  eminent 

domain  reaffirmed  180 

municipal  liens  proper  subject  181 

municipal  taxation  proper  subject  181 

assessments  for  benefits  proper  i8r 

unusual  provisions  as  to  foregoing  questionable  182 

street  railway  motive-power  proper  subject  183 

regulation  of  distinguished  from  incorporation 

statutes  184 

provision  for  lien  whether  entered  against 

owner  or  not  invalid  185 

provision  that  judicial  sale  shall  vest  title  invalid  185 

municipal  taxation  for  municipal  purposes  186 

properly  a subject  of  class  legislation  for  cities  186 

so  is  annexation  of  territory  186 

confusion  of  classification  in  relation  to  taxes 

invalid  187 

Ruan  street,  argument  of  188 

dissents  in  188 

Ruan  street  explained  190 

Ruan  street  summary  of  act  in  question  191 

constitutional  classification  remarks  of  Sla- 
gle, J.  192 

municipal  highways  as  municipal  subjects  193 

how  they  differ  from  country  highways  193 

uniform  regulation  of  right  of  eminent  domain  194 

sewers  as  municipal  subjects  194 

municipal  liens  as  municipal  subjects  195 

distinction  between  assessments  for  benefits 
and  damages  for  taking  or  injuring  of  prop- 
erty 195 

assessments  depend  on  taxing  power  195 

taking  and  injuring  on  right  of  eminent  domain  195 


INDEX. 


333 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

municipal  tax  liens  196 

priority  of  196 

perpetuity  of  196 

undivestible  tax  liens  196 

uniformity  of  regulation  among  different 

classes  of  cities  198,  199 

how  far  class  legislation  may  regulate  enforce- 
ment of  city  taxes  20 1 

municipal  liens  and  taxation  as  related  to  en- 
actment by  reference  202 

difficulties  in  drafting  bills  illustrated  202 

unity  of  subject  of  volume  pointed  out  202 

What  are  Municipal  Matters  Proper,  and 
What  are  Not  203 

clauses  of  Article  III  relating  to  cities  203 

how  construed  203 

tests  of  validity  of  class  legislation  for  cities  204 

classification  of  constitutional  provisions  204 

those  relating  directly  to  municipal  affairs  204 

those  having  no  relation  to  municipal  affairs  205 

those  relating  to  municipal  affairs  or  not  ac- 
cording to  circumstances  206 

provisions  under  first  class  204 

provisions  under  second  class  205 

provisions  under  third  class  206 

explanation  of  provisions  under  third  class  206 

explanation  of  provisions  under  second  class  207 

harmony  of  decided  cases  with  the  foregoing  209 

summary  of  conclusions  21 r 

what  are  municipal  affairs  generally  21 1 

provisions  of  general  borough  law  examined  212 

municipal  subjects  as  shown  thereby  214 

Acts  of  Assembly  Void  in  Part  214 

general  rule  214 

manner  in  which  questions  arise  215 

rule  of  essential  parts  215 

rule  of  single  object  215 


334 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

rule  as  to  two  or  more  objects  215 

time  and  use  216 

Validity  of  Things  Executed  Under  Invalid 
Acts  of  Assembly  216 

rule  as  to  acts  done  under  color  of  authority  217 
rule  as  to  officers  de  facto  217 

distinction  between  personal  immunity  and 

creation  of  rights  under  invalid  laws  218 

immunity  of  officer  extends  to  person  acting 

under  his  direction  218 

rule  as  to  de  facto  streets  and  highways  219 

de  facto  officers  220,  221 

effect  of  regular  proceedings  under  color  of 

statute  222 

de  facto  city  223 

borough  becoming  a city  within  invalid  clas- 
sification act  remains  a city  of  the  third  class  223 

Curative  Statutes  223 

legislature  may  ratify  what  it  may  authorize  223 

legislature  may  not  ratify  what  it  could  not 

authorize  224 

may  ratify  assessments  for  local  improvements  224 

or  paving  225 

taxation  226 

ordinances  of  de  facto  city  227 

legalized  de  facto  officers  229 

Questions  of  Repeal  230 

class  legislation  unaffected  by  subsequent  laws 

general  in  the  broad  sense  230 

class  legislation  does  not  repeal  pre-existing 

local  legislation  t 231 

class  legislation  governs  when  city  enters  a 

class  232 

hence  its  prior  local  laws  yield  to  class  legis- 
lation 233 

for  example,  on  the  subject  of  taxation  233 

legislation  enjoined  by  the  Constitution  tend- 


INDEX. 


335 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

ing  to  uniformity  will  frequently  prevail  over 
special  laws  234-236 

for  example,  regulation  of  increase  of  indebt- 
edness for  municipalities  234 

general  legislation  sometimes  cumulative  with 

class  legislation  235 

special  law  remains  in  effect  notwithstanding 

division  of  territory  236,  237 

Local  Affairs  of  Political  Sub-Divisions  of 
the  State  239 

summary  of  provisions  not  infringed  239 

the  constitutional  provisions  construed  as 

remedial  239 

no  distinction  between  direct  and  incidental  in- 
fringements 239 

provisions  as  to  local  affairs  which  have  been 

construed  240 

Counties  241 

local  provision  for  courts  invalid  241 

official  salaries  and  fees  241 

authorizing  appeals  241 

regulating  fences  241 

taxing  fees  of  officers  valid  241 

doubt  as  to  whether  poor  districts  are  included 

within  the  provisions  241 

police  power  245 

salaries  245 

appeals  246 

prisoners  246 

indexes  in  courts  247 

actions  by  veterans  against  counties,  etc.  247 

lien  of  taxes  excepting  certain  classes  of  cities 

invalid  248 

provision  for  county  buildings  excepting  a 

county  invalid  248 

furnishing  offices  at  county  seat  valid  248 

relief  of  poor  where  not  cared  for  at  county  ex- 
pense invalid  249 


33^  INDEX. 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 


Cities  249 

prescribing  effect  of  scire  facias  in  certain  class 

of  cities  invalid  249 

or  for  incorporation  of  street  railways  249 

or  providing  special  judicial  procedure  for  as- 
sessment of  damages  248 

or  regulating  school  affairs  250 

laying  out  of  highways  a municipal  subject  250 

and  deciding  when  their  opening  shall  take 

place  250 

and  institution  of  proceedings  therefor  250 

and  grading,  paving,  sewering,  and  lighting  250 

judicial  proceedings  not  within  the  principle  of 

classification  250 

taxation  a municipal  power  250 

provision  for  liens  for  assessment  proper  250 

unusual  provisions  of  doubtful  validity  250 

validity  of  perpetual  lien  of  taxes  doubtful  250 

regulation  of  street  railway  motive  power 

proper  250 

provision  for  annexation  of  territory  proper  250 

provision  as  to  tax  liens  excepting  certain 

classes  of  cities  invalid  251 

provision  that  taxes  shall  be  liens  without  re- 
gard to  whether  the  true  owner  is  named 
invalid  251 

provision  that  judicial  sale  of  real  estate  shall 
vest  title  whether  owner  named  or  not  in- 
valid 251,253,254 

perpetual  lien  enforced  on  distribution  254 

priority  of  lien  enforced  on  distribution  254 

regulation  of  milk  traffic  doubtful  254 

requiring  a certain  court  to  appoint  assessors 

invalid  254 

regulation  of  plumbers  valid  255 

annexation  of  territory  valid  255 

election  of  constables  in  cities  of  certain  classes 

valid  255 


INDEX. 


337 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

poor  affairs  in  cities  of  certain  classes  valid  255 

prescribing  effect  of  judgment  in  city  of  cer- 
tain class  invalid  255 

Boroughs  256 

annexation  of  territory  proper  256 

regulation  of  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs 

proper  256 

authorizing  improvements  of  streets  in  bor- 
oughs proper  256 

authorizing  assessment  for  benefits  in  such 

cases  valid  256 

Townships  257 

act  relating  to  a certain  township  invalid  257 

regulating  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 

townships  valid  257 

enabling  taxpayers  to  contract  for  making 

roads  in  townships  valid  257 

School  Districts  257 

regulation  of  school  affairs  in  cities  of  certain 

class  invalid  257,  258,  259,  260,  261 

Highways  261 

are  a municipal  subject  261 

except  in  relation  to  judicial  procedure  involved  262 
assessment  for  benefits  a municipal  power  262 

liens  valid  262 

unusual  provisions  of  doubtful  validity  262 

Judicial  Matters  263 

authorizing  appeals  except  in  certain  counties 

invalid  263 

giving  special  remedies  to  certain  officers  in- 
valid 263 

enlarging  civil  jurisdiction  of  justices  of  the 

peace  . 263 

excepting  Philadelphia  263 

giving  special  effect  to  scire  facias  in  city  in- 
valid 263 


22 


338 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

providing  special  procedure  in  the  exercise  of 

the  power  of  eminent  domain  invalid  263 

perpetual  lien  of  taxes  in  cities  doubtful  264 

prescribing  effect  of  judicial  sales  in  cities  in- 
valid 264 

providing  special  remedy  and  limitation  in 

favor  of  veterans  invalid  264 

special  rule  of  evidence  in  city  of  certain  class 

invalid  265 

special  effect  of  judgment  in  city  of  certain 

class  invalid  265 

special  procedure  invalid  265 

provision  for  election  of  constables  in  boroughs 

and  townships  valid  265 

in  classes  of  cities  valid  265 

authorizing  judicial  appointment  of  assessors 

in  city  of  certain  class  invalid  266 

classification  of  election  contests  266 

special  jurisdiction  thereunder  266 

prescribing  effect  of  judicial  sales  267 

curative  laws  as  to  267 

Liens  267 

provisions  for  mechanics’  liens  excluding  cer- 
tain counties  invalid  268 

provision  for  special  effect  of  scire  facias  in  cer- 
tain cities  invalid  268,  269 

liens  for  benefits  in  cities  of  certain  class  valid  268 
unusual  provisions  as  to  doubtful  268 

perpetual  lien  of  taxes  in  cities  of  certain  class 

doubtful  268 

lien  without  regard  to  whether  owner  named 

or  not  invalid  268 

lien  for  all  local  taxes,  certain  classes  of  cities 

excepted  invalid  268 

Taxation  269 

requiring  levy  of  tax  for  certain  purpose  in 
certain  township  invalid  269 


INDEX.  339 

PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

authorizing  appeals  excepting  certain  counties 

invalid  270 

regulation  of  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs 

and  townships  valid  270 

taxation  for  benefits  in  class  of  cities  valid  270 

perpetual  lien  in  class  of  cities  doubtful  270 

municipal  taxation  a municipal  subject  270 

authorizing  township  taxpayers  to  maintain 
roads  by  contract  in  lieu  of  paying  taxes 
valid  270 

taxation  of  fees  of  officers  in  counties  having 

less  than  150,000  inhabitants  valid  270 

provision  for  lien  of  local  taxes  excepting  cer- 
tain classes  of  cities  invalid  270,  271 

direct  inheritance  tax  doubtful  276 

classification  of  real  estate  valid  271 

election  of  assessors  in  boroughs  and  town- 
ships valid  272 

system  for  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 

townships  valid  273,  274,  275 

Elections  \ 275 

special  election  law  prior  to  Constitution  in  ef- 
fect after  its  adoption  276 

Baker  Ballot  Law  valid  276 

Superior  Court  Act  valid  276 

Private  Corporations  276 

provision  for  incorporation  of  street  railways 

in  certain  cities  invalid  277,  278 

regulation  of  motive  power  in  cities  of  certain 

class  valid  277 

special  classification  of  bridges  valid  278 

provisions  of  Article  XVI,  Section  10,  Clause  2 278 

Cemeteries,  Etc.  279 

cases  as  to  279 

Labor,  Trade,  Mining,  or  Manufacturing  279 

prohibiting  railway  discrimination  279 

regulation  of  anthracite  mines  valid  279 


340 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

LOCAL  AND  SPECIAL  LEGISLATION— Continued. 

classification  of  anthracite  mines  valid  279 

similar  provisions  as  to  bituminous  mines 
valid  281 

provision  for  lien  in  favor  of  employees  in 

working  timber  and  bark  valid  281 

semi-monthly  pay  law  doubted  281 

Special  Privileges  and  Immunities  281 

special  rights  of  action  in  certain  officers  in- 
valid 281 

special  provisions  as  to  actions  for  wages  of 

manual  labor  doubtful  282 

special  provisions  for  action  by  veterans  invalid  282 
special  school  privileges  to  children  of  soldiers 

invalid  282 

Partial  Repeal  of  General  Law  283 

special  provision  as  to  statute  of  limitations 

invalid  283 

Cases  Within  General  Law  of  Judicial  Juris- 
diction 283 

exclusion  of  retroactive  effect  valid  283 

cumulative  remedy  valid  • 284 

Notice  4 284 

presumption  of  notice  284 

whether  presumption  may  be  rebutted  285,  286 

LOG  ROLLING. 

prevented  10 

MANDATORY. 

provision  as  to  titles  of  acts  is  5 

provision  of  Article  III,  Section  6,  is  61 

MANUAL  LABOR, 
see  Subject. 

see  Special  Privileges  and  Immunities. 


MILK. 

see  Cities. 


INDEX. 


341 


PAGE 

MINERS. 

see  Subject. 

MINES. 

see  Classification. 

MISCHIEF. 

intended  to  be  remedied  by  Article  III,  Section  6 61 

by  provision  as  to  titles  10 

by  provisions  as  to  local  and  special  legisla- 
tion 101,  102,  103 

MOTOR  POWER  COMPANIES. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

MULTIPLICITY. 

see  Two  Subjects. 


MUNICIPAL  AFFAIRS. 

prescribing  effect  of  scire  facias  in  cities  invalid  172 
incorporating  street  railways  in  given  classes 

of  cities  invalid  173 

general  rights  of  persons  and  property  must  be 

secured  by  general  laws  173 

class  legislation  for  cities  must  be  confined  to 

municipal  purposes  173 

incorporation  and  government  of  street  rail- 
ways is  not  such  a purpose  174 

regulating  exercise  of  power  of  eminent  do- 
main is  not  174 

judicial  procedure  as  to  such  exercise  is  not  174 
instances  of  proper  and  improper  legislation  175 
procedure  in  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  emi- 
nent domain  in  street  laws  invalid  177 

distinction  between  municipal  and  non-muni- 
cipal purposes  again  pointed  out  178 

test  is  the  effect  of  the  law  179 

it  must  be  confined  to  municipal  powers  or 

duties  or  municipal  officers  or  duties  179 


342 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

MUNICIPAL  AFFAIRS— Continued. 

caring  for  the  poor  of  the  city  a municipal 

function  180 

rule  as  to  exercise  of  power  of  eminent  domain 

reaffirmed  180 

municipal  liens  proper  subject  181 

municipal  taxation  proper  subject  181 

assessment  for  benefits  proper  181 

unusual  provisions  as  to  foregoing  questionable  183 
street  railway  motive  power  proper  subject  183 

regulation  of  distinguished  from  incorporation 

statutes  184 

provision  for  lien  whether  entered  against 

owner  or  not  invalid  185 

provision  that  judicial  sale  shall  vest  title  in- 
valid 185 

municipal  taxation  for  municipal  purposes  186 

properly  a subject  of  class  legislation  for  cities  186 
so  is  annexation  of  territory  186 

confusion  of  classification  in  relation  to  taxes 

invalid  187 

Ruan  street  argument  of  188 

dissents  in  188 

Ruan  street  explained  190 

Ruan  street  summary  of  act  in  question  191 

constitutional  classification  remarks  of  Sla- 
gle, J.  I92 

municipal  highways  as  municipal  subjects  193 

how  they  differ  from  country  highways  193 

uniform  regulation  of  right  of  eminent  domain  194 
sewers  as  municipal  subjects  194 

municipal  liens  as  municipal  subjects  195 

distinction  between  assessments  for  benefits 
and  damages  for  taking  or  injuring  of 
property  195 

assessments  depend  on  taxing  power  195 

taking  and  injuring  on  right  of  eminent  do- 


main 


195 


TNDEX. 


343 


PAGE 

MUNICIPAL  AFFAIRS— Continued. 

municipal  tax  liens  196 

priority  of  196 

perpetuity  of  196 

undivestible  tax  liens  196 

uniformity  of  regulation  among  different 

classes  of  cities  198,  199 

how  far  class  regulation  may  regulate  enforce- 
ment of  city  taxes  201 

municipal  liens  and  taxation  as  related  to  en- 
actment by  reference  202 

difficulties  in  drafting  bills  illustrated  202 

unity  of  subject  of  volume  pointed  out  202 

What  are  Municipal  Matters  Proper  and 
What  are  Not  203 

clause  of  Article  III  relating  to  cities  203 

how  construed  203 

tests  of  validity  of  class  legislation  for  cities  204 
classification  of  constitutional  provisions  204 

those  relating  directly  to  municipal  affairs  204 

those  having  no  relation  to  municipal  affairs  205 

those  relating  to  municipal  affairs  or  not,  ac- 
cording to  circumstances  206 

provisions  under  first  class  204 

provisions  under  second  class  205 

provisions  under  third  class  206 

explanation  of  provisions  under  third  class  206 

explanation  of  provisions  under  second  class  207 
harmony  of  decided  cases  with  the  foregoing  209 

summary  of  conclusions  21 1 

what  are  municipal  affairs  generally  21 1 

provisions  of  general  borough  law  examined  212 

municipal  subjects  as  shown  thereby  214 

MUNICIPAL  ASSESSMENTS. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Judicial  Matters. 
see  Cities. 


344 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

MUNICIPAL  LEGISLATION. 

not  within  provisions  as  to  local  and  special 

legislation  j0y 

these  provisions  apply  only  to  General  Assembly  107 

MUNICIPAL  LIENS. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Taxation. 
see  Cities. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

NATURE. 

see  Classification. 

NAVIGABLE  STREAM. 

not  affected  by  a title  which  merely  names  an 

improvement  company  19 

NECESSITY. 

see  Classification. 


NOTICE. 

title  must  give  fair  notice  18 

presumption  of  notice  of  special  bill  284 

whether  presumption  may  be  rebutted  285,  286 

object  of  provision  as  to  enactments  by  refer- 
ence 61 

OMNIBUS  LEGISLATION. 

prevented  by  provision  as  to  titles  II 

OPTION. 

not  at  first  regarded  as  admissible  under  classi- 
fication acts  156 

special  option  for  a class  invalid  157 

general  option  for  a class  valid  157 

provided  the  purpose  is  to  substitute  a general 

for  special  systems  157 

option  tending  to  uniformity  valid  158 

partial  option  invalid  159 

option  tending  to  diversity  invalid  159 


INDEX.  345 

PAGE 

OPTION — Continued. 

option  must  include  whole  system  not  part  160 

option  for  special  classes  invalid  160 

working  of  valid  option  law  illustrated  162 

for  purposes  of  classification  all  cities  not  be- 
longing to  the  first  or  second  class  belong  to 
the  third  163 

for  purposes  of  municipal  government  only 
those  belonging  to  the  third  class  which  are 
governed  by  the  general  system  163 

class  legislation  not  operative  in  non-accepting 

cities  163 

option  as  related  to  local  and  special  legislation  165 
local  option  invalid  165 

because  it  produces,  or  may  produce,  local  re- 
sults 166 

for  example,  option  in  relation  to  fences  1 66 

the  test  is  possible  results  167 

local  option  invalid  as  an  evasion  of  the  Con- 
stitution 168 

such  option  distinguished  from  choice  of 

methods  applicable  to  all  of  a class  168 

for  example,  in  the  maintenance  of  roads  168 

summary  of  conclusions  as  to  option  170 

constitutional  provisions  as  to  option  171 

option  as  to  support  of  poor  invalid  172 

ORIGINAL  ACTS  AND  GENERAL  SUPPLE- 
MENTS AND  AMENDMENTS. 

identification  of  original  sufficient  43,  44,  45 

general  supplement  may  include  what  original 

title  might  have  included  42,  43,  44 

apparently  erroneous  recital  not  fatal  43 

when  title  of  supplement  insufficient  43,  46 

when  sufficient  43,  47 

general  amendment  sufficient  44 

generality  in  license  law  46 

error  in  recital  47 


346 


INDEX. 


ORIGINAL  ACTS  AND  SPECIFIC  AMENDMENTS 
AND  SUPPLEMENTS. 

maxim  expressio  unius  applies 
fish  and  game 

destructive  animals  specified  and  not  specified 

PARTIAL  REPEAL  OF  GENERAL  LAW. 

special  provisions  as  to  statute  of  limitations  in- 
valid 

PENALTIES. 

see  Germane. 

PERPETUAL  LIENS, 

see  Liens. 

PERSONS. 

general  as  to  persons  local  as  to  subject-matter 
valid 
invalid 

PERSONS  AND  PARTIES, 

see  Germane. 

PLUMBERS. 

see  Cities. 

POLICE  POWER. 

whether  affected  by  provisions  as  to  local  and 

special  legislation  134,  245 

POOR. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Cities. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Counties. 

POPULATION. 

the  only  basis  of  city  or  county  classification 
census  the  only  test  of 


116 

11 7 


PAGE 


47 

47 

48 


283 


139 

149 


INDEX. 


347 


PAGE 

PRE-EXISTING  SYSTEM. 

not  transferred  by  reference  69,  73,  84 

difficulties  in  drafting  bills  illustrated  202 

PRESUMPTION. 

favors  legislative  classification  137 

PRIORITY  OF  LIENS, 
see  Liens. 

PRISONERS. 

see  Counties. 

PRIVATE  CORPORATIONS. 

provision  for  incorporation  of  street  railways 

in  certain  cities  invalid  277,  278 

regulation  of  motive  power  in  cities  of  certain 

class  valid  277 

special  classification  of  bridges  valid  278 

provision  of  Article  XVI,  Section  10,  Clause  2 278 

PROCEDURE. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

PROTHONOTARIES’  CLERKS. 

may  be  provided  for  in  general  appropriation 


bill  53 

PROVISO. 

inconsistent  with  title  void  21,  52,  53 

limiting  territorial  scope  of  act  22 

PROVISOS,  EXCEPTIONS,  AND  AMENDMENTS. 

inconsistent  proviso  void  21,  52,  53 

amendment  by  proviso  52 

exception  need  not  be  specified  in  title  53 

exemption  need  not  be  specified  in  title  53 

PROVISION  FOR  ENFORCEMENT. 


may  be  extended  by  reference  in  a supplement  72 
not  in  original  enactment  74 


348 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

PUBLIC  BUILDINGS, 
see  Germane. 
see  Classification. 
see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Cities. 

PUBLIC  SQUARE, 
see  Germane. 

QUESTIONS  OF  REPEAL. 

class  legislation  unaffected  by  subsequent  laws 

general  in  the  broad  sense  230 

class  legislation  does  not  repeal  pre-existing 

local  legislation  231 

class  legislation  governs  when  city  enters  a class  232 
hence  its  prior  local  laws  yield  to  class  legis- 
lation 233 

for  example,  on  the  subject  of  taxation  233 

legislation  enjoined  by  the  Constitution  tend- 
ing to  uniformity  will  frequently  prevail  over 
special  laws  234,  236 

for  example,  regulation  of  increase  of  indebt- 
edness of  municipalities  234 

general  legislation  sometimes  cumulative  with 

class  legislation  235 

special  law  remains  in  effect  notwithstanding 

division  of  territory  236,  237 

see  Repeal. 

QUOTATION  MARKS. 

error  in  title  will  be  corrected  by  construction  13 

RAILWAY. 

used  in  title  meaning  of  17 

REASONABLE  INQUIRY. 

sufficient  if  title  suggests  19 

RECORDS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 


INDEX.  349 

PAGE 

REFERENCE. 

by  way  of  illustration  not  within  Article  III, 

Section  6 68 

REPEAL. 

by  implication  not  within  Article  III,  Section  6 67 

by  title  not  within  Article  III,  Section  6 67 

whether  repeal  must  be  specified  in  title  46 

see  Repeal  and  Re-Enactment. 
see  Two  Subjects. 
see  Questions  of  Repeal. 
see  Revival  by  Repeal. 

REPEAL  AND  RE-ENACTMENT. 

when  repeal  need  not  be  specified  in  title  48,  51 

when  repeal  must  be  specified  48,  49,  50,  51 

re-enactment  not  noticing  intervening  repeal  49 

RES  INTER  ALIOS  PRINCIPLE. 

as  related  to  titles  of  acts  23 

leasehold  expressed  cannot  affect  freehold  23 

one  city  and  county  expressed  cannot  affect 
another  23 

city  expressed  townships  cannot  be  affected  23 

borough  expressed  county  cannot  be  affected  23,  24 
incorporation  expressed  navigable  stream  can- 
not be  affected  24 

county  lines  expressed  borough  and  township 

not  affected  24 

county  controllers  expressed  county  auditors 

not  affected  24 

perfecting  records  expressed  county  not 

chargeable  with  expense  24 

borough  expressed  road  district  not  affected  24 

motor  power  companies  expressed  doubt  as  to 

leasing  passenger  railways  25 

cities  expressed  annexation  covered  25 

taxes  in  boroughs  and  townships  expressed 

county  taxes  covered  25 


350 


INDEX. 


PAGE 


RES  INTER  ALIOS  PRINCIPLE— Continued. 

boroughs  and  townships  expressed  county  not 

affected  27 

deputy  coroners  expressed  county  not  charge- 
able with  salaries  27 

regulation  of  licenses  expressed  treasurer’s  fee 

not  taken  away  27 

regulation  of  the  poor  expressed  county  not 

chargeable  28 

city  expressed  county  not  chargeable  with 

bridge  28 

a township  being  specified  another  township 

not  affected  29 

borough  being  specified  county  not  chargeable  29 

RETROACTIVE. 

act  is  general  though  not  retroactive  116 

see  Construction. 

REVIVAL  BY  REPEAL 

not  within  Article  III,  Section  6 67 

local  act  not  revived  by  repeal  of  repealing  act  68 


ROAD  DISTRICTS. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

SALARIES. 

see  Classification. 
see  Counties. 
see  Transition. 

SALE. 

title  specifying  may  cover  gift  20 

SCHOOL  DISTRICTS. 

regulation  of  school  affairs  in  cities  of  certain 

class  invalid  257,  258,  259,  260,  261 

SCIRE  FACIAS. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Judicial  Matters. 
see  Liens. 


INDEX. 


351 


PAGE 

SELF-SUSTAINING. 

enactments  must  be  61 

SEWERS  AND  DRAINS, 
see  Germane. 
see  Municipal  Affairs. 

SPECIAL  LAW. 


defined  and  illustrated  98 

definition  of  not  changed  by  Constitution  129 

SPECIAL  PRIVILEGES  AND  IMMUNITIES. 

special  rights  of  action  in  certain  officers  in- 
valid 281 

special  provisions  as  to  actions  for  wages  of 

manual  labor  doubtful  282 

special  provisions  for  action  by  veterans  invalid  282 

special  school  privileges  to  children  of  soldiers 

invalid  282 


see  Judicial  Matters. 

SPECIAL  PROVISIONS. 

necessary  to  render  general  law  effective  proper  117 

STREET  PASSENGER  RAILWAY  COMPANIES, 
see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 
see  Cities. 

see  Private  Corporations. 

STREETS. 

see  Subject. 
see  Germane. 
see  Cities. 
see  Highways. 
see  Municipal  Affairs. 

SUBJECT. 

unity  of 

county  and  county  seat 
streets  and  assessments 


11,29,  30 

29 

30 


352 


INDEX. 


PAGE 


SUBJECT — Continued. 

details  of  subject  30 

corollary  of  subject  30 

cognate  matters  30 

change  of  classification  and  result  as  to  officers  31 
of  title  and  object  of  act  31 

what  included  with  regulation  of  highways,  etc.  31 

protection  of  livery  stable-keepers  32 

protection  of  miners  23 

divers  classes  of  cities  32 

cities  and  school  districts  33 

divers  streets  (special  act)  33 

appeals  wages  of  manual  labor  33 


see  Two  Subjects. 
see  Appropriation  Bill. 

SUMMARY  CONVICTIONS, 
see  Germane. 

SUPPLEMENTS. 

not  usually  within  Article  III,  Section  6 65 

by  way  of  extension  are  66 

may  adopt  remedies  by  reference  72 

see  Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements 
see  Original  Acts  and  Specific  Supplements 


TAXATION. 

provisions  relating  to  91,  269 

though  an  affair  of  sovereignty  is  also  a local 

affair  105,  no 

general  statute  may  save  special  tax  laws  114 

alien  tax  law  invalid  129 

classification  of  subjects  of  taxation  129,  130,  137 
municipal  taxation  proper  subject  for  muni- 
cipal class  legislation  181.  186,  250,  270 

and  so  of  assessments  for  benefits  181 

confusion  of  local  classification  invalid  187 

assessments  depend  on  taxing  power  195 

curative  statutes  valid  226 


INDEX. 


353 


PAGE 


TAXATION— Continued. 

prior  local  tax  laws  yield  to  general  where  a 

city  enters  a class  232,  233 

taxation  of  official  fees,  counties  under  150,000  241 

provision  for  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs 

proper  256, 270 

and  so  in  townships  257,  270 

act  requiring  levy  of  tax  for  certain  purpose 

in  certain  township  invalid  269 

authorizing  appeals  except  in  certain  counties 

invalid  270 

taxation  for  benefits  in  class  of  cities  invalid  270 

municipal  taxation  a municipal  subject  270 

taxation  fees  of  officers  counties  less  than 

1 50,000  270 

direct  inheritance  tax  of  doubtful  validity  276 

classification  of  real  estate  for  taxation  valid  271 

election  of  assessors  in  boroughs  and  town- 
ships valid  272 

system  of  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 

townships  valid  273,  274,  275 


see  Liens. 
see  Cities. 

see  Municipal  Affairs. 
see  Classification. 

TAXES. 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 
see  Germane. 

TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


constitutional  provisions  relating  to  1 

the  constitutional  provisions'  are  mandatory  5 

title  is  part  of  the  act  6 

was  not  so  formerly  6 

roll  is  conclusive  evidence  of  title  7 

effect  of  legislative  marks  on  7 

must  title  accompany  bill  through  the  legis- 
lature? 8,9,10 


354 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY— Continued. 

Purpose  of  Provision  as  to  Title  10 

log  rolling  prevented  io 

omnibus  legislation  prevented  n 

Clearness  of  Title  Required  ii 

title  not  aided  by  inference  of  knowledge  of 
matters  dehors  the  language  used  12 

must  be  self-sufficient  14 

Measures  Scope  of  Act  14 

Construction  of  Provisions  Relating  to 

Titles  12 

legislative  usage  recognized  12 

construction  generally  13 

quotation  marks  in  title  13 

maxim  ut  res  magis  valeat  applies  13 

maxim  expressio  unius  applies  13,  46 

only  that  portion  of  act  fails  which  is  not  cov- 
ered by  the  title  15 

title  is  not  an  index  17,  19 

must  give  fair  notice  18 

must  reasonably  lead  to  inquiry  19 

must  be  sufficiently  specific  19 

must  not  be  so  general  as  to  mislead  19 

general  title  to  incorporate  may  probably  carry 

power  of  eminent  domain  20 

may  not  affect  status  of  navigable  stream  19 

general  title  cannot  relieve  from  liability  to  re- 
pair streets  20 

nor  reduce  rate  of  taxation  20 

sale  may  include  gift  20 

Inconsistency  Between  Title  and  Act  21 

not  permissible  21 

inconsistent  proviso  void  21 

acknowledgments  not  covered  where  title  re- 
lates to  records  21 

title  relating  to  leaseholds  act  to  property  upon 

them  22 

lottery  gifts  does  not  govern  gifts  22 


INDEX. 


355 


PAGE 

TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY— Continued. 

protection  of  miners  suggest  safety  not  crim- 
inal liability  23 

inconsistency  in  proviso  52,  54 

Res  Inter  Alios  Principle  as  Relating  to 
Titles  23 

leasehold  expressed  cannot  affect  freehold  23 

one  city  and  county  expressed  cannot  affect 

another  23 

city  expressed  townships  cannot  be  affected  23 

borough  expressed  county  cannot  be  affected  23,  24 
incorporation  expressed  navigable  stream  can- 
not be  affected  24 

county  lines  expressed  borough  and  township 

not  affected  24 

county  controllers  expressed  county  auditors 

not  affected  24 

perfecting  records  expressed  county  not 

chargeable  with  expense  24 

borough  expressed  road  district  not  affected  24 

motor  power  companies  expressed  doubt  as  to 

leasing  passenger  railways  25 

cities  expressed  annexation  covered  25 

taxes  in  boroughs  and  townships  expressed 

county  taxes  covered  25 

boroughs  and  townships  expressed  county  not 

affected  27 

deputy  coroners  expressed  county  not  charge- 
able with  salaries  27 

regulation  of  licenses  expressed  treasurer’s  fee 

not  taken  away  27 

city  expressed  county  not  chargeable  with 

bridge  28 

a township  being  specified  another  township 

not  affected  29 

borough  being  specified  county  not  chargeable  29 
Unity  of  Subject  i i,  29,  30 

county  and  county  seat  29 


INDEX. 


356 


PAGE 


TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY— Continued. 

streets  and  assessments  30 

Details  of  Subject  30 

corollary  of  subject  30 

cognate  matters  30 

change  of  classification  and  result  as  to  officers  31 
of  title  and  object  of  act  31 

what  included  with  regulation  of  highways,  etc.  31 
protection  of  livery  stable-keepers  32 

protection  of  miners  23 

divers  classes  of  cities  32 

cities  and  school  districts  33 

divers  streets  (special  act)  33 

Provisions  of  Act  Must  be  Germane  to  the 

Subject  as  Expressed  in  the  Title  34 

what  germane  means  ' 34 

county  seat  and  county  boundary  34 

assessments  and  streets  34 

court  clerk  and  grand  jury  34 

persons  and  parties  34 

sewers  and  drains  and  charges  for  use  34 

public  buildings  and  public  square  34 

borrowing  money  and  constructing  bridges  34 

borough  and  town  plans  and  surveys  34 

city  controller  designed  county  officer  in  salary 

act  34 

Brooks  law  34 

costs  and  taxes  and  water  rents  34 

city  officers  and  change  of  class  34 

taxing  dogs  and  declaring  them  property  35 

release  of  husband’s  claim  action  by  husband 

and  wife  35 

annexation  and  incorporation  35 

elections  of  public  officers  and  to  increase  debt  36 
wholesalers  and  brewers  and  distillers  37 

enabling  act  containing  a disabling  clause  37 

summary  convictions  and  penalties  38 

street  railways  on  rural  roads  38 


index.  357 

PAGE 

TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY— Continued. 

borough  improvement  and  sewers  and  pave- 
ments 38 

elective  tax  in  general  tax  law  ( 38 

taxation  and  appropriation  38 

fruits  et  cetera  may  include  trees  39 

executions  39 

adoption  and  collateral  inheritance  tax  exemp- 
tion 39 

Two  Subjects  40 

prohibiting  licenses  and  including  legalized 

liquor  selling  40 

enactment  and  repeal  40 

highways  and  novel  mode  of  assessment  41 

multiplicity  40, 41 

general  appropriation  bill  may  incidentally 

create  an  office  53 

Original  Acts  and  General  Supplements  and 
Amendments  42 

identification  of  original  sufficient  42,  43,  44 

general  supplement  may  include  what  original 

title  might  have  included  42,  43,  44 

apparently  erroneous  recital  not  fatal  43 

when  general  title  and  supplement  insufficient  43,  46 
when  sufficient  43,  47 

general  amendment  sufficient  44 

generality  in  license  law  46 

error  in  recital  47 

Original  Acts  and  Specific  Supplements  and 
Amendments  47 

maxim  expressio  tinius  applies  47 

fish  and  game  47 

destructive  animals  specified  and  not  specified  48 

Repeal  and  Re-Enactment  48 

when  repeal  need  not  be  specified  in  title  48,  51 

when  repeal  must  be  specified  48,  49,  50,  51 

re-enactment  not  noticing  intervening  repeal  49 

Provisos,  Exceptions,  and  Exemptions  52 


358 


INDEX. 


PAGE 

TITLES  OF  ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY— Continued. 

inconsistent  proviso  void  52,  53 

amendment  by  proviso  52 

exception  need  not  be  specified  in  title  53 

exemption  need  not  be  specified  in  title  53 

Appropriation  Bills  53 

general  may  incidentally  create  an  office  53 

TOWNSHIPS. 

act  relating  to  a certain  township  invalid  257 

regulating  collection  of  taxes  in  boroughs  and 

townships  valid  257 

enabling  taxpayers  to  contract  for  making 

roads  in  townships  valid  257 

see  Res  Inter  Alios  Principle. 

TRANSITION. 

Luzerne  Co.  subject  to  Act  of  1876  148 

fee  system  restored  on  division  of  county  148 

census  the  test  of  population  149 

salary  system  restored  in  Luzerne  County  in 

1890  150 

Schuylkill  became  subject  to  in  1890  150 

special  statutory  provisions  for  transition  1 5 1 

transition  of  city  151 

effect  of  .151 

works  only  necessary  change  to  adjust  to  class  151 
office  and  officers  remain  as  before,  save  as 

affected  by  new  provisions  152 

general  laws  relating  to  the  class  prevail  over 

special  formerly  applicable  153 

for  example,  general  system  of  taxation  super- 
sedes former  special  system  155 

see  Classification. 

TWO  SUBJECTS. 

prohibiting  licenses  and  including  legalized 

liquor  selling  40 

enactment  and  repeal  40 


INDEX. 


359 


PAGE 

TWO  SUBJECTS— Continued. 

highways  and  novel  mode  of  assessment  41 

multiplicity  40, 41 

general  appropriation  bill  may  incidentally 

create  an  office  53 

UNITY  OF  SUBJECT. 

what  is  11 

see  Subject. 

UT  RES  MAGIS  VALEAT  QUAM  PEREAT. 

maxim  applies  to  titles  12 


VALIDITY  OF  THINGS  EXECUTED  UNDER  IN- 
VALID ACTS  OF  ASSEMBLY. 


rule  as  to  acts  done  under  color  of  authority  217 

rule  as  to  officers  de  facto  217 

distinction  between  personal  immunity  and 

creation  of  rights  under  invalid  laws  218 

immunity  of  officer  extends  to  person  acting 

under  his  direction  218 

rule  as  to  dc  facto  streets  and  highways  219 


VETERANS. 

see  Counties. 

see  Judicial  Matters. 

see  Partial  Repeal  of  General  Law. 

VOID  IN  PART. 

only  that  portion  of  act  fails  which  is  not  cov- 
ered by  the  title  15 

see  Acts  of  Assembly  Void  in  Part. 

WAGES. 

of  manual  labor 
see  Subject. 

see  Special  Privileges  and  Immunities. 


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